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SUMMARY  
It has been stated multiple times that the European Court of Human Rights has become a victim 
of its own success. In the last two decades, it has been flooded with a constant stream of 
incoming petitions, ultimately impeding on its efficient functioning. The pilot judgment 
procedure was created for and by the European Court of Human Rights to try to manage this 
historic backlog. The Court had noticed that a large portion of its backlog consisted of repetitive 
cases which had their origins in systemic or structural issues in some of the Member States of 
the Council of Europe. The pilot judgment procedure was created by the Court in 2004 to tackle 
just these kinds of cases. When reduced to its very core, the pilot judgment procedure can be 
described as a procedure whereby an individual case or a combination of cases, classified by 
the Court under priority treatment, is used to diagnose a structural problem in the respondent 
State and gives instructions to that State as to how to remedy the issue. In the ideal scenario, 
the other similar cases are generally kept pending, awaiting their repatriation after the home 
State has set up an effective domestic remedy in execution of this pilot judgment. These 
applicants are thus barred from accessing the Court.  
This research centres around four main research questions. First, this thesis questions how the 
pilot judgment procedure works in practice. The procedure was created out of practice, leaving 
a lot of uncertainty concerning how it works in reality. Second, the research looks at the pilot 
judgment procedure from the viewpoint of the Court itself and investigates whether it is 
procedurally efficient. Third, the perspective of the applicants is taken into account whereby 
the focus is laid on the question whether the procedure hinders their right to access to justice. 
Last, the fourth research question wants to combine all of these insights and asks how the 
procedure can be made procedurally efficient while also accessible to the applicants.  
The dissertation is divided into six major parts. The first part introduced the research and 
sketches the theoretic framework within which it has taken place. The second part maps the 
complexity of the pilot judgment procedure: what is this procedure; which cases does it pertain 
to; where does it originate from; what is its role in the institutional design of the Council of 
Europe and to what has it evolved now? The third part looks into procedural efficiency and 
explains how the procedure works in terms of the efficiency parameters of case-load, 
simplicity/complexity of the underlying issue, productivity, length of proceedings and 
clearance rate. The fourth part then evaluates the pilot judgment procedure in the light of access 
to justice based on the following criteria: access to legal representation, access to clear legal 
information, access to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, the use of fair procedures and 
due process - including concepts of procedural justice - and the use of appropriate case 
management tools. The fifth part focusses on the influence of the pilot judgment procedure on 
the level of execution of pilot cases. The sixth and last part then comes to a conclusion on the 
four main research questions.  
This thesis concludes with four main points. First, it poses that the pilot judgment procedure 
has grown out of its infancy and has entered a new phase of consolidation. What this phase 
looks like is further enumerated in the thesis. Second, this dissertation clarifies that the 
procedure is indeed efficient under certain circumstances: State cooperation is a necessary 
condition, the Court should refrain from indicating complex general measures and should take 
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some measures in order to preclude the perverse effect of the pilot judgment procedure of 
attracting more similar cases. Third, this thesis concludes that the pilot judgment procedure 
lacks accessibility and proposes that the Court improves access to clear legal information, only 
allows friendly settlements and unilateral declaration when the State cooperates, draws 
inspiration from the certification stage of the class action procedure, considers founding a 
specialised division within the Court’s Registry and creates the possibility to argue 
differentiation for the applicants in the similar pending cases. Last, this dissertation ends with 




Reeds meermaals is gesteld dat het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens het slachtoffer 
geworden is van haar eigen succes. De voorbije twee decennia werd het namelijk overspoeld 
door een continue stroom van verzoeken, wat uiteindelijk zijn tol eist op haar functioneren. De 
pilootarrest procedure werd in het leven geroepen door het Hof met de bedoeling deze 
historische achterstand weg te werken. Het Hof had namelijk opgemerkt dat een groot deel van 
deze achterstand namelijk bestond uit repetitieve zaken die hun oorsprong hadden in 
systemische of structurele problemen in bepaalde van de Lidstaten van de Raad van Europa. De 
pilootarrest procedure werd gecreëerd door het Hof in 2004 voor net dit soort zaken. Kort 
samengevat kan de pilootarrest procedure beschreven worden als een procedure waarbij een 
individuele zaak of een combinatie van individuele zaken, geclassificeerd door het Hof onder 
prioritaire zaken, gebruikt wordt om een structureel probleem in een betrokken staat vast te 
stellen en zodoende instructies te verlenen aan die staat over hoe dat probleem kan aangepakt 
worden. In een ideaal scenario worden de andere hangende zaken hangende gehouden tot 
wanneer de staat de algemene maatregelen opgelegd door het Hof in het pilootarrest heeft 
uitgevoerd. Daarna worden deze hangende zaken dan teruggestuurd naar het nationale 
rechtssysteem om daar opgelost te worden. Deze verzoekers worden dus de toegang tot het Hof 
ontzegd.  
Dit doctoraatsonderzoek gaat in op vier onderzoeksvragen. Ten eerste wordt onderzocht hoe de 
pilootarrest procedure werkt in de praktijk. Aangezien de procedure ontstaan is uit de praktijk, 
heerst er nog onzekerheid rond wat het is en hoe het werkt. Ten tweede bekijkt deze thesis de 
pilootarrest procedure vanuit het standpunt van het Hof zelf en vraag het zich af of de procedure 
wel efficiënt is. Ten derde wordt ook het standpunt van de verzoekers ingenomen. De focus 
wordt hier gelegd op de vraag of de procedure het recht op toegang tot de rechter verhindert. 
Tenslotte brengt dit doctoraatsonderzoek al deze inzichten samen en vraagt het zich af of de 
procedure zowel procedureel efficiënt als toegankelijk kan gemaakt worden.  
Deze dissertatie bestaat uit zes delen. Het eerste deel introduceert het onderzoek en schetst het 
theoretisch kaderwerk waarbinnen het onderzoek heeft plaatsgevonden. Het tweede deel brengt 
de complexiteit van de pilootarrest procedure in kaart: wat is het, op welke zaken heeft het 
betrekking, waaruit is het ontstaan, wat is de rol van de procedure in het institutioneel raamwerk 
van de Raad van Europa en tot wat is het geëvolueerd? Het derde deel gaat dan dieper in op 
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procedurele efficiëntie en legt uit hoe de procedure werkt in de context van een aantal 
efficiëntieparameters: case-load, eenvoud/complexiteit van het onderliggend probleem, 
productiviteit, duur van de procedure en clearance rate. Het vierde deel evalueert de pilootarrest 
procedure vervolgens in het licht van het recht op toegang tot de rechter, op basis van de 
volgende criteria: toegang tot vertegenwoordiging, toegang tot duidelijke juridische informatie, 
toegang tot mechanismen voor alternatieve geschillenbeslechting, het gebruik van eerlijke 
procedure en het recht op een eerlijk proces – met inbegrip van concepten van procedurele 
rechtvaardigheid – en het gebruik van geschikte casemanagementtools. Het vijfde deel legt zich 
toe op de invloed van de pilootarrest procedure op de graad van uitvoering van pilootzaken. Het 
zesde en laatste deel komt dan tot een conclusie en formuleert een antwoord op de vierde 
onderzoeksvraag.  
Deze thesis eindigt met vier centrale argumenten. Ten eerste wordt gesteld dat de pilootarrest 
procedure uit zijn kinderschoenen is gegroeid en een nieuwe geconsolideerde vorm heeft 
bereikt. Welke vorm dit is en hoe deze eruit ziet wordt verder uitgelegd in de conclusie van 
deze thesis. Ten tweede verduidelijkt deze dissertatie dat de procedure inderdaad efficiënt is 
onder bepaalde voorwaarden: de medewerking van de staat is een noodzakelijke voorwaarde, 
het Hof moet zich onthouden van complexe algemene maatregelen op te leggen en het moet 
maatregelen nemen om het perverse effect van de piloot arrest procedure, namelijk het 
aantrekken van meer soortgelijke zaken, tegen te gaan. Ten derde concludeert deze thesis dat 
de pilootarrest procedure toegankelijkheid mist en stelt voor dat het Hof de toegang tot 
duidelijke juridische informatie verbetert, enkel minnelijke schikkingen en eenzijdige 
verklaringen toestaat wanneer de betrokken staat medewerking verleent, dat het Hof inspiratie 
moet putten uit de certificatie fase uit de class action procedure, dat het Hof moet overwegen 
om een gespecialiseerde divisie op te richten binnen haar griffie en dat het de mogelijkheid 
moet creëren om differentiatie te beargumenteren voor de verzoekers van de gelijkaardige 
handende zaken. Ten slotte eindigt deze thesis met enkele suggesties voor verder onderzoek.  
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I. Introduction  
Polyana Valcheva, a member of the bar in Bulgaria tipped the local prosecutor in 2004 that her 
former spouse had committed possible documentary fraud. During the investigation, she was 
implicated herself and criminal proceedings were started against both of them. In 2010 she was 
finally acquitted. In that same year however, she turned to Strasbourg to complain of excessive 
length of proceedings.  Polyana Valcheva was instructed by the European Court of Human 
Rights in 2013 to re-submit her claim to a Bulgarian court after the State had set up new 
domestic remedies in execution of the pilot judgments of Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria 
and Finger v. Bulgaria. After struggling through almost ten years of proceedings – six years in 
Bulgaria and another four in Strasbourg – Mrs. Valcheva was obliged to start anew from the 
beginning.1  
İdris Aşan complained before the Court that the Turkish prison disciplinary board had destroyed 
one of his letters which was addressed to a newspaper on the grounds that it would stir up 
trouble because it allegedly contained false statements about the prison that might mislead 
public opinion. Mr. Aşan’s case was also found inadmissible and subsequently sent back to the 
domestic legal system. The Turkish State had set up a Compensation Commission in execution 
of the previous pilot judgment of Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey which was later made applicable 
to claims such as Mr. Aşan’s. Consequently, seven years after his letter was destroyed by the 
Turkish government, Mr. Aşan still had not been granted relief.2 
Dimitrov Atanasov and Aleksandar Atanasov Apostolov submitted in their applications of 
February and March 2017 before the Court that they were being detained in inhuman or 
degrading circumstances. The Court also found these applications inadmissible for non-
exhaustion of domestic remedies and sent the applicants back to the domestic system. The 
Bulgarian State had created a new preventive and compensatory domestic remedy after the pilot 
judgment of Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria.3  
At first glance, these persons do not seem to have anything in common. All of their applications 
however were declared inadmissible by the Strasbourg Court for non-exhaustion of domestic 
remedies after a previous pilot judgment. A pilot judgment is a procedure used by the Court 
when it is confronted with a systemic or structural problem in a country, which due to its nature 
brings with it a large group of victims. This procedure was created in 2004 in order to help the 
Court deal with large incoming groups of similar applications. It is meant to tackle the 
                                                 
 
1 ECtHR, decision, Valcheva and Abrashev v. Bulgaria, application nos. 6194/11 and 34887/11, 18 June 2013; 
ECtHR, Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, application nos. 48059/06 and 2708/09, 10 May 2011; ECtHR, 
Finger v. Bulgaria, application no. 37346/05, 10 May 2011;  A. BUYSE, “Flying or landing? The pilot judgment 
procedure in the changing European human rights architecture” in O.M. ARNARDÓTTIR, A. BUYSE, Shifting 
Centres of Gravity in Human Rights Protection. Rethinking relations between the ECHR, EU , and national legal 
orders, Routledge, 2016, 101.  
2 ECtHR, decision, Aşan v. Turkey, application no; 38453/09, 30 August 2016; ECtHR, Ümmühan Kaplan v. 
Turkey, application no. 24240/07, 20 March 2012.  
3 ECtHR, decision, Atanasov and Apostotolov v. Bulgaria, application nos. 65540/16 and 22368/17, 27 June 2017; 
ECtHR, Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria; application nos. 36925/10, 21487/12, 72893/12, 73196/12, 77718/12 and 
9717/13, 27 January 2015.  
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underlying problem while safeguarding the efficient functioning of the Court’s machinery. As 
the examples above show however, the use of the pilot judgment procedure can have quite 
frustrating and seemingly unfair results for the victims of these systemic human rights 
violations. It could thus be argued that the pilot judgment procedure puts pressure on the 
position of the applicants of these cases. The tension between the interests of the Court and the 
interests of the affected victims created by the pilot judgment procedure will be the central 
theme of this thesis. This thesis has the aim of discovering how both sets of interests are 
influenced by the use of the pilot judgment procedure. Through the discovery of the functioning 
in reality of the procedure, this thesis intends to formulate possibilities to improve the pilot 
judgment procedure from both the viewpoints of the Court and the applicants involved.  
A. The pilot judgment procedure: an introduction 
Before the design, methodology and structure of this dissertation can be outlined, the pilot 
judgment procedure must be introduced. To this end, this sub-chapter will offer a first glance 
at the procedure. It will discuss in broad terms why the procedure was created, how it works 
and what its consequences are for the applicants involved.  
1. Why was the pilot judgment procedure created?  
Put simply, the pilot judgment procedure was created as a means for the Court to try to manage 
its historic backlog. Generally, the Court’s caseload in the early 2000’s could be divided into 
two broad categories of cases: 1) unmeritorious cases; and 2) meritorious cases.4 With the 
creation of Protocol 14, the Court developed a strategy to do away with this first category of 
cases quickly and efficiently: the Single Judge procedure.5 In order to understand this, it is 
important to know that the Court performs its tasks in different formations: Single Judges, 
Committees of three judges, Chambers of seven judges and the Grand Chamber of seventeen 
judges.6 Generally speaking, these formations deal with cases in an increasing level of 
complexity. Single Judges have the competence to provide a simple ruling in clearly 
inadmissible cases using a fast-track procedure.7 These decisions, which are final, were 
originally not motivated at all. Recently, the Court decided to start motivating these decisions. 
Applicants whose cases are found inadmissible will receive a letter detailing the specific 
grounds of inadmissibility in their case.8 If there is a more thorough examination needed of the 
case at hand, the Single Judge will forward it to a Committee or to a Chamber, depending on 
the complexity of the case. Committees will be charged with the more simple cases. They have 
the competence to either rule a case inadmissible, or rule it admissible and render a judgment 
                                                 
 
4 The Right Honourable The Lord Woolf, Review of the Working Methods of the European Court of Human Rights, 
December 2005, 49. The early 2000’s here are taken as the relevant time-frame for broadly looking at the reason 
for creating the pilot judgment procedure. The procedure was first used in 2004 and came about in the context of 
reforms at the Court, a process which roughly started in these early 2000’s. These reforms will be discussed more 
in-depth further on.  
5 Article 7 of Protocol 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
amending the control system of the Convention, Council of Europe Treaty Series – No. 194, 13 May 2004. 
6 The Court consists of 47 judges but there is a rotation system.  
7 Article 27 ECHR.  
8 European Court of Human Rights Press Release, Launch of new system for Single Judge decisions with more 
detailed reasoning, ECHR 180 (2017), 1 June 2017.  
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on the merits at the same time if the issue at hand is well-known at the court and is thus subject 
to well-established case law. This procedure is called the Well-Established Case law or WECL 
procedure.9 The Chamber then receives the more interesting and complex cases on which there 
is no established case law yet.10 The Grand Chamber is tasked with deciding on cases which 
raise a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention, or a serious 
issue of general importance.11 After a judgment rendered by a Chamber, the parties can further 
refer it to the Grand Chamber if they are not satisfied with the solution offered. If the case raises 
a serious question concerning the interpretation of the Convention, the Grand Chamber may 
accept this referral and examine the case again.12  
The pilot judgment procedure is a strategy which was created in order to tackle the backlog in 
the second category of meritorious cases. The Court had noticed that within this group of cases, 
a lot of its caseload consisted of repetitive cases.13 These repetitive cases either involved issues 
on which the Court had already found a violation with respect to a certain Member State, or 
they represent a wide-spread systemic issue in a Member State leading to multiple similar 
complaints submitted to the Court. Handling all of these cases separately was deemed to be 
time-consuming and inefficient. Consequently, the Court decided to entertain these cases 
simultaneously, through the pilot judgment procedure. A pilot case can either be pronounced 
by a Chamber or the Grand Chamber, again depending on the complexity of the human rights 
issue at play.14 After a pilot case, similar pending cases – if not sent back to the domestic system 
– can be handled through the WECL procedure at the Committees.  
2. How does the procedure work? Case study of the Broniowski case  
In the classic scenario, the Court will decide to use the procedure when it is confronted with an 
inflow of cases which stem from the same systemic issue in one of its States parties. The perfect 
example here is the first pilot case of Broniowski v. Poland, rendered by the Court in 2004. This 
case was concerned with violations of the right to property of the Bug River people by the 
Polish State. The issue stemmed from the redrawing of the borders of Poland after the Second 
World War. Poland was to give a part of its territory which was situated beyond the Bug River 
to Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus. The properties were seized by the USSR from the local 
bourgeoisie, which was Polish and handed over to the peasant population, which consisted of 
Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Belarusians. In return, Poland received a part of German territory. 
The Polish citizens once living beyond the Bug river  - it is estimated that this were 1 240 000 
                                                 
 
9 Article 28 ECHR; the concept of Well-Established Case law will further be explained more thoroughly on page 
103.   
10 Article 29 ECHR.  
11 Articles 31 and 43 (2) ECHR.  
12 Article 43 ECHR. Chambers can also relinquish jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber when the cases raises a 
serious question affecting the interpretation of the Convention or where the resolution of the question involved 
might have a result inconsistent with a judgment previously delivered by the Court, conform article 30 ECHR.  
13 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention, Council of Europe Treaty Series – 
No. 194, 13 May 2004, § 7.  
14 Whether a pilot case was dealt with by a Chamber or the Grand Chamber is indicated in the Chart in Annex 5 
on page 219.  
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persons - were then repatriated to Poland and partly relocated to this territory which had before 
belonged to Germany. The Polish State agreed to provide a remedy: alternative land and 
compensation for all people who had their territory seized beyond the Bug River. However, 
there wasn’t enough land in this former part of Germany so that successive Polish governments 
kept re-enacting this legislation, promising compensation for the Bug River people without 
being  able to act on that promise. Since there were not enough plots in this former German 
territory, the Polish law had further given the Bug River people a statutory right to obtain 
compensation through an administrative scheme of bidding for government real property at 
public auctions: a right to credit rather than a directly enforceable right to financial 
compensation. Through an administrative decision however, these public lands were never put 
up for sale. Instead, these public lands were transferred to the local authorities who were not 
covered by the bidding option, leaving only forest and army land in the hands of the central 
government. Forest and army land however were mostly excluded from the right to credit. 
Consequently, this right to credit was an empty promise by the Polish State so that these 
relocated Polish citizens in reality had never been compensated for the loss of their lands.15 The 
Court thus saw these cases coming in and noticed that they had a root in the same issue: this 
chain of administrative decisions which had barred the applicants from claiming compensation 
for their loss.  
The Court then decided to pick one case, the case of Mr. Broniowski, as an example or ‘pilot’ 
case. Mr. Broniowski’s grandmother was one of the Bug River claimants who were relocated 
after the Second World War. His family was compensated with a plot of land. However, it was 
estimated that the value of the land was only 2% of the land originally held beyond the Bug 
River.16 At that moment, there were an estimated 80 000 persons left whose families still were 
not compensated for the loss of their land after the redrawing of Poland’s borders.17 The other 
cases stemming from the same issue were kept pending for the duration of the procedure in the 
Broniowski case. Normally, the Court can only decide on the issue at hand with respect to the 
specific applicant in the case. In this first pilot case however, the Court diagnosed the 
underlying problem, explained how the State could remedy the issue and subsequently included 
the obligation for the State to tackle the underlying problem in the operative part of the 
judgment. This means that remedying the issue in the specific way explained by the Court had 
become a binding obligation on the State. This in itself was novel in the Court’s case law and 
is still contested.18 What is important to know is that this ‘Broniowski template’ was afterwards 
used for other situations as well and had thus become a part of the Court’s procedure. It was 
                                                 
 
15 Interview anonymous II; R. DEGENER, P. MAHONEY, “The Prospects for a test case procedure in the European 
Court of Human Rights” in D. PLAS, M. PUÉCHAVY, Trente ans de droit européen des droits de l’homme. Etudes 
à la mémoire de Wolfgang Strasser, Anthemis, 2008, 175-177.  
16 R. DEGENER, P. MAHONEY, “The Prospects for a test case procedure in the European Court of Human Rights” 
in D. PLAS, M. PUÉCHAVY, Trente ans de droit européen des droits de l’homme. Etudes à la mémoire de Wolfgang 
Strasser, Anthemis, 2008, 175-176. 
17 R. DEGENER, P. MAHONEY, “The Prospects for a test case procedure in the European Court of Human Rights” 
in D. PLAS, M. PUÉCHAVY, Trente ans de droit européen des droits de l’homme. Etudes à la mémoire de Wolfgang 
Strasser, Anthemis, 2008, 177; ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland, application no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, § 162.  
18 the reason why is explained in the part of this dissertation concerning the division of competences between the 
Court and the Committee of Ministers on page 87.  
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later termed the pilot judgment procedure and was further codified in 2010 in the Rules of 
Court.  
3.  The fate of the follow-up cases  
Mr. Broniowski was not the only applicant addressing the Court with a claim based on the 
systemic issue in Poland. Others had come to the Court as well, and it was foreseen that there 
were a large group of potential applicants in Poland who could virtually also turn to Strasbourg. 
The group of duped persons was thus large, consisting of both applicants who had already 
submitted their claims before the Court and potential applicants who did not (yet) do so. With 
respect to the group of cases already pending at the Court, the ‘Broniowski template’ signifies 
that they will be adjourned until the Court has rendered its decision in the pilot case. Generally, 
these cases which are kept pending can be dealt with through several avenues:  
1. The ideal scenario for the Court is that they are sent back to the domestic system. This 
can however only happen when the State has a) actually solved the underlying 
problem;19 b) has put in place a domestic remedy for all persons in the same position to 
complain about this problem in the domestic courts and; c) has made this domestic 
remedy retroactively applicable so that the applicants who had already come to the 
European Court can in reality use this new domestic remedy to submit their complaint 
before the national courts. Their applications will then be found inadmissible for non-
exhaustion of domestic remedies; or 
2. The Court can also decide to allow the State to settle the other pending cases, through a 
friendly settlement or a unilateral declaration. This is the option normally when the State 
did put up a solution to the issue nationally, but it did not make the remedy retroactively 
available to the applicants of the pending cases. It is important to mention here that the 
Court will only allow friendly settlements and unilateral declarations in pilot cases when 
the State not only includes a solution with respect to the specific applicant involved in 
the friendly settlement or unilateral declaration procedure, but also presents a solution 
for the wider underlying issue. The Court must thus be sure that the issue will not again 
appear on its list of cases.  
3. If a State does not solve the underlying issue, the Court can decide to handle all of the 
other similar cases through the WECL-procedure. This is the Well-Established Case 
Law procedure, which, simply stated, means that these will be dealt with by a 
Committee of Three Judges through a simplified, fast-track procedure. This Committee 
has the capacity to decide on the admissibility and the merits of a case in one go. 
Important here is that they only decide on cases which do not raise novel legal issues. 
They can thus simply apply ‘well-established case law’. This is the worst case scenario, 
because it means that the underlying issue is still there and continues to present a 
                                                 
 
19 As will be discussed below starting from page 87 however, the Court has developed a practice whereby it strikes 
such similar cases out of its list when it has found that the domestic remedy set up in execution of the pilot judgment 
is appropriate. The underlying issues must thus not necessarily be solved, as long as the applicants can direct their 
complaints to the newly set-up domestic remedy, instead of the Court.  
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problem for the Court’s caseload. The underlying problem remains, which is detrimental 
both  to the applicants of the cases already at the Court, as well as to other potential 
future victims subject to the involved Member State.    
In the first and the second scenario, the Court will normally let one other case get through. This 
will be a case coming after the pilot, from an applicant who already had the chance of ‘testing’ 
the new remedy or the solution in the home state. This second case will then be used by the 
Court to see if the remedy set up after the pilot judgment is an effective one. These follow-up 
decisions thus serve as a control mechanism for the Court.  
This is a rough outline of the classic example of a pilot judgment case. As will be described 
below, the practice has shown to not always fit into this ‘Broniowski template’. The Court has 
treated such cases which show a systemic issue in a given country differently in certain 
instances. The varying  practice of the pilot procedure will be detailed below in “Genealogy of 
a pilot – a continuum”.  
B. Relevance and design of the research  
1. Critique on the pilot judgment procedure  
The pilot judgment procedure has emerged from practice. It was not codified before it was first 
used by the Court in the Broniowski case. Moreover, it does not seem to be the product of the 
usual political process needed to amend the Convention. Therefore, there was no detailed 
description of its design and purpose before it was first used. Consequently, it has already been 
thoroughly discussed in the literature in an attempt to understand the phenomenon better. These 
commentaries have however predominantly concentrated on the case law and later on its 
codified version in Rule 61.20  
                                                 
 
20 Rule 61 is included in annex 10 to this thesis on page 236. Among others, see: V. ZAGREBELSKY, “Violations 
structurelles et jurisprudence de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme”, La Nouvelle Procédure devant la 
Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme après le Protocole N° 14 , Colloquium, Ferrara, April 2005 ; L. 
WILHABER, “Pilot Judgments in Cases of Structural or Systemic Problems on the National Level” in R. WOLFRUM, 
U. DEUTSCH, The European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and Possible 
Solutions, International Workshop, Heidelberg, December 2007; R. DEGENER, P. MAHONEY, “The Prospects for a 
test case procedure in the European Court of Human Rights” in D. PLAS, M. PUÉCHAVY, Trente ans de droit 
européen des droits de l’homme. Etudes à la mémoire de Wolfgang Strasser, Anthemis, 2008; N. FRANGAKIS, 
“Systemic Human Rights Violations in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights”, Nomika Vima 
(Greek Law Journal), 2009; D. T. BJÖRGVINSSON, “The “Pilot-Judgment” Procedure of the European Court of 
Human Rights” in G. ALFREDSSON, J. GRIMHEDEN, B. G. RAMCHARAN, A. DE ZAYAS, International Human Rights 
Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009; P. LEACH, H. 
HARDMAN, S. STEPHENSON, B.K. BLITZ, Responding to Systemic Human Rights Violations. An Analysis of ‘Pilot 
Judgments’ of the European Court of Human Rights and their Impact at National Level, Intersentia, 2010; A. 
BUYSE, “ The Pilot Judgment Procedure at the European Court of Human Rights: Possibilities and Challenges”, 
Nomiko Vima (Greek Law Journal): European Court of Human Rights - 50 Years, 2010; M. SUSI, “The Definition 
of a ‘Structural Problem’ in the Case law of the European Court of Human Rights Since 2010”, German Yearbook 
of International Law, 2012; M. FYRNYS, “Expanding Competences by Judicial Lawmaking: the Pilot Judgment 
Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights” in A. VON BOGDANDY, I. VENZKE, International Judicial 
Lawmaking – On Public Authority and Democratic Legitimation in Global Governance, Springer, 2012; S. 
QUESADA, “La genèse de l’arrêt pilote : Maria Athanasiu et autres contre Roumanie“ in A. ALMǍŞAN (ed.), In 
honorem Corneliu Bîrsan, Editura Hamangiu, 2013; C. DUBOIS, E. PENNINCKX, La procédure devant la Cour 
européenne des Droits de l’Homme et le Comité des Ministres, Wolters Kluwer, 2016; A. BUYSE, “Flying or 
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There is one instance of empirical research undertaken partly with respect to pilot judgments. 
Glas has conducted empirical research on pilots in the context of her doctoral thesis concerning 
procedural dialogue in the European Convention on Human Rights. Here, the pilot judgment 
procedure is used as an example of dialogic potential between States, the Court and the 
Committee of Ministers. The research however is not concerned with how the procedure works 
in practice and whether it is indeed efficient. It further does not include the perspective of the 
real and potential applicants.21 Glas further conducted research concerning the functioning of 
the pilot judgment procedure in practice based on an analysis of the case law and the appropriate 
Convention articles and Rules.22 Until now, there is no thorough investigation of how the 
procedure works from the inside and whether it is efficient in practice, based on qualitative 
empirical data. 
The literature has further also criticized the pilot judgment procedure for hindering one of the 
core principles of the European Human Rights System: the right to individual petition as 
safeguarded in article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights.23 As will be argued 
below, this right to individual petition can be seen as the equivalent of the right to access to 
justice before the European Court of Human Rights.24 Looking at the procedure already from 
afar, it can be questioned how the right to access to justice of the applicants of the cases which 
are not chosen as the pilot cases comes into play. With respect to the perspective of the 
applicants, there is again no existing research based on qualitative empirical data looking into 
how the procedure affect their rights and interests. As the procedure is largely developed 
through practice and is now growing out of its infancy,25 there is a need to uncover how it takes 
form in reality based on the experiences of the persons who have been directly involved with 
these cases. This doctoral research has the intention to help fill this research gap.  
                                                 
 
landing? The pilot judgment procedure in the changing European human rights architecture” in O.M. 
ARNARDÓTTIR, A. BUYSE, Shifting Centres of Gravity in Human Rights Protection. Rethinking relations between 
the ECHR, EU , and national legal orders, Routledge, 2016; DI MARCO, A., “L’état face aux arrêts pilotes de la 
Cour européenne des droits de l’homme ", 108 Revue Trimesterielle des droits de l’Homme, 2016 ; F. FAVUZZA, 
“Torreggiani and Prison Overcrowding in Italy”, Human Rights Law Review, 2017.  
21 L. GLAS, The Theory, Potential and Practice of Procedural Dialogue in the European Convention on Human 
Rights System, Intersentia, 2016, 243-254.  
22 L. GLAS, ‘The Functioning of the Pilot-Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights in Practice’ 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 1, 2016.  
23 Among others, see: A. BUYSE, “ The Pilot Judgment Procedure at the European Court of Human Rights: 
Possibilities and Challenges”, Nomiko Vima (Greek Law Journal): European Court of Human Rights - 50 Years, 
2010, 90; J.H. GERARDS AND L. R. GLAS, “Access to justice in the European Convention on Human Rights 
system”, Netherlands Quaterly of Human Rights, 2017, Vol. 35(1), 27; DI MARCO, A., “L’état face aux arrêts 
pilotes de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme ", 108 Revue Trimesterielle des droits de l’Homme, 2016, 
903; A. BUYSE, “Flying or landing? The pilot judgment procedure in the changing European human rights 
architecture” in O.M. ARNARDÓTTIR, A. BUYSE, Shifting Centres of Gravity in Human Rights Protection. 
Rethinking relations between the ECHR, EU , and national legal orders, Routledge, 2016, 106; M. FYRNYS, 
“Expanding Competences by Judicial Lawmaking: the Pilot Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human 
Rights” in A. VON BOGDANDY, I. VENZKE, International Judicial Lawmaking – On Public Authority and 
Democratic Legitimation in Global Governance, Springer, 2012, 361.  
24 For this argument see “The right to individual application as protected under article 34 of the ECHR.”on page 
141.  
25 This argument can be found in the conclusion starting from page 194.  
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2. The IAP Project  
a. The Human Rights Integration Project 
The doctoral research originates in an overarching research project entitled ‘The Global 
Challenge of Human Rights Integration: Towards a User’s Perspective’. It is funded by the 
Interuniversity Attraction Poles (IAP) Programme created by the Belgian Science Policy 
Office.26 The central goal of this project is to study the fragmented architecture of human rights 
law as an integrated approach from a user’s perspective.  
Within the confines of the IAP project, this research is situated within its work package 5. The 
package is meant to examine the procedural dimension of human rights integration in order to 
optimize access to international human rights mechanisms. Its focus is on reconciling the 
interests of international complaints mechanisms for an improved efficiency with the 
importance of optimal accessibility to them for their users. Particular attention is paid here to 
solutions and strategies developed within one system that could benefit others.27  
b. User’s perspective  
This doctoral research focusses mostly on the second prong of the overarching research project, 
it will primarily look at the pilot judgment procedure from a user’s perspective. In order to 
frame this research correctly, it is however important to explore what a user’s perspective 
entails.  
Adopting a user’s perspective shifts the analytical focus to the viewpoint of one or more users 
of human rights, in contrast to looking at a specific document or issue.28 This is what Desmet 
has labelled an empathic approach. It requires the researcher to adopt an insider’s perspective 
based on experience with the practice of human rights.29 Desmet identifies four characteristics 
of adopting this empathic user’s perspective. First, it will result in a context-specific exploration 
of a given human rights issue. Context is important to understand the evolutions and practical 
translation of a given legal norm.30 Second, looking at human rights from within will more 
directly uncover the complexities of the multi-layered human rights architecture. Resulting 
from the fragmented nature of human rights law, a user will be confronted with a multitude of 
sources applicable to his or her specific use of human rights.31 Third, the employment of a user’s 
perspective is based on a social-constructivist understanding of human rights. This entails that 
law in general, and human rights law specifically, is viewed as a living thing that is shaped and 
                                                 
 
26 See http://hrintegration.be.   
27 See http://hrintegration.be/work-package/optimizing-access-international-human-rights-mechanisms-ugent.  
28 E. DESMET, “Analysing Users’ Trajectories in Human Rights”, Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 
2014, 122.  
29 E. DESMET, “Analysing Users’ Trajectories in Human Rights”, Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 
2014, 124.  
30 E. DESMET, “Analysing Users’ Trajectories in Human Rights”, Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 
2014, 124.  
31 E. DESMET, “Analysing Users’ Trajectories in Human Rights”, Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 
2014, 124.  
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realized through its use.32 Lastly, and most importantly for this doctoral research, adopting a 
user’s perspective ultimately leads to questions about the effectiveness of human rights law as 
a system. When viewing human rights from the perspective of its users, it becomes clear that 
they are confronted with numerous challenges in realizing their rights.33 In this context, it may 
be important to point to the critique of Arendt on the idea of universal human rights. She argues 
that human rights are intrinsically linked to States that provide a space where rights can be 
claimed. When States do not create this space and ignore a primordial ‘right to have rights’, the 
persons who fall under these jurisdictions become in fact ‘rightless’.34 This undoubtedly leads 
to the realization that when it comes to human rights, we cannot just accept access to justice as 
a given.35 Consequently, research adopting a constructive user’s perspective, must pay special 
attention to the capabilities of these users, what they can actually do and be,36 and the difficulties 
they experience in exercising their rights.37 
Desmet has defined ‘human rights user’ as“ (…)any individual or composite entity who engages 
with (uses) human rights”.38 This definition reveals that the scope ratione personae, as well as 
ratione materiae is to be interpreted broadly. It does not only encompass human rights law but 
also the two other interrelated dimensions of values and good governance. This means that 
human rights law must be seen in an interrelated context of moral values and rule of law 
principles. As to the scope ratione personae, the definition includes individuals and any formal 
or informal composite entity. The perspective used here is thus inclusive. This however runs 
the possible risk of equalization, through which all users are considered similar, resulting in a 
lack of nuance. Therefore, in order to effectively employ this perspective, it is paramount that 
this inclusivity is approached in a differentiated manner.39 Based on the different ways in which 
human rights can be used, Desmet has identified four categories of human rights users.40 Direct 
users engage with human rights immediately, by invoking them – the applicants for instance -  
or giving effect to them – such as States. Indirect users come into contact with the use of human 
rights more distantly, by way of supporting or imposing the implementation of these rights.41 
Supporting users can for instance be human rights NGO’s who act as intermediaries in order to 
                                                 
 
32 E. DESMET, “Analysing Users’ Trajectories in Human Rights”, Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 
2014, 125.  
33 E. DESMET, “Analysing Users’ Trajectories in Human Rights”, Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 
2014, 125.  
34 H. ARENDT, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Harcourt, 1968, 296; M. BAUMGÄRTEL, “Unpacking a Concept for 
Human Rights Research”, Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 2014, 147.  
35 M. BAUMGÄRTEL, “Unpacking a Concept for Human Rights Research”, Human Rights & International Legal 
Discourse, 2014, 151.  
36 M. C. NUSSBAUM, “capabilities as fundamental entitlements: Sen and Social Justice”, Feminist Economics, 
2003, 33.  
37 M. BAUMGÄRTEL, “Unpacking a Concept for Human Rights Research”, Human Rights & International Legal 
Discourse, 2014, 143.  
38 E. DESMET, “Analysing Users’ Trajectories in Human Rights”, Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 
2014, 126.  
39 E. DESMET, “Analysing Users’ Trajectories in Human Rights”, Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 
2014, 127.  
40 E. DESMET, “Analysing Users’ Trajectories in Human Rights”, Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 
2014, 128-129.  
41 E. DESMET, “Analysing Users’ Trajectories in Human Rights”, Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 
2014, 129.  
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help victims vindicate their rights. Users imposing the implementation of human rights can be 
typified as judicial users, meaning the judges and Court staff analysing the rights claims brought 
to them by alleged victims.  
Employing a user’s perspective opens up a range of possibilities concerning the design of the 
research. It is possible to study a subject from a single, dual or multiple user’s perspective. This 
methodological choice will ultimately impact the nature of the findings.42 A wide, multiple 
user’s perspective will lead to a more balanced representation of the issue, while a single user’s 
perspective can provide a more in-depth analysis of one particular user of interest. When 
choosing to look into a category, it will also be important to concentrate on the diversity within 
the category. Otherwise, the researcher runs the risk of obscuring power, economic, cultural 
and social differences within one of these categories.43 Adopting a user’s perspective creates 
the opportunity of looking at the interaction of different users, who naturally approach a certain 
issue differently.44 Lastly, the research topic can be broadened to include the perspective of the 
potential user. They are in a position where they could use human rights but have not (yet) 
decided to do so.45  
Directing research towards these issues in turn raises questions concerning the capabilities of 
users and possible inhibiting factors.46 Here, the Arendtian critique on universal human rights 
can again be looked at.47 Taking this critique seriously, it is paramount that a user’s perspective 
also includes vulnerable individuals. A user’s perspective may however mitigate the Arendtian 
critique in that it can show under which circumstances and conditions marginalized groups and 
individuals may effectively mobilize human rights.48 Secondly, the user’s perspective 
framework can be studied from structuralist social theories which challenge the idea that users 
are autonomous agents, who act independently of their environment.49 Adopting a user’s 
perspective must thus be sensitive towards structural issues whose relevance depend on 
contextual elements, such as the user in question, the right studied, national/regional setting, 
and culture. Empirical research can help reveal if and how these structural issues play in a given 
context.50  
                                                 
 
42 E. DESMET, “Analysing Users’ Trajectories in Human Rights”, Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 
2014, 136.  
43 E. DESMET, “Analysing Users’ Trajectories in Human Rights”, Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 
2014, 137.  
44 E. DESMET, “Analysing Users’ Trajectories in Human Rights”, Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 
2014, 137.  
45 E. DESMET, “Analysing Users’ Trajectories in Human Rights”, Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 
2014, 137.  
46 E. DESMET, “Analysing Users’ Trajectories in Human Rights”, Human Rights & International Legal Discourse, 
2014, 138.  
47 M. BAUMGÄRTEL, “Unpacking a Concept for Human Rights Research”, Human Rights & International Legal 
Discourse, 2014, 147-151.  
48 E. BREMS and E. DESMET, “Studying Human Rights Law From The Perspective(s) of its Users”, Human Rights 
& International Legal Discourse, 2014, 112.  
49 M. BAUMGÄRTEL, “Unpacking a Concept for Human Rights Research”, Human Rights & International Legal 
Discourse, 2014, 151-156.  
50 M. BAUMGÄRTEL, “Unpacking a Concept for Human Rights Research”, Human Rights & International Legal 
Discourse, 2014, 156.  
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c. Work Package 5: Optimizing access to international human rights mechanisms  
The Human Rights Integration project was split up into seven work packages, divided among 
the different partners of the project. Work Package 5 was – among others - assigned to Ghent 
University and encompassed the following project description:  
“Work package 5 will examine the procedural dimensions of human rights integration, with 
a focus on international complaint procedures. While monitoring bodies such as the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission and Court on 
Human Rights are confronted with mounting or even huge amounts of incoming petitions, 
individual petitioners and in particular members of vulnerable groups still experience 
practical and legal obstacles hindering them to effectively pursue cases of alleged human 
rights violations. The research will formulate clear-cut and substantiated proposals 
reconciling optimal access with the need of procedural efficiency and an efficient 
management of incoming cases. Particular attention will be paid to examining to what 
extent solutions and strategies developed within one system (also beyond the regional 
mechanisms) may benefit another.”51 
The pilot judgment procedure was created in the context of the Court’s tackling of its historic 
backlog. One of the reasons for its conception was indeed procedural efficiency and one of the 
main criticism launched at the procedure is that it would weaken the position of the applicants 
in terms of their right to individual petition. This research firstly tries to evaluate the procedure 
in the light of these two presumptions: is the pilot judgment procedure indeed efficient and does 
it harm the applicants’ right to access to the Court? Secondly, based on this evaluation, this 
research will aim to formulate proposals to ameliorate the procedure with respect to the two 
normative goals of procedural efficiency and access to justice. The research thus fits well within 
work package 5.52  
d. The pilot judgment procedure in the context of the IAP project  
This doctoral research focusses strongly on efficiency, in the context of procedures at the 
European Court of Human Rights. It acknowledges that access to justice is not evident here, 
certainly not in the context of the overburdening of the Court, the Council of Europe’s answer 
to these issues, and more specifically the creation of pilot judgments. The research is 
conceptually looking at the difficulties that different users experience, both on the side of the 
processing of the incoming cases, or on the side of accessing the Court. Its main goal is to 
mitigate these hurdles from both perspectives.  
The research further employs a multiple user’s perspective. It will direct its attention firstly 
towards NGO’s who can act both as direct users, by invoking human rights, or as indirect users, 
by supporting these rights of others. Secondly, it will focus on judicial users, who can be 
                                                 
 
51 Human rights Integration, Work Package 5: Optimizing access, available at: http://hrintegration.be/work-
package/optimizing-access-international-human-rights-mechanisms-ugent. 
52 The focus on vulnerable groups of applicants is not thoroughly discussed in this research. As will be discussed 
below starting from page 171, the empirical research conducted in the framework of this doctoral research has 
shown that vulnerability is not a factor which plays a role in the context of the pilot judgment procedure.  
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categorized as indirect users by imposing human rights. Lastly, it can be argued that this 
doctoral research should focus on the potential applicants themselves, instead of NGO’s. It is 
however methodologically difficult to predict who these potential applicants would be in the 
future. Focusing on NGO’s that have an established practice in introducing bulk cases at the 
European Court of Human Rights can arguably provide a more representative result. 
Interestingly, it can be argued that the Court itself also has employed a multi-user’s perspective 
to look at itself in the context of the reforms of the European Human Rights system. More 
specifically, during the Oslo Conference in 2014, the Court studied itself from an inside 
perspective and invited experts to offer an outside perspective.53 
Thirdly, seeing that the research will be carried out to focus on the perspective from within, the 
use of empirical research methods, and specifically of qualitative empirical methods, is 
arguably necessary.  
3. Research questions 
As a result of the existing literature and the questions raised therein, combined with the 
framework provided by Work Package 5, this research will essentially centre around four 
research questions.  
Firstly, this dissertation will outline how the current system of the pilot judgment procedure is 
working in practice. The pilot procedure has emerged from practice, leaving legal uncertainty 
as to how it works. This problem has partly been addressed with the codification of the 
procedure in Rule 61 of the Rules of Court. However, there is a widely varying practice 
concerning the use of the pilot judgment procedure which results in a persisting uncertainty. 
This dissertation will therefore firstly map the whole of the pilot judgment procedure.  
Secondly, the research will look at the pilot judgment procedure from the viewpoint of 
procedural efficiency, thereby focussing on the viewpoints of the procedure’s users at the side 
of the Court. How do they work with this procedure and how do they tweak it in order to use it 
efficiently? What factors do they take into account and how do they weigh in their decisions?  
Thirdly, the pilot judgment procedure will be studied from the viewpoint of the users at the side 
of the victims of these large-scale human rights violations. How does this procedure work in 
terms of access to justice? Does or doesn’t it hinder this right in practice and on which levels? 
This research project thus aims at carrying out a thorough evaluation of the pilot judgment 
procedure from two viewpoints, in order to find its strengths and weaknesses from these 
perspectives.   
Fourthly, based on this assessment of strengths and weaknesses, this dissertation will aim to 
formulate means to improve the existing system. These proposals for improvement will be 
inspired by the two viewpoints of procedural efficiency and access to justice. The aim of this 
study is however primarily on identifying the difficulties faced by the two groups of users of 
the pilot judgment procedure. These proposals will thus remain on the surface, making 
                                                 
 
53 Conference on the long-term future of the European Court of Human Rights, Session I – History, reforms and 
remaining challenges, Oslo, 7 April 2014, 27-48.  
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suggestions for improvements based on comparable aggregate claims procedures or further 
research.  
It must be emphasized that it is not this dissertation’s aim to propose the creation of a new 
procedure. This is a conscious choice for several reasons. Firstly, it is a pragmatic choice. 
Working out a wholly new system would simply not be feasible in the confines of this research 
project, both as to time as well as to resources. This could however be an avenue for further or 
alternative research. Secondly, the pilot judgment procedure is a new evolution which was 
created by the Court itself. Although there’s not always a paper trail to this evolution, the 
procedure was created by the judges to fulfil a need that was there at the relevant time. In the 
meantime, the procedure has been codified in the Rules of Court and although it is still 
somewhat contested, it has now become an integral part of the European Human Rights System. 
The interviews conducted at the European Court of Human Rights in the context of this doctoral 
research further indicate that the persons working with the procedure evaluate it positively. It 
thus seems as if the procedure is here to stay. Therefore, to change this is not feasible. 
Contrarily, clarifying the inner workings of the procedure while further proposing changes 
meant to have a positive effect on the use of the procedure for both the Court and the applicants 
is an achievable goal.  
 
In conclusion, the research questions around which this dissertation is built are 
four-fold:   
1) How does the pilot judgment procedure work in practice?  
2) Is it procedurally efficient?  
3) Is it accessible for the applicants involved?  
4) If necessary, how can we make the procedure both efficient, while also 
accessible to the applicants?  
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The following is a schematic representation of the goal of this doctoral research and the steps taken towards this goal:  
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C. Methodology  
1. Mixed Research Methods  
The methodology applied in this dissertation consists of a combination of traditional legal 
research methods and socio-legal research. During the first stage of the research, the focus was 
placed on classical desk study of the topic in general and the demarcation of the research. Due 
to the design of the research questions and the topic itself, the research then moved on to the 
collection of empirical research data. The pilot judgment procedure was born out of practice 
with the specific goal of ameliorating the Court’s efficiency. Notwithstanding the fact that it is 
now part of the Rules of Court, analysing the cases has clarified that the practice of the 
procedure is still evolving. As a result of this, the practical implementation of the procedure is 
the focal point in answering the question whether the procedure is indeed efficient. In order to 
address this question, it is important to look at the experiences of the persons who are working 
with it. Additionally, the procedure has been critiqued to hinder the right to individual 
application of actual and potential victims of large-spread human rights violations. This again, 
is also a question which goes to the heart of the experiences of the persons who are involved in 
these mass cases and have tried to reach the Court.  
Consequently, in order to find an answer to the research questions whether the pilot judgment 
procedure is in practice efficient as well as accessible, the experiences of both the lawyers and 
judges at the European Court of Human Rights and the lawyers bringing cases involving wide-
spread human rights abuses to this Court were imperative. The interview topics were designed 
in the first stage of the desk study and were divided into overarching themes, selected on the 
basis of the literature study. For the questions concerning procedural efficiency, the parameters 
developed by the Council of Europe’s own European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice 
(CEPEJ) were taken as the basis. With respect to access to justice, inspiration was primarily 
drawn from the Court’s own case law and procedural justice theory. The researcher thus 
employed a deductive methodology, in which the research started from the literature, through 
which hypotheses were developed which were then later tested. This desk study further 
involved research with respect to methodology itself. As the researcher did not have experience 
in the field of socio-legal research, a lot was still to be learnt. In this context, the researcher also 
followed a specialist course in the Doctoral Schools program geared towards elite interviews. 
The desk study further resulted in a series of charts and tables created by the researcher on the 
basis of publically available information. On the one hand, the researcher synthesized the 
existing contentieux on full and quasi-pilots between 22 June 2004 – the date of the first pilot 
of Broniowski – and end of 2017. The case of Burmych v.Ukraine, although not strictly a pilot 
case, will also be discussed in this thesis. It has however shifted the landscape of pilot 
judgments. As a result, a thesis concerning pilots would not be complete without the inclusion 
of the Burmych case. These tables were created in order to abstract the whole of the case law 
and to enable theory to emerge from it. They further include a brief explanation on the facts of 
the cases. These facts are only included in the text of this thesis when necessary. If the reader 
however is interested to find out more about a certain case in this thesis, the information can be 
found in the tables made available in the annexes. On the other hand, the researcher created 
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charts based on the statistics made publically available by the Court, in order to provide the 
reader and herself with a visual representation of this data.  
The researcher further reserved the possibility for new themes to emerge from the interviews, 
being aware that not everything could have been covered in the desk study. This empirical data 
indeed showed a range of factors which were not apparent from the initial literature study. The 
researcher allowed for this and employed the basic principle of grounded theory of letting the 
theory emerge from the data. After the interview stage, a rough coding of the interviews took 
place. Coding was conducted in an unscripted manner, whereby the researcher opted for an 
inductive research method based on grounded theory. The literature and pilot cases relevant to 
the topic were then also roughly coded along the lines of the concepts that emerged from this 
first coding of the interviews. Subsequently, a first wave of writing took place based on the 
literature, after which the interviews were coded for a second time. It is only after this second 
stage of coding of the interviews, that the interviews themselves were included in this thesis.    
2. Selection of target groups and conducting the interviews 
The researcher conducted twenty nine semi-structured interviews with two groups of elite 
stakeholders involved in the pilot judgment procedure. Nineteen respondents were interviewed 
on the side of the Court in January 2017. Both the themes of access to justice and efficiency 
were discussed during the interviews with the Registry lawyers and judges at the Court. Ten 
interviewees participated at the side of the applicants’ representatives.54 The theme of access to 
justice was focussed on more prominently during the interviews with the lawyers and non-
governmental organizations that bring these kinds of large-scale cases to the Court. For the 
purpose of this thesis a non-governmental organization or NGO is defined as any type of 
organization that is formally free from governmental intervention and that does not wield 
governmental power.55 These interviews were conducted in February and March 2017. 
Efficiency at the Court sometimes was discussed with this target group as well. However, as 
will be explained, the Court has control concerning the application of the procedure and has the 
general overview concerning its own functioning. Consequently, knowledge concerning the 
efficiency and inner workings of the procedure is primarily present at the Court resulting in the 
fact that efficiency was more thoroughly discussed with the respondents at the Court.  
Initially, Judges and Registrars were selected on the basis of their experience with pilot cases. 
Other Registry lawyers could not be selected from the desk study because it is not made public 
which lawyer worked on which case. The researcher contacted all Judges and Registrars who 
had worked on at least four full pilot cases. The majority of selected persons reacted positively, 
a minority expressly declined or never reacted.  Additionally, once arrived at the Court the 
researcher used snowballing, with the help of a gatekeeper. This enabled the researcher to also 
include Registry lawyers in the interviews. Therefore, in order to find and contact these persons, 
a contact on the inside of the Court was imperative to create a big enough sample of 
                                                 
 
54 The list of Interviewees is included in Annex 1.  
55A. PETERS, “Membership in the Global Constitutional Community” in J. KLABBERS, A. PETERS AND G. ULFSTEIN 
(eds.), The Constitutionalization of International Law, OUP, 2009, 218. 
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interviewees in Strasbourg. The other side of the coin is, however, that the researcher was not 
able to completely control her sample as it was partly given form through this gatekeeper and 
other interviewees who suggested people to talk to. All but one of these interviews took place 
in the offices of the Court in Strasbourg. One interview was conducted over email, in which the 
respondent answered questions in a written form.  
With respect to the second group, the researcher selected these lawyers and organizations as the 
respondents instead of the actual and potential applicants who could bring such cases to the 
Court. There are two main reasons for this selection. Firstly, the nature of the cases involved 
made interviewing real and potential applicants virtually impossible. Pilot judgments by their 
very nature encompass an enormous number of involved persons, as they are geared towards 
cases exemplifying a structural or widespread issue in a given country in the Council of Europe. 
The first pilot judgment, Broniowski v. Poland, involved some estimated 80,000 persons in a 
similar situation. At the time of the judgment, there were 167 similar cases pending before the 
Court. Currently, there are 28 full pilot cases.56 It could be argued that the research could have 
employed a case study methodology, looking at one specific case. However, looking at the case 
law involving the pilot judgment procedure, it is abundantly clear that the practice differs. 
Looking at only one case, even though in-depth, would not create a situation in which the 
researcher could make assertions about the efficiency and accessibility of the procedure as a 
whole. In order thus to make the research practically feasible while at the same time encompass 
a larger sample of all pilot cases involved, the researcher opted to interview the lawyers and 
organizations who had brought these large-scale cases to the Court or were involved through 
third party interventions.  
Secondly, the lawyers and human rights organizations involved in these cases were 
hypothesized to hold a more contextual view on these cases. Human rights lawyers and 
organizations include the general situation in their framing of the case before the European 
Court of Human Rights. They may even bring a certain case before the Court in the context of 
strategic litigation.57 As such, they are in the ideal position to offer a broad perspective on the 
inner workings of the procedure, while still focussing on the interests on the side of the 
applicants. Furthermore, in looking at the case law with respect to the pilot judgment procedure, 
it is clear that these kinds of lawyers and organizations are often involved.58 They may thus be 
playing an important role in the development of the pilot judgment procedure.  
All lawyers and human right organizations that had worked on a pilot or a quasi-pilot case were 
contacted.59 The initial selection thus did not solely look at possible respondents involved with 
full pilot cases. The Court has control concerning the application of the procedure and as will 
be explained below starting from page 37, this decision is not always completely clear. As a 
result, these lawyers and organizations might have had the intention to bring a pilot case before 
                                                 
 
56 A detailed overview can be found in Annex 5 on page 219.  
57 The concept of strategic litigation is discussed below on page 174. For the purpose of this thesis, it is defined as  
a form of public interest litigation where a case is pursued on behalf of an applicant or group of applicants, with a 
view to achieving a law reform goal beyond the individual case.   
58 In 5 of the 28 full pilot cases and in 7 out of 19 quasi-pilot cases.  
59 The NGO’s and their affiliation to a certain case are detailed in Annexes 7 – 9 starting from page 226.  
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the Court, while the Court ultimately decided not to apply the procedure. The initial access to 
the Court in the form of framing of the case in this hypothesis was done with the pilot judgment 
procedure in mind, making these respondents equally interesting in the framework of this 
doctoral research. Again, not all of the contacted persons agreed. A minority declined or never 
reacted.  As these lawyers and organizations are spread across Europe, these interviews were 
conducted through Skype. There are two exceptions to this, as these respondents were 
accessible for a face-to-face interview.  
The interviewees expressed a wide range of choice as to the modalities of the interview and 
how the material was going to be used. A minority of respondents indicated that they wanted 
to remain anonymous. A majority of respondents preferred to be named as one of the 
respondents but did not wish for their input to be linked to their names. A small minority of 
interviewees mentioned that they would not mind to be quoted, a practice which the researcher 
decided not to do in order to ensure equality and consistency among respondents. The quotes 
eventually used in the dissertation were only slightly altered in order to increase legibility by 
translating spoken to written language.  
Some respondents did not want to be recorded, a majority did not mind provided that the 
recordings would be eliminated afterwards. Some interviewees indicated that they wanted to 
say some things off the record, other remained formal and did not share such information. Some 
interviewees wanted to see the transcript of their interview, others did not. One respondent 
made changes as to language: no alterations were made to the content but made the text more 
readable. Another respondent also changed the transcript in order to weaken the strength of the 
language used.  
In reporting, the respondents at the Court who wished to remain anonymous were referred to as 
such in the footnotes. As the snowball method was used at the Court, other persons might be 
aware when the interview took place with these persons. It was thus not possible to guarantee 
anonymity while indicating the date of the interview in the footnotes. Therefore, they are 
referenced to as ‘anonymous I’, ‘anonymous II’ and ‘anonymous III’. With respect to the 
lawyers, one interviewee first indicated to wanting to be included in the list of interviewees but 
later wished to remain anonymous. As there was no snowballing used whereby any other person 
could know when this interview took place, this interview is referenced in the normal fashion 
‘Interview dd X.X.XXXX.’ 
3. Limitations and problems faced 
In the course of the interviews, it became clear that it would have been interesting in order to 
look at the issue of the pilot judgment procedure in the context of accessibility and efficiency 
for the researcher to also talk to State representatives at the Committee of Ministers. In order to 
look at the complete picture whereby all primary actors – meaning Court, applicants and States 
– are equally taken into account. The States’ perspectives were never part of the original design 
of this research project, following the framing of the research within WP5 of the IAP Project. 
This thesis circles  around the normative goals of efficiency and accessibility, two interests 
which the researcher attributed to the Court and the applicants respectively. It is only during 
the course of the research that it became clear that the States’ willingness to cooperate would 
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play such a primordial role in both. The researcher however opted to remain with the original 
design of the research. This third perspective could however be an interesting avenue for further 
research.  
Lastly, since the judgment in Burmych and others v. Ukraine which came out on 12 October 
2017, the landscape of pilot judgments has considerably changed.60 Here, the Court was 
confronted with a State reluctant to execute a previous pilot judgment, which resulted in a 
constant influx of similar cases on its docket.61 As a result, the Court found that it had fulfilled 
its duty based on the Convention: it had found a violation and had identified the source as being 
a systemic problem of non-execution of domestic judgment. It had further instructed the State 
to address the underlying systemic problem. According to the Court, this is where its task under 
the Convention ends. As a result, the Court decided that it would not render judgment in these 
pending cases. Instead, it would strike these cases out of its docket and usurp them in the 
execution process of the previous pilot judgment before the Committee of Ministers. This thus 
means that the Court is not going to entertain these cases. Instead, a violation is supposed and 
these applicants can just skip a step and go directly to the Committee of Ministers which is now 
tasked with dealing with all of these cases. During the interviews at the Court, the researcher 
was at several instances instructed to await this judgment. The lawyers and judges at the Court 
working with the pilot procedure were aware that there was a problem of mass non-execution 
of a pilot judgment and that this case was at that time pending before the Grand Chamber. One 
respondent even signaled that this Burmych case would be as important as the first pilot of 
Broniowski.62 What the outcome would be however, was not divulged.  
The Burmych indeed is of crucial importance in the context of pilot judgments. It does however 
not impact the validity of the research carried out. The solution proposed in Burmych is geared 
towards cases where the involved State is manifestly unwilling to execute a previous pilot 
judgment. This is a specific and exceptional situation and thus does not impact the validity of 
this research. In the aftermath of Burmych, it would however be interesting to know how the 
lawyers and NGO representatives regard this evolution in the case law. Specifically, it could be 
argued that this might make their work easier. The violation is taken as a given and the case is 
automatically brought to the Committee of Ministers. Access to a court is not even necessary 
anymore, the applicants are automatically directed to the next step. This might be seen as a 
pragmatic view. On the other hand, there is no access to a court anymore. The Committee of 
Ministers is a political body which is not designed to take the individual situation of an applicant 
into account.63 From a more principled position, it could be argued that this way of working 
does not qualify as justice for the victims, as there is no longer an independent judicial body 
examining the case.  
                                                 
 
60 ECtHR, Burmych and others v. Ukraine, application nos. 46852/13 et al., 12 October 2017.  
61 At the time of the judgment, there were 12 143 similar cases pending at the Court.  
62 Interview III dd 13.01.2017.  
63 This point will be more thoroughly discussed below starting from page 91.  
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D. Structure of the dissertation    
This first chapter has created the framework within which this research has taken place. It has 
introduced the pilot judgment procedure and explained the relevance of the research conducted. 
Further, the design of the research was set out and the methodology clarified.  
The second chapter will offer a thorough examination of the pilot judgment procedure from the 
inside out. As explained, the procedure was created through practice. Consequently, there is 
still a lot of uncertainty both inside and outside of the Court as to what it is, where it originated 
from and how it works. This first chapter aims to answer these questions in order to create a 
holistic view of the procedure. This will serve as the basis for the subsequent chapters 
concerning procedural efficiency and access to justice.  
The third chapter will discuss the pilot judgment procedure from the perspective of procedural 
efficiency. To this end, the concept of procedural efficiency will first be demarcated in order to 
subsequently operationalize it in the context of this dissertation. The chapter will move on to 
include the findings of the empirical research carried out at the Court. It will end with a 
conclusion to the research question whether the pilot judgment procedure is efficient.  
The fourth chapter then turns to the perspective of access to justice; The first two sub-chapters 
aim to define the concept of access to justice before it is operationalized in the context of this 
dissertation. A fourth sub-chapter subsequently presents the findings from the qualitative 
empirical research carried out both at the Court as with the representatives of the applicants. 
The chapter ends with a conclusion answering the research question of whether the pilot 
judgment procedure is accessible.  
The fifth chapter brings both perspectives together as the interviews have shown that execution 
of the general measures indicated in the pilot judgment is a necessary condition for both 
procedural efficiency and accessibility. This chapter will thus zoom in on the question whether 
the problem was solved by looking at State execution of these pilot judgment. In doing so, the 
chapter will aim to assess success in pilot cases.  
The last and sixth chapter brings us to a conclusion and aims to answer the question whether 
the pilot judgment procedure is both efficient as well as accessible to the victims of these 
systemic human rights violations. In the chapter, the elements which raise difficulty are being 
diagnosed and certain points for improvement are raised.   
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II. The Pilot Judgment Procedure: taking a closer look behind the scenes.  
In this chapter, the pilot judgment procedure will thoroughly be discussed, based on the case 
law and on the experiences of the judges and Registry staff at the Court. In a first sub-chapter, 
it will be shown that thé pilot judgment does not exist. Pilots and pilot-like cases are instead 
placed on a continuum, ranging from the classic Broniowski template to cases where the Court 
identified a systemic issue but did not attach a procedural consequence to this. A second sub-
chapter will explain how the Court then selects a pilot case. This decision entails two steps: 
firstly, the decision which situations warrant the application of the pilot judgment procedure; 
and secondly, the decision which case stemming from the underlying problem will serve as the 
example case. Further, the pilot judgment procedure was created from practice and seems to 
emerge out of nowhere from the outside perspective. In a third sub-chapter therefore, the origins 
of this procedure will be traced. In a fourth sub-chapter, the procedure will be put in the wider 
institutional context of the Council of Europe. A last and fifth sub-chapter will conclude based 
on the above evolutions what the pilot judgment procedure looks like now.  
A. Genealogy of a pilot – a continuum  
The pilot judgment procedure is an innovative procedure created by the Court in 2004 with the 
case of Broniowski v. Poland.64 When reduced to its very core it can be described as a procedure 
whereby an individual case or a combination of cases, classified by the Court under priority 
treatment, is used by the Court to diagnose a structural problem in the respondent State and 
gives instructions to that State as to how to remedy the issue.65 Through this one case the Court 
seeks “to achieve a solution that extends beyond the particular case or cases so as to cover all 
similar cases raising the same issue”.66 In other words, the chosen case will serve as a 
magnifying glass for the Court to discuss a wider issue in one of its Contracting States, which 
is at the base of human rights violation at hand.  
The reality of the pilot judgment procedure is however a bit more complex. The Court will 
indeed try to provide a thorough diagnosis of the wider issue. It will also provide some 
suggestions as to the measures that could be taken by the State to remedy the problem, and most 
importantly, it will include the obligation to take general measures in the operative part of the 
judgment. This means that in principle, this obligation has now become binding upon the 
respondent State.  
Furthermore, the wider systemic issue which the Court is trying to remedy through these pilot 
judgments in most cases brings with it a group of similarly situated applicants. In most pilot 
cases, these similar applications are kept pending. The Court will not render a judgment. 
Instead, these applicants wait until the involved State has executed the requested general 
                                                 
 
64 ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland, application no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004. As explained above starting from page 
2.  
65 A. BUYSE, “The Pilot Judgment Procedure at the European Court of Human Rights: Possibilities and 
Challenges”, Nomiko Vima (Greek Law Journal): European Court of Human Rights - 50 Years, 2010, 78. 
66 European Court of Human Rights, The Pilot-Judgment Procedure – Information note issued by the Registrar, 
available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Pilot_judgment_procedure_ENG.pdf.  
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measures, which in most cases involves the setting up of a domestic remedy. These cases are 
then generally sent back to the national legal system, so that they can be dealt with domestically.  
Former Judge and Registrar67 at the European Court of Human Rights, Paul Mahoney has 
explained clearly what the pilot judgment procedure essentially did in the context of the 
Broniowski case:  
“The Broniowski judgment essentially contained two elements on the issue of execution. 
The Government were told: firstly, you have to eliminate the source of the violation, that is 
for the future, and secondly, you must provide a remedy for past prejudice that has been 
suffered by not only the individual applicant but also all the other 80000 Bug river 
claimants adversely affected by the systemic violation found.”68 
The procedure has however evolved with time and under the influence of the cases that have 
come before the Court. The strict conception of what a pilot judgment entailed in Broniowski 
has changed, a sort of ‘continuum’ has formed. This continuum of cases dealing with human 
rights issues which go beyond a mere individual violation entails grossly three categories of 
cases: the strict ‘full’ pilot judgment procedure, the quasi-pilots and cases in which there is 
mention of a systemic issue but the Court does not attach any procedural consequence to this.   
1. The ‘full’ pilot  
In order to know how the procedure works, it is necessary to understand what it entails. This is 
a crucial step leading to the question in the next sub-chapter when and how the Court will decide 
to apply the procedure. Even within the category of full pilot cases, there are a range of different 
views on what a pilot is, varying from very strict to more liberal approaches.69  
The most strict definition can be found with Wildhaber, President of the Court at the time of 
the Broniowski case, who posed that a full pilot case consists of eight characteristics:70  
(i) the Grand Chamber of the Court finds a violation of the Convention in the form of 
a systemic problem affecting an entire class of individuals in a similar situation;  
(ii) the Court concludes that this systemic problem may give rise to numerous 
subsequent applications;  
(iii) the Court indicates general measures needed to remedy the issue;  
(iv) the Court acknowledges that these measures should apply retroactively;  
                                                 
 
67 Mr. Mahoney was Registrar of the Grand Chamber in the Broniowski case.  
68 P. MAHONEY, “Discussion Following the Presentation by Luzius Wildhaber” in R. WOLFRUM, U. DEUTSCH, The 
European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and Possible Solutions, International 
Workshop, Heidelberg, December 2007, 85; R. DEGENER, P. MAHONEY, “The Prospects for a test case procedure 
in the European Court of Human Rights” in D. PLAS, M. PUÉCHAVY, Trente ans de droit européen des droits de 
l’homme. Etudes à la mémoire de Wolfgang Strasser, Anthemis, 2008, 189. 
69 The definitions of Wildhaber, Leach and Buyse are focused on as they are most widely reproduced.  
70 L. WILHABER, “Pilot Judgments in Cases of Structural or Systemic Problems on the National Level” in R. 
WOLFRUM, U. DEUTSCH, The European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and 
Possible Solutions, International Workshop, Heidelberg, December 2007, 71.  
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(v) the Court decides to adjourn the consideration of all pending applications deriving 
from the same systemic problem;  
(vi) the Court includes the general measures in the operative part of the judgment;  
(vii) the Court reserves the question concerning just satisfaction based on article 41;  
(viii) the Court communicates it’s approach to the Committee of Ministers and the key 
Council of Europe bodies are informed of developments in the pilot case.  
Prof. Philip Leach takes a more flexible approach and has identified three criteria that define a 
full pilot judgment as follows:71   
(i) the explicit application by the ECtHR of the pilot judgment procedure;  
(ii) the identification by the Court of a systemic violation of the ECHR; and 
(iii) the stipulation of general measure in the operative part of the judgment in order that 
the respondent State should resolve the systemic issue (which may be subject to 
specific time-limits). 
Prof. Buyse has specified only two criteria which make up the core of a pilot judgment: 72  
(i) the identification of a systemic problem and;  
(ii) explicit guidance given by the Court to the State concerned.  
The Court itself seems to be taking the most flexible approach, posing that the inclusion of the 
remedial general measures in the operative part of the judgment is the crucial element that 
defines a pilot judgment procedure in the strict sense.73   
  
                                                 
 
71 P. LEACH, “Can the European Court’s Pilot Judgment Procedure Help Resolve Systemic Human Rights 
Violations? Burdov and the Failure to Implement Domestic Court Decisions in Russia”, Human Rights Law 
Review, 2010, p. 351; P. LEACH “Resolving Systemic Human Rights Violations – Assessing the European Court’s 
Pilot Judgment Procedure”, in S. Besson (ed.), The European Court of Human Rights after Protocol 14 – 
Preliminary Assessment and Perspectives, Schulthess, 2011, p. 224; P. LEACH, H. HARDMAN, S. STEPHENSON, 
B.K. BLITZ, Responding to Systemic Human Rights Violations. An Analysis of ‘Pilot Judgments’ of the European 
Court of Human Rights and their Impact at National Level, Intersentia, 2010, p. 22.  
72 This is mainly because he poses that the Court employs the pilot procedure rather on a continuum than as a black 
and white division between pilots and individual cases. This point will be revisited below in the next sub-chapter 
starting from page 25; A. BUYSSE, “The Pilot Judgment Procedure at the European Court of Human Rights: 
Possibilities and Challenges”, Nomiko Vima (Greek Law Journal): European Court of Human Rights - 50 Years, 
2010, 
73 European Court of Human Rights Press Unit, Factsheet – Pilot Judgments, July 2015, p.1, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Pilot_judgments_ENG.pdf.  
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II.1 Varying definitions for the pilot judgment procedure 
Criteria  Wildhaber  Leach  Buyse  The 
Court  
Grand Chamber X    
Identification of a systemic problem  X X X  
Class of individuals in a similar situation  X    
Systemic problem may give rise to 
numerous subsequent applications 
X    
Indication of general measures X  X  
Retroactive application of general measures X    
Adjournment of pending similar 
applications 
X    
General measures in the operative part of 
the judgment 
X X  X 
Reservation of the question concerning just 
satisfaction 
X    
Communication of approach to the 
Committee of Ministers and providing 
information to key Council of Europe 
bodies 
X    
Explicit mention of the application of the 
pilot judgment procedure in the judgment  
 X   
 
Furthermore, within the Court there are a myriad of different views concerning what 
characteristics make up a full pilot judgment. The fact that there is discussion among judges 
within the Court concerning what a pilot judgment is and means was expressly mentioned 
during an interview.74 Some adhere to the formal definition expressly proposed by the Court 
whereby the defining element is the inclusion of general measures in the operative provisions.75 
One of the interviewees further put forward that a case is a pilot when it is communicated as 
such to the State.76 Most interestingly, one respondent with considerable experience provided a 
pragmatically detailed definition of the procedure, which differed considerably from the ones 
above:  
“ [The Pilot Judgment Procedure is a] procedure for prioritized handling of repetitive cases 
which raise structural problems, involving (1) the identification of a lead case for 
communication; (2) adjournment of the remaining applications of the same type; (3) in the 
event of a violation, a ruling under article 46, (a) an order of general measures aiming at 
                                                 
 
74 Interview dd 18.01.2017.  
75 Interview anonymous; Interview dd 16.01.2017; Interview dd 19.01.2017.  
76 Interview dd 09.01.2017.  
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redressing the applicants in the adjourned cases by means of domestic remedies or measures 
and/or of any potential applicants, (b) development of a follow-up friendly settlement 
procedure to strike out the adjourned applications; (4) enhanced supervision of the 
execution phase; (5) if necessary, resumption of the procedure by means of a follow-up pilot 
decision/judgment; (6) WECL [Well-Established Case Law].”77 
This definition proves particularly interesting since all of the mentioned elements indeed play 
an important part in designing a successful pilot judgment. The pragmatic view of this particular 
respondent depicts a rather complete overview of how the procedure works from the inside. 
These elements will subsequently be discussed in the following sub-chapters.78  
2. Quasi-pilots or article 46 cases79  
Although these different views already make defining the pilot judgment procedure difficult, 
the practice proves to be even more complex. The Court has also issued judgments that come 
within the realm of pilot judgments, cases in which a systemic problem was identified but the 
adoption of measures are merely proposed in the reasoning of the Court.80 These cases are not 
categorized as pilot judgments in the strict sense because they don’t include the indication of 
the proposed general measures in the operative part of the judgment. Quasi-pilots are also 
identified by the fact that the Court does not expressly mention the application of the pilot 
judgment procedure in the judgment itself, like for instance in the case of Lukenda v. Slovenia.81 
Instead, in the literature they are labelled ‘quasi-pilots’ or ‘article 46 cases’.82 One of the 
respondents in Strasbourg explained that article 46 cases are close to pilot cases. They do not 
                                                 
 
77 Interview dd 17.01.2017.  
78 They will further all be brought together in the conclusion of this dissertation, on page 193.  
79 Article 46 of the Convention is concerned with the binding force and the execution of the Court’s judgments. It 
futher entails the division of competences between the Court, the states and the Committee of Ministers. The Court 
entertains a case under article 46 if it entails a problem of a large-scale nature on which it has already rendered a 
judgment in a previous similar case. It is used as a reminder to the state that the problem is already known and the 
state should have addressed it after the previous judgment based on its obligations under article 46.  
80 European Court of Human Rights, Seminar Background Paper Implementation of the judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights, 2014, § 9. 
81 ECtHR, Lukenda v. Slovenia, application no. 23032/02, 6 October 2005, § 89-96. The case was however marked 
as a pilot case afterwards by the Court, in the Kuric judgment (ECtHR, Kurić and others v. Slovenia, application 
no. 26828/06, 26 June 2012).  
82 examples are Lukenda v. Slovenia (ECtHR, Lukenda v. Slovenia, Application no. 23032/02, 6 October 2005),   
Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (ECtHR, Xenides Arestis v. Turkey, Application no. 46347/99, 22 December 2005), and  
Klaus and Iouri Kiladze v. Georgia (ECtHR, Klaus and Yuri Kalidze v. Georgia, Application no. 7975/06, 2 
February 2010); see P. LEACH, “Can the European Court’s Pilot Judgment Procedure Help Resolve Systemic 
Human Rights Violations? Burdov and the Failure to Implement Domestic Court Decisions in Russia”, Human 
Rights Law Review, 2010, pg. 351; P. LEACH “Resolving Systemic Human Rights Violations – Assessing the 
European Court’s Pilot Judgment Procedure”, in S. BESSON (ed.) The European Court of Human Rights after 
Protocol 14 – Preliminary Assessment and Perspectives, Schulthess, 2011, p. 224; C. DUBOIS, E. PENNINCKX, La 
procédure devant la Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme et le Comité des Ministres, Wolters Kluwer, 2016, 
305 ; A. BUYSSE, "The Pilot Judgment Procedure at the European Court of Human Rights: Possibilities and 
Challenges”, Nomiko Vima (Greek Law Journal): European Court of Human Rights - 50 Years, 2010, 81.  
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entail the use of the full procedure but by resorting to article 46, the Court is detecting a 
problem.83  
Article 46 of the ECHR outlines the obligations attributed to the different bodies and actors in 
the Council of Europe. Under this article, States must abide by the final judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights and must execute these judgments accordingly. In cases 
where the Court involves article 46 in its reasoning, it will investigate the broader situation 
surrounding the violation at hand. This means that the Court is concluding that the State 
involved has put up and maintained a system which is in itself in violation of a certain right of 
the Convention. These sorts of systems point to the existence of a systemic situation resulting 
in human rights violations, a situation which might lead to the decision of the Court to apply 
the pilot judgment procedure. In some cases however, the Court merely resorts to such an article 
46 consideration, while not employing the pilot judgment procedure. As will be discussed in 
the next sub-part starting from page 37, the reasons for this are not always known.  
Generally, the existence of full pilots and quasi-pilots results from the flexibility that was built 
into the procedure. One respondent stated that it would even be a mistake to think that there is 
one inflexible pilot judgment procedure. These structural issues are different in every case: they 
have varying origins – historically grown, rooted in politics or laid down in law or practice -, 
they affect different numbers of people and involve different monetary values. The procedure 
thus must come in different shapes and sizes.84 A lawyer further explained that this flexibility 
is an asset to the procedure. The procedure can be adapted to the national circumstances, 
whether the State is already doing something about it and the expectations that the Court itself 
has of the solutions that need to be offered by the State.85  
In some instances, the quasi-pilot format is used as a warning by the Court. In these situations, 
the underlying systemic issue has been known for quite a while and the Court is trying to 
motivate the involved State to finally address it. In Novruk and others v. Russia the Court indeed 
expressly warned the State that if it does not solve the issue, the Court will have to take the next 
opportunity to come out with a pilot judgment.86 The quasi-pilot case of Iacov Stanciu v. 
Romania was also followed by a full pilot case Rezmiveş and others v. Romania.87 During the 
course of the interviews, this possibility to use the procedure as a ‘flag’ towards the State was 
mentioned. Such a quasi-pilot can be used in cases where the Court doesn’t find it necessary 
yet to employ the full-fledged pilot procedure. It is then used as a last warning to the State that 
they must take measures to fix the problem according to the suggestions of the Court. If they 
do not, then perhaps the full procedure will follow.88  
                                                 
 
83 Interview II dd 18.01.2017.  
84 Interview anonymous II.  
85 Interview I dd 16.01.2017.  
86 ECtHR, Novruk and others v. Russia, application nos. 31039/11, 48511/11, 76810/12, 14618/13 and 13817/14, 
15 March 2016, §135.  
87 ECtHR, Rezmiveş and others v. Romania, application nos. 61467/12, 39516/13, 48231/13 and 68191/13, 25 
April 2017.  
88 Interview dd 9.01.2017.  
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However, a point that consistently came up during the interviews was the strategic choice of 
the Court to use the full pilot procedure in cases where the cooperation of the State is relatively 
certain.89 The importance of the State’s willingness to cooperate will be discussed more in-
depth below with respect to the arguments used by the Court to decide to apply the procedure.90  
3. Cases involving a systemic issue without procedural consequence 
Going further, the Court has also issued cases in which it referred to the existence of a systemic 
problem, or even identified the problem itself, but then did not indicate general measures at all. 
It merely stated that structural changes in the Member State would be necessary but that the 
State itself is best placed to decide on which measures to employ, under the supervision of the 
Committee of Ministers. In these kinds of cases, it thus identifies the case as potentially falling 
within the category of article 46 or even pilot cases, but it decides to go about it as usual in 
individual cases.91 In the case of Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia, the Court mentioned 
that the inadequate treatment of prisoners suffering from serious contagious diseases formed a 
structural issue in the country at the material time.92 It did however not come back to this finding 
of a structural issue and continued to treat the case on a merely individual basis. Interestingly, 
in the case of Holomiov v. Moldova, the Court did not find a structural issue of tacit 
prolongations of pre-trial detention in Moldova despite the fact that the Moldovan judge had 
claimed that the issue was systemic. In his separate opinion, judge Pavlovschi regretted the fact 
that the Court had not pointed towards the systemic nature of this problem and in the argument 
referred to the Broniowski case.93   
4. Repercussions of the continuum: does it really matter?   
However, the Court does not always adhere to its one criterion of the inclusion of the general 
measures in the operative part of the judgment. For instance, in the cases of Vassilios 
Athanasiou v. Greece, Michelioudakis v. Greece, Finger v. Bulgaria and Dimitrov and 
Hamanov v. Bulgaria the Court referred to previous pilot cases. In this reference to other cases 
it also included the case of Scordino v. Italy, in which it hadn’t included general measures in 
the operative part.94 It has even marked the case of Dogan and others v. Turkey as being a pilot 
                                                 
 
89 Interview dd 9.01.2017; Interview dd 12.01.2017; Interview II dd 20.01.2017; Interview dd 17.01.2017; 
Interview anonymous I; Interview anonymous II; Interview I dd 18.01.2017; Interview II dd 18.01.2017; Interview 
dd 19.01.2017.  
90 This discussion will start from page 55. As will be discussed throughout this dissertation, it seems that the 
application of the pilot procedure is used strategically. As a result of this, the procedure is indeed flexible so that 
theoretically, it is difficult to make the distinction between the inherent characteristics of a pilot case on the one 
hand, and the arguments used by the Court to apply the procedure on the other. These elements will collide a bit, 
depending on the situation. As the strategy behind the pilot judgment procedure mostly lies in the decision to apply 
the procedure, the arguably decisive element of the cooperation level of the involved state will thus be discussed 
in the context of the selection of a pilot case.  
91 An overview of such cases is given in Annex 9 on page 233. It must be emphasized that this overview is not 
meant to be exhaustive.  
92 ECtHR, Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. Georgia, application no. 35254/07, 22 November 2011, § 54.  
93 ECtHR, Holomiov v. Moldova, application no. 30649/05, 7 November 2006, Partly Concurring, Partly 
Dissention Opinion of Judge Pavlovschi.  
94 ECtHR, Vassilios Athanasiou et autres v. Greece, application no. 50973/08, 20 December 2010, § 44; ECtHR, 
Michelioudakis c Grèce, application no. 54447/10, 3 April 2012, § 64; ECtHR, Finger v. Bulgaria, application no. 
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long after it had already delivered its judgment, while in this initial judgment it was not handled 
as a pilot.95 The abovementioned quasi-pilot of Lukenda v. Slovenia was also later on labelled 
as a pilot in the Kurić case.96 This creates the assumption that the Court itself does not make a 
strict distinction between pilot cases, quasi-pilots cases and other cases mentioning the 
existence of a systemic issue.  
Therefore, in line with Buyse, it can be argued that there is in fact a continuum between cases 
concerned with strictly individual issues on the one extreme, and pilot cases on the other.97 The 
procedure is thus used fairly flexible in practice.  
Interestingly, this does not seem to be the result of sloppy practice. To the contrary, as 
Wildhaber recognizes, this flexibility is needed “to accommodate the range of different 
situations with which the Court is confronted.”98 It could thus be argued that this flexibility is 
a strategic choice of the Court, making it possible to adapt it to the specific circumstances of 
the case at hand. The lowest common denominator in all of these cases it then “the attempt to 
address a problem affecting large numbers of persons through a judgment in an individual 
case, whether this is expressly acknowledged or not.”99 This onus on the flexible nature of the 
pilot judgment procedure is emphasized by the Court itself. In the case of Rutkowski v. Poland, 
the Court explained that the procedure can be adapted to the whole of legal and factual 
circumstances in a given situation, as well as its own caseload developments.100 As explained 
above under “Quasi-pilots or article 46 cases” starting from page 25, this is also a conclusion 
that can be supported based on the empirical research adopted within the framework of this 
doctoral research.  
The idea that flexibility was purposely designed into the procedure from the very beginning can 
however be nuanced. One respondent with considerable and differentiated experience on this 
                                                 
 
37346/05, 10 May 2011, § 114; ECtHR, Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, application nos. 48059/06 and 
2708/09, 10 May 2011, § 109.  
95 ECtHR, decision, Içyer v. Turkey, Application no. 18888/02, 12 January 2006; ECtHR, Dogan and others v. 
Turkey, application nos. 8803-8811/02,8813/02 and 8815-8819/02 , 29 June 2004; A. Buysse, “The Pilot Judgment 
Procedure at the European Court of Human Rights: Possibilities and Challenges”, Nomiko Vima (Greek Law 
Journal): European Court of Human Rights - 50 Years, 2010, 82. The Court did the same with the case of Mandić 
and Jović v. Slovenia, a quasi-pilot which it marked as a pilot case in the decision closing the Kurić pilot 
proceedings in ECtHR, decision, Anastasov and others v. Slovenia, application no. 65020/13, 18 October 2016, § 
72.  
96 Kurić and others v. Slovenia, application no. 26828/06, 26 June 2012, § 413.  
97  A. BUYSSE, “The Pilot Judgment Procedure at the European Court of Human Rights: Possibilities and 
Challenges”, Nomiko Vima (Greek Law Journal): European Court of Human Rights - 50 Years, 2010, 84; also 
followed BY C. DUBOIS, E. PENNINCKX, La procédure devant la Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme et le 
Comité des Ministres, Wolters Kluwer, 2016, 305.  
98 L. WILHABER, “Pilot Judgments in Cases of Structural or Systemic Problems on the National Level” in R. 
WOLFRUM, U. DEUTSCH, The European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and 
Possible Solutions, International Workshop, Heidelberg, December 2007, 74.  
99 L. WILHABER, “Pilot Judgments in Cases of Structural or Systemic Problems on the National Level” in R. 
WOLFRUM, U. DEUTSCH, The European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and 
Possible Solutions, International Workshop, Heidelberg, December 2007, 75; C. DUBOIS, E. PENNINCKX, La 
procédure devant la Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme et le Comité des Ministres, Wolters Kluwer, 2016, 
307. 
100 ECtHR, Rutkowski and others v. Poland, application nos. 72287/10, 13927/11 and 46187/11, 7 July 2015, §226.  
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topic, remarked that the distinction between pilots and quasi-pilots grew organically. In the 
early period between 2004 and 2008, the Court was still experimenting with the procedure:  
“the Court was practicing but also learning how to proceed with pilot judgment 
procedures. That is why whenever there was a possibility of introducing article 46, 
without entering into a deeper dialogue but there was enough substantive material to 
define that there are structural problems, the Court was reaching upon semi-pilot 
judgment procedures which were equally successful as the pilot judgment 
procedure.”101 
The respondent continued that the distinction has lost its importance since the codification of 
the procedure with the adoption of Rule 61. This idea is backed by another colleague who stated 
that the situation is clearer since the adoption of this rule, although it is still not completely 
clear-cut.102 
Flexibility then plays a role in the detail used by the Court to indicate the general measures 
needed. In the early cases of Broniowski and Hutten-Czapska, the Court leaves the States rather 
free in which kinds of measures it should include. Basing itself on article 46, the Court makes 
some suggestions and subsequently poses that the State remains free to choose the means to 
remedy the systemic problem, under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers.103 In the 
Broniowski template, the Court includes broadly in the operative part that the State should take 
general measures, and in which general direction these measures should go. In other cases, the 
Court is much more detailed and gives a whole list of complex general measures. For instance, 
in the cases of Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria, Varga v. Hungary and Rutkowski v. Poland, the 
Court goes into a lot of detail concerning the possible avenues for general measures to take. It 
seems as if the Court is in fact communicating with the Committee of Ministers as to its views 
on how the State should tackle the issue.104 Even stronger, in the case of Suljagic v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Court included a specific list of tasks for the State to complete in order to 
remedy the systemic issue identified in the judgment.105 Even in a quasi-pilot, in the case of 
Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, the Court decided to list specific general measures to be taken by 
the State. It decided to do so since “the nature of the violation found may be such as to leave no 
real choice as to the measures required to remedy it and the Court may decide to indicate a specific 
measure.”106 In any case, from the moment the Court includes an article 46 finding in its judgment 
– whether that is a full pilot or a quasi-pilot – this will lead to closer scrutiny with respect to 
                                                 
 
101 Interview dd 12.01.2017. 
102 Interview I dd 16.01.2017.  
103 Among others: ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland, application no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, §193; ECtHR, Hutten-
Czapska v. Poland, application no. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, §239; ECtHR, Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), application 
no. 33509/04, 15 January 2009, §140.  
104 ECtHR, Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria; application nos. 36925/10, 21487/12, 72893/12, 73196/12, 77718/12 
and 9717/13, 27 January 2015, §§274-289; ECtHR, Varga and others v. Hungary, application nos. 14097/12, 
45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13, and 64586/13, 10 March 2015, §§101-110; ECtHR, Rutkowski and 
others v. Poland, application nos. 72287/10, 13927/11 and 46187/11, 7 July 2015, §§207-222.  
105 ECtHR, Suljagic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, application no. 27912/02, 3 November 2009, point 4 of the 
operative part.  
106 ECtHR, Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine, application no. 21722/11, 9 January 2013, §195.  
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execution. Furthermore, the case will be communicated to the Committee of Ministers and the 
Council of Europe as involving a systemic issue.107 
In conclusion, it seems that the Court itself does not always differentiate between full pilots and 
quasi-pilots. The practice shows a lot of flexibility with respect to one of the defining elements of 
the pilot judgment procedure: the indication of general measures. Other cases in which the Court 
finds a systemic issue without attaching a procedural consequence are however generally treated as 
individual cases.  
5. Demarcation of the pilot in this research project.  
Consequently, demarcating the concept of a pilot case is practically difficult. Different 
definitions have been used by varying actors. Yet others exist at the Court. These different 
viewpoints are  shown in the practice where the labelling of a case as a pilot or a quasi-pilot has 
led to a variety of procedural consequences. For the purpose of this thesis, the researcher has 
chosen to include as broad a spectrum as possible although the onus will be on full pilots.  
There will thus be mention of the division between full pilots and quasi-pilots. The Court does 
treat these cases differently from a procedural point of view. For instance, the qualification of 
a case as a pilot can – and will in a considerable part of the cases - result in the official 
adjourning of similar pending or incoming cases. Quasi-pilot cases do not result in the official 
freezing of similar cases. This is an important distinction, certainly from the perspective of the 
applicants.  
As to the categorization of full pilot cases, the researcher has chosen to only take into account 
the cases in which the Court has applied the pilot judgment procedure and has mentioned that 
it has done so in the original judgment. The Court has been known to mark cases retroactively 
as pilots. 108 It is however not clear if these cases were then indeed handled as such. As a result, 
the researcher has chosen to take the Court for its word and only categorize cases in which the 
Court expressly mentions the application of the pilot judgment procedure under the heading of 
full pilots.  
The category of quasi-pilot cases encompasses a wider range of varying procedural elements. 
As a consequence, this group of cases will be more difficult to catch in a single description. 
Generally however, for the purpose of this thesis this category includes all cases in which the 
Court identifies a structural problem and applies article 46 to this issue. Cases in which the 
                                                 
 
107 Interview II dd 17.01.2017.  
108 Two cases have afterwards been termed by the Court to be pilot cases, while they were not marked as such in 
the original case. The case of Lukenda v. Slovenia (ECtHR, Lukenda v. Slovenia, application no. 23032/02, 6 
October 2005) was marked as a pilot case in the Kuric case (ECtHR, Kurić and others v. Slovenia, application no. 
26828/06, 26 June 2012, § 413). The case of Dogan and others v. Turkey (ECtHR, Dogan and others v. Turkey, 
Application nos. 8803-8811/02,8813/02 and 8815-8819/02 , 29 June 2004) has been termed a pilot case in the 
Içyer v. Turkey (decision),  (ECtHR decision, Içyer v. Turkey, Application no. 18888/02, 12 January 2006; 
ECtHR). However, these two cases are not included in the Registry’s factsheet concerning pilot judgments, nor 
are they marked as such in HUDOC. As a result, it is not clear whether the Court as a whole indeed regards these 
cases as pilots. As a result, they are not included as such in this thesis.  
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Court merely mentions the existence of a structural issue in the obiter dicta but does not attach 
any procedural consequence to this are not included in this group of quasi-pilots. 
If we then try to make a genealogy of pilots and pilot-like cases:   
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II.2 CONTINUUM OF PILOTS AND PILOT-LIKE CASES109
 
                                                 
 
109 It is important to note that this chart is indeed non-exhaustive with respect to all cases encompassing a systemic issue. One respondent explained that sometimes the Court de facto used the 
pilot judgment procedure – or some version of it – without ever explicitly stating so. One case was chosen and once the judgment had become final, the Registry contacted the state and asked 
what is was planning to do about the rest of the similar pending cases. The state decided to solve the issue, so that the other pending cases could be struck out of the list of cases (Interview dd 
23.02.2017). This shows that the Court renders judgments in cases where there is indeed a systemic issue going on. However, if the Court decides to go about it differently and the systemic 
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Broniowski v. Poland x x x x x x x x x







judgment x x x x x x x / x




after PJP) / / x / x
Olaru and others v. Moldova x x x x x x x x x x




after PJP) / / x / x
Suljagic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina / x / x x x x x / x
Rumpf v. Germany / x / x / / / x / x
Maria Atanasiu and others v. 
Romania x x / x x x x x / x
Greens and M.T. v. UK / x x x x x x x / x
Vasilios Athanasiou and others v. 
Greece / x / x / / / x / x
Finger v. Bulgaria / x / x x / / x / x
Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria / x / x x / / x / x
Ananyev and others v. Russia / x x x x / / x / x
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nature of the underlying problem is never made public, it is impossible to know. As a result, I want to stress that it is impossible to provide an exhaustive list of the complete continuum. I have 
however attempted to include all cases deemed relevant on the basis of public information.   
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Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey / x / x
depends! (see 
point 5 of 
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l Court x x / x
Michelioudakis v. Greece / x / x x x x x / x
Kuric and others v. Slovenia
referral after 
chamber 
judgment x x x x x x x / x
Manushaqe Puto and others v. 
Albania / x / x x / / / x
Glykantzi v. Greece / x / x x x x x / x
Torregiani and others v. Italy / x x x x / x x / x
M.C. and others v. Italy / x x x x / x x x x
Gerasimov and others v. Russia / x x x x x x x / x
Alisic and others v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, 
Slovenia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
Referral after 
Chamber case x x x x x x x / x
Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria / x x x / / / x / x
Varga and others v. Hungary / x x x / / / x / x
Rutkowski and others v. Poland / x / x x x
/x 
communicate
d to state in 
order to offer 
redress x / x
Gaszo v. Hungary / x / x x / / x / x
W.D. v. Belgium / x x x x x x x / x
Rezmiveş and others v Romania / x x x x / / x / x
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Doğan and others v. Turkey / x x / / / / / x afterwards
Lukenda v. Slovenia / x / x / / / x / afterwards
Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey /
widespread 
problem' x x / / / x / afterwards 
Sejdovic v. Italy
referral after 
Chamber case x / / / / / / / /
Scordino (no. 1) v. Italy x x x x / / / / / /
Kauczor v. Poland / x x / (implictly) / / / / / /
Orchowski v. Poland / x x x / / / / / /
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece /
/ (implicitly - at the 
Court. Looking at 
the documents of 
CoM: classified as 
structural and 
complex problem 
re Greece) x / / / / / / /
Mandic and Jovic v. Slovenia /
/ (only problem in 
Ljubljana prison, 
not nation-wide) x / / / / / / /
StrucL and others v. Slovenia /
/ (only problem in 
Ljubljana prison, 
not nation-wide) x / / / / / / /
Kaverzin v. Ukraine / x x x / / / / / /
Iacov Stanciu v. Romania / x x x / / / / / /
Aslakhanova v. Russia / x x x / / / / / /
Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine / x x x / / / / x /
Vlad and others v. Romania / x / x / / / x / /
Bittó and others v. Slovakia / / (implicitly) / x / / / / x /
Grande Stevens and others v. Italy / / / / / / / / / /
Novruk and others v. Russia / x x / / / / / / /
Zherebin v. Russia / x x x / / / / / /
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Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. 
Georgia / x x / / / / / / /
Konstantin Markin v. Russia x x x / / / / / / /
Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di 
Stefano v. Italy x
/ (but stressed by 
third party) / / / / / / / /
Tarakhel v. Switzerland x
/ (brought up by 
applicants) x / / / / / / /
Söro v. Estonia /
/ (but mentioned 
in separate opinion 
by Judge Pinto) x / / / / / / /
Mursic v. Croatia x
/ (argued by 
applicant but 
explictly rejected 
by Court) x / / / / / / /
Holomiov v. Moldava /
/ (Moldovan judge 
in his separate 
opinion stressed 
the structural 
nature of issue) x / / / / / / /
Yevdokimov and others v. Russia / x x x / / / / / /
Mansur Yalçin v. Turkey / x x x / / / / / /
S.Z. v. Bulgaria / x / / / / / / / /
Lindheim and others v. Norway / x x x / / / / / /
Grudic v. Serbia / x x x / / / / / /
Harakchiev and Tolumov v. Bulgaria / x x x / / / / / /
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B. The selection of a pilot case  
There is thus not one template for a pilot judgment procedure, there exists something more akin 
to a continuum. However, it is a continuum with rudimentary demarcations. It does matter 
whether a case is being labelled as a full pilot or a quasi-pilot. It will create the possibility for 
the Court to adjourn pending similar applications, the element which is mostly marked as 
paramount to the efficient nature of the procedure. It further impacts the position of applicants 
in the same position as the applicant in the pilot case. Therefore, the question arises which 
situations warrant the Court’s decision to apply the full pilot judgment procedure.  
This chapter will be divided into two parts, as there are intrinsically two questions that need to 
be answered. Firstly, in which situations does the Court decide to apply the pilot judgment 
procedure?  When receiving a bulk of applications that share a root cause, the Court can select 
one or more for priority treatment under the pilot procedure.110 Indeed, the size of the group of 
applicants that the Court receives seems to be an important determinant in applying the pilot 
judgment procedure.111 It is however not necessary that the Court already has a certain amount 
of similar cases pending on its docket.112 The possible influx of future similar cases is in itself 
sufficient for the Court to initiate a pilot judgment procedure.113 It is thus not entirely clear how 
the Court selects the cases that it will apply the pilot judgment procedure to. It will depend on 
a combination of practical, political and legal factors.114 In this context, the consideration 
whether the State is likely to be cooperative has been significant in this decision, although it 
will not be a prerequisite.115 Secondly, if the Court has decided to introduce the pilot judgment 
procedure into a certain situation, how does it go about selecting the example case? This is 
important as the situation of the applicant in this example case will differ from that of the 
applicants in the other cases.   
1. The decision to apply the pilot procedure  
The Registry of the Court in an official document suggests that the reasons for applying the 
procedure are threefold. First, they are meant to assist the member States of the Council of 
                                                 
 
110 European Court of Human Rights Press Unit, Factsheet – Pilot Judgments, July 2015, p.1, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Pilot_judgments_ENG.pdf. 
111 P. LEACH, H. HARDMAN, S. STEPHENSON, B.K. BLITZ, Responding to Systemic Human Rights Violations. An 
Analysis of ‘Pilot Judgments’ of the European Court of Human Rights and their Impact at National Level, 
Intersentia, 2010, p. 23.  
112 This can be inferred from the wording of Rule 61.1 of the Rules of Court: “The Court may initiate a pilot-
judgment procedure and adopt a pilot judgment where the facts of an application reveal in the Contracting Party 
concerned the existence of a structural or systemic problem or other similar dysfunction which has given rise or 
may give rise to similar applications.” (emphasis added).  
113 ECtHR, Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, Application no. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, §. 236; P. LEACH, H. HARDMAN, 
S. STEPHENSON, B.K. BLITZ, Responding to Systemic Human Rights Violations. An Analysis of ‘Pilot Judgments’ 
of the European Court of Human Rights and their Impact at National Level, Intersentia, 2010, p. 23.  
114 P. LEACH, H. HARDMAN, S. STEPHENSON, B.K. BLITZ, Responding to Systemic Human Rights Violations. An 
Analysis of ‘Pilot Judgments’ of the European Court of Human Rights and their Impact at National Level, 
Intersentia, 2010, p. 174.  
115 P. LEACH, H. HARDMAN, S. STEPHENSON, B.K. BLITZ, Responding to Systemic Human Rights Violations. An 
Analysis of ‘Pilot Judgments’ of the European Court of Human Rights and their Impact at National Level, 
Intersentia, 2010, p. 174.  
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Europe in addressing systemic or structural problems at the national level. In this context, it can 
be said that the pilot judgment procedure leans towards the constitutional function of the 
European Court of Human Rights, moving away from its strong emphasis on the individual 
right of application.116 There is an important debate going on both in the Council of Europe, as 
well as in academia concerning the preferred role for the Court in the light of its overburdened 
docket. Should the Court keep with individual justice, meaning that individual applicants 
submit their claims to Strasbourg? Or should the Court instead focus its efforts on the legal 
issues at the basis of individual violations of human rights, thereby focussing on the bigger 
picture?117 The pilot judgment procedure can be placed at the side of both viewpoints 
concerning the Court’s role, as it addresses a large-scale issue through entertaining an individual 
case. The constitutional function however arguably takes preference as large groups of similarly 
situated victims do not get individual treatment of their case at the court. Second, the Registry 
explains that pilots aim for speedier procedures for the applicants. Third, they mean to improve 
the efficiency of the Court itself by reducing the number of recurring cases.118  
The case law of the Court seems to confirm these multiple goals of the pilot procedure. In the 
Wolkenberg decision, the Court stated that the object for the Court is to facilitate the speediest 
and most effective resolution to the systemic problem at the national level. One of the factors 
that it takes into account in this decision is then the number of incoming cases.119 In Hutten-
Czapska however, the Court stated that the goal of the procedure is to assist State to fulfil their 
role in the Convention system: their role as primary safe keepers of human rights. This in turn 
would safeguard the rights of the involved victims as they would be offered more rapid 
redress.120 It seems thus that the Court derives its justification to apply the pilot procedure from 
different viewpoints. Sometimes it emphasizes its own interests, claiming that the incoming or 
pending cases pose a threat to the Convention machinery. Other times, it focusses on the States, 
emphasizing their responsibility under the principle of subsidiarity.121 In some cases, the Court 
explicitly references the rights of the applicants to speedy redress for violations incurred.  
In practice however, it seems that the Judge-Rapporteur122 will be in charge of selecting cases 
for pilot judgment treatment, in consultation with the Registrar assigned to his or her specific 
Section of the Court.123 One of the respondents explained the process:  
                                                 
 
116 M. FYRNYS, “Expanding Competences by Judicial Lawmaking: The Pilot 
Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights”, German Law Journal, 2001, p. 1233.  
117 S. GREER, L. WILDHABER, “Revisiting the Debate about ‘constitutionalising’ the European Court of Human 
Rights”, 12 HRLR, 2013.  
118 European Court of Human Rights Press Unit, Factsheet – Pilot Judgments, October 2017, p.1, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Pilot_judgments_ENG.pdf. This factsheet is regularly updated by the 
Registry.  
119 ECtHR decision, Andrzej Wolkenberg and others v. Poland, application no. 50003/99, 4 December 2007, § 34.  
120 ECtHR, Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, application no. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, § 234.  
121 This principle will be more thoroughly discussed below starting from page 47.  
122 The Judge-Rapporteur is assigned as the primary judge for one specific country. Which judges are assigned to 
which countries are however not made public.  
123 Interview II dd 18.01.2017.   
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“it is a decision which needs to be taken by a judicial formation and normally, it is the 
Chamber which takes this decision. Before addressing the Chamber, there is a dialogue 
and an intense study of the case by the Judge-Rapporteur who is helped by the lawyers 
of the Registry. This is the normal way the Court operates. You know that the name of 
the Judge-Rapporteur in this court is not known, which might appear a strange thing 
but this is the practice. The rapporteur plays a very important role. It is for a Chamber 
to decide but if the Rapporteur prepares his or her case well, then the Chamber 
follows.”124  
Another interviewee explained that there is a difference with respect to the role of the Judge-
Rapporteur between the procedure in a standard Chamber case on the one hand, and in Grand 
Chamber cases and Chamber cases involving a hearing on the other hand. In a standard 
Chamber case, the discussion will proceed on the basis of a draft judgment, prepared by the 
Registry and the Judge-Rapporteur, in which all relevant information and documents  - such as 
third party interventions - have already been processed. With a Grand Chamber case and in 
Chamber cases where a hearing was held, all involved judges have access to all documents. 
After the hearing, there will be a deliberation and a preliminary vote which will form the basis 
for the draft judgment. This draft will then again be submitted to the Chamber or Grand 
Chamber for deliberations.125 The Judge-Rapporteur thus plays an important role, certainly in 
the context of standard Chamber cases. How the Judge-rapporteur and the Registry lawyers 
come to the conclusion to apply the pilot procedure will depend on many elements, as will be 
explained throughout this sub-chapter. 
a. What does the court mean when it talks about a structural problem?  
It is clear from reading Rule 61126 that the existence of a systemic or structural problem forms 
one of the constitutive factors for the Court to decide to apply the procedure.127 The rule does 
however not define what the structural or systemic nature of such an issue entails. Seeing the 
importance of these concepts for the application of the pilot procedure, it is necessary to know 
what the Court means when it talks about a structural problem. Furthermore, the use of this 
terminology by the Court could function as a warning sign for the respondent State, but as long 
as the concept lacks predictability this will not be the case.128 It is thus important for the success 
of the pilot judgment procedure that the concept of the systemic or structural nature of a problem 
is somewhat demarcated.  
The Court in Broniowski focussed on the systemic and widespread nature of the issue at hand, 
which it said resulted from defective legislation and administrative practice in the domestic 
                                                 
 
124 Interview dd 19.01.2017.  
125 Interview dd 23.02.2017.  
126 Rule 61 provides that “[t]he Court may initiate a pilot-judgment procedure and adopt a pilot judgment where 
the facts of an application reveal in the Contracting Party concerned the existence of a structural or systemic 
problem or other similar dysfunction which has given rise or may give rise to similar applications.” 
127 C. DUBOIS, E. PENNINCKX, La procédure devant la Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme et le Comité des 
Ministres, Wolters Kluwer, 2016, 310.  
128 M. SUSI, “The Definition of a ‘Structural Problem’ in the Case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
Since 2010”, German Yearbook of International Law, 2012, 404.  
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system and which had affected or remained capable of affecting a large number of persons.129 
The Hutten-Czapska case in turn then introduced the terminology of structural problem and 
signified the starting point for using both terms quasi interchangeably.130  
The problem quite regularly stems from defective legislation.131 In the Novruk case, the Court 
stated that132:  
“[a] systemic or structural problem stems or results not just from an isolated incident 
or a particular turn of events in individual cases but from defective legislation, when 
actions and omissions based thereon have given rise, or may give rise, to repetitive 
applications. […] The problem underlying the violation the Court has found concerns 
the legislation itself, and the findings extend beyond the sole interests of the applicants 
in the instant case.” 
The absence of an effective domestic remedy for certain violations in the respondent State’s 
legal system can also fall within this category.133 
As stated early on in the Broniowski case however, systemic or structural issues can find their 
origin in what the Court has started to term in its case law ‘a practice inconsistent with the 
Convention’.134 Examples of such practices include: the erasure of persons from the register of 
                                                 
 
129 ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland, application no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, §189.  
130 ECtHR, Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, application no. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, § 233.  
131 Defective legislation was marked as (part of) the problem in the following cases: ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland, 
application no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004; ECtHR, Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, application no. 35014/97, 19 June 
2006; ECtHR, Kurić and others v. Slovenia, application no. 26828/06, 26 June 2012; ECtHR, Greens and M.T. v. 
UK, application nos. 60041/08 and 60054/08, 23 November 2010; ECtHR, M.C.  and others v. Italy, application 
no. 5376/11, 3 September 2013.  
132 ECtHR, Novruk and others v. Russia, application nos. 31039/11, 48511/11, 76810/12, 14618/13 and 13817/14, 
15 March 2016, § 131.  
133 Examples of this can be seen in the following cases:  ECtHR, Rumpf v. Germany, application no. 46344/06, 2 
September 2010; ECtHR, Alisic and others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, application no. 60642/08, 16 July 2014; ECtHR, Kurić and others v. Slovenia, 
application no. 26828/06, 26 June 2012; ECtHR, Greens and M.T. v. UK, application nos. 60041/08 and 60054/08, 
23 November 2010 ; ECtHR, Varga and others v. Hungary, application nos. 14097/12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 
34001/13, 44055/13, and 64586/13, 10 March 2015; ECtHR, Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria; application nos. 
36925/10, 21487/12, 72893/12, 73196/12, 77718/12 and 9717/13, 27 January 2015; ECtHR, Gerasimov and others 
v. Russia, application nos. 29920/05, 3553/06, 18876/10, 61186/10, 21176/11, 36112/11, 36426/11, 40841/11, 
45381/11, 55929/11, 60822/11, 1 July 2014; ECtHR, Torreggiani  and others v. Italy, application nos. 43517/09, 
46882/09, 55400/09, 57875/09, 61535/09, 35315/10 et 37818/10, 8 January 2013; ECtHR, Glykanzi v. Greece, 
application no. 40150/09, 30 October 2012; ECtHR,  Ananyev and others v. Russia, application nos. 42525/07 and 
60800/08, 10 January 2012; ECtHR, Manushaqe Puto and others v. Albania, application nos. 604/07, 43628/07, 
46684/07 and 34770/09, 31 July 2012; ECtHR, Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey, application no. 24240/07, 20 March 
2012; ECtHR, Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), application no. 33509/04, 15 January 2009; ECtHR, Vassilios Athanasiou 
et autres v. Greece, application no. 50973/08, 20 December 2010; ECtHR, Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, 
application nos. 48059/06 and 2708/09, 10 May 2011; ECtHR, Finger v. Bulgaria, application no. 37346/05, 10 
May 2011; ECtHR, Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine, application no. 40450/04, 15 October 2009; ECtHR, 
Rutkowski and others v. Poland, application nos. 72287/10, 13927/11 and 46187/11, 7 July 2015; ECtHR, Gazsó 
v. Hungary, application no. 48322/12, 16 July 2015; ECtHR, W.D. v. Belgium, application no. 73548/13, 6 
September 2016.  
134 ECtHR, Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine, application no. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, §88; ECtHR, 
Rutkowski and others v. Poland, application nos. 72287/10, 13927/11 and 46187/11, 7 July 2015, § 206; ECtHR, 
Rumpf v. Germany, application no. 46344/06, 2 September 2010; § 70; ECtHR, Olaru and others v. Moldova, 
application nos. 476/07, 22539/05, 17911/08 and 13136/07, 28 July 2009, § 56; ECtHR, Maria Athanasiu and 
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permanent residents135, the non-enforcement of domestic proceedings136, the excessive length 
of domestic proceedings137, the internment of mentally ill convicts in ill-suited conditions138, 
inhuman and degrading prison conditions139, and the ineffective restitution of property 
confiscated during the communist regime140.  
This terminology of a ‘practice inconsistent with the Convention’ was first used by the Court 
in the case of Bottazzi v. Italy of 1999. In the case, the Court stated that the frequency with 
which violations are found indicate that there is an accumulation of identical breaches which 
reflect a continuing situation. This accumulation of breaches was then termed to be a practice 
inconsistent with the Convention.141 In the quasi-pilot case of Aslakhanova v. Russia, the Court 
stated that the growing mass of similar cases supports the conclusion that there is a systemic 
practice incompatible with the Convention. It then goes on by defining this accordingly as “an 
accumulation of identical breaches which are sufficiently numerous and inter-connected to 
amount not merely to isolated incidents or exceptions but to a pattern or system. Such breaches 
reflect a continuing situation that has not yet been remedied and in respect of which litigants 
have no domestic remedy. This accumulation of breaches constitutes a practice that is 
incompatible with the Convention.”142 Contrarily, the Court did not conclude to the existence 
of a systemic issue in the case of Mandic and Jovic v Slovenia since the problem of 
overcrowding was not a nation-wide issue but only prevalent in one prison.143 The Court could 
consequently not induce from the facts that there was an accumulation of breaches amounting 
to a pattern or a system.  
                                                 
 
others v. Romania, application nos. 30767/05 and 33800/06, 12 October 2010, § 219; ECtHR, Manushaqe Puto 
and others v. Albania, application nos. 604/07, 43628/07, 46684/07 and 34770/09, 31 July 2012, §107; ECtHR, 
Gerasimov and others v. Russia, application nos. 29920/05, 3553/06, 18876/10, 61186/10, 21176/11, 36112/11, 
36426/11, 40841/11, 45381/11, 55929/11, 60822/11, 1 July 2014, § 190; ECtHR, Gazsó v. Hungary, application 
no. 48322/12, 16 July 2015, § 37; ECtHR, Finger v. Bulgaria, application no. 37346/05, 10 May 2011, Point 4 
operative part; ECtHR, Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, application nos. 48059/06 and 2708/09, 10 May 2011, 
Point 5 operative part; ECtHR, Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), application no. 33509/04, 15 January 2009, § 135; ECtHR, 
W.D. v. Belgium, application no. 73548/13, 6 September 2016, § 164; ECtHR, Torreggiani  and others v. Italy, 
application nos. 43517/09, 46882/09, 55400/09, 57875/09, 61535/09, 35315/10 et 37818/10, 8 January 2013, § 88.  
135 ECtHR, Kurić and others v. Slovenia, application no. 26828/06, 26 June 2012, § 346.  
136 ECtHR, Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine, application no. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, §88; Olaru and 
others v. Moldova, application nos. 476/07, 22539/05, 17911/08 and 13136/07, 28 July 2009, § 56; ECtHR, 
Manushaqe Puto and others v. Albania, application nos. 604/07, 43628/07, 46684/07 and 34770/09, 31 July 2012, 
§ 107-108; ECtHR, Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), application no. 33509/04, 15 January 2009, §§ 131-135 
137 ECtHR, Rutkowski and others v. Poland, application nos. 72287/10, 13927/11 and 46187/11, 7 July 2015, § 
20; ECtHR, Rumpf v. Germany, application no. 46344/06, 2 September 2010, § 70; ECtHR, Gazsó v. Hungary, 
application no. 48322/12, 16 July 2015, § 37; ECtHR, Finger v. Bulgaria, application no. 37346/05, 10 May 2011, 
§ 119; ECtHR, Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, application nos. 48059/06 and 2708/09, 10 May 2011; § 114 
138 ECtHR, W.D. v. Belgium, application no. 73548/13, 6 September 2016, § 164.  
139 ECtHR, Torreggiani  and others v. Italy, application nos. 43517/09, 46882/09, 55400/09, 57875/09, 61535/09, 
35315/10 et 37818/10, 8 January 2013, § 88.  
140 Maria Athanasiu and others v. Romania, application nos. 30767/05 and 33800/06, 12 October 2010, § 219.  
141 ECtHR, Bottazzi v. Italy, application no. 34884/97, 28 July 1999, § 22.  
142 ECtHR, Aslakhanova v. Russia, applications nos. 2944/06 and 8300/07, 50184/07, 332/08, 42509/10, 18 
December 2012, § 212.  
143 ECtHR, Mandić and Jović v. Slovenia, application nos. 5774/10 and 5985/10, 20 October 2011, § 127.  
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Based on this and a myriad of subsequent pilot cases,144 it could be argued that the Court will 
find such a systemic problem by referring to previous case law. The fact that the Court has had 
to pronounce upon the same issue before could here be argued to be proof, showing that the 
underlying issue has been around for some time and affects more than just one person. 
However, the two original full pilot cases – Broniowski and Hutten-Czapska – were the first 
ones of their kind. The more recent case of Kurić is also the first of its kind.145 In several cases 
even, the Court distinguishes the case at hand from these originals by saying that unlike 
Broniowski and Hutten-Czapska, where the Court identified new systemic issues, the Court has 
to render a judgment on an issue which has already entertained.146 Consequently, the fact that 
the issue has already been dealt with by the court or has been around for quite some time will 
not be decisive for the court to find that the issue is widespread or structural. The Court will 
sometimes take previous case law into account to show the duration of the issue and the number 
of victims involved. This is however more a consequence of the systemic nature of the issue, 
than it is an essential factor.147 The wording of the original Broniowski case also makes this 
clear, the systemic nature of the issue will automatically result in a wide-spread victim-base.  
This discussion might create the idea that the existence of a systemic or structural issue  is the 
prerogative of pilot and pilot-like cases. It is important to remember that the finding of the 
existence of a structural of systemic problem does not necessarily lead to the application of the 
pilot judgment procedure. The Court has found the existence of a systemic problem in 
individual cases as well, for instance in MSS v. Belgium and Greece where the Court only 
indirectly hinted towards a systemic problem in Greece. It did so more explicitly in Kharchenko 
v Ukraine.148 Neither of these cases resulted in the application of the pilot judgment procedure. 
Therefore, it can be said that the existence of a systemic issue is a conditio sine qua non for the 
application of the pilot judgment procedure. Finding such an issue in a given case will however 
                                                 
 
144 ECtHR, Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey, application no. 24240/07, 20 March 2012, 65; ECtHR, Glykanzi v. 
Greece, application no. 40150/09, 30 October 2012, § 68; ECtHR, Michelioudakis c Grèce, application no. 
54447/10, 3 April 2012 , § 55; ECtHR, Vassilios Athanasiou et autres v. Greece, application no. 50973/08, 20 
December 2010, § 36; ECtHR, W.D. v. Belgium, application no. 73548/13, 6 September 2016, § 162; ECtHR,  
Ananyev and others v. Russia, application nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, 10 January 2012, § 179; ECtHR, Burdov 
v. Russia (no. 2), application no. 33509/04, 15 January 2009, § 122; ECtHR, Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, 
application nos. 48059/06 and 2708/09, 10 May 2011; § 110; ECtHR, Finger v. Bulgaria, application no. 37346/05, 
10 May 2011, § 115; ECtHR, Gazsó v. Hungary, application no. 48322/12, 16 July 2015,, § 34; ECtHR, Gerasimov 
and others v. Russia, application nos. 29920/05, 3553/06, 18876/10, 61186/10, 21176/11, 36112/11, 36426/11, 
40841/11, 45381/11, 55929/11, 60822/11, 1 July 2014n § 213; ECtHR, Manushaqe Puto and others v. Albania, 
application nos. 604/07, 43628/07, 46684/07 and 34770/09, 31 July 2012, § 108; ECtHR, Maria Athanasiu and 
others v. Romania, application nos. 30767/05 and 33800/06, 12 October 2010, § 215; ECtHR, Neshkov and others 
v. Bulgaria; application nos. 36925/10, 21487/12, 72893/12, 73196/12, 77718/12 and 9717/13, 27 January 2015, 
§ 268; ECtHR, Rumpf v. Germany, application no. 46344/06, 2 September 2010, § 53; ECtHR, Rutkowski and 
others v. Poland, application nos. 72287/10, 13927/11 and 46187/11, 7 July 2015, §§ 203-204; ECtHR, Yuriy 
Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine, application no. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, § 73.  
145 ECtHR, Kurić and others v. Slovenia, application no. 26828/06, 26 June 2012, § 414.  
146 Among others: ECtHR, W.D. v. Belgium, application no. 73548/13, 6 September 2016, § 161; ECtHR, Maria 
Athanasiu and others v. Romania, application nos. 30767/05 and 33800/06, 12 October 2010, § 215; ECtHR, 
Rutkowski and others v. Poland, application nos. 72287/10, 13927/11 and 46187/11, 7 July 2015, § 203.  
147 in contrario to M. SUSI, “The Definition of a ‘Structural Problem’ in the Case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights Since 2010”, German Yearbook of International Law, 2012, 415.  
148 M. SUSI, “The Definition of a ‘Structural Problem’ in the Case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
Since 2010”, German Yearbook of International Law, 2012, 399 + 401.  
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not automatically lead to the application of the procedure. There are therefore other reasons to 
be found in the case law.   
b. The interests of the Court:  is it merely a numbers game?  
From a strict reading of Rule 61, the Court may decide to apply the procedure “where the facts 
of an application reveal in the Contracting Party concerned the existence of a structural or 
systemic problem or other similar dysfunction which has given rise or may give rise to similar 
applications”.149 This clause consists of two separate constitutive concepts, a structural or 
systemic problem and a bulk of applications, linked together in a causal relationship. The Court 
does not define what it considers to be an issue of a systemic character, nor how many similar 
applications are needed to trigger the application of the pilot judgment procedure.  It can further 
be questioned whether these are the only reasons the Court uses to apply the pilot judgment 
procedure.   
The CDDH (the Steering Committee for Human Rights) has in this context connected the 
systemic nature of an issue to the repetitive character of a case before the Court. It clarified that 
repetitive applications are those that arise out of systemic or structural issues at the domestic 
level. The term repetitive then refers to the fact that the Court has in essence already judged 
upon this underlying systemic issue. However, the CDDH stresses that the group of cases 
stemming from systemic issues are not necessarily all repetitive applications. Like in the 
Broniowski case, the Court may be asked to judge on a case revealing a new fact pattern but 
which is in essence capable of resulting in a large group of applications.150   
i Do the numbers matter?  
Indeed, in most pilot cases, the Court does not drift too far off from the original wording of 
Rule 61. In these cases, it explicitly pinpoints as its reason to apply the procedure the existence 
of a systemic or widespread problem151, the number of similar pending applications152 or the 
                                                 
 
149 Rule 61, §1 Rules of Court.  
150 Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), Report containing conclusions and possible proposals for 
action on ways to resolve the large numbers of applications arising from systemic issues identified by the Court, 
CM(2013)93 add6, 11 July 2013, §4.  
151 ECtHR, M.C.  and others v. Italy, application no. 5376/11, 3 September 2013, §113 ; ECtHR, Torreggiani  and 
others v. Italy, application nos. 43517/09, 46882/09, 55400/09, 57875/09, 61535/09, 35315/10 et 37818/10, 8 
January 2013, §87 ; ECtHR, W.D. v. Belgium, application no. 73548/13, 6 September 2016, §163 ; ECtHR, 
Broniowski v. Poland (friendly settlement), application no. 31443/96, 28 September 2005, § 193 ; ECtHR, 
Manushaqe Puto and others v. Albania, application nos. 604/07, 43628/07, 46684/07 and 34770/09, 31 July 2012, 
§107; Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria; application nos. 36925/10, 21487/12, 72893/12, 73196/12, 77718/12 and 
9717/13, 27 January 2015, §268.  
152 ECtHR, Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey, application no. 24240/07, 20 March 2012, § 63-64; ECtHR, M.C.  and 
others v. Italy, application no. 5376/11, 3 September 2013, §112; ECtHR, Michelioudakis c Grèce, application no. 
54447/10, 3 April 2012, §71; ECtHR, Torreggiani  and others v. Italy, application nos. 43517/09, 46882/09, 
55400/09, 57875/09, 61535/09, 35315/10 et 37818/10, 8 January 2013, §89; ECtHR, Vassilios Athanasiou et 
autres v. Greece, application no. 50973/08, 20 December 2010, §51; ECtHR, W.D. v. Belgium, application no. 
73548/13, 6 September 2016, §165; ECtHR, Alisic and others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, 
Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, application no. 60642/08, 16 July 2014, §144; ECtHR,  
Ananyev and others v. Russia, application nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, 10 January 2012, §184; ECtHR, 
Broniowski v. Poland, application no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, § 193; ECtHR, Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), application 
no. 33509/04, 15 January 2009, §133; ECtHR, Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, application nos. 48059/06 and 
2708/09, 10 May 2011, §110; ECtHR, Finger v. Bulgaria, application no. 37346/05, 10 May 2011, §115; ECtHR, 
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risk for future influx of cases153. In this context, it has also more implicitly referenced to the 
number of persons affected by the systemic issue154 and eventually, the risk posed by potentially 
incoming cases to the effectiveness of the Convention system.155  
The Court has however not defined the parameters used to conclude to the structural or systemic 
nature of an issue. Rule 61 states that the systemic nature of the issue is revealed by the facts of 
the case and potentially results in similar applications. We can thus ask whether the decision to 
apply the pilot judgment procedure is in itself merely a numbers game. Indeed, in its case law, 
the Court has concluded that there was a systemic problem because the case at hand was not an 
isolated incident. This was then based on numbers: cases pending at the national and the 
international level, statistics, shortcomings in the authorities’ conduct affecting a large number 
of people, and the numerous previous judgments concerning the issue including the resulting 
decisions by the Committee of Ministers.156  
Former Judge and Registrar at the time of the Broniowski case Mahoney has revealed that for 
him it is a numbers game. He mostly makes the distinction between a leading case and a pilot 
                                                 
 
Gazsó v. Hungary, 16 July 2015, application no. 48322/12, §36; ECtHR, Gerasimov and others v. Russia, 
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476/07, 22539/05, 17911/08 and 13136/07, 28 July 2009, §53; ECtHR, Rumpf v. Germany, application no. 
46344/06, 2 September 2010, §69; ECtHR, Rutkowski and others v. Poland, application nos. 72287/10, 13927/11 
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November 2009, §63; ECtHR, Varga and others v. Hungary, application nos. 14097/12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 
34001/13, 44055/13, and 64586/13, 10 March 2015, §98; ECtHR, Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine, 
application no. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, §86.    
153 ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland (friendly settlement), application no. 31443/96, 28 September 2005, § 35; 
ECtHR, Kurić and others v. Slovenia, application no. 26828/06, 26 June 2012, § 414.  
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Italy, application no. 5376/11, 3 September 2013, § 114 ; ECtHR, Michelioudakis c Grèce, application no. 
54447/10, 3 April 2012, § 64; ECtHR, Vassilios Athanasiou et autres v. Greece, application no. 50973/08, 20 
December 2010, § 44; ECtHR, W.D. v. Belgium, application no. 73548/13, 6 September 2016, § 164; ECtHR, 
Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, application nos. 48059/06 and 2708/09, 10 May 2011, § 109; ECtHR, Gazsó 
v. Hungary, application no. 48322/12, 16 July 2015, §31; ECtHR, Kurić and others v. Slovenia, application no. 
26828/06, 26 June 2012, §413.  
155 ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland, application no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, § 193; ECtHR, Greens and M.T. v. UK, 
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case, based on the number of similar pending or prospected cases. Specifically, he has written 
the following:  
“The Broniowski Judgment makes it clear that this kind of approach is suitable when 
there is a risk of an avalanche of similar cases being lodged with the Strasbourg Court. 
If the position is simply that there is a general problem in the country concerned, then 
what is needed is what is sometimes called a “judgment of principle”, which may have 
consequences elsewhere. But, although the judgment may well settle the issue for many 
other persons in a similar situation in the country concerned (hence a “judgment of 
principle”), it will not necessarily have the characteristics of a “pilot judgment” in the 
Broniowski sense. A pilot judgment in this sense is called for when there are already a 
number of applications pending or there is a risk of a flood of similar applications being 
lodged. The object, as Luzius Wildhaber said, is to prevent that flood”.157 
ii Which numbers are required?  
It does thus seem that the numbers do matter. However, the Court does not specify a minimum 
range with respect to the persons affected in the involved State or the number of pending 
applications. As to the number of pending cases, the Court is mostly relatively specific.  There 
are situations in which over a thousand158 or several hundred159 prima facie meritorious cases 
are pending. Sometimes however, the number of pending cases does not seem to be extremely 
overwhelming. In Hutten-Czapska for instance, the Court had as low as eighteen similar cases 
pending. It mentioned then that only one of these cases involved some 200 landlords.160 Indeed, 
in these situations, the Court will emphasize the potential inflow of future cases as its main 
reason to apply the pilot judgment procedure. There, it will then turn to the number of persons 
potentially affected by the systemic issue.161 With respect to this element, the Court does not 
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158 ECtHR, Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey, application no. 24240/07, 20 March 2012, §64; ECtHR, Alisic and others 
v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
application no. 60642/08, 16 July 2014, §144; ECtHR, Greens and M.T. v. UK, application nos. 60041/08 and 
60054/08, 23 November 2010 , §111; ECtHR, Suljagic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, application no. 27912/02, 3 
November 2009, §63; ECtHR, Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine, application no. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, 
§ 86.  
159 ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland, application no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, §193; ECtHR, Michelioudakis c Grèce, 
application no. 54447/10, 3 April 2012 , §71 ; ECtHR, Vassilios Athanasiou et autres v. Greece, application no. 
50973/08, 20 December 2010, §51; ECtHR,  Ananyev and others v. Russia, application nos. 42525/07 and 
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§133; ECtHR, Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, application nos. 48059/06 and 2708/09, 10 May 2011, §110; 
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no. 48322/12, 16 July 2015, §36; ECtHR, Gerasimov and others v. Russia, application nos. 29920/05, 3553/06, 
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always indicate how many potentially affected persons need to be involved to trigger the pilot 
procedure. However, the approximate numbers range from 600.000 in Hutten-Czapska, over 
70.000 in Greens and M.T., to 13.000 in Kuric.162 Seeing this kind of reasoning, it could be 
concluded that a large number of affected persons plays an important role in the Court’s 
decision to apply the pilot judgment procedure.  
From the interviews in Strasbourg, the number of cases in the bulk is one of the decisive factors 
in the decision to apply the pilot procedure. There are indeed no quantitative criteria with 
respect to how many cases should be pending before the Court or how many previous cases 
have already been decided.163 Some respondents however brought up that the number of cases 
is mostly important from a case-management logic.164 It thus seems that looking at the numbers 
is motivated by efficiency. The respondents also indicated that the numbers were not the only 
factor taken into account. It is mostly a combination of different elements.165  
iii A combination of varying reasons  
Reading its case law thoroughly, the Court has indeed given a multitude of other reasons for its 
decision to apply the pilot judgment procedure. As already discussed, contrary to the literal text 
of Rule 61, it is  incorrect to assume that the pilot judgment procedure will be applied solely in 
situations where the Court is confronted with a widespread problem for the first time. To the 
contrary, in almost all cases, the Court has decided to apply the pilot judgment procedure after 
it had already rendered judgments in similar cases.166 This feature deviates from the original 
template of the pilot judgment procedure, as represented by the early cases of Broniowski and 
Hutten-Czapska. Indeed, the Court in some of these cases even clearly states “unlike Broniowski 
and Hutten-Czapska, […] , in which the failings in the domestic legal order were identified for 
                                                 
 
36925/10, 21487/12, 72893/12, 73196/12, 77718/12 and 9717/13, 27 January 2015, §270; ECtHR, Kurić and 
others v. Slovenia, application no. 26828/06, 26 June 2012, §414.  
162 ECtHR, Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, application no. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, §236; ECtHR, Greens and M.T. 
v. UK, application nos. 60041/08 and 60054/08, 23 November 2010 , §111; ECtHR, Kurić and others v. Slovenia, 
application no. 26828/06, 26 June 2012, §69.  
163 Interview II dd 17.01.2017; Interview I dd 13.01.2017; Interview II dd 13.01.2017; Interview anonymous I; 
Interview II dd 18.01.2017; Interview II dd 16.01.2017.  
164 Interview II dd 16.01.2017; Interview II dd 17.01.2017.  
165 Interview II dd 17.01.2017; Interview II dd 13.01.2017; Interview anonymous I.  
166 ECtHR, Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey, application no. 24240/07, 20 March 2012, §65; ECtHR, Glykanzi v. 
Greece, application no. 40150/09, 30 October 2012, § 71; ECtHR, Michelioudakis c Grèce, application no. 
54447/10, 3 April 2012, §68; ECtHR, Vassilios Athanasiou et autres v. Greece, application no. 50973/08, 20 
December 2010, § 48; ECtHR, W.D. v. Belgium, application no. 73548/13, 6 September 2016, § 161; ECtHR,  
Ananyev and others v. Russia, application nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, 10 January 2012, §184; ECtHR, Burdov 
v. Russia (no. 2), application no. 33509/04, 15 January 2009, § 133; ECtHR, Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, 
application nos. 48059/06 and 2708/09, 10 May 2011, § 110; ECtHR, Finger v. Bulgaria, application no. 37346/05, 
10 May 2011, § 155; ECtHR, Gazsó v. Hungary, 16 July 2015, application no. 48322/12, § 34; ECtHR, Gerasimov 
and others v. Russia, application nos. 29920/05, 3553/06, 18876/10, 61186/10, 21176/11, 36112/11, 36426/11, 
40841/11, 45381/11, 55929/11, 60822/11, 1 July 2014, §213; ECtHR, Manushaqe Puto and others v. Albania, 
application nos. 604/07, 43628/07, 46684/07 and 34770/09, 31 July 2012, § 108; ECtHR, Maria Athanasiu and 
others v. Romania, application nos. 30767/05 and 33800/06, 12 October 2010, § 215; ECtHR, Neshkov and others 
v. Bulgaria; application nos. 36925/10, 21487/12, 72893/12, 73196/12, 77718/12 and 9717/13, 27 January 2015, 
§ 268; ECtHR, Rumpf v. Germany, application no. 46344/06, 2 September 2010, § 64; ECtHR, Rutkowski and 
others v. Poland, application nos. 72287/10, 13927/11 and 46187/11, 7 July 2015, § 203-204; ECtHR, Varga and 
others v. Hungary, application nos. 14097/12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13, and 64586/13, 10 March 
2015, § 98; ECtHR, Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine, application no. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, § 83.  
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the first time, the present case comes to be considered after several judgments in which the 
Court has already found a violation”.167 The fact that an issue has existed for a long time already 
while not enough action has been taken will thus also play a role.168 In fact, the Court has also 
more explicitly mentioned the substantial duration of the widespread problem, or its recurrent 
and persistent nature as one of the reasons to apply the procedure.169 Even more forcefully, the 
Court has cited the fact that the State has not solved a known problem despite substantial and 
consistent case law in the matter.170  
The Court mostly derives its justification from a combination of the abovementioned factors. 
One respondent in this sense explained that the number of cases is not the most important factor, 
it is only imperative for case management purposes. The main issue is that there was 1) a 
structural problem that 2) had persisted for many years that had 3) led already to a number of 
judgments but which did not necessarily highlight the source of these problems and 4) where 
the government was unresponsive to solve this issue.171  
In none of the full pilot cases, there is only one reason to apply the pilot judgment procedure. 
However, with the evolution of the procedure, it seems that the Court has developed a ‘standard 
clause’, which appears almost word-for-word in different pilots. The Court has used this 
following standard clause in Burdov, Finger, Michelioudakis, Vassilios Athanasiou, Dimitrov 
and Hamanav, Gazsó, Gerasimov, Neshkov, and Varga:  
                                                 
 
167 ECtHR, Maria Athanasiu and others v. Romania, application nos. 30767/05 and 33800/06, 12 October 2010, § 
215. A similar idea is also found in ECtHR, Rutkowski and others v. Poland, application nos. 72287/10, 13927/11 
and 46187/11, 7 July 2015, § 203;  
168 This element was also brought up in Interview dd 23.02.2017; Interview II dd 16.01.2017.  
169 ECtHR, Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey, application no. 24240/07, 20 March 2012, § 63; ECtHR, Gerasimov and 
others v. Russia, application nos. 29920/05, 3553/06, 18876/10, 61186/10, 21176/11, 36112/11, 36426/11, 
40841/11, 45381/11, 55929/11, 60822/11, 1 July 2014, § 213; ECtHR, Greens and M.T. v. UK, application nos. 
60041/08 and 60054/08, 23 November 2010, §112; ECtHR, Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria; application nos. 
36925/10, 21487/12, 72893/12, 73196/12, 77718/12 and 9717/13, 27 January 2015, §271;  ECtHR, Michelioudakis 
c Grèce, application no. 54447/10, 3 April 2012, § 64 ; ECtHR, Vassilios Athanasiou et autres v. Greece, 
application no. 50973/08, 20 December 2010, § 44; ECtHR, Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, application nos. 
48059/06 and 2708/09, 10 May 2011, § 109; ECtHR, Finger v. Bulgaria, application no. 37346/05, 10 May 2011, 
§ 114; ECtHR, Gazsó v. Hungary, application no. 48322/12, 16 July 2015, § 31; ECtHR, Gerasimov and others v. 
Russia, application nos. 29920/05, 3553/06, 18876/10, 61186/10, 21176/11, 36112/11, 36426/11, 40841/11, 
45381/11, 55929/11, 60822/11, 1 July 2014, § 218; ECtHR, Manushaqe Puto and others v. Albania, application 
nos. 604/07, 43628/07, 46684/07 and 34770/09, 31 July 2012, § 109; ECtHR, Maria Athanasiu and others v. 
Romania, application nos. 30767/05 and 33800/06, 12 October 2010, § 216; ECtHR, Neshkov and others v. 
Bulgaria; application nos. 36925/10, 21487/12, 72893/12, 73196/12, 77718/12 and 9717/13, 27 January 2015, § 
271; ECtHR, Olaru and others v. Moldova, application nos. 476/07, 22539/05, 17911/08 and 13136/07, 28 July 
2009, § 56; ECtHR, Rumpf v. Germany, application no. 46344/06, 2 September 2010, § 53; ECtHR, Varga and 
others v. Hungary, application nos. 14097/12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13, and 64586/13, 10 March 
2015, § 100; ECtHR, Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine, application no. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, § 73.  
170 ECtHR, W.D. v. Belgium, application no. 73548/13, 6 September 2016, § 161; ECtHR, Gazsó v. Hungary, 16 
July 2015, application no. 48322/12, § 35; ECtHR, Greens and M.T. v. UK, application nos. 60041/08 and 
60054/08, 23 November 2010, § 112; ECtHR, Maria Athanasiu and others v. Romania, application nos. 30767/05 
and 33800/06, 12 October 2010, § 216; ECtHR, Rumpf v. Germany, application no. 46344/06, 2 September 2010, 
§ 68; ECtHR, Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine, application no. 40450/04, 15 October 2009 , § 74.  
171 Interview II dd 16.01.2017; the level of cooperation of the State will be discussed below in “The intersection 
of efficiency and accessibility: was the problem solved in reality?” starting from page 182.  
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“Taking into account the recurrent and persistent nature of  the problem, the large number 
of people it has affected or is capable of affecting, and the urgent need to grant them speedy 
and appropriate redress at the domestic level, the Court considers it appropriate to apply 
the pilot-judgment procedure in the present case.”172 
This use of a standard practice in its case law makes it clear that for the Court, the numbers are 
not the sole decisive criterion to decide to the existence of a systemic issue warranting the 
application of the pilot judgment procedure. It can be argued that there are three additional 
overarching goals behind the Court’s decision in this respect: the principle of subsidiarity, the 
Court’s regard for the interests of the applicants in these cases and the level of cooperation 
exhibited by the involved State.  
c. Do the interests of the States matter? The principle of subsidiarity  
The first one of these overarching goals is the emphasis that the Court places on the principle 
of subsidiarity that underpins the Convention.173 The principle of subsidiarity signifies that the 
primary responsibility for ensuring respect for human rights rests with the States. The Court 
only has the competence to interfere if they fail to do so.174 Former President of the Court, Jean-
Paul Costa, has explained that under the subsidiarity principle “States must comply with the 
Court's case law and make sure that judgments of the Court are adequately executed, notably 
by adopting the appropriate general measures and by taking remedial action in respect of cases 
which could give rise to similar issues”.175 The principle thus assumes that human rights are 
respected by national authorities and if not, that there are domestic remedies in place. The fact 
that there are such high numbers of repetitive cases indicates that the principle of subsidiarity 
is not working properly.176  
The principle of subsidiarity follows from the division of competences between the Committee 
of Ministers, the Court and the States Parties. States are attributed the primary responsibility to 
respect, protect and fulfil human rights as enshrined in the Convention. The Court must interpret 
the Convention and monitor the States’ compliance with their obligations. The Committee of 
                                                 
 
172 ECtHR, Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), application no. 33509/04, 15 January 2009, §130; ECtHR, Finger v. Bulgaria, 
application no. 37346/05, 10 May 2011, §114; ECtHR, Michelioudakis c Grèce, application no. 54447/10, 3 April 
2012, §64; ECtHR, Vassilios Athanasiou et autres v. Greece, application no. 50973/08, 20 December 2010, §44; 
ECtHR, Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, application nos. 48059/06 and 2708/09, 10 May 2011, §109; ECtHR, 
Gazsó v. Hungary, application no. 48322/12, 16 July 2015, §31; ECtHR, Gerasimov and others v. Russia, 
application nos. 29920/05, 3553/06, 18876/10, 61186/10, 21176/11, 36112/11, 36426/11, 40841/11, 45381/11, 
55929/11, 60822/11, 1 July 2014, §218; ECtHR, Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria; application nos. 36925/10, 
21487/12, 72893/12, 73196/12, 77718/12 and 9717/13, 27 January 2015, §271; ECtHR, Varga and others v. 
Hungary, application nos. 14097/12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13, and 64586/13, 10 March 2015, 
§100.  
173 The principle of subsidiarity will also be looked at in a wider discussion concerning the relationship between 
the Court and the states in a following sub-chapter starting from page 82.  
174 H. KELLER, A. FISCHER, D. KÜHNE, “Debating the Future of the European Court of Human Rights after the 
Interlaken Confeence: Two Innovative Proposals”, The European Journal of International Law, 2011, 1031.  
175 J.P. COSTA, Memorandum of the President of the European Court of Human Rights to the States with a view to 
Preparing the Interlaken Conference, 3 July 2009.  
176 H. KELLER, A. FISCHER, D. KÜHNE, “Debating the Future of the European Court of Human Rights after the 
Interlaken Confeence: Two Innovative Proposals”, The European Journal of International Law, 2011, 1031.  
THE PILOT JUDGMENT PROCEDURE AT THE ECTHR: AN EVALUATION IN THE LIGHT OF PROCEDURAL 
EFFICIENCY AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE  
49 
 
Ministers then oversees the execution of judgments of the Court by the States.177 Since the 
principle is not explicitly written into the Convention, its scope has become clear through the 
Court’s jurisprudence. The Court has thus interpreted the principle in the context of pilot 
judgments.  
In the case of Gerasimov and Others v. Russia, the Court mentioned that it would not be the 
best way to achieve the Convention’s purpose to repeatedly find several violations in similar 
individual cases. It found that the pilot judgment procedure appears to be the most effective 
way to assist States to find appropriate solutions on the one hand, and the Committee of 
Ministers with supervising the execution of these solutions on the other hand.178 It further 
justified its application of the pilot judgment procedure as follows: “the Court does not have 
the capacity, nor is it  appropriate to its function as an international court, to adjudicate on 
large numbers of cases which require the finding of basic facts or the calculation of monetary 
compensation – both of which should, as a matter of principle and effective practice, be the 
domain of domestic jurisdictions […]”.179  Also in other cases, it has emphasized the Court’s 
role in assisting States to find a solution to the underlying systemic problem from which the 
case at hand originated.180 Interestingly, in the friendly settlement judgment of the Broniowski 
case, the Court even Stated that “the pilot judgment procedure is primarily designed to assist 
the Contracting States in fulfilling their role in the Convention system by resolving such 
problems at national level […]”.181  
This kind of reasoning, taken together with the other justifications offered by the Court, may 
indicate that it is indeed not only thinking about efficiency when applying the pilot judgment 
procedure. The abovementioned rationales signal that the Court is also very much concerned 
with reasons referring to the principle of subsidiarity underpinning the Convention.  From this 
focus and the text of the Convention, the Convention’s purpose referred to in the case of 
Gerasimov and Others v. Russia seems to be the maintenance and further realization of human 
rights by the State, assisted through monitoring by the Court and the Committee of Ministers.182 
This is completely in line with the principle of subsidiarity.  
This conclusion is also supported by the empirical research carried out in the framework of this 
thesis. Several respondents at the Court have emphasized the role of the State in the context of 
article 46 of the Convention and have placed the pilot judgment procedure in the center of 
                                                 
 
177 Article 46 ECHR. The principle of subsidiarity in the context of the balance of competences within the Council 
of Europe will be discussed more in depth below on page 82. 
178 ECtHR, Gerasimov and others v. Russia, application nos. 29920/05, 3553/06, 18876/10, 61186/10, 21176/11, 
36112/11, 36426/11, 40841/11, 45381/11, 55929/11, 60822/11, 1 July 2014, § 218.  
179 ECtHR, Gerasimov and others v. Russia, application nos. 29920/05, 3553/06, 18876/10, 61186/10, 21176/11, 
36112/11, 36426/11, 40841/11, 45381/11, 55929/11, 60822/11, 1 July 2014, § 207; emphasis added.   
180 ECtHR,  Ananyev and others v. Russia, application nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, 10 January 2012, §190; 
ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland, application no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, § 194; ECtHR, Greens and M.T. v. UK, 
application nos. 60041/08 and 60054/08, 23 November 2010, § 112.  
181 ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland (friendly settlement), application no. 31443/96, 28 September 2005, § 35; 
emphasis added.   
182 Combined reading of articles 1 and 46, and the Preamble, §3 of the Convention with ECtHR, Gerasimov and 
others v. Russia, application nos. 29920/05, 3553/06, 18876/10, 61186/10, 21176/11, 36112/11, 36426/11, 
40841/11, 45381/11, 55929/11, 60822/11, 1 July 2014, § 207 + § 218.  
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subsidiarity. The abovementioned ‘reasoning of self-preservation’ employed in the Broniowski 
case fits within this viewpoint.183  
There are different elements of the pilot judgment procedure which point towards the 
importance of subsidiarity. Firstly, the subsidiarity principle means that applicants should have 
access to remedies at home, meaning in their domestic legal system. This idea is translated in 
the pilot judgment procedure with the freezing of similar applications and sending them back 
to be dealt with domestically after the set-up of an available remedy as part of the general 
measures.184 Certainly with respect to property cases involving determinations concerning a 
suitable amount for just satisfaction, some respondents have posed that national courts are better 
placed than an international court such as the European Court of Human Rights.185  
Secondly, one respondent linked subsidiarity to judicial efficiency by referring to the pilot case 
of Varga v. Hungary186.  
“So this is the dilemma now, because the more you do, the more you receive cases from 
applicants. Because everybody turns to the court for relief. Whereas the Court's role is 
subsidiary and it is the primary responsibility of the contracting States to provide a 
resolution to a national malfunction identified by the Court.”187 
Thirdly, the pilot judgment procedure fits within a broader legal-philosophical discussion 
concerning the Council of Europe mechanism. As already explained above starting from page 
37, there is a discussion going on concerning the role of the Court: is it intended primarily for 
individual justice – risking that it turns into a small claims court - or does it have to focus on 
setting human rights standards alone – meaning that it takes on a constitutional role?188 The 
procedure ensures through the use of the principle of subsidiarity that the Court goes back to its 
original role under article 19 of the Convention. This article spells out that the Court was set up 
“[t]o ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in 
the Convention and the Protocols thereto (…)”189 One respondent explained that the pilot 
judgment procedure shifts responsibility back to the State for providing general remedial 
                                                 
 
183 Interview I dd 17.01.2017.  
184 Interview dd 11.01.2017; Interview II dd 18.01.2017 
185 Interview II dd 18.01.2017; Interview III dd 13.01.2017.  
186 In this case, similar pending applications were initially not adjourned. Seeing the success of the case, this had 
attracted more applicants which made the case actually less efficient in the long term for the Court. The case will 
be discussed more in-depth below in the context of efficiency in “The shadow side of efficiency: attraction of new 
cases due to the pilot procedure” starting from page 130.   
187 Interview III dd 13.01.2017.  
188 In favour of a more constitutional role for the Court are Steven Greer and former Judge at the ECtHR Luzius 
Wildhaber, joined by Rick Lawson. Former ECtHR Judge Françoise Tulkens represents the other side of the 
debate, she emphasizes the importance of individual justice here. See: S. GREER, L. WILDHABER, “Revisiting the 
Debate about ‘constitutionalising’ the European Court of Human Rights”, 12 HRLR, 2013; R. LAWSON, “De mythe 
van het moeten. The Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens en 800 miljoen klagers”, 28 NJCM, 2003; N. 
VAN LEUVEN, “’Het E.H.R.M. mag niet beschouwd worden als een fabriek, die men draaiende moet houden’ 
Interview met Françoise Tulkens, rechter in het Europees Hof van de Rechten van de Mens in Straatsburg”, 
Interview with Françoise Tulkens in 1 TvMR, 2003; H. DURIEUX, A. JOYE, “Het laatste duwtje. TvMR sprak met 
Françoise Tulkens, vicevoorzitter van het EHRM”, Interview with Françoise Tulkens in 9 TvMR, 2011.  
189 Article 19 ECHR.  
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measures. The Court must ensure observance of human rights but that does not mean that 
repetitive findings of the same violation would help. For this person, it is all about subsidiarity:  
“the purpose is to ensure that the States secure rights in accordance with the 
convention, secondly that the court is able to perform its functions under article 19 
which means simply not having delays and being able to handle meritorious cases, 
warranting examination which are put aside if you are inundated by masses of similar 
cases.”190  
Another respondent contrasted the principle of subsidiarity with the applicants’ rights in the 
context of the combined reading of articles 19 and 41191 of the Convention:  
“On the one hand, the pilot-judgment procedure keeps the Court to its proper role, which 
is not to substitute itself for the national authorities in taking over the task of dealing with 
the nitty gritty of many identical cases, perhaps thousands and thousands.  The Strasbourg 
Court was not set up with the intention of its converting itself into a small-claims court in 
the place of the national courts. I would agree that, at first blush, there is some virtue in the 
argument that all victims of the same violation should receive equal treatment.  “Why,” it 
is asked, “should the first applicant receive better treatment from the Strasbourg Court than 
the other, following victims of the same violation?”  If one looks closer, however, the virtue 
of the argument about equality of treatment of applicants is more apparent than real.  What 
is worse, it is capable of undermining the effectiveness of the whole Convention system.  The 
whole point of the mission of the Court is to ensure that the Contracting States keep to their 
undertakings. It is not to give as much financial compensation to as many victims as 
possible. That is not the mission of the Court. That is how I read Article 19 (why the Court 
was established) and Article 41 (the Court’s power to award just satisfaction).192  
During the interviews, some respondents have uttered the idea that having a pilot judgment 
procedure could be in the involved State’s interests, independently of the subsidiary principle. 
One respondent mentioned that:  
“There is also a tendency from a few States who have a preference to have a pilot judgment 
in order to gain time. (…)later experiences showed that the States want to have a pilot 
judgment in order to have two three four more years at their disposal.”193 
It is not only time which is an argument in favour of the pilot judgment procedure from the 
viewpoint of States. Another respondent explained that one specific State might strategically 
have opted for a pilot case in order to have less violations to its name. 194  
                                                 
 
190 Interview I dd 16.01.2017.  
191 Article 41 of the Convention provides the basis for applicants to request just satisfaction from the state.  
192 Interview anonymous II.  
193 Interview I dd 18.01.2017.  
194 Interview II dd 18.01.2017.  
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d. Do the interests of the applicants matter?  
In addition, the Court in its reasoning to apply the procedure seems to take into account the 
rights of the victims of these systemic human rights violations. It does so based on a number of 
different factors.  
i The interests of all victims involved  
The Court does not only focus on the applicants in the chosen pilot cases, but sometimes also 
refers to the interests of the larger pool of victims. Indeed, in almost all full pilot cases, the 
Court has justified its procedural choice partly on the basis of the urgent need to offer redress 
to all the persons involved.195 One respondent has labelled the aim of compensating the victims 
and seeing the government taking measures in this respect as the main objective of the 
procedure.196 The Court further has even gone so far as to label the pilot judgment procedure 
as the most speedy and effective resolution of a structural dysfunction affecting a fundamental 
right in the national legal order.197 Furthermore, the Court has also referred to the gravity of the 
issue, which in that particular case amounted to a de facto denial of justice, as a reason for the 
application of the pilot judgment procedure.198 The fact that the applicants in the national legal 
order had been denied compensation for a considerable amount of time also convinced the court 
in one case.199  
ii The right to compensation  
The interests of the applicants of the pilot case itself are most evidently served with respect to 
the finding of the violation itself and with the granting of compensation as a result. However, 
as shown above, the full pilot procedure as described by Luzius Wildhaber generally reserves 
the question of just satisfaction under article 41 for determination at a later date.200 In some 
pilot cases however, the Court has decided to not reserve this determination and go ahead with 
the analysis of the applicants’ just satisfaction claim under article 41. In the case of Manushaque 
                                                 
 
195 ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland (friendly settlement), application no. 31443/96, 28 September 2005, § 35; 
ECtHR, Glykanzi v. Greece, application no. 40150/09, 30 October 2012, § 67; ECtHR, M.C.  and others v. Italy, 
application no. 5376/11, 3 September 2013, § 115 ; ECtHR, Michelioudakis c Grèce, application no. 54447/10, 3 
April 2012, § 64; ECtHR, Torreggiani  and others v. Italy, application nos. 43517/09, 46882/09, 55400/09, 
57875/09, 61535/09, 35315/10 et 37818/10, 8 January 2013, § 90; ECtHR, Vassilios Athanasiou et autres v. 
Greece, application no. 50973/08, 20 December 2010, § 44 ; ECtHR,  Ananyev and others v. Russia, application 
nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, 10 January 2012, § 190; ECtHR, Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), application no. 33509/04, 
15 January 2009, § 130; ECtHR, Finger v. Bulgaria, application nos. 48059/06 and 2708/09, 10 May 2011, § 109; 
ECtHR, Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, application nos. 48059/06 and 2708/09, 10 May 2011, § 114; ECtHR, 
Gazsó v. Hungary, application no. 48322/12, 16 July 2015, § 31; ECtHR, Gerasimov and others v. Russia, 
application nos. 29920/05, 3553/06, 18876/10, 61186/10, 21176/11, 36112/11, 36426/11, 40841/11, 45381/11, 
55929/11, 60822/11, 1 July 2014, § 218; ECtHR, Manushaqe Puto and others v. Albania, application nos. 604/07, 
43628/07, 46684/07 and 34770/09, 31 July 2012, § 109; ECtHR, Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria; application nos. 
36925/10, 21487/12, 72893/12, 73196/12, 77718/12 and 9717/13, 27 January 2015, § 271; ECtHR, Rumpf v. 
Germany, application no. 46344/06, 2 September 2010, §62; ECtHR, Varga and others v. Hungary, application 
nos. 14097/12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13, and 64586/13, 10 March 2015, § 100.  
196 Interview I dd 20.01.2017.  
197 ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland (friendly settlement), application no. 31443/96, 28 September 2005, § 35.  
198 ECtHR, Michelioudakis v. Greece, application no. 54447/10, 3 April 2012, § 72 ; ECtHR, Vassilios Athanasiou 
et autres v. Greece, application no. 50973/08, 20 December 2010, § 52.  
199 ECtHR, Kurić and others v. Slovenia, application no. 26828/06, 26 June 2012, § 412.  
200 For Wildhaber’s definition, see page 22 and further.  
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Puto v. Albania, the applicants even expressly requested the Court to not reserve the 
determination under article 41. They did so because they were very sceptical about the utility 
of the application of the pilot judgment procedure in itself. The Court had indeed already 
requested general measures under article 46 in previous leading cases in order to address the 
problem of non-enforcement of administrative decisions providing compensation for 
confiscated property. The Albanian government had reacted to this with “promises to draft 
unrealistic and ineffective action plans”.201 The Court granted the applicants’ request and 
ordered the State to pay them just satisfaction.202 The applicants had further specifically 
requested to not adjourn the already communicated cases, a request which was also granted by 
the Court.203 One respondent explained this decision from the side of the Court and stated that 
they did not want to discriminate among the larger pool of victims. In order to be fair with 
everybody, they decided to keep dealing with the remaining cases submitted until the moment 
the judgment in Manushaqe Puto became final. For the other cases which might be brought 
after that moment, the Court would wait and see whether general measures would be put in 
place by the State. 204 
iii The decision to adjourn similar pending cases  
The interests of the applicants of pending and future cases has become the most apparent in the 
Court’s decision concerning the freezing of similar cases. As shown above, the Court will not 
always decide to adjourn pending or incoming cases.205 It seems that in pilot cases involving 
sub-standard conditions of detention contrary to article 3 ECHR, the Court will refrain from 
adjourning pending cases.206 For instance, it has refused to do so in the case of Ananyev v. 
Russia in which it clearly stated that it would be unfair to the other applicants if they, after 
having  “suffered through periods of detention in allegedly inhuman or degrading conditions 
and, in the absence of an effective domestic remedy, sought relief in this Court, were compelled 
yet again to resubmit their grievances to the domestic authorities, be it on the grounds of a new 
remedy or otherwise.” As a plus-side to the continued examination of pending similar cases, 
the Court considers that this would act as a constant reminder to the State to take the necessary 
measures.207 The decision of the Court not to adjourn cases as a way to put pressure on the State 
to solve the underlying issue was also raised by a respondent at the Court.208 Another respondent 
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however questioned this idea by stating that “if the purpose is to encourage the State to quickly 
adopt general measures, then there is little sense in processing cases.”209 
This principled approach concerning the non-adjournment of article 3 issues is justified by the 
Court based on “the fundamental nature of the right protected under article 3 and the 
importance and urgency of complaints about inhuman or degrading treatment”.210 The Court 
does however sometimes adjourn cases involving article 3 claims, such as in W.D. v. Belgium 
and with respect to the non-communicated cases in Torreggiani v. Italy.211 It has however not 
provided an express reasoning for deciding differently in these cases. With respect to the 
Torreggiani case, one respondent explained that these cases were adjourned because firstly, the 
cases would not have been dealt with within a year because of a shortage of Italian lawyers in 
the Registry and secondly, because positive steps are already being taken by the Italian 
government.212 In short, due to the circumstances these cases would thus have been dealt with 
quicker nationally than at the Court. Contrary, in the case of Greens and M.T. v. UK, the Court 
assessed the applicants’ interests in deciding to adjourn their pending cases. In this case, the 
Court found a violation based on a blanket ban for prisoners to vote. It then stated that it would 
not be detrimental to the applicants in similar cases to have their cases frozen. No individual 
examination of their cases is necessary, seeing the nature of the underlying issue. Furthermore, 
no financial compensation is necessary as the only real compensation possible in this instance 
is declaratory in nature.213 
There does indeed not seem to be agreement within the Court concerning the question whether 
cases can or can’t be adjourned when they involve article 3 violations. Some respondents at the 
Court opined that adjournment of pending cases has nothing to do with the underlying issue.214 
Others however take the principled approach that article 3 cases cannot be adjourned.215 To put 
it in the words of one of the respondents: “You cannot bargain the case if the applicant is not 
out of the violating conditions.”216 Adjourning or not adjourning further is based on the level of 
cooperation of the State involved217, the national circumstances and the burden represented by 
the bulk of similar cases on the Court’s docket218. 
iv Friendly settlements and unilateral declarations  
In some cases, the Court hints towards the use of friendly settlements and unilateral declarations 
by the State concerning pending cases. The Court here clarifies that the State’s action should 
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primarily be aimed at finding a solution to the underlying systemic issue. However, in the 
meantime, it could also take what the court calls ad hoc solutions.219 As friendly settlement 
procedures are intrinsically more a working method for the Court than they are a procedural 
tool for settlement220, this suggestion seems to be the Court dividing responsibilities between 
itself and the States with respect to this group of applicants which have already come to the 
Court. The Court has mentioned this option both in cases where it has adjourned a group of 
pending cases – such as in W.D. v. Belgium and Gaszó v. Hungary - , as well as when it hasn’t 
adjourned them. An example of the latter situation is the case of Rutkowski v. Poland, in which 
the Court had identified two systemic problems in the context of excessive length of procedures 
in Poland: the Polish court’s fragmentation of procedures when calculating their length and the 
practical difficulties faced by the victims of these violations in securing compensation. The 
Court had indicated in its pilot judgment that it would not adjourn the pending cases but would 
instead offer the Polish State a term of two years to offer redress to this group of applicants, 
through friendly settlements or ‘unilateral remedial offers’.221 The Polish State then went 
forward with unilateral declarations comprising both individual and general measures.222 The 
settlements put forward in these unilateral declarations were not accepted by all applicants. The 
applicants who did not accept argued before the Court that their cases involved particular 
circumstances which warranted they be awarded a significantly higher sum in compensation. 
The Court however emphasized that it is an international court whose “principal task it is to 
secure the respect for human rights, rather than compensate applicants’ losses minutely and 
exhaustively. Unlike in national jurisdictions, the emphasis of the Court’s activity is on passing 
public judgments that set human rights standards across Europe.”223 With this, the Court’s 
seems to indicate that its role is constitutional rather than to provide individual financial relief.  
e. Decisive factor in applying the pilot procedure: cooperation of the State?  
From the way that the procedure is designed and the backdrop of heightened attention for the 
subsidiarity principle in the context of its creation, it is clear that the level of cooperation coming 
from the involved State will be decisive for its success.224 The cooperation of national 
authorities is imperative in all cases before the Court, but with pilot judgments this element is 
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even more important.225 The pilot judgment procedure is in principle supported by the States 
parties of the Council of Europe, as evidenced by its endorsement in the Brussels Declaration.226  
i Cooperation of State authorities  
Contrary to this general expression of political endorsement, the willingness of governments to 
cooperate in specific pilot cases has been termed by Luzius Wildhaber as the procedure’s most 
fundamental problem.227 State cooperation takes up varying forms.  
(i) State’s initial reaction to the application of the pilot procedure in a specific 
case 
From very early on, non-cooperation has been a factor taken into account by the Court. This is 
apparent from the practice, which eventually was written into the rule, of asking the parties to 
submit their views concerning the application of the procedure with the communication of the 
case.228 States have reacted in different ways. In some cases, the State remained neutral. The 
Greek government for instance wished not to pronounce itself on the question of the application 
of the procedure in Vassilios Athanasiou and others.229 The Italian government in Torreggiani 
simply stated that it was not opposing, simultaneously stressing that it was already doing 
something about the issue at hand.230 The Bulgarian government in the Neshkov case recognized 
the issue with respect to sub-standard prison conditions. Unfortunately, the State immediately 
clarified that budgetary issues would stand in the way of bringing these conditions up to 
standard.231  
However, when looking at the whole of the full pilots, it becomes clear that in 60% of cases, 
States oppose the application of the procedure.232 They resist for different reasons. Mostly, these 
States argued that there was no problem at all233, or that the nature of the issue was not systemic. 
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234 Along with some other technical reasons235, States also sometimes contended that the 
procedure in their case is not necessary as the problem was already solved on the national level 
or because remedies are already underway.236 
(ii) The cooperation of the State as criterion to apply the pilot procedure 
Next, the question can be raised whether the Court out of pragmatic considerations will take 
the will of States into account in deciding to apply the full pilot procedure, or merely resorting 
to the toned-down version of the quasi-pilot. In the Sejdovic case for instance, the Court decided 
not to apply the full pilot procedure because there were already new laws underway and it first 
wanted to see what the result of those new laws would be, a point raised by the Italian 
government.237 In the end, it would however take over a decade for the case to be closed through 
a Final Resolution of the Committee of Ministers.238 In the case of Aslakhanova and others v. 
Russia – a case concerning the lack of proper investigations into forced disappearances in 
Chechnya and Ingushetia – the Court concluded to not apply the full pilot procedure as well. 
As was the case in Sejdovic, the Court did say that the issue at hand was clearly systemic, for 
which there was no domestic remedy.239 It did however recognize that the problems involved 
are too complex so that it was not in a position to order exact general and individual measures, 
nor to set a time-limit. Instead, the Court gave some guidance as to what direction these 
measures should go in and referred the matter to the Committee of Ministers to indicate in 
practical terms which measures would be required from the Russian State.240 The Aslakhanova 
case from 2012 has not yet been executed by the Russian Government, with the Committee of 
Minister’s last interim decision requesting the government for more information in order to 
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show that these forced disappearances are no longer taking place and past occurrences are being 
investigated.241  
It has been argued in the literature that the Court will decide not to apply the pilot judgment 
procedure with respect to politically sensitive issues, by reason of safeguarding the State’s 
discretionary powers on the one hand, and minimizing the risk of non-execution on the other.242 
It could thus be claimed that the reason why these quasi-pilot cases are not as successful as the 
full pilots is because the Court is tipping the scale in its favour beforehand. However, seeing 
the involved States’ resistance to the application of the pilot judgment procedure mentioned 
above, this seems to be an argument that can easily be rebutted.   
During the course of the interviews, it became abundantly clear that the level of cooperation of 
States is one of the primordial factors taken into account by the Registry to decide to propose a 
certain case for pilot judgment treatment.243 One respondent explained that they will only take 
the risk of having to work through this heavy procedure when all criteria seem to be fulfilled, 
including the good will of the government. Since this kind of procedure is tough for the involved 
lawyers and time-consuming for all parties involved, there is a need to anticipate the results of 
the pilot procedure.244 
ii Involvement of domestic Constitutional and Supreme Courts 
In eight of the full pilot cases, the Court refers to the findings of national Constitutional and 
Supreme Courts confirming the existence and the systemic nature of problem at the national 
level.245 In the Broniowski case, the Polish Constitutional Court had already marked the Bug 
River legislation as “causing an inadmissible systemic dysfunction”, a wording which was used 
by the Court to show the systemic nature of the issue in front of it.246 Furthermore, in the case 
of Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, the Court even refers to the recommendations made by the Polish 
Constitutional Court in its indication of general measures to the State.247 Half of these cases 
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have already been executed.248 The other four cases are considerably new.249 It seems thus that 
the involvement of a national Constitutional or Supreme Court might have a positive influence 
on the level of cooperation or willingness to execute of the involved States. 
One respondent emphasized the importance of the national Constitutional Courts in several 
pilot and quasi-pilot cases and how the Court has benefitted from their involvement:  
“This is visible in Broniowski and also in Burdov (no.2). In both pilot judgment procedures, 
we see that the role of the constitutional court was extremely important. In Broniowski, it 
was the constitutional court of Poland who was involved in the development of the national 
legislation as a tool for overcoming the systemic problem. Another positive example of 
dialogue between a national court and our Court is the semi-pilot judgment of Lukenda v. 
Slovenia. The first signals for systemic problems were in fact raised by the constitutional 
court of Slovenia at that time. This is visible also in Kuric, because it was the constitutional 
court who raised the problem of national legislation which is not in line with human rights 
. And for us, these elements were a perfect basis in our analysis. These are for me best 
examples of a pilot judgment procedure.”250 
f. Conclusion: the decision to apply the pilot judgment procedure 
It is evident from the above that the Court takes into account a myriad of factors when deciding 
to apply the pilot judgment procedure. This is due to the fact that the pilot judgment procedure 
brings many viewpoints and dynamics together.  
Firstly, the nature of the issue involved is relevant if it creates or is capable of creating a high 
influx of similar cases. This need for efficiency prompts the Court to address it in an efficient 
manner. Out of efficiency considerations, the Court does not want – nor is it able – to address 
all of these cases individually. It does thus seem that the numbers play an important role in the 
Court’s decision to apply the pilot judgment procedure.   
Secondly, seeing that the principle of subsidiarity underpinning the Convention states that 
securing the protection of human rights is first and foremost the duty of the States, it is a useful 
ally in deciding to apply the procedure. The Court uses this reasoning in order to shift 
responsibility back to the States. In this manner, it is making sure that it can guard its own role 
of setting human rights standards for the Council of Europe Member States, rather than 
affording individual financial relief similar to a small-claims court.  
Thirdly, the applicants’ interests come into play more out of moral considerations. A certain 
faction within the Court is for instance convinced that similar applications may not be adjourned 
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in article 3 cases. The Court has further termed the pilot judgment procedure as the most speedy 
and effective solution for the victims of large-scale human rights violations. The rights of the 
larger victim pool are further linked to it’s own efficient functioning through the solving of the 
underlying systemic problem. When the underlying problem is solved and the State is asked to 
set up a domestic remedy for the persons already harmed, this larger victim pool is addressed 
while the Court is also not confronted with an influx of similar cases anymore.  
Lastly, the cooperation of the State however is a factor which is not expressly mentioned in the 
case law but is highly decisive, based on the empirical data. The Court will not risk its own 
legitimacy due to persistent non-execution, as well as the hard work needed to bring this 
procedure to a good end. All of these factors have their role to play in the decision of the Court 
to apply the procedure.  
2. The choice of the specific pilot case 
When the Court considers to apply the pilot judgment procedure in a certain situation, it will 
select a case through which to diagnose the issue. There is no known procedure through which 
the Court officially selects a pilot. Further, from the interviews in Strasbourg it turns out that 
there are multiple criteria which come into play in this decision.  
a. One pilot or a combination of cases?  
In twelve of the twenty-eight full pilot cases, the Court has selected a combination of cases to 
serve as the pilot in that instance.251 Focussing on a selection of cases, rather than betting on 
one horse thus seems to be part the Court’s general practice.252  
The reasons for choosing to select a combination of cases vary. In the case of Kurić v. Slovenia, 
the selection of multiple cases proved important. The lead applicant originally was a Mr. 
Makuc. He however died, resulting in Mr. Kurić becoming the lead applicant.253 In the 
Gerasimov case, the Court revealed another reason to elect multiple cases to act as the pilot. It 
specified that it had chosen a selection of cases in order to reflect the underlying systemic issue 
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better.254 The Court specified that its selection of cases in this case represented a variety of 
situations, the vulnerability of the people affected by them, the vast territory of Russia on which 
the same recurrent problems arise and the persistence of those problems in time.255 This 
preference to combine some cases in order to create a pilot was affirmed by several respondents 
in Strasbourg.256  
b. Criteria for selecting the pilot(s).  
The criteria for selecting a pilot case were discussed during the interviews in Strasbourg, which 
resulted in a myriad of different parameters which are taken into account. One respondent 
defined the right case as a case which illustrates the underlying problems, is not going to be lost 
for failure to comply with the six month rule257 and in which the applicants are legally 
represented.258 Another respondent focusses on the following questions: how important was the 
case on the national level; how well is it defended; is the core violation in the centre of the 
complaint? The considerations thus seems to centre on technical criteria.259 Another respondent 
with considerable experience explained the thought-process as follows:  
“We choose cases so that we deal with all particular problems which might arise. We 
deal with them in one judgment but we cover all legal issues that might come in follow-
up cases. This is the main criterion. We choose the best example! We even pay attention 
to the name of the applicants. We also check whether the applicant is represented by a 
lawyer and we look at the quality of the application submitted.”260  
Legal representation as a criterion was mentioned by others as well.261 However, there is no 
agreement on this. Some respondents expressly denied that legal representation or the quality 
thereof played a role in the selection of a case as the pilot.262 
The level of representation offered by the pilot case might pose problems in practice. For 
instance, in the case of Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, the government argued against the pilot 
procedure claiming that the chosen case was not representative of the problem at hand.263 One 
respondent explained in this context:  
“The governments are never pleased with the choice of case. When you follow the 
observations, you will see that generally they contest the application of the pilot judgment 
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procedure. One of the arguments is that the case does not reveal a typical situation. You 
will find it in Hutten-Czapska. So the best solution to my mind is to select a few cases. That's 
why on the list [of pilot cases] you will see there is always a second or third case. This is a 
question of certain prudence.”264 
In conclusion, the Court tends to select a group of cases which reflect the underlying system 
well in all its facets. In selecting this group, the Court mostly focuses on technical criteria, such 
as the admissibility of the case, whether the applicants have legal representation and sometimes 
even whether that legal representation delivers qualitative submissions concerning the systemic 
nature of the underlying issue.  
C. Creation of the pilot judgment procedure in the context of reforming the ECtHR  
The interviews clarified that there are roughly two ways of looking at the pilot judgment 
procedure. One group of respondents, largely represented among judges, put pilots in the middle 
of a larger debate concerning the role of the Court: they focus on the idea that the Court cannot 
be obliged to render the same judgment over and over again concerning a matter which should 
have been dealt with nationally. This stance puts the emphasis on subsidiarity and the division 
of roles in the Council of Europe reflected in article 46 of the Convention.265 One respondent 
expressed this idea as follows: 
“From what I witnessed of its inception, it would not be accurate to say that the pilot-
judgment procedure was dreamt up solely as a managerial tool to ease the workload, to 
help the Court have an easier time. In my view, the pilot-judgment procedure represents 
a more faithful reflection, in procedural terms, of what the real mission of the Court is. 
It's not just a cynical, grey-suited manager’s or accountant's solution for cost-cutting.  
The presentation one sometimes hears is that, whereas the Court should be rendering 
justice to victims, instead these awful accountants and budget-managers have come in 
and polluted the system. I do not share that analysis at all. […]for me, to conceive of 
the purpose of the pilot-judgment procedure as being no more than achieving efficient 
case-management is somewhat inaccurate.  I would prefer to say that its overall purpose 
is to achieve better justice within the limits of the Convention system of human rights 
protection, including the most effective justice for the all the multiple victims of systemic 
violations of the Convention.”266  
Another group of respondents within the Court regard the pilot judgment procedure rather as a 
working method that is meant to help reduce the Court’s caseload. This viewpoint is mostly 
represented under registry lawyers and is best reflected in the words of another respondent:  
“I still think that this is one of the best working methods recently developed by the Court 
[…]. It helps a lot, not only in overcoming the huge number of applications that are arriving 
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in front of the Court and applications that are deriving from the same factual or situations, 
linked with structural problems or systemic problems.”267 
It is not clear where the idea for the pilot judgment procedure originated from. From the 
perspective of the outsider, the procedure seems to emerge out of nowhere. Even for persons 
working inside the Court, it came as a surprise.268 It is however important to know where the 
procedure originated from, which body took the initiative, what the original goals were and 
whether the procedure still lives up to those goals.  
More specifically, as these two viewpoints show, the idea behind the procedure matters when 
translating it in practice. They differ as to the goals that are strived towards, mostly with respect 
the applicants in these cases. It is clear that the interests of the victims of these large-scale 
human rights violations in both points of view are not of primary importance. The weight that 
they receive however seems to differ depending on the perspective taken towards the pilot 
judgment procedure in the larger context of the current workings of the Court.  
In order to uncover the purpose behind the pilot judgment procedure and thus the philosophy 
with which it is applied in certain situations, it is important to ascertain where and why the 
procedure was created. Although from an outside perspective it seems to emerge from nowhere, 
when taking a closer look behind the scenes it appears that different evolutions came together, 
culminating in the creation of the pilot procedure.  
1. Creation of the Court? Case law developments leading to the pilot judgment procedure  
From the side of the Court, the pilot judgment procedure did not come out of nowhere. In its 
jurisprudence, the Court has followed an evolution towards the Broniowski case law.  
a. Structural problems in the Court’s case law  
The focus of the Court on structural or recurring issues started with the famous length of 
proceedings cases in Italy, a problem which plagued Italy for years on end and which ended up 
flooding the Court.269 In the case of Bottazzi v. Italy, the Court for the first time emphasized the 
recurring nature of the issue at hand and labelled it as a practice inconsistent with the 
Convention.270 This is interesting since this kind of wording is also used later on in pilot 
judgments. However, the Court did not yet decide to attach any procedural consequence to this 
and handled the case like any other.  
At the time of the Bottazzi case, there were 14 000 similar cases pending before the Court. 
However, because the Registry did not have the capacity to deal with them, they were not even 
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communicated to the Government.271 This can be termed as an unofficial adjournment of the 
pending cases. The result is the same, meaning that these cases are not handled for a certain 
period of time. The parties however do not receive a communication, meaning that they do not 
receive information concerning the case.272 These first length of proceedings cases in Italy 
eventually led to the Pinto law, which was meant to remedy the issue by awarding compensation 
to the persons affected. The transitional provisions of this Pinto law offered applicants, who 
already brought their case to the Court but whose case was not yet declared admissible, the 
possibility to come back to Italy to claim compensation. This provision, in turn, was used by 
the Court to declare new cases inadmissible on the ground of non-exhaustion of domestic 
remedies, in casu repatriating cases back to the national system.273 These 14 000 pending cases 
were then de facto sent back to Italy, for the applicants to exhaust this new remedy.274 The issue 
however came back to the Court in the form of a quasi-pilot case with the case of Scordino (no. 
1) v. Italy, in which the Court found that the compensation offered under the Pinto law was 
inadequate and that the Pinto law was not efficient to remedy the underlying issue of the 
excessive length of proceedings in Italy.275  
In the case of Kudła v Poland, the Court for the first time found a violation explicitly because 
there was no domestic remedy. The Court made it clear that without such a domestic remedy 
“individuals will systematically be forced to refer to the Court in Strasbourg complaints that 
would otherwise, and in the Court’s opinion more appropriately, have to be addressed in the 
first place within the national legal system. In the long term the effective functioning, on both 
the national and international level, of the scheme of human rights protection set up by the 
Convention is liable to be weakened.”276 With this case, subsidiarity-reasoning had found its 
way in the Court’s jurisprudence, but the Court did not yet indicate binding general measures 
for the State to fulfil its duty based on the principle of subsidiarity. The length of proceedings 
issue in Poland later came back in the pilot case of Rutkowski v. Poland, in which the Court 
decided that the measures introduced after Kudła were effective in principle but showed some 
lacunae in practice.277   
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b. The need for the State to offer structural solutions 
At the same time, the Court also started to restrict the choice of means for States to offer redress 
for a certain violation. For instance, in the case of Papamichalopoulos and others v. Greece, 
the Court had ordered the Greek State to return property to the applicant.278 Further, in 
Assanidze v. Georgia, it ordered the State to release the applicant who was illegally detained.279 
These were still individual measures, but they were already made binding on the State in the 
operative part of the judgment.   
The first time that the Court found that a State has the obligation to remedy a violation under 
the terms of ‘restitutio in integrum’, including general measures, was in the case of Scozzari 
and Giunta v. Italy.280 In the case, the Court used the following words, in which the ground 
work for Broniowski v. Poland is laid:  
“The Court points out that by Article 46 of the Convention the High Contracting Parties 
undertook to abide by the final judgments of the Court in any case to which they were 
parties, execution being supervised by the Committee of Ministers. It follows, inter alia, that 
a judgment in which the Court finds a breach imposes on the respondent State a legal 
obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction, but 
also to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if 
appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their domestic legal order to put an end 
to the violation found by the Court and to redress so far as possible the effects. Furthermore, 
subject to monitoring by the Committee of Ministers, the respondent State remains free to 
choose the means by which it will discharge its legal obligation under Article 46 of the 
Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the conclusions set out in the 
Court's judgment.”281 
It is clear from this wording that the Court acknowledges here that merely pecuniary 
compensation is not always sufficient to provide redress to the victims of human rights 
violations.282 The Court indeed next posed that pecuniary compensation is only appropriate to 
repair damage that cannot otherwise be repaired.283 It is thus a secondary means of providing 
redress to the victims of human rights violations.284 
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The Broniowski contentieux ultimately brought these two evolutions together, meaning on the 
one hand the emphasis on the large-scale nature of certain issues and on the other, the need for 
the State to offer structural solutions.   
2. Zooming in – the political context leading to the pilot judgment procedure  
This case law evolution at the Court did not take place in a vacuum. The creation of the pilot 
judgment procedure must be placed in the context of a larger political debate concerning the 
future of the Court and the Council of Europe in general.  
a. The Court’s case-load problem  
It has been stated multiple times in the literature that the European Court of Human Rights has 
been the victim of its own success.285 Since its conception, the amount of pending cases has 
consistently increased, with an absolute peak of 151 600 pending cases in 2011. Only after 
2011, the burden on the Court’s docket has decreased (see Chart 1).286 It must be noted that the 
numbers are again increasing. This is largely due to current large-scale issues in three States: 
Hungary and Romania, for complaints concerning prison conditions and Turkey, for complaints 
concerning the failed coup d'état of July 2016.287 The source of the recent dramatic decline in 
numbers is unclear. It could be hypothesized that the judgment of Burmych v. Ukraine which 
did away with 12 413 pending cases has its role to play in this.288  
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II.3 APPLICATIONS PENDING BEFORE A JUDICIAL FORMATION 2000 - 2017289 
 
This first increase in the Court’s caseload has been predominantly linked with the accession of 
new member States, mostly Eastern European States, in the 1990’s.290 They have indeed had a 
considerable share in the Court’s caseload. Since its conception in 1959, almost half of the 
judgments delivered by the Court have concerned 5 States: Turkey, Italy, Russia, Romania, and 
Poland.291 As of January 2018, 56 250 cases were pending before the Court, 44.7% of which 
originate from Romania, Turkey and Russia292 Moreover, many of the Court’s pending cases 
are repetitive, which means that they stem from the same systemic issues in a given State.293 
This increasing caseload has inspired the European Human Rights System to rethink its 
procedures. It is incumbent to emphasize that the European Court is not doing these efforts in 
a vacuum. These reforms are carried out and pushed forward by the various Council of Europe 
bodies with a strong partaking of the Committee of Ministers. It is within this reform context 
that the conception of the pilot judgment procedure must be situated.  
                                                 
 
289 European Court of Human Rights, Analysis of Statistics 2014, January 2015, p. 7, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_analysis_2014_ENG.pdf; ; European Court of Human Rights, The 
European Court of Human Rights in Facts & Figures 2015, March 2016, 3,  
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Facts_Figures_2015_ENG.pdf; European Court of Human Rights, The 
European Court of Human Rights in Facts & Figures 2016, March 2017, 3, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Facts_Figures_2016_ENG.pdf; European Court of Human Rights, Pending 
Applications Allocated to a Judicial Formation, 30 April 2017, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_pending_2017_BIL.pdf.   
290 P. LEACH, H. HARDMAN, S. STEPHENSON, B.K. BLITZ, Responding to Systemic Human Rights Violations. An 
Analysis of ‘Pilot Judgments’ of the European Court of Human Rights and their Impact at National Level, 
Intersentia, 2010, p. 9; Evaluation Group, Report of the evaluation Group to the Committee of Ministers on the 
European Court of Human Rights, EG Court(2001)1, 27 September 2001, 16; C. DUBOIS, E. PENNINCKX, La 
procédure devant la Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme et le Comité des Ministres, Wolters Kluwer, 2016, 
299; Interview dd 11.01.2017; Interview dd 17.01.2017; Interview 23.02.2017.  
291 European Court of Human Rights, The ECHR in Facts & Figures 2014, February 2015, p.4,  
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Facts_Figures_2014_ENG.pdf. 
292 European Court of Human Rights, Pending Applications Allocated to a Judicial Formation, 1 January 2018, 
http://echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_pending_2018_BIL.pdf.    












THE PILOT JUDGMENT PROCEDURE AT THE ECTHR: AN EVALUATION IN THE LIGHT OF PROCEDURAL 
EFFICIENCY AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE  
68 
 
b. The interplay between the Committee of Minister’s Evaluation Group and the CDDH’s 
Reflection Group 
The first sign of an idea in the direction of a pilot judgment procedure within the Council of 
Europe machinery can be found in the early 2000s. To mark the 50th anniversary of the opening 
for signature of the Convention, the Council of Europe organized a European Ministerial 
Conference in Rome in 2000. One of the themes on the agenda was then ensuring the 
effectiveness of the Court, since concerns about this were already being voiced internally and 
following an audit by the Council of Europe’s Internal Auditor who predicted a further increase 
in the numbers.294 This Conference adopted a Declaration which explicitly warned for the ever 
increasing number of applications and emphasized that there was an urgent need to take 
measures in order to ensure the Court’s effective functioning in the future. To this end, an in-
depth reflection on the different possibilities was said to start to achieve this goal.295 As a result,  
in February 2001, the Ministers’ Deputies within the Committee of Ministers set up an 
Evaluation Group on the one hand while on the other hand, the Steering Committee for Human 
Rights (CDDH) set up a Reflection Group on the Reinforcement of the Human Rights 
Protection Mechanism. Both groups were created to consider ways of guaranteeing the 
effectiveness of the European Court of Human Rights. This Reflection Group first submitted 
its Activity Report to the Evaluation Group in June 2001, after which the latter handed down 
its report in September 2001.296 The further interplay between the Committee of Ministers in 
general and the CDDH, a body set up by the Committee,297 will prove instrumental in the 
creation of the pilot judgment procedure.   
The Activity Report of the CDDH’s Reflection group took some specific parameters in account 
to underpin its list of possible measures. Firstly, the proposed measures had to effectively lead 
to a reduction of the influx of cases, to an increase in the Court’s output of cases, or to both. 
Secondly, the principle of subsidiarity had to be firmly maintained. Thirdly, any measures were 
to improve the effectiveness of the system, they could not weaken it. Fourthly, all individuals 
within the jurisdiction of the Court needed still be able to enjoy the same protection, without 
geographical distinction.298 As a general remark then, the Activity Report advanced the idea 
that, although the aim of the report was not to discuss possible national measures, it would be 
important to think about building more incentives into the system “for national authorities, in 
particular the courts, to assume fully their prime responsibility to respect and protect the ECHR 
rights”. It thus firmly emphasizes the importance of national authorities to take up their tasks 
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in the context of the principle of subsidiarity.299 The Activity Report discusses the issue of 
“clone cases” – as they were labelled then – under the heading of the execution of judgments. 
It then specifies that the Court could include general measures in its judgments that need to be 
adopted as soon as possible by the Respondent State. It further uttered the idea of having the 
Committee of Ministers signalling particular interpretation issues to the Court, which can then 
enable it to put subsequent cases which are capable of clarifying this issue on a fast track.300 
Subsequently and based on this previous Activity Report, the Evaluation Group submitted its 
report to the Committee of Ministers in September 2001. In this report, it devoted special 
attention to the increasing case-load of the Court, including an emphasis on repetitive 
applications.301 However, it proposed a considerably different approach than the later created 
pilot judgment procedure. Firstly, seeing the delicate interplay between the different Council of 
Europe bodies as evidenced in article 46 of the Convention, the Evaluation Group was not a 
proponent of the idea that the Court should give in its judgments a more precise indication of 
the measures to be taken by the Respondent States. The report stressed that States enjoy freedom 
in choosing the specific measures under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers. 302 As 
a result, the Evaluation Group placed more responsibilities concerning these repetitive cases 
with the Committee of Ministers. This was their proposal:  
“On being informed by the Registry of the Court of the existence of the pending 
applications, the Committee of Ministers would deal with the execution of the original 
judgment by a special procedure allowing for the expedited treatment; the pending 
applications would be “frozen” by the Court for a given period, but subject to regular 
review, to allow time for the necessary measures to be taken by the Respondent State. 
This procedure would enable the Committee of Ministers to exert special pressure on 
the State concerned and could reduce the need for the Court to deliver a series of purely 
repetitive judgments on the merits.”303  
It is clear that the onus for action taken concerning repetitive cases would thus need to fall with 
the Committee of Ministers. The Evaluation Group further emphasized the need for the 
Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly to use every tool they have in their 
toolbox: “additional publicity for difficult cases might be one means; complementary 
examination of structural problems by the Council of Europe’s political and parliamentary 
monitoring procedures might be another.” Indeed, it said that the Parliamentary Assembly 
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could play a valuable role in this context by exerting more political pressure on the State party 
involved.304 
In November 2001 then, the Committee of Ministers adopted the Declaration on “The 
protection of human rights in Europe: Guaranteeing the long-term effectiveness of the European 
Court of Human Rights”.305 During the same Ministerial Session, the Committee of Ministers 
adopted the abovementioned Report by the Evaluation Group and instructed the CDDH to (i) 
carry out a feasibility study of the most appropriate way to conduct the preliminary examination 
of applications, particularly by reinforcing the filtering of applications, and (ii) to examine and, 
if appropriate, submit proposals for amendments of the Convention, notably on the basis of the 
recommendations in the report of the Evaluation Group.306  
In October 2002, the CDDH submitted its interim report in which it agreed to examine by June 
2003 proposals to facilitate the handling of repetitive cases. In this context, it envisaged to 
examine proposals aiming at:  
“(i) encouraging, in the framework of the execution of the Court’s judgments, any State 
against which the Court has issued a judgment in a “pilot” case to make available to 
applicants having brought the same complaint, either a special remedy or full 
reparation; (ii) allowing the Court to decide on cases of lesser importance (on the 
admissibility and the merits) by following a simplified procedure, for instance, by 
increasing the powers of committees of three judges or by establishing a simplified 
procedure in the Chambers; (iii) improving the supervision by the Committee of 
Ministers of the execution of the Court judgments.”307 
It is interesting here to see that the CDDH is no longer talking about clone cases, but is already 
alluding to a “pilot” case. It is not clear where this terminology originated from.  
After the adoption of the Interim Report, the CDDH submitted its Final Report in April 2003 
to the Committee of Ministers. Again, this report mentions pilot cases. However, it further 
develops the system in line with what it has grown into today. Firstly, the report defines a pilot 
judgment as a “first case, […], a judgment which exposes a structural or general shortcoming 
in the law or the practice of the State, which may lead to a large number of complaints before 
the Court concerning the same State party”. This judgment then needs to include sufficient 
guidance to allow for the determination of subsequent cases concerning the same points of law. 
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The report however stressed that allegations of serious human rights violations should not be 
considered as repetitive cases.308 This remark proved important, because it was later used in 
some pilots not to freeze similar pending cases.  
The report further again stresses the paramount importance of the principle of subsidiarity  in 
the European Human Rights System. This would then result in the obligation on the State to 
ensure that applicants have an effective remedy following a pilot judgment. The report 
enumerates multiple advantages of having domestic remedies available: it would allow the 
registry to send cases back, even when the domestic remedy is then applied retroactively, and 
it would allow individuals to obtain redress at the national level. It is however interesting to see 
that the CDDH provides for the possibility that in some cases after a pilot judgment, it would 
be more appropriate to set up new remedies only for future applicants. The report does not 
indicate in which situations this would be the case. Allowing applicants who are already at the 
Court to seek redress in Strasbourg would however not be detrimental to the court’s caseload if 
it would effectively provide for a faster solution for the applicant and the government were to 
accept a friendly settlement or accelerated procedure before the Court.309  
Importantly, the report includes a proposal for the Committee of Ministers to invite the Court 
to identify in its judgments underlying systemic problems. The proposal includes a warning that 
it is not aimed to invite the court to indicate corrective measures since this prerogative belongs 
to the States themselves. Additionally, the proposal is also not aimed to interfere with the work 
of the Committee of Ministers in the execution of judgments. Its aim is to improve the work of 
the Committee of Ministers, making it more efficient through information found in the 
judgment itself.310 The fact that the Committee of Ministers had not intended for the Court to 
start indicating specific general measures in the operative part was indeed confirmed by one 
respondent who had worked at the Committee before. It was merely their intention to receive 
somewhat more guidance from the Court as to what kind of case it was and what kind of 
measures the Court would deem appropriate in order to resolve the issue.311 
In May 2003, the Committee of Ministers adopted its Declaration “Guaranteeing the long-term 
effectiveness of the European Court of Human Rights”, in which it welcomed the CDDH’s 
report. It also instructed the CDDH to continue its work on this and other points.312 In 
September 2003, the European Court of Human Rights involved itself in the discussion by 
giving comments on the CDDH Report. The Court uttered the possibility of a pilot judgment 
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procedure in the situation of systemic problems. It proposed that this would first of all empower 
the court to decline the examination of similar cases, while also triggering an accelerated 
procedure before the Committee of Ministers. This procedure would then entail the obligation 
for the State to both eliminate the issue for the future as well as provide a remedy – retroactively 
– for the victims. The Court would then adjourn the examination of similar pending cases while 
the State is setting up the remedy.313  
In November 2003 then, the CDDH responded to this intervention by the Court. It suggested 
that the proposed system of the pilot judgment procedure was difficult to find under the existing 
Convention. An amendment would be necessary to introduce it. However, the CDDH was wary 
of introducing such an amendment because of the difficulties that might follow from obliging 
States to introduce retroactive measures. Instead, such a procedure could be created under the 
existing terms of the Convention.314 Meanwhile, the Committee of Ministers adopted the 
abovementioned proposal of the CDDH and called on the Court in a resolution to identify in its 
judgments underlying systemic problems certainly when the case is likely to trigger numerous 
applications, “so as to assist States in finding the appropriate solution and the Committee of 
Ministers in supervising the execution of judgments”.315 In April 2004 then, the CDDH came 
out with its final report concerning the mandate it receiving in this context. It mentioned in this 
final report that it was planning to include a “considerably simplified procedure for dealing with 
repetitive cases” in its preparatory work for Protocol no; 14.316  
c. The Committee of Ministers’ subsequent Recommendation and Resolution 
Subsequently, on 12 May 2004, the Committee of Ministers adopted two important instruments. 
Firstly, it came out with a Recommendation aimed at the States parties concerning the 
improvement of domestic remedies. In this, it focussed strongly on the importance of having an 
effective remedy in place in order to avoid repetitive cases at the Court.317 During the discussion 
surrounding the Recommendation, it is important to note that the Committee of Ministers 
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already referred to pilot judgment as such. The Court itself only used the term ‘pilot judgment 
procedure’ after the initial Broniowski judgment.318 This already clarifies that there was some 
talk behind the scenes between the different bodies of the Council of Europe concerning the 
creation of a pilot judgment procedure. Interestingly, the Recommendation also talks about one 
of the consequences of the pilot case where the Court could invite the applicants in similar 
applications to have recourse to the new remedy set up nationally and even decide to declare 
their cases inadmissible.319 However, it also states that this would not always be the case as it 
would inappropriate in certain circumstances to compel the applicants to bear the further burden 
of having to once again exhaust domestic remedies, which would not be in place until a change 
in the domestic legislation.320 
The Committee further issued a Resolution on judgments revealing an underlying systemic 
problem. In this resolution, the Committee invited the Court to identify and diagnose the 
underlying structural problems in its judgments with a view to helping the State remedy them.321 
This was essentially qualified by the Court as a plea for help from the Committee of 
Ministers.322 Immediately after, the Court reacted to the Committee of Ministers’ invitation 
when it came out with its judgment in the first pilot judgment Broniowski v. Poland on 22 June 
2004.323 With the judgment, the Court showed that it did not want to wait for the proposed 
reform in Protocol 14, which could – as it rightly predicted – take years.324  
d. The role of the Committee of Ministers: the idea behind the 2004 Resolution  
There is considerable confusion as to where the concept and the operation of the pilot judgment 
precisely originated from. The abovementioned documents indeed make this history quite 
cloudy: did the idea come from the Committee of Ministers or from the Court? One source, 
former Judge Zagrebelsky of Italy writes that the Committee of Ministers actively looked for 
the help of the Court with its call for the pilot judgment procedure in the abovementioned 
Resolution. Since the Committee of Ministers is a political organ, it needs to decide on 
everything with a majority. And although it had already the common practice of indicating 
general measures in the supervision of the execution of judgments, in some cases it could not 
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agree to those general measures. As a consequence, he contends that the Committee then asked 
the Court to lend a hand in this respect. 325  
This is the only source in the literature expressly mentioning this. It can however be supported 
by the text of the documents in question. The specific text of the Resolution also does not 
indicate that the Committee of Ministers asked the Court to list general measures in its 
judgments. It instead requested the Court to diagnose the specific systemic or structural issue 
at stake. These are indeed two completely different aspects of a pilot judgment procedure. In 
addition, in the abovementioned Recommendation, the Committee also provides a different 
description of what the procedure looks like to them and again, the stipulation of general 
measures by the Court is not included. 
This turn of events was described during the interviews at the Court in Strasbourg. One 
respondent explained that the Committee of Ministers indeed asked the Court for help. The 
Court entertained cases rather chronologically, as a result of which it was lagging behind. In 
practice, this resulted in the Court requesting solutions from a State based on fact patterns taking 
place multiple years before. The Committee of Ministers needed more information in order to 
find a practical solution to these kinds of situations. It needed to know from the Court how 
many other cases were behind representing similar fact patterns, whether it was a structural 
problem. If not, the Committee reasoned that it was fighting a losing battle without this much-
needed information. As a result, the Committee came out with its Resolution which in turn was 
perceived by the Court as an invitation to start with the pilot judgment procedure.326 Several 
respondents at the Court hinted towards this. One respondent clarified that:  
“At that time [meaning, the time when Protocol 14 was drafted], I must admit that the 
CDDH was not really open toward the idea that came from the Court concerning the 
introduction of a pilot judgment procedure as a working method which will be 
legislatively prescribed by Protocol 14. At that time, this idea was accepted with some 
kind of reserve. But then the Committee of Ministers was willing  to support the idea of 
the Court and I can say that perhaps this triangle of different organs was somehow, in 
moments when one aspect was not probably well envisaged by CDDH, the other angle 
of this triangle, Commitee of Ministers, was here to balance and to accept the initiative 
of the Court.”327  
Another respondent recounted that the idea for the pilot judgment procedure indeed originated 
at the Court. 328  Concerning the Committee of Ministers’ Resolution inviting the Court to 
clarify its judgments, one respondent explained that this came about because of criticisms of 
the Court’s judgments that were being voice by some commentators. One of those critics was 
Pierre-Henri Imbert, the then Director of Human Rights at the Council of Europe. This 
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respondent clarified that Imbert complained that he had to advise the Committee of Ministers 
what the judgment implied in the way of remedial execution measures and very often he was in 
a difficult position to do anything of the kind in the light of the judgment. It was often very 
difficult, to work out whether the violation found was to be analysed as a one-off, isolated 
incident or whether it was the product of a general problem in the country concerned; whether 
simply paying financial compensation to the particular applicant involved was enough or 
whether there were other victims of the same sort of violation in the wing; whether the 
Committee of Ministers had to require general remedial measures of the respondent State as 
proper execution of the judgment. He further did not want to be in a position where the 
Committee’s secretariat drafted a meeting document stating its opinion that general measures 
were required only to be met by the respondent State protesting that none of this was in the 
Court’s judgment and that it was prepared to pay the money awarded to the particular applicant 
by the Court as just satisfaction and that was it.  He pointed to the very real difficulties that the 
Court’s “opaque” judgments were causing at the execution stage.  It would help the respondent 
State in knowing what it had to do, what measures, individual and general, it had to take in 
order to fulfil its treaty obligation of “abiding by” the judgment, it would help the Committee 
of Ministers in discharging its responsibility of supervising the execution of judgments. This 
would also avoid disputes between respondent States and the Committee of Ministers, if the 
Court could be clearer in identifying the source of violations and, in particular, systemic or 
structural problems in the legal system of the country.”329 
e. Conclusion: collaboration but ultimately the Court’s initiative 
This clarifies that all sides of the abovementioned triangle330 agreed that the Court needed to 
identify the existence of systemic issues in its judgments, in order to facilitate more effective 
execution at the level of the Committee of Ministers. Here, the key would lie to helping States 
execute their duties under the Convention and would ultimately stop the constant stream of 
repetitive cases to Strasbourg.  
The Court however took it a bit further by starting to put binding obligations on States in pilot 
judgments to take general measures. The Committee of Ministers seems to have been against 
this development, while the CDDH warned that the Court did not have the competence to do 
so. The Court however found a way to bring this competence within the borders of the 
Convention and hereby created the pilot judgment procedure as we know it today.  
3. Zooming out:  Protocol 14 and the high level conferences  
The origin of the pilot judgment procedure must further be placed against the background of 
the creation of Protocol 14 to the ECHR. The start for the drafting process for this Protocol was 
also given at the Ministerial Conference in Rome of 2000 and the preparatory works were 
carried out by the same bodies as mentioned above (cfr. The Evalutation Group and the 
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Reflection Group of the CDDH).331 The Protocol itself was adopted in May 2004, but only 
entered into force in June 2010.332  
a. Relevance of Protocol 14 to pilot judgments  
From the explanatory report to Protocol 14, it is clear that the reason why there was a need for 
institutional change at that time was precisely the overload of the Court and the worry that the 
Convention  would not function properly in the future.333 It refers multiple times to the need to 
find an instrument for the Court to help resolve applications which stem from domestic 
structural problems. However, nothing in the Explanatory Report to the Protocol suggests that 
the Court will now also be able to give guidance to the States – let alone binding general 
measures – concerning the changing of their laws.334 Indeed, the pilot judgment procedure was 
expressly kept out of the reform efforts of Protocol 14.335  
Protocol 14 nevertheless introduced two new measures which are of interest in the context of 
the pilot judgment procedure.336 First of all, the Protocol has included the capacity for the 
committees of three judges to rule in a fast-track on the merits in repetitive cases, provided that 
the underlying question is subject to established case law.337 This is what has been called the 
WECL-procedure and will prove important in the context of repetitive cases, including cases 
revealing a systemic problem.338 Furthermore, and of particular importance in the context of 
pilots, the Committee of Ministers is given the possibility to bring a State before the Court 
based on article 46 when the State refuses to comply with a final judgment by the Court. This 
has been termed an infringement procedure. The Committee would need a two-thirds majority 
of the representatives entitled to sit on it, in order to have the authority to bring a case.339 This 
measure was expressly created to strengthen the Committee of Ministers’ powers, since the 
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rapid and full execution of the Court’s judgments is vital when it comes to repetitive cases.340 
This would not result in a new finding of a substantial violation by the Court, nor would it lead 
to a financial punishment for the State involved. It is more of a ‘naming and shaming’ tactic, 
meant to exert political pressure onto the reluctant State in order to foster compliance.341  
b. Delayed implementation of Protocol 14: interim solutions 
In 2005, the Committee of Ministers had appointed a Group of Wise Persons to reflect on further 
means for the Court to reduce its backlog and limit the number of incoming petitions, going 
beyond the measures in Protocol 14 and which could be done while the Protocol was not yet in 
force. In their report, the Group of Wise Persons expressly endorsed the pilot judgment 
procedure – which was then recently created342 - and suggested that it could be included in the 
Rules of Court or maybe even in the Convention itself. It further proposed a new judicial 
filtering mechanism and a simplified procedure to amend the Convention in order to avoid 
lengthy ratification processes of additional protocols.343  
By 2006, all States except Russia had ratified Protocol No.14, barring it from entering into 
force.344 As a result, the States parties came out with an agreement to allow certain provisions 
from Protocol 14 to already enter into force in relation to certain States who consent to this.345 
The Single Judge procedure and the WECL competence of the Committees of three judges were 
already installed with respect to the States adhering to Protocol 14bis.346 This Protocol 14bis 
turned out to be a success, it already considerably reduced the backlog of the Court before 
Protocol 14 could enter into force.347  
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c. A series of High-Level Conferences  
Parallel with this development, the then President of the Court, Jean-Paul Costa, took the 
initiative to organize a high-level conference. The conference was designed for the States 
parties to discuss the difficult situation of the Court and was aimed at offering a solution to the 
stalemate around Protocol 14.348  
The Conference was organized in Interlaken by Switzerland in October 2010 and focussed on 
a number of specific themes, among which the right to individual petition and repetitive 
applications.349 Right before the start of the conference, Russia deposited its ratification of 
Protocol 14, which then could enter into force.350 The fundamental importance of the right to 
individual petition was again affirmed as one of the key factors of the European Human Rights 
System. The Interlaken Declaration calls in this regard on the Committee of Ministers to think 
about additional measures to improve the Court’s efficiency “without deterring well-founded” 
applications.351 Additionally, during the conference, there was talk of adding some conditions 
to the exercise of the right to individual petition: (i) compulsory legal representation; (ii) the 
payment of court fees; and (iii) the use of one of the two official languages when filing an 
application. Although these conditions were included in an early draft of the Declaration, they 
were not included in the final version.352 Concerning repetitive applications, the Declaration 
offers no new solutions than the already existing pilot judgment procedure. It however does call 
on States to facilitate friendly settlements and unilateral declarations concerning these cases 
and to cooperate closely with the Committee of Ministers in order to find a solution. Specifically 
directed towards the Court, the Declaration emphasizes the need to create clear and predictable 
standards for the application of the pilot procedure, including standards concerning the selection 
of cases, the procedure to be followed and the treatment of frozen cases.353 In order to improve 
the Court’s efficient dealing with the increasing number of incoming cases, the Declaration 
suggested the creation of a filtering division within the Court. It further hinted that this filtering 
division could also deal with repetitive cases.354 This ultimately resulted in a very effective 
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working method for the Court, the WECL-criterion on which this thesis will elaborate on.355 In 
general, the Interlaken process initiated a long-term discussion on the future of the Court. The 
Declaration itself merely sketched the possible avenues for solutions in the future – ideas which 
had already been circulating within the Council of Europe for years - and delegated tasks to 
different actors in this respect.356  
The next High Level Conference took place in Izmir in April 2011 and included a Follow-up 
Plan to the Interlaken action plan. The Izmir Follow-up plan called on the Committee of 
Ministers to again look into the possibility of charging fees to applicants and other procedural 
possibilities so as to decrease the number of incoming petitions.357 It further welcomed the new 
competences of the committees of three judges, including the competence to deal with repetitive 
cases, and the new Rule 61 dealing with pilot judgments. In the context of repetitive cases, it 
further invited the states to give preference to friendly settlements and unilateral declarations 
when resolving repetitive cases.358 Interestingly, the Follow-up plan also instructed the 
Committee of Ministers to investigate the possibility of introducing the competence for the 
Court to deliver advisory opinions, a idea further worked out in Protocol 16 to the Convention 
which is yet to enter into force.359  
Fairly quickly a new High Level Conference took place, this time in Brighton in April 2012. 
Again, there are a few interesting additions to the framework set out by the Interlaken process. 
Firstly, the Conference now also supported the idea uttered by the Court to reduce the time 
within which an application can be submitted to four months.360 This will eventually be 
included in Protocol 15, which is yet to enter into force.361 The declaration further raises the 
following idea: “[The Conference], building on the pilot judgment procedure, invites the 
Committee of Ministers to consider the advisability and modalities of a procedure by which the 
Court could register and determine a small number of representative applications from a group 
of applications that allege the same violation against the same respondent State Party, such 
determination being applicable to the whole group.”362 Also very interestingly, the Brighton 
declaration suggested an  ideal time-line for the processing of cases for the Court. It proposed 
that the Court should be able to decide whether to communicate a case or not within one year. 
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Thereafter, all communicated cases should be resolved, either through decision or judgment, 
within two years.363 This has proved to be an important guideline for the Court, not in the least 
to start measuring its own backlog. Cases which the Court was not able to deal with within 
these parameters are now marked as falling within the ‘Brighton Backlog’.364 Finally, the 
Brighton Declaration called for a process which not only thinks about the problems that were 
faced by the Court at that time, but also looked further into the future. Indeed, the extended 
Interlaken process, encompassing also Izmir and Brighton, looked merely towards 2019. After 
Brighton, possible future challenged needed to be anticipated in order to develop a vision for 
the future of the European Human Rights System, aiming towards 2030.365  
This process was officially started with the next High Level Conference on the long-term future 
of the Court, held in Oslo in April 2014. Unlike the previous high-level conferences, here was 
no clear outcome of the conference in a the form of a declaration . However, the conferences 
did prelude a new wave of ideas concerning the long-term future of the Court and possible 
reforms in that respect. A broad spectrum of issues was discussed between members of the 
Court, State representatives and academics which can be divided in three main focusses. Firstly, 
the backlog of the Court’s caseload was on the forefront of the discussions. Secondly, the 
conference concerned itself with the political backlash against the Court and thirdly, the 
accession of the EU to the Convention.366  
Subsequently, there was a High-level Conference in Brussels on the implementation of the 
Convention. Following the positive evolutions due to the reforms of Protocol 14, the Oslo 
conference had placed an emphasis on the issue of non-implementation as posing the greatest 
risk in the future.367 In this sense, the Brussels Declaration states that “emphasis must now be 
placed on the current challenges, in particular the repetitive applications resulting from the non-
execution of Court judgments, the time taken by the Court to consider and decide upon 
potentially well-founded cases, the growing number of judgments under supervision by the 
Committee of Ministers and the difficulties of States Parties in executing certain judgments due 
to the scale, nature or cost of the problems raised.”368  
It can be argued that from the Oslo Conference on the Court  turned its focus more externally, 
focussing on the States parties and the Committee of Ministers. More specifically, when it 
comes to the Court’s backlog it seems that the Court has done away with the biggest portion of 
easier cases due to reforms in its internal working methods. However, with the caseload still 
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high and now mostly encompassing meritorious cases that need an actual resolution, the Court 
calls the help of its partners within the Council of Europe.369 The Action Plan attached to the 
Brussels Declaration is primarily directed towards the States parties and the Committee of 
Ministers. The former is encouraged to improve their procedure for execution of judgments. 
The latter is asked to gather information concerning the implementation of judgments and to 
question whether new measures are necessary in the future.370  
4. Conclusion: the origins and ratione legis of the pilot judgment procedure  
Although the pilot judgment procedure thus indeed seems to come out of thin air to the outside 
perspective, inside the Council of Europe and the Court there were developments taking place 
that ultimately culminated into the creation of the pilot judgment procedure.  
On the micro-level, the Court was putting out case law in which it addressed structural 
problems, while in other cases it required specific individual measures from the State to execute 
its judgments. These two developments paved the way for the pilot judgment procedure which 
can be seen as bringing these two developments together: a finding of the existence of a 
systemic human rights issue, requiring specific measures from the State to address it in 
execution of the judgment.   
On a broader level, the creation of the pilot judgment procedure is even more evident. There 
was an interplay between the Court, the Committee of Ministers and the CDDH who were all 
trying to address the large share of repetitive cases at the Court’s docket. There was agreement 
that the Court needed to signal to the Committee of Ministers that there was an underlying 
systemic issue. The Court however also started to indicate specific general measures which it 
made binding on the State in pilot judgments.  
On the macro-level, development towards and surrounding the creation of the pilot judgment 
procedure are less apparent. It is however clear that there was a wide-spread urgency across the 
Council of Europe to address systemic problems in certain member States. The major political 
actors tried to address this through the amendments of Protocol 14, thereby creating the WECL 
procedure which would be instrumental in the efficient functioning of the pilot judgment 
procedure.  
It must be emphasized that these reforms were all carried out in the spirit of increasing the 
efficiency of the Court – and the European Human Rights System as a whole for that matter – 
and bringing the Court back to its intended role of international watchdog over the States. This 
more principled stance will be discussed in the next sub-chapter, as the arguments are linked 
with placing the pilot judgment procedure in its institutional context. What must be remembered 
however is that the interests of the victims of these large-scale issues was not of primary 
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concern. They rarely come up in these discussions. This might explain why their rights are 
generally not given preference in the context of the pilot judgment procedure.  
D. Placing the pilot judgment procedure in its institutional context  
The proof of the pudding is in the eating or, as former Judge Françoise Tulkens has stated: “[a] 
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights is not an end in itself, but a promise of future 
change, the starting point of a process which should enable rights and freedoms to be made 
effective.”371 The problem with effectiveness is closely linked to the execution of judgments.372 
The execution of judgments is dealt with under article 46 of the Convention. It encompasses a 
delicate balance between the three main actors tasked by it with safeguarding human rights: the 
States parties, the Court and the Committee of Ministers. Simply put, in this balance the Court 
is responsible for monitoring compliance with the Convention through legal assessments of 
individual cases, States must implement and safeguard the Convention and the Court’s 
judgments and the Committee of Ministers is to overlook the execution by the States of the 
Court’s judgments.373 The Committee does this via a political mechanism whereby all states 
are represented and discuss the progress of execution during regular meetings in Strasbourg.374 
Although these tasks are not explicitly laid down in the Convention, the practice and procedure 
have developed as such over the years.375 This division of powers has been said to be 
fundamental to the European Human Rights system.376  
The Court’s judgments are of a declaratory nature.377 The nature of the obligation on the States 
to comply with the Court’s judgments is generally an obligation of results. The State is given 
considerable discretion to choose the means to implement the Court’s judgment, as long as 
these means achieve the intended result. This principle derives from the abovementioned 
balance of power within the Council of Europe System, shaped in the principle of subsidiarity 
on the one hand and the competences of the Committee of Ministers on the other. Consequently, 
in principle the Court will refuse to indicate specific measures which need to be taken by a State 
in order to execute its judgment.378  
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The pilot judgment procedure has invited the criticism that the Court has gone beyond its 
judicial competences in the traditional sense.379 It encroaches on this triangle of balanced 
powers in two ways. Firstly, by promulgating binding general measures on the States the Court 
is taking away the State’s competence to decide how to implement its judgments, chipping 
away at the classic interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity. Secondly, these same general 
measures also reduce the Committee of Minister’s competence to decide, in consultation with 
the affected States, which measures should be taken in order to tackle the issue domestically. 
Both of these issues will be explored here.  
1. Relationship between the Court and the Contracting States: the principle of subsidiarity  
The principle of subsidiarity is one of the fundaments of the Convention system. It means that 
the primary responsibility for ensuring respect for human rights is placed with the States. Only 
if they fail to do so, does it fall to the European Court of Human Rights to interfere.380 Argued 
from a different perspective, Helfer contends that when the States as first-line defenders of 
human rights fail, then “the core values underlying the Convention’s ‘special character as a 
treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights’ are best served by giving the ECtHR a 
more assertive (but hopefully temporary) supervisory role”.381 
As explained above in the previous sub-chapter382, the pilot judgment procedure must be placed 
in the context of reforms of the Convention system. These reforms are not only aimed at the 
Court. To the contrary, they have taken a holistic approach: they are aimed at all actors involved 
in strengthening human rights in the Council of Europe, including the States parties. It has been 
claimed that the most pertinent way to address the overload of cases is through the States parties 
who need to take effective measures in domestic legislation and practice.383 In his preparatory 
note to the Interlaken Conference, the then President of the Court stated that the subsidiarity 
principle shows that “States must comply with the Court’s case law and make sure that 
judgments of the Court are adequately executed, notably by adopting the appropriate general 
measures and by taking remedial action in respect of cases which could give rise to similar 
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issues.”384 This idea is in full conformity with the notion of subsidiarity.385  In recent years, the 
principle of subsidiarity has gained considerable attention as playing a central role in 
strengthening the Court. Judge Spano has even gone so far as to call the current era the “age of 
subsidiarity”.386 Furthermore, Protocol 15 which has yet to come into force specifically inserts 
the principle at the end of the Preamble to the Convention.387 It has also been discussed in the 
Court’s case law more and more frequently, taken centre stage after the start of the Interlaken-
process.388 
The principle is not yet explicitly laid down in the Statute of the Council of Europe, nor in the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Instead, it is implicitly imbedded in the combined 
reading of articles 1 and 19 of the Convention and has been interpreted as such by the Court.389 
As early as 1968, the Court has stated in the Belgian language case that:  
“In attempting to find out in a given case, whether or not there has been an arbitrary 
distinction, the Court cannot disregard those legal and factual features which 
characterise the life of the society in the State which, as a Contracting Party, has to 
answer for the measure in dispute. In so doing it cannot assume the role of the competent 
national authorities, for it would thereby lose sight of the subsidiary nature of the 
international machinery of collective enforcement established by the Convention. The 
national authorities remain free to choose the measures which they consider 
appropriate in those matters which are governed by the Convention. Review by the 
Court concerns only the conformity of these measures with the requirements of the 
Convention.” 390 
The principle of subsidiarity has played a considerable role in the Court’s case law. The Court 
has always had to find a balance between its own competences and those of the national 
authorities. Overall, subsidiarity is reflected in the Court’s contentieux on two levels. Firstly, 
substantive subsidiarity can be seen in the Court’s refusal to take “fourth-instance applications” 
and the use of its margin of appreciation doctrine. These fourth-instance cases are rooted in a 
misapprehension on the part of the applicants on what the Court is. The Court cannot quash 
judgments of national courts, it is not a court of appeal. The Court thus has to practice self-
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restraint: it cannot rule on the facts of the case, the interpretation or application of domestic 
law, the admissibility and assessment of evidence, the substantive fairness of the outcome of a 
civil dispute, or the guilt of an accused in criminal proceedings.391 The margin of appreciation 
doctrine is used in the context of the proportionality test of articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the 
Convention. The Belgian language case exemplifies this doctrine very well. The margin of 
appreciation summarily means that the State is considered to be best placed to assess the 
specific circumstances of a case needed to make this balancing exercise of the proportionality 
test. The Court has in this context clearly stated that the margin of appreciation doctrine is a 
“tool to define relations between domestic authorities and the Court”.392 
Secondly, there is procedural subsidiarity, which is clearly reflected in the admissibility criteria 
enshrined in article 35 of the Convention. More specifically, the idea that the Court can only 
entertain a case after all domestic remedies have been exhausted is inherently the Council of 
Europe’s recognition and safeguarding of the principle of subsidiarity.393 Most importantly, this 
procedural subsidiarity is a consideration which is embedded in pilot cases as well. As a general 
rule, States can decide how to execute the Court’s judgments. The Court has stated multiple 
times that its judgments have a declaratory character and that States are free to choose how to 
execute them, even in the context of pilot cases.394 However, in some cases the Court will 
indicate specific general or individual measures based on a creative reading of article 46 ECHR. 
This is where the pilot judgment continuum is to be placed. Here, the Court has developed the 
practice of indicating general measures as a means to preventing future violations.395  
In this context it is interesting to mention the Neshkov and Varga cases in which the Court gave 
a very detailed explanation of the possible avenues for Bulgaria and Hungary respectively, to 
improve its penitentiary system in line with the Convention.396 However, the only binding 
general measure in the operative part of the judgment is the need to create an effective remedy 
for compensation. This may indicate that the Court is walking the line in a difficult balancing 
exercise between its own competences, those of the Committee of Ministers and those of the 
State involved. Indeed, in the Neshkov case, the Court indicates that it has refrained from giving 
specific indications as to general measures because that would fall outside of its judicial 
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function.397 One respondent clarified that indicating general measures in vague terms in the 
Broniowski case was in the same sense meant to given general guidance as to how to solve the 
issue.398 The detailed list could however in this context thus be seen as guidance for the 
Committee of Ministers in monitoring the execution of the judgments.399  
Most importantly in the context of pilot judgments is that the Court will in most cases400 refrain 
from proclaiming very specific binding general measures. Instead, the Court will generally 
sketch some possibilities but will then emphasize the need for the State involved to set up an 
effective domestic remedy. As it stated in the Neshkov case, the Court refrained from spelling 
out specific general measures but it considered the need for the State to put in place an effective 
remedy as being of a different category. The Court considers that setting up this remedy “will 
enable any person in the applicants’ position to complain of a breach of article 3 of the 
Convention resulting from poor detention conditions and obtain adequate relief for any such 
breach at domestic level”.401 Requiring a State to put in place an effective domestic remedy is 
a means for the Court to require the State to fulfil its duty under the principle of subsidiarity.402 
Neshkov is certainly not the only case in which the Court has indicated the States’ need to put 
in place an effective remedy. To the contrary, in sixteen of the other full pilot cases the Court 
indicated that the State should set up effective domestic remedies, either as the sole binding 
general measure or in combination with others.403 This emphasis of the Court on effective 
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domestic remedies in pilot cases is subsidiarity at its finest.404 Furthermore, this has been termed 
by one of the respondents as “reasoning of self-preservation”,405 whereby the Court sends the 
work it has been given back to the States, within the parameters set up by the Convention.   
The Court doesn’t only detail possible solutions in full pilot cases. In Orchowski v. Poland,  the 
Court indicated the following, although it did not make it a binding obligation in the judgment’s 
operative part:  
“The Court is aware of the fact that solving the systemic problem of overcrowding in 
Poland may necessitate the mobilisation of significant financial resources. However, it must 
be observed that lack of resources cannot in principle justify prison conditions which are 
so poor as to reach the threshold of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention and 
that it is incumbent on the respondent Government to organise its penitentiary system in 
such a way that ensures respect for the dignity of detainees, regardless of financial or 
logistical difficulties. If the State is unable to ensure that prison conditions comply with the 
requirements of Article 3 of the Convention, it must abandon its strict penal policy in order 
to reduce the number of incarcerated persons or put in place a system of alternative means 
of punishment.” 406 
Following the Broniowski case and the new feature of the Court’s judgment whereby general 
measures are made binding in the operative provisions, there was critique directed at the Court 
both from within the Court, as from academia and from States. These critics claimed that the 
Court is overstepping the boundaries of its competences with indicating these general measures 
to States. The critique is even stronger when the Court sets a time-limit for the State to 
implement the general measures or explicitly calls for legislative reforms, indicating that this 
may be intrusive or that time-limits are not realistic.407 In this respect, the submissions of the 
Italian government in the Sejdovic case – a quasi-pilot case – is worth mentioning. The 
government did not oppose in principle the fact that the Court is giving fairly detailed 
indications on how to remedy the issue at hand. However, the Italian government did voice its 
concern that this new practice would nullify the principle that States are free to choose the 
means to execute judgments.408 
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Former Judge and Registrar Mahoney rebutted the critique that the Court cannot indicate 
general measures through a textual approach. He contended that there is nothing in the text of 
article 46 to bar the Court from specifying the consequences of a judgment finding a violation 
and even including that in the operative provisions. He stated: “I do not understand why the 
Court’s proceeding in such a manner in appropriate circumstances is in any way contrary to 
the Convention or to the rule of the binding effect of judgment.” He further continued that in 
the Broniowski case, the court merely fixed that the applicants in these cases should be able to 
enjoy their right to property, or else they should be given equivalent in lieu. Consequently, he 
concluded that the Polish State in the Broniowski case did receive considerable leeway to decide 
how to implement the judgment.409 As a result, the Court did not overstep its boundaries.  
Luzius Wildhaber, President of the Court at the time of the Broniowski  judgment, touched upon 
the heart of the matter and represents the pragmatic approach to tackle the criticism concerning 
the Court’s role in the context of subsidiarity. In a workshop concerning the improvement of 
domestic remedies, he emphasized that in matters which have been numerously judged upon 
by the Court, these cases should be repatriated to the domestic courts. There is no point in 
asking the Court to continuously confirm the same principles. They are clear and they should 
be thus dealt with domestically.410 This is a view which was supported among many 
respondents at the Court.411  
2. Relationship between the Court and the Committee of Ministers: article 46 and the 
institutional balance of powers.  
a. The complementary nature of the relationship between the Committee of Ministers and 
the Court412  
Seeing the history of the pilot judgment procedure, it can be stated that it was created as a tool 
to assist the Committee of Ministers and the Council of Europe States to better execute cases 
stemming from systemic and large-scale issues.413 The main actors in the execution of 
judgments are the States and the Committee of Ministers. The former enjoy in principle a wide 
discretion to select the measures they will take in order to execute judgments rendered by the 
Court. However, States will have to communicate with the Committee of Ministers as well, as 
the Committee of Ministers is tasked with assessing whether the chosen measures will 
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effectively achieve the result required by the Court.414 The Committee of Ministers is inherently 
a political body. It creates a forum for constructive dialogue and political review of execution 
process. The supervision of the execution of the Court’s judgments proceeds in a cooperative 
manner, contrary to the inquisitorial nature of the procedure before the Court.415 Originally thus, 
there was a strict division of competences between the Court and the Committee of Ministers 
concerning the execution of judgments, a competence reserved for the latter.416 
This strict division of powers has worked with success during the first forty years of the Council 
of Europe. However, it has begun to show cracks with the expansion of the system and the 
political climate turning against it. The Court has reacted to this with a growing interference 
into the execution of its judgments by giving the States indications on how to remedy the 
violations found.417 With respect to individual measures, it has justified this shift as follows:  
“In some cases the Court considers the individual remedial measure to be self-evident 
to the point that any real choice is excluded. In these circumstances to leave such a 
measure to be identified through a lengthy process of dialogue between the Committee 
of Ministers and the respondent government runs counter to the principle of 
effectiveness which guides the Court in much of its work.”418 
In case of the pilot judgment procedure, the Evaluation Group had already pinpointed the issue 
that the Court is usually aware of the large-scale nature of a certain issue at an earlier time than 
the Committee of Ministers. In seeing its docket being flooded, the Court is already aware that 
the first case represents only the tip of the iceberg.419 The idea that the Court is de facto helping 
the Committee of Ministers with its diagnosis of the underlying problem and the indication of 
general measures was supported by several respondents in Strasbourg.420  
Interestingly, these interferences by the Court do show to be effective as they put pressure on 
the State, pressure which the Committee of Ministers cannot always exert itself. Lambert-
Abdelgawad has shown that when the Court gives these recommendations States tend to be 
more diligent and the Committee of Ministers will supervise the execution of these judgments 
more quickly and rigorously. Furthermore, the observations given by the Court when it 
examines an issue for the second time have proven to be more effective sometimes than the 
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Committee of Minister’s interim resolutions. She further shows that pilot judgments have 
overall been satisfactorily executed,421 with some exceptions.422 
However, the delicate institutional balance between the Court and the Committee of Ministers 
has also been a point of discussion concerning the pilot judgment procedure.423 Fairly early on, 
former Judge Björgvinsson expressed his doubts concerning the question whether the pilot 
judgment procedure really makes the work of the Committee of Ministers easier. Looking at 
the early pilot cases, he states that the Court is not being very clear on which specific measures 
it expects. This in turn creates problems for the work of the Committee of Ministers  and blurs 
the line between the roles of both bodies.424 Clearly, the cooperative political nature of the 
execution process is duly complicated by the ‘judicialization’ of it imposed by the Court 
through these general measures.425 In the quasi-pilot case of Sejdovic v. Italy, the Government 
assessed the division of powers between the Court and the Committee of Ministers, criticizing 
the competences that the Court is claiming for itself in this respect. The Italian State contended 
that the only article giving some kind of power to the Court to “sentence” a State was article 
41, no such power is to be found in article 46. Additionally, the new measures introduced by 
Protocol 14 for the Committee of Ministers – the possibility to request interpretations of 
judgments to the Court and the abovementioned infringement procedures – were claimed to 
clearly confirm this traditional division of powers. Furthermore, the respondent State argued 
that the Committee of Ministers with its Resolution aimed at inviting the Court to diagnose 
systemic issues, had not intended for the Court to also fix the solutions aimed at remedying 
these issues. This last competence must have remained with the Committee of Ministers, the 
Government opined.426  
A comparable argument was also made against the application of the pilot judgment procedure 
in the case of Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v.Ukraine, where the Government claimed that the use 
of the procedure would mean that the Court was performing a supervisory task, which belongs 
to the competences of the Committee of Ministers, as the Committee had already rendered a 
resolution containing the measures required from Ukraine.427 The Court replied by clarifying 
that it is indeed the competence of the Committee of Ministers to supervise the implementation 
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of measures aimed at satisfying the States’ obligations under article 46 of the Convention. The 
Court on the other hand is tasked to “ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by 
the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto” based on Article 19 
of the Convention. It emphasized that this task is not necessarily best achieved by repeating the 
same finding in large series of cases. Seeing the recurrent problems in this respect, it is within 
the competence of the Court to apply the procedure in order to “induce the respondent State to 
resolve large numbers of individual cases arising from the same structural problem at domestic 
level”.428 Further on in the case, the Court explains that multiple and complex measures are 
required from the State and as a result, the Committee of Ministers might be better placed to 
develop the specific general measures required. However, the Committee had already done so 
and the Ukraine government still had not started to remedy the underlying issue. As a result, 
the Court concluded that Ukraine had demonstrated “an almost complete reluctance” to solve 
the issue.429 It thus seems that the Court is explaining in this specific context that it does have 
the competence to interfere, as the State is reluctant to abide by the general measures designed 
by the Committee of Ministers beforehand. The Committee of Ministers and the Court are 
working in close tandem, showing that they will follow-up on the issue until it is solved.  
Apart from the indication of general measures, there are a number of other elements of the pilot 
judgment procedure which can be said to shift the institutional balance between the Court and 
the Committee of Ministers. It has become standard practice for the Court to indicate time-
frames within which general measures must be executed. This signifies a further straying into 
the competences of the Committee of Ministers.430 In several full pilot cases, the Court has 
indicated time-limits for the State to execute general measures.431 For instance, in the case of 
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Xenides-Arrestis432, the Court foresaw a time-frame of three months for the Turkish State to 
create a remedial measure, and another three months to compensate the applicants in these cases 
through this remedial measure.433 However, in three other full pilots, the Court has taken a more 
cautious approach. In the cases of Varga and Ananyev, the Court has required the State to 
produce to the Committee of Ministers within a set time-limit a fixed time-frame to make the 
necessary general measures.434 In the case of Greens and M.T., the Court inserted in the 
operative part the obligation for the United Kingdom to first, have a draft bill ready within a 
certain time-period but then only to enact this new legislation within a time-frame fixed by the 
Committee of Ministers.435 This balancing of functions between the Court and the Committee 
of Ministers shows the increasingly complementary nature of the division of powers between 
them. 436 Some respondents even go as far as to admit there is an overlap of functions now 
between the Court and the Committee of Ministers.437 
Another practice which signifies the tension created by the pilot judgment procedure is the 
Court’s assessment of the general measures after they have been put in place domestically. The 
Court will let another case come through for a decision on the admissibility in order to make 
sure that the general measures put in place after the principal pilot case are adequate to solve 
the underlying systemic issue. In the Broniowski friendly settlement judgment, the Court 
decided the following:  
“While, by virtue of Article 46 of the Convention, it is for the Committee of Ministers to 
evaluate these general measures and their implementation as far as the supervision of 
the execution of the Court’s principal judgment is concerned (see also Rule 43 § 3 of 
the Rules of Court), the Court, in exercising its own competence to decide whether to 
strike the case out of its list under Articles 37 § 1 (b) and 39 following a friendly 
settlement between the parties, cannot but rely on the respondent’s Government’s actual 
and promised remedial action as a positive factor going to the issue of ‘respect for 
human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto’”438 
Commentators have however argued that the Court only makes a superficial assessment of the 
national reforms being undertaken due to the pilot case. They claim the Court affords great 
leniency towards the States in setting up their remedies, approving them based on mere 
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promises or when there is no relevant practice yet to show how the remedy works.439 Detailed 
examination of the new domestic systemic would then still fall to the Committee of Ministers.440 
Furthermore, the Court usually reserves itself the right to re-open a case when the circumstances 
justify this, meaning when the State has indeed not offered a real solution.441 The Broniowski 
case for instance ended with the Court’s Wolkenberg decision of 4 December 2007.442 A group 
of  Bug river applicants, whose cases had been adjourned, had submitted a claim before the 
Court based on the legislation which had been enacted due to the Broniowski judgment. 
Specifically, they complained that their right to property had been infringed because this Act 
of 2005 only provided for a compensation of 20% of the original value of their claim. They 
consequently complained that they had lost 80% of their lawfully accrued right due to this post-
Broniowski legislation.443 The Court made it clear that by virtue of article 46, it is for the 
Committee of Ministers to assess the general measures taken by the involved State and to 
supervise their execution in the light of the Court’s judgment. The Court on the other hand 
needs to exercise its own power in the light of article 37 ECHR444 in order to decide whether it 
can strike out the cases following the resolution of the overarching situation. To this end, the 
Court only has to assess whether the new legislation provided the applicants with relief at the 
domestic level.445 More specifically, the Court emphasized that “the Court’s role after the 
delivery of the pilot judgment and after the State has implemented the general measures in 
conformity with the Convention cannot be converted into providing individualised financial 
relief in repetitive cases arising from the same systemic situation.”446 This has been termed by 
one of the respondents in Strasbourg as quite cautious and circumscribed language by the Court, 
to make sure that it would not be seen as a ruling by the Court on the conformity of the measures 
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taken by the State with the Broniowski judgment.447 The latter would have certainly been the 
competence of the Committee of Ministers. 
Furthermore, in the context of this follow-up procedure, the Court must make sure that the 
measures put in place by the State after the pilot case are not only beneficial to the applicant in 
that original case. These general measures must be aimed at resolving the general underlying 
issue in the domestic legal order as identified in the principal pilot judgment.448 This again 
exemplifies the overlap created by the pilot judgment procedure perfectly. As one respondent 
explains, the Court’s logic in general is individual. It assesses a situation on a case-by-case 
basis. The Committee of Ministers on the other hand is more problem-oriented and assesses 
situations more general. The pilot judgment procedure signifies the overlap between these two 
viewpoints and, according to this respondent, this creates its added value.449 
b. The procedure before the Committee of Ministers with respect to pilot judgments.  
In general, proceedings at the Committee of Ministers start with the Court’s transmission of the 
case. The Committee will then automatically inscribe it on the agenda of the next human rights 
meeting. Cases involving systemic issues will be treated with priority. It will then also invite 
the involved State to provide it with information concerning the measures it has taken or is 
planning to take. In examining the execution of the case, the Committee will firstly focus on 
the question whether the State has already paid just satisfaction to the applicant. Subsequently 
and taking into account the discretion of the State to choose the kind of remedial measures, the 
Committee will assess the individual and general measures that have been adopted. The 
Committee also employs what it calls ‘control intervals’. If the State hasn’t provided the 
Committee with any information yet, the case will continue to be put on the agenda for the 
human rights meetings. If the State has informed the Committee that it has not been able to take 
the general measures necessary to implement the judgment, the case can be placed on the 
agenda of another human rights meeting no more than six months later. The case is completely 
closed after the Committee of Ministers delivers a Final Resolution in which it finds that the 
State has taken all remedial measures to abide by the judgment.450  
With respect to pilot judgments, the Committee of Ministers has introduced after Interlaken a 
new twin track supervision system, in which pilot judgments will be treated by the Committee 
according to a priority scheme labelled the enhanced supervision procedure.451 The procedure 
entails that the execution is more closely monitored. They are continuously put on the agenda 
of the Human Rights meetings as long as they are not executed and are debated there.452 This 
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enhanced supervision procedure not only applies with respect to pilots. The Committee of 
Ministers will also turn to this procedure in case of judgments requiring urgent individual 
measures, interstate cases and other cases disclosing major structural and/or complex 
problems.453 The standard procedure is the default procedure. Therefore, only a minority of 
cases is treated under the enhanced procedure. Of the total of 1352 new cases brought before 
the Committee in 2016, 668 were treated under the standard procedure, 295 were supervised 
under the enhanced procedure and 389 were awaiting classification.454 The enhanced procedure 
imposes on the Committee the obligation to follow the execution of these cases more closely 
and will result in a more active interaction with the involved States. This may result in the 
Committee of Ministers assisting the States in drafting or implementing their action plans, in 
providing them with expert advice concerning the measures that could be taken, or in 
cooperation programs for cases raising complex problems.455  
One of the respondents however signalled a current problem with the categorization of cases 
leading to this enhanced procedure:  
“There is a kind of relatively newly emerging category of article 46[…]. When you look 
at pilot judgments, vis à vis the rules of procedure before the Committee of Ministers, 
you would see that they have enhanced procedure for pilot judgments but not for the 
rest. Well, they call it "systemic violations" and so on but, if you have this kind of unclear 
article 46 thing, then where should it go? to enhanced procedure? to normal procedure? 
So it may pose problems from the point of execution of judgments, what kind of 
procedure it requires.”456 
The continuum of pilot and pilot-like cases above457 shows indeed that the Committee of 
Ministers does not necessarily supervise all cases which involve a systemic issue by way of the 
enhanced procedure.  
Furthermore, as this dissertation is also looking at the pilot procedure from the perspective of 
the applicants, it is important to mention that the Committee receives information from all 
actors involved in the proceedings before the Court. However, the applicants are only allowed 
to submit information concerning the payment of the just satisfaction or the individual 
measures. Comments concerning general measures will need to come from States, non-
governmental organizations and national institutions for the promotion and protection of human 
rights (NHRI’s).458 In general, the phase of the execution is outside of the control of the 
applicant. The victims of these violations don’t play a part in this arrangement, they are absent 
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from the Committee of Ministers.459 Applicants would thus need to liaise with such 
organizations or institutions were they to comment on the general measures instituted by States 
following a judgment, as these actors are the only ones with access to the Committee of 
Ministers. Since June 2016 however, the Committee of Ministers has increased the transparency 
of its procedures, making sure that the cases which will be under supervision on the next human 
rights meeting are already on the agenda by the end of the previous one. This is meant to give 
the interested parties – including NGO’s and NHRI’s – the chance to submit their comments. 
This has indeed caused an increase of such submissions.460 Information-sharing in general has 
increased, in order to put interested parties in the position to follow the execution of cases. The 
recent creation of the database HUDOC-EXEC is an example of this democratization of the 
Committee of Minister’s work, aimed at increasing transparency and external involvement.461  
As to general measures, it must be noted that the Committee of Ministers has had a long 
tradition of focussing on these kinds of measures with respect to the execution of cases. 
Originally, the Committee of Ministers was the Council of Europe body with the capacity to 
decide which general measures were necessary, sufficient and adequate.462 Furthermore, 
general measures are not only the prerogative of pilot or pilot-like cases.463 In assessing these 
general measures, the Committee of Ministers will ask proof from the State that it has adopted 
them. It can also ask the State to take further measures if the ones in place do not suffice. It is 
important to know that this supervision will continue after a friendly settlement was reached 
and the case was struck out of the list by the Court, contrary to when a case was struck out 
following a unilateral declaration.464 In the context of this evaluation of general measures, the 
Committee of Ministers will have due regard for the effectiveness of domestic remedies, 
certainly in the context of pilot judgments. With this scrutiny, the Committee wants to 
encourage States to adopt provisional measures so as to avoid repeat violations in the waiting 
period towards reforms.465 
If a State objects or delays taking certain measures in execution of the Court’s judgments, the 
Committee of Ministers has some coercion methods available. First, the Committee can adopt 
Interim Resolutions in order to provide information about the execution process, to express 
concern or to make suggestions to the State involved.466 Furthermore, since Protocol 14, the 
                                                 
 
459 E. LAMBERT ABDELGAWAD, The execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Council of 
Europe Publishing, 2008, 32.  
460 Committee of Ministers, Supervision of the execution of judgments and decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights 2016, March 2017, 10.  
461 Committee of Ministers, Supervision of the execution of judgments and decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights 2016, March 2017, 11.  
462 ECtHR, Sejdovic v. Italy, application no. 56581/00, 1 March 2006, § 116.  
463 ECtHR, Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, application no. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, Partly Dissenting Opinion Judge 
Zagrebelsky; E. LAMBERT ABDELGAWAD, The execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, 
Council of Europe Publishing, 2008, 48.  
464 E. LAMBERT ABDELGAWAD, The execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Council of 
Europe Publishing, 2008, 37.  
465 C. DUBOIS, E. PENNINCKX, La procédure devant la Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme et le Comité des 
Ministres, Wolters Kluwer, 2016, 406-407.  
466 Rule 16 of the Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of judgments and of 
the terms of friendly settlements, adopted on 10 May 2006 and as amended on 18 January 2017. 
THE PILOT JUDGMENT PROCEDURE AT THE ECTHR: AN EVALUATION IN THE LIGHT OF PROCEDURAL 
EFFICIENCY AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE  
97 
 
Committee can decide to bring a reluctant State back before the Court to assess whether that 
State has failed to fulfil its obligation under article 46 §1 ECHR. 467 It is important to note that 
the Court, in the formation of the Grand Chamber, will not be asked to find a violation of the 
same primary issue again. It will instead only have to deal with the question whether the State 
has failed to execute its previous judgment.468 These infringement proceedings will only be 
brought in exceptional circumstances. They required a two-thirds majority vote of the members 
allowed to sit on the Committee.469 In December 2017, the Committee of Ministers announced 
that it would start such proceedings for the first time against Azerbaijan.470  
3. The Burmych judgment: giving new meaning to the institutional balance within the 
Council of Europe  
The recent judgment of the Court in Burmych and others v. Ukraine has shed new light on how 
the Court places itself in the institutional context of the Council of Europe. The case followed 
the earlier pilot case of Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine which was not executed, leading 
to a steady increase of similar cases and prompting the Court to re-evaluate its general approach 
in pilot judgments.  
a. The earlier Ivanov pilot judgment 
Since over a decade, Ukraine has triggered the influx of a relatively high number of cases to 
the Court. During this time-span it has continuously been included in the high-case count 
countries in the Court’s statistics. Since 2014 until October 2017, it has even been the State 
accounting for the highest percentage of pending applications.471 The explanation behind these 
statistics is that Ukraine has a systemic problem of non-execution of national judgments which 
create a right to compensation from a government or government-controlled agency.  
This issue was first discussed in the case of Kaysin and others v. Ukraine in 2001, not 
coincidentally the first judgment against Ukraine.472 The case concerned the applicants’ right 
to an invalidity pension which was not paid by their employer, a partly state-owned mining 
company. The parties reached a friendly settlement and the involved applicants received just 
satisfaction. The underlying issue however was not solved.  
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Consequently, the Court kept receiving applications following from the same underlying 
structural problem. Seeing this influx of similar cases, the Court decided to apply the pilot 
judgment procedure in order to induce Ukraine to tackle the issue. The chosen case was the one 
of Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov473, a retired soldier who had not been paid the lump-sum pension 
to which he was entitled. In the case, the Court explained that more than half of its judgments 
against Ukraine between 2004 and 2009 had concerned non-enforcement of final decisions, and 
that at that moment 1400 similar applications were pending.474 The underlying structural issues 
were still posing problems and there was no domestic remedy available. These applicants thus 
all had turned to Strasbourg. The Ukrainian State clarified that there were multiple factors 
creating this systemic problem: the lack of budgetary allocations, shortcomings in national 
legislation and administrative practice and omission or inaction on the part of the bailiffs in the 
national courts.475 The Court found that this was correct, however all of these factors were under 
the control of the State. The Court further emphasized that remedying this would require 
complex general measures which should be developed under the auspices of the Committee of 
Ministers.476 Similar pending cases were adjourned for a term of a year, giving the Ukrainian 
government the time to work out a plan with the Committee and to set up a domestic remedy.477 
The goal was then to send these similar cases back to the domestic system so that they could 
submit their complaint through this new domestic remedy. The Court also reprimanded Ukraine 
and stated that it had shown an almost complete reluctance to resolve the issue.478 It 
subsequently warned that it would be forced to re-open examination of these pending cases if 
Ukraine failed to take the necessary measures.479  
As clearly feared by the Court, the Ukrainian government failed to execute the Ivanov 
judgment. After a first extension of the time period, it was clear that the Government still had 
not reacted adequately. The second request for extension was thus refused and the Court 
resumed the examination of pending cases, hoping that this would again put pressure on the 
State to take action.480 This strategy again failed. The Court started to receive complaints from 
applicants whose cases had already been processed and had thus been granted compensation. 
They informed the Court that Ukraine had again not honoured its obligation, meaning thus that 
the problem still had not been solved domestically.481 Moreover, it had in the meantime grown 
into a major obstacle for the Court’s future functioning: since 2004 the Court had received 29 
000 similar applications, of which 12 143 were still pending on 12 October 2017.482 
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b. Failing of a pilot judgment: the Court’s approach in the Burmych case  
This clear failure of its approach in the Ivanov pilot judgment and the resulting overwhelming 
number of similarly situated victims turning to Strasbourg triggered the Court to address the 
situation in the Burmych case. The Court recognized that it would have to employ a new 
approach, in line with the principle of subsidiarity underpinning the Convention.483 The Court 
specifically asked itself whether it should act as a mechanism for awarding compensation to 
each and every applicant of repetitive applications which follow pilots. The Court found that 
this is not its task, that it has thoroughly addressed the underlying issue in its previous 
judgments and had assisted the State in indicating the kind of measure needed to remedy the 
problem. Subsequently, the Court found that these pending cases needed to be absorbed into 
the execution process at the Committee of Ministers and consequently struck them out of its 
list.  
The Grand Chamber judgment was rendered by ten votes to seven. Arguably, there must have 
been a weighty discussion preceding it. The seven minority judges, including the Ukrainian 
judge,484 attached a rather strong-worded dissent. The judges stress that this decision was taken 
out of efficiency considerations. According to them, it has nothing to do with human rights. 
They focus very much on the viewpoint of the victims by claiming that the Convention requires 
that each application is given an individual judicial assessment and that no victim is to be 
regarded by the Court as a ‘burden’.485 Further, they argue that the Court simply accepts that 
there is no solution and in order to release itself from the burden, it passes the buck to the 
Committee of Ministers. Interestingly, the dissenters state that the Committee of Ministers was 
not consulted concerning this new division of powers.486 Lastly, the dissenters warn that the 
present solution has the perverse result of encouraging members States not to introduce general 
measures where a structural problem has been found to exist. During at least the next two years, 
nothing will happen with these cases. It is not tangible that the solution to a problem which has 
persisted for over sixteen years will be found at the Committee of Ministers within these two 
years. The Court is thus postponing having to deal with the issue again and in the meantime, 
the applicants will not be heard nor will they receive a binding judicial decision. The pressure 
on the State is off and consequently they argue that the judgment is in fact rewarding non-
compliance.487  
c. The institutional shift caused by the Burmych case  
As explained above on page 62, there are roughly two ways of looking at the pilot judgment 
procedure. On the one hand, there is the more principled approach mostly adhered to by judges 
that the procedure brings the Court back to its original role: providing principled judgments 
concerning the Convention. This viewpoint goes hand in hand with a strong emphasis on the 
principle of subsidiarity: when States fulfil their duties, the Court can direct its efforts to 
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analysing complex issues of human rights posed by the practice in the member States. The 
proponents of this perspective argue that the Court was not set up to deal with large groups of 
applicants bringing the same case to the Court.  
On the other hand, there is the more pragmatic approach which entails that the Court is simply 
not capable of dealing with these large streams of cases stemming from systemic issues. As a 
result, it is necessary to bring the forces together of all actors involved – meaning the Court, the 
Committee of Ministers and hopefully, the States - in order to solve the underlying issue and 
thus the reason for the influx of similar applications.  
The Burmych judgment approaches the problem of non-execution in the context of the pilot 
judgment procedure from a very principled point of view. The Court elaborately investigates 
what its role is from different angles. It first looks at itself through the lens of article 19 which 
States that the Court was set up “to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by 
the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto”. From this, the 
judgment states that this is its primary duty, and not the adjudication on awards for just 
satisfaction under article 41. Therefore, the Court argues that when put in the position to choose 
between both tasks, the Court is not held to render the same judgment over and over again while 
there is no live Convention issue anymore. The problem is clear, the solution as well and thus 
the Court has availed itself from its task.488 This is a logical conclusion based on the 
Convention. It does however result in a denial of justice for the victims involved, similarly to 
what the dissenters argue. The Court is for them the last hope after they are not heard in their 
own country. With the Burmych judgment, they will thus not be heard by an independent 
judicial body.  
Furthermore, the judgment is particularly interesting with respect to its examination based on 
article 46. The Court finds that in pilot judgments, it is assisting States in their duties under 
article 46 by indicating the type of measure that is appropriate to address the underlying 
systemic problem. The Committee of Ministers on the other hand is tasked with supervising the 
observance of these general measures by the State. As the obligation to grant relief to victims 
in follow-up cases is encompassed in these general measures, the Court argued that this needs 
to be addressed in the framework of the execution proceedings.489 As execution is the central 
point here and the problems are essentially of a financial and political nature, the Court decided 
that the non-execution of the Ivanov pilot case is now the responsibility of the Committee of 
Ministers.490 All similar pending applications were struck out from the Court’s list and absorbed 
in the execution process of the Ivanov case at the Committee of Ministers. The Court however 
reserved the right to re-open the cases if the circumstances justify it. To this end, the Court 
envisaged to reassess the situation within two years of the delivery of the Burmych judgment 
in order to consider whether circumstances exist such as to justify a re-opening of cases.491 
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The outcome of this case is thus that the Court wants to create a system where it renders 
principled judgments where it diagnoses the underlying problem and indicates the kind of 
measured needed to remedy it. The Committee of Ministers is then tasked with dealing with the 
big groups of applicants accompanying these kinds of cases. However, the Committee of 
Ministers does not foresee the possibility for the applicants to submit their claims, or to make 
their individual case.492 They can merely submit information concerning the execution of 
individual measures, including the payment of just satisfaction. Submissions concerning the 
general issue are then left to civil society, meaning national human rights institutions and 
NGO’s. The applicants thus loose their right to access to a court. It remains however to be seen 
whether this strategy would be successful in prompting Ukraine to finally do away with the 
underlying systemic problem.  
It must however be remembered that the Burmych case is quite exceptional. The only other case 
where the State flagrantly refuses to execute is the case of Greens and M.T. v. the United 
Kingdom concerning a blanket ban for prisoners to vote. Here, the Court had also already 
pointed out the problem in the individual leading case of Hirst v. the United Kingdom, which 
the government refused to execute. The Court then came out with Greens and M.T., which the 
government still refuses to execute, comparable to the situation in Ukraine. If the strategy in 
Burmych proves successful, the Court might decide to do the same for similar cases following 
Greens and M.T. For a number of other cases however, this strategy is not necessary. Chapter 
V will discuss the level of execution of pilots and will show that generally, the procedure might 
be termed successful.  
4. Conclusion: the Court as the spider in the web  
The pilot judgment procedure has been criticized from two angles based on the division of 
competences within the Council of Europe. Firstly, it has been said to go against the principle 
of subsidiarity where the Court is claiming the competence to indicate to States how to execute 
its judgments. The Court here explains that there is no point in rendering the same judgment 
over and over again. More even, this is not its task under the Convention. As a result, logic 
dictates that it must be able to explain to States how to align themselves with their obligations 
under the Convention. The Court is further trying to walk a delicate line here: in most pilot 
cases it merely indicates the obligation to set up a domestic remedy in the operative part of the 
judgment. This way, it is again obliging the State to fulfil its role based on the principle of 
subsidiarity, rather than encroaching upon the State’s territory in obliging it to change laws or 
practices.  
Secondly, the procedure has been critised because it blurs the division of powers between the 
Court and the Committee of Ministers. It has been claimed that the Court is taking up 
supervisory powers by indicating general measures, time-limits within which to execute these 
and taking follow-up decisions in which it evaluates the measures set up in execution of a 
previous pilot. Here, the Court again emphasized that there is no use for any of the actors 
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involved for the Court to find the same violation repeatedly. As a result, the Court is wanting 
to assist the Committee of Ministers by indicating that the issue at hand is systemic in nature 
and which kinds of general measures would be appropriate to remedy it. Time-frames might 
indeed be problematic, although it could be argued that the Court uses these to create a 
possibility for itself to go to the follow-up decisions more quickly. These follow-up decisions 
then involve a rather superficial assessment of the measures set up by the state in execution of 
a previous pilot, which will then serve as the basis for the Court to strike out similar applications 
from its list. In reality, the Court will mostly check whether the State has set up the domestic 
remedy which it required in the pilot judgment. A thorough assessment of the execution of 
general measures will then still be done by the Committee of Ministers.  
The Burmych judgment has further put pressure on this power balance, although it must be 
remarked that this is rather an exceptional situation of an extremely reluctant state. The Court 
has had to clearly draw the lines of what its tasks are in the pilot judgment procedure. Following 
Burmych, the Court will focus on rendering principled judgments, including the indication of 
general measures. The Committee of Ministers on the other hand is tasked with supervising the 
execution of these general measures and dealing with the large numbers of victims involved.  
With the pilot judgment procedure, the Court is in fact thus taking front stage in the proceedings. 
It identifies the underlying issues and the measures which would be appropriate to remedy them. 
It further is delegating tasks to the involved actors in order to come to a solution in the most 
efficient way: it indicates general measures for the States to execute and thus gives guidance to 
the Committee of Ministers on its supervisory task. The Burmych judgment shows that when 
confronted with a State reluctant to execute, the Court will conclude that it has fulfilled its task 
and will subsequently pass the buck to the Committee of Ministers.  
E. The pilot judgment procedure now  
The pilot judgment procedure has grown out of its infancy based on the evolving practice in the 
case law. It has become an integral part of the Court’s procedural tools. Although it has always 
been a flexible tool, allowing the Court to adapt it to the circumstances of the case, it could be 
argued that a somewhat consolidated practice has emerged. This evolution will be discussed in 
this next part.  
1. The codification of the procedure  
The previous part has shown that the pilot judgment procedure has grown from practice, created 
through evolving case law. The procedure first found its legal basis in the combination of the 
first two paragraphs of Article 46 and article 41 of the European Convention.493 The first 
paragraph of article 46 obliges the States to abide by judgments of the Court to which they are 
a party. The second paragraph places the burden to supervise the execution of judgments on the 
Committee of Ministers. Article 41 secures the possibility for the Court to order just satisfaction 
after a violation.494 The combined reading of both articles results in the State’s legal obligation 
after a finding of violation by the Court to compensate the individuals involved in the case, as 
                                                 
 
493 ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland, application no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, § 188 – 194.  
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well to take the individual and general measures – if so required – to put an end to the violation. 
The State is however free to decide the means to acquit itself from this obligation, under the 
supervision of the Committee of Ministers.495  
From the very beginning, the procedure was criticized, including with arguments based on the 
principle of subsidiarity. The judgment of Broniowski explicitly referred to the Resolution 
(2004)3 of the Committee of Ministers as a source for the creation of the pilot judgment 
procedure.496 Commenters have remarked in this regard that these resolutions are in no way 
binding to the Court, nor does the Court have to power to interpret and apply these 
instruments.497 Secondly, the Court was said to have overstepped its boundaries and to have 
appropriate competences that it did not have under article 46. Specifically here, the critique is 
that the Court has stepped onto the territory of the Committee of Ministers on the one hand, by 
getting involved with the supervision of the execution of its judgments, and with the 
competences of the States’ parties under the principle of subsidiarity on the other hand, by 
taking away the States’ choice as to the means to respond to the Court’s judgments.498 It must 
however be remarked that with the Burmych judgment, the Court seems to retreat from both of 
these fields of competence and going back to its original role of setting the principles, while the 
States under the Committee of Ministers translate these back to the national level.  
Furthermore, in the beginning phase of the procedure, it was clear that the Court was still 
experimenting.499 Looking back on this experimental phase and the uncertainty brought with it, 
the Court was called on to codify the procedure. These calls were directed at the Court from 
different angles, they were coming from the CDDH,500 the States parties,501 and evenfrom 
                                                 
 
495 ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland, application no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, § 192; C. DUBOIS, E. PENNINCKX, La 
procédure devant la Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme et le Comité des Ministres, Wolters Kluwer, 2016, 
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496 ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland, application no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, §190.  
497 ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland, application no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, Concurring Opinion Judge Zupančič; 
D. T. BJÖRGVINSSON, “The “Pilot-Judgment” Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights” in G. 
ALFREDSSON, J. GRIMHEDEN, B. G. RAMCHARAN, A. DE ZAYAS, International Human Rights Monitoring 
Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009, 539.  
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judgment procedure in its institutional context” starting from page 81.  
499 L. WILDHABER, “Discussion Following the Presentation by Luzius Wildhaber” in R. WOLFRUM, U. DEUTSCH, 
The European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and Possible Solutions, 
International Workshop, Heidelberg, December 2007, 90; A. BUYSE, “Flying or landing? The pilot judgment 
procedure in the changing European human rights architecture” in O.M. Arnardóttir, A. Buyse, Shifting Centres 
of Gravity in Human Rights Protection. Rethinking relations between the ECHR, EU , and national legal orders, 
Routledge, 2016, 108.  
500 D. MILNER, “Discussion Following the Presentation by Luzius Wildhaber” in R. WOLFRUM, U. DEUTSCH, The 
European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and Possible Solutions, International 
Workshop, Heidelberg, December 2007, 83. 
501 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Interlaken Declaration, 19 
February 2010. 
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within the Court itself502.  One respondent in Strasbourg explained that there were many 
discussions within the Court after Broniowski, during the experimentation phase. Judges 
debated among each other and apparently, there was some reluctance to use the procedure at 
all. This reluctance mostly originated from the idea that the Court would lose its credibility if 
there would ever be a failed pilot judgment.503 Another respondent clarified that the States were 
surprised by the Court with the conception of this procedure and they wanted some security as 
to the terms of its use.504 During the Interlaken Conference of 2010, the States parties thus called 
on the Court to set up clear and predictable standards concerning the selection of the cases and 
the treatment of the other pending cases awaiting the pilot judgment.505 Following this and 
parallel with the entry into force of Protocol 14, the procedure was codified into the Rules of 
Court in February 2011.506  
Looking at the Rules of Court more closely, the pilot judgment procedure is provided for as 
follows. The Court can, on its own initiative or on the request of one or both parties, initiate a 
pilot judgment procedure when it is confronted with applications that reveal systemic or 
structural problems in a member State that could give rise to similar applications. The 
interviews show that up until now, pilots have only been initiated by the Court.507 Before 
initiating the procedure, it must first consult with the parties whether the application results 
from such a problem and on the suitability of employing it.508 The Court is however only held 
to consultation, the parties do not have a right to veto.509 In rendering its judgment, the Court 
must then include the identification of the problem and specify the measures to be adopted in 
its operative provisions.510 The Court can adjourn the examination of all pending similar 
applications to give the involved State the time to adopt the proposed remedial measures.511 It 
can however examine an adjourned application where the “interests of the proper administration 
of justice so require”.512 This has happened for instance in the case of Yuriy Nikolaeyevich 
Ivanov v. Ukraine, where the Court had first adjourned similar pending cases but then resumed 
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their examination when the Ukrainian State did not take measures to execute the judgment.513 
In relation to the remaining cases on the docket, the Court has decided in a currently pending 
case to take no further procedural steps in relation to the remaining applications, while 
examining the leading cases of the group.514 
The pilot judgment procedure has found its place in the contentieux of the European Court of 
Human Rights.515 As of end 2017, the Court has identified 28 full pilot cases.516  
  
                                                 
 
513 ECtHR, Burmych and others v. Ukraine, application nos. 46852/13 et al., 12 October 2017, § 24.  
514 European Court of Human Rights Press Release, European Court Registrar calls for special measures to deal 
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II.4 FULL PILOT JUDGMENTS PER YEAR 2004 - 2017517 
 
As evident from the chart, there is a considerable increase in the use of the pilot judgment 
procedure starting from 2009. The Court had signalled in that year that it had the intention of 
applying the procedure more frequently to do away with its backlog.518 Before 2009, there were 
only the ‘classics’: Broniowski and Hutten-Czapska. After 2009, the flexibility of the pilot 
judgment procedure started to show and the lines between full pilots and quasi-pilots began to 
blur.519 As is also visible from the chart, the last two years of 2016 and 2017 have had less pilot 
judgments. There is no conclusive explanation why the numbers have dropped again. There are 
further some repeat players with respect to pilot cases, such as Russia, Poland, Greece and 
Bulgaria each of which has three pilots to its name. The spreading of pilots across the countries 
of the Council of Europe can be seen in the next chart.  
                                                 
 
517 HUDOC database search; European Court of Human Rights Press Unit, Factsheet – Pilot Judgments, November 
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II.5 PILOT JUDGMENTS PER COUNTRY 2004 - 2017520 
 
2. Well-Established Case Law (WECL)  
In the context of the current working methods surrounding the pilot procedure, it is important 
to mention the WECL (“Well-Established Case Law”) procedure. This was first set up by 
Protocol 14 and has been further developped in the course of 2015.521 Cases concerning issues 
which can be solved based on well-established case law are sent to a Committee of Three Judges 
to be dealt with speedily.522 Cases coming after a pilot cases are also considered to fall under 
this category of WECL cases.523 As a consequence, cases dealing with the same systemic issue 
coming after a pilot case will be sent to such Committees. They decide in unanimity on both 
the admissibility and the merits at the same time.524 In general, the Court here aims to produce 
a judgment within 8 to 9 months following the introduction of the first letter of application.525  
When introduced, this WECL procedure was especially geared towards encouraging friendly 
settlements, specifically with respect to repetitive cases. This was confirmed by several 
respondents in Strasbourg.526 The Court previously could only suggest a friendly settlement 
after the decision on the merits. However, this rule was adapted to make the Court available to 
the parties for a friendly settlement at any time in the procedure specifically with a view to 
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increasing their number in the context of the WECL procedure.527 The consequence is that the 
parties now receive a proposal for friendly settlement with the communication of the case.528 
In total, these Committees are said by the Court to deal with roughly 80% of all repetitive 
cases.529  
This WECL procedure has however already been criticized by the Council of Europe’s 
Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law as the number of such cases being 
transmitted to the Committee of Ministers increase. The Directorate stated that these cases 
include a limited description of the facts, which makes it difficult to subsequently decide on 
possible individual and general measures. The friendly settlements coming out of them further 
predominantly focus on the payment of just satisfaction, with only six of the friendly 
settlements also requiring the State to undertake measures other than payment.530 The 
Committees must render judgments which are able to be executed well through the Committee 
of Ministers, while also guarding over their function to help remedy the underlying systemic 
issue.  
3. Streamlining the pilot judgment procedure.  
The pilot judgment procedure is still developing.531 Meanwhile internally, the pilot judgment 
procedure is being streamlined. As one respondent explains and is apparent from the charts on 
the previous pages, there was a silence between the years of 2006 and 2009: there were no full 
pilot judgments, only article 46 cases.532 It’s only when Rule 61 came into being that the pilot 
judgment procedure was again more broadly used, more and more by the different sections of 
the Court.533  
The recent factsheet issued by the Court concerning the pilot procedure contains a more detailed 
description of the procedure than in previous years and is more clearly based on the practice of 
the procedure than on the initial conceptual idea of the pilot procedure. The factsheet aimed at 
practitioners and potential applicants contains the following elements of a pilot case: the 
existence of an underlying systemic issue which leads to multiple similar cases being brought 
to the Court; the choice of the Court to deal with one or a selection of these cases under priority 
treatment; the diagnosis of the problem at hand; and the indications given to the involved 
government of the type of remedial measures necessary to resolve the issue. It further names 
the possibility for the Court to adjourn similar pending cases on the condition that the 
Government acts promptly to adopt the required general measures a key feature of the 
                                                 
 
527 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
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procedure. Interestingly, it specifically distinguishes between full and quasi-pilot cases. It also 
includes the follow-up decisions in which the Court evaluates the measures set up by the 
State.534 Furthermore, a common practice has emerged to require States to submit an action plan 
with the Committee of Ministers within a certain time-limit as part of the general measures, 
instead of the Court indicating specific general measures in the original judgment.535 This 
indicates that the Committee of Ministers has again received the prime responsibility in 
evaluating the best suited solution for implementing cases, also outside of the exceptional 
circumstance of Burmych. Lastly, the combination of the Single Judge procedure and the 
WECL procedure, both put in place by Protocol 14, has done away with a considerable part of 
the backlog, so that now there remain mostly meritorious Chamber cases.536 One respondent 
remarked that the pilot judgment procedure will probably be used in a lot of interesting cases 
now that these less complex repetitive ones have been done away with.537 
In conclusion, the pilot judgment procedure in the years before the codification was not widely 
used within the Court. The codification however made it workable for the Chambers within the 
Court to do away with repetitive cases due to systemic issues. The procedure has now grown 
out of its infancy and has taken its place in the procedural tools of the Court. There is further 
an emerging standard practice in which the Court has returned from its previous bold position 
where it indicated specific general measures in pilots, to reserving a much more active role for 
the Committee of Ministers again.  
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III. Procedural efficiency – looking at the pilot judgment procedure from the 
perspective of the Court.  
This research is attempting to uncover and subsequently evaluate how the pilot judgment 
procedure is working in practice from two viewpoints, one of which is procedural efficiency. 
Specifically, the research will focus on the viewpoints of the procedure’s users at the side of 
the Court. How do they work with this procedure and how do they tweak it in order to use it 
efficiently? What factors do they take into account and how do they weigh in their decisions? 
To this end, this chapter will firstly describe what the current stance is on pilot judgments and 
efficiency (A.). Secondly, the viewpoint of the Council of Europe on the concept of procedural 
efficiency will be examined (B.), which in turn will inspire the operationalization in this thesis 
of procedural efficiency, as will be explained in a third-subchapter (C.). This operationalization 
is further based on numbers and statistics made publically available by the Court. This 
information is combined in order to explain how the questions were drafted that were 
subsequently put to the respondents at the Court. The fourth sub-chapter will outline the 
experiences of these respondents based on the elements of efficiency as operationalized in the 
previous part (D.). Lastly, the researcher will conclude whether the pilot judgment procedure 
indeed fulfils its role in terms of procedural efficiency based on the experiences of the 
respondents at the Court (E.).  
A. The current stance on pilot judgments and efficiency 
Much has already been written about the role of the pilot procedure in the context of the 
efficiency of the European Court of Human Rights and whether it is fulfilling that role.538 
Increasing efficiency related to the Court’s enormous backlog was always one of the goals of 
the procedure and it still is. The Registry in its most recent factsheet concerning pilots has 
indicated that the goals of the procedure are threefold, including to help the Court to manage 
its workload more efficiently by reducing the number of similar, usually complex, cases that 
have to be examined in detail.539 This goal already reveals something about the kinds of cases 
that the procedure is designed to deal with. In one of its most recent decisions concerning the 
procedure, the Court itself detailed that it served in essence two objects: on the one hand it is 
meant to reduce the threat to the effective functioning of the Convention system, while on the 
                                                 
 
538 Among others: A. BUYSE, “ The Pilot Judgment Procedure at the European Court of Human Rights: Possibilities 
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other it is designed to facilitate a speedier resolution of the issue for the individuals involved.540 
The Burmych judgment further shows that in situations where the Court is overwhelmed by an 
enormous amount of incoming cases, it will prefer efficiency. Efficiency in the form of the swift 
processing of incoming cases has thus remained one of the primary underlying motivators for 
applying the pilot judgment procedure. Finding a solution for the victims of these large-scale 
human rights violations is the other, a focus which will be discussed in depth in chapter IV 
concerning Access to Justice.  
In the context of efficiency, it is important to know which kinds of cases are involved when 
talking about the pilot judgment procedure. Back in 2005, the Lord Woolf report already warned 
that a lot of the cases included in the backlog of the Court at that time were meritorious Chamber 
cases. He predicted that the Court, while focussing on increasing its efficiency and  upping its 
clearance rate would be tempted to focus on the clearly inadmissible cases, whose share in the 
incoming caseload was estimated at around 95% of applications at that time. However, the Lord 
Woolf report reckoned that up to 40% of the pending backlog of the Court – meaning the cases 
which have exceeded the time-limit allowed for at each stage of the proceedings – was made 
up of Chamber cases. With Chamber cases he refers to cases which are admissible and raise a 
serious, complex human rights issue. They thus require more work from the Registry.541 This 
is exactly what has happened. The explanatory report to Protocol 14 clarifies that measures 
aimed at increasing the efficiency of the Court must be focussed on the two groups of cases 
which are predominantly responsible for the huge case-load of the Court. The first group are 
the inadmissible cases, these represented some 90% of incoming cases at that time. The second 
group are the repetitive cases.542  
The Single Judge procedure543 has done away with a huge number of these first category cases 
in the Court’s backlog. These cases are however by their very nature unmeritorious. During the 
Oslo Conference, the President of the Court clarified that of the 90.000 cases decided in 2013, 
80.000 were inadmissibility decisions rendered by a Single Judge.544 Moreover, since the Court 
did not motivate its judgments in these cases until recently, they were quickly dealt with.545 The 
Court however remained with these second category of Chamber cases, a big part of which 
were repetitive. The Single Judge procedure alone was thus not the solution to the Court’s case 
overload problem. 546 These repetitive cases in and of themselves represent a considerable part 
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of the Court’s backlog. Eric Friberg, former Registrar at the European Court, has noted in 2011 
that it would take 20 years for the Court to render a judgment on all these recurring cases 
individually.547 It is in this category of cases that the pilot judgment procedure is to be situated.  
Former Judge Mahoney has claimed that the pilot judgment procedure will not necessary reduce 
the work of the Court regarding the already pending cases. Its role would be preventive, 
obstructing streams of cases coming in which are primarily geared towards awarding victims 
just satisfaction.548 The practice of the Court’s closing cases via decisions -  such as Anastasov 
v. Slovenia after the Kurić pilot case, E.G. v. Poland and 175 other Bug River applications after 
Broniowski and the Association of Real Property Owners in Łódź and others v. Poland decision 
closing the Hutten-Czapska pilot  - seem to suggest that the amount of compensation plays an 
important part here and that the Court has successfully created a practice in which it can 
confidently send these cases back to the respective domestic systems to deal with.549  
In the same line, former President of the Court Wildhaber550 has raised the point that using the 
pilot judgment procedure could also be a way of setting the Court’s priorities straight. A lot of 
these full pilot cases deal with technical procedural issues, such as the length of civil or criminal 
proceedings in several States and non-enforcement of domestic judgments.551 Certainly in these 
kinds of cases, it is not the Court’s role to decide on these issues over and over again. He argued 
that there should be a better recognition and acceptance of priorities, so that the Court can 
                                                 
 
547 L. WILDHABER, “Criticism and Case-overload: Comments on the Future of the European Court of Human 
Rights”, in S. FLOGAITIS, T. ZWART, J. FRASER (eds.), The European Court of Human Rights and its Discontents, 
Edward Elgar, 2013, 14; referring to E. Fribergh, “First Experiences with Protocol No.14 and Further Need for 
Reform” in S. Besson (ed.), The European Court of Human Rights After Protocol 14: Preliminary Assessment and 
Perspectives, Forum Europarecht – Forum droit européen, Schulthess, 2011, 119.  
548 P. MAHONEY, “Discussion Following the Presentation by Luzius Wildhaber” in R. WOLFRUM, U. DEUTSCH, 
The European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and Possible Solutions, 
International Workshop, Heidelberg, December 2007, 87.  
549 ECtHR, decision, Anastasov and others v. Slovenia, application no. 65020/13, 18 October 2016; ECtHR, 
decision, E.G. v. Poland and 175 other Bug River applications, application nos. 50425/99 and 175 others, 23 
September 2008; ECtHR, decision, Association of Real Property Owners in Łódź and others v. Poland, application 
no. 3485/02, 8 Mach 2011.  
550 Luzius Wildhaber was judge for Switzerland in the Court between 1991 and 2006 and was President from 1 
November 1998 until 18 January 2007.  
551 The following nine pilot cases concerned excessive length of proceedings: ECtHR, Michelioudakis c Grèce, 
application no. 54447/10, 3 April 2012; ECtHR, Glykantzi v. Greece, application no. 40150/09, 30 October 2012; 
ECtHR, Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey, application no. 24240/07, 20 March 2012; ECtHR, Vassilios Athanasiou et 
autres v. Greece, application no. 50973/08, 20 December 2010; ECtHR, Rumpf v. Germany, application no. 
46344/06, 2 September 2010; ECtHR, Finger v. Bulgaria, application no. 37346/05, 10 May 2011; ECtHR, 
Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, application nos. 48059/06 and 2708/09, 10 May 2011; ECtHR, Rutkowski 
and others v. Poland, application nos. 72287/10, 13927/11 and 46187/11, 7 July 2015; ECtHR, Gazsó v. Hungary, 
application no. 48322/12, 16 July 2015. Five pilot cases concerned non-execution of domestic decisions: ECtHR, 
Gerasimov and others v. Russia, application nos. 29920/05, 3553/06, 18876/10, 61186/10, 21176/11, 36112/11, 
36426/11, 40841/11, 45381/11, 55929/11, 60822/11, 1 July 2014; ECtHR, Manushaqe Puto and others v. Albania, 
application nos. 604/07, 43628/07, 46684/07 and 34770/09, 31 July 2012; ECtHR, Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), 
application no. 33509/04, 15 January 2009; ECtHR, Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine, application no. 
40450/04, 15 October 2009; ECtHR, Olaru and others v. Moldova, application nos. 476/07, 22539/05, 17911/08 
and 13136/07, 28 July 2009.  
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effectively deal with cases that concern grave violations of human rights.552 The pilot judgment 
procedure could be argued to do just that: do away with these kinds of technical issues in a swift 
manner, leaving the Court more resources to allocate towards the most serious cases.   
The Court itself seems to applaud the pilot judgment procedure for reducing the treat to the 
Convention system. In its Stella decision, by which it closed the issue of prison overcrowding 
in Italy following the Torreggiani pilot case, the Court stated that the pilot judgment here had 
as a direct result the creation of some national laws which would lead to the end of the large 
number of similar pending cases at the Court.553  This positive evaluation of the pilot judgment 
in the systemic issue of prison overcrowding in Italy has also been affirmed in the literature, 
claiming even that this type of judgment might be marked as being more efficient in inducing 
the State to ameliorate the domestic situation.554 Yet, the Torreggiani solution was 
controversial. One of the measures that was taken was the de-criminalisation of certain drug 
offences, which lead to the release of many detainees.555 This was however not deemed a long-
term solution.556 
Subsequently turning to the numbers the procedure indeed seems to do its job. The question 
here is: under which circumstances will the procedure be efficient? In order to answer this 
question, this doctoral research want to add a perspective to this discussion. This research is 
also concerned with the experience of the persons working with this procedure: which 
parameters are needed for the pilot procedure to function as projected and how do the users use 
these parameters in order to make them fit the circumstances?  
B. How does the Council of Europe see efficiency?  
The Council of Europe itself has performed a lot of work concerning the efficiency of justice 
and how to measure this concept. Especially the Council of Europe’s European Commission 
for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) has developed elaborate parameters of efficiency. 
When looking at a court as a system, it can be posed that it works in a simple ‘system-model’, 
which means that it differentiates between input, throughput and output. With regard to the 
input, resources and cases are distinguished. A court has three kinds of resources: personnel, 
material and financial resources. 557 The throughput of a court is the process where an incoming 
case is dealt with by the judges and court staff, resulting in a judgment. Here again, the length 
of proceedings and the backlog in cases is one of the indicators looked at to measure the 
throughput.558 The output is then the eventual judgment and its execution.  
                                                 
 
552 L. WILDHABER,” Discussion Following the Presentation by Luzius Wildhaber” in R. WOLFRUM, U. DEUTSCH, 
The European Court of Human Rights Overwhelmed by Applications: Problems and Possible Solutions, 
International Workshop, Heidelberg, December 2007, 91.  
553 ECtHR, decision, Stella  and others v. Italy, application no. 49169/09, 16 September 2014, § 43.  
554 F. FAVUZZA, “Torreggiani and Prison Overcrowding in Italy”, Human Rights Law Review, 2017, 172; referring 
to Haider, The Pilot-Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights (2013) at 54. 
555 Interview II dd 18.01.2017.  
556 Interview anonymous III.  
557 P. ALBERS, “Performance indicators and evaluation for judges and courts”, CEPEJ, p. 2, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/events/OnEnParle/MoscowPA250507_en.pdf. 
558 P. ALBERS, “Performance indicators and evaluation for judges and courts”, CEPEJ, p. 2, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/events/OnEnParle/MoscowPA250507_en.pdf. 
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We look at the court as a system because the performance of an individual judge is influenced 
by external factors, such as changes in the budget and reforms in the legal context they are 
working in.  Since a number of these factors are out of the reach of the judge, an integral 
approach of looking at the performance of courts and judges is necessary.  This integral 
approach is realized by looking at six performance indicators: the caseload per judge, (labour) 
productivity, duration of proceedings, cost per case, clearance rate, and the budget of the 
court.559 Since allocating the budget of the European Court is based on a political process, this 
research will not look at this parameter. There are also no public numbers on costs per case 
available, making it impossible to research this parameter. Identifying the problem that the 
European Court of Human Right is plagued with, that is the increasing case-load due to 
recurring cases, resulting in the prolonged time it takes for the Court to deliver judgments, this 
doctoral research will thus focus on the four abovementioned parameters of caseload, 
productivity, duration of proceedings and clearance rate. These factors will subsequently each 
be elaborated on.  
C. Explanation of how efficiency is used in this dissertation 
This research is also concerned with the experiences of the persons working with this procedure: 
do they consider it to be an efficient tool and how do they make this work? Therefore, the 
research will focus on questions concerning caseload, time management and productivity and 
how these users of the procedure on the side of the Court tend to ‘tweak’ the procedure in order 
to make it more efficient in a given case.560 Because, as judge Nicholas Bratza said in 2005: 
“an imaginative use of pilot judgments could do much to reduce the Court’s burden”.561 This 
idea was also supported by one of the Strasbourg respondents, stating that the pilot judgment 
procedure is part of the freedom of the Court in order to keep a coherent line in its case law. To 
cast the procedure in a mould, is to curtail that freedom.562  
The parameters developed by the CEPEJ are taken as the basis for the questions. There are 
many other sources that have created variations or completely different criteria for assessing 
the efficiency of a court system.563 The CEPEJ criteria however are arguably the most logical 
choice as they are used by the Council of Europe itself to evaluate judicial efficiency.  
                                                 
 
559 P. ALBERS, “Performance indicators and evaluation for judges and courts”, CEPEJ, p. 3, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/events/OnEnParle/MoscowPA250507_en.pdf. 
560 The concrete questions posed to the respondents can be found in annex 2. 
561 N. BRATZA, “The Changing Landscape of the European Court”, speech given to Middle Temple, 5 October 
2005; The Right Honourable The Lord Woolf, Review of the Working Methods of the European Court of Human 
Rights, December 2005, p. 40.  
562 Interview II dd 13.01.2017.  
563 See, among others, the parameters used by the European Union (length of proceedings, clearance rate, and 
pending cases), see European Commission – Directorate-General for Justice, The 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard, 
COM(2016) 199 final, 2016. The US Department of Justice has standards concerning overall performance, 
encompassing access to justice; expedition and timeliness; equality, fairness and integrity; independence and 
accountability; and public trust and confidence. See U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance, Trial Court Performance 
Standards With Commentary, NCJ 161570, July 1997. The Economics Department of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) seems to focus predominantly on length of proceedings, see 
OECD, “What makes civil justice effective?”, OECD Economics Department Policy Notes No. 18, 18 June 2013.  
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1. Case-load  
The most evident way to calculate the caseload per judge564 is to divide the total number of 
incoming cases and pending cases to the total number of judges.565 The total caseload number 
of the Court can be calculated on the basis of the statistics released by the European Court itself 
each year.566 This chart shows the following evolution between 2006 and 2017. The chart shows 
that the caseload follows the same evolution as the evolution in the total number of pending 
cases. Due to the higher number of pending cases in 2011, the caseload naturally was high as 
well. The numbers have gone down after that, with a short-term boost again from end of 2016 
to mid-2017. It could be questioned whether the pilot judgment procedure has had an impact 
on this general downfall of the numbers after 2011.  
III.1 CASELOAD OF THE ECTHR AS A WHOLE 2006-2017 
 
This will however not present a complete image of the caseload per judge, since the European 
Court performs its tasks in differing formations: single-judge cases, in a Committee of Three 
Judges, Chamber formations of seven judges, and Grand Chamber panels of seventeen 
judges.567 Where a case will be dealt with depends on the priority given to it and the category 
to which it will be assigned. This will be explained in the context of the question of 
simplicity/complexity below.  
As to the part pilot cases play in this caseload of the Court, the statistics show that pilot 
judgments as such do not impact the numbers considerably. However, the way that similar 
applications are dealt with following a pilot case through the WECL procedure will have an 
                                                 
 
564 As will be explained below under Productivity on page 117, there are no clear numbers as to the total number 
of lawyers working at the Court. It is however fixed that there are 47 judges working at the Court. Consequently, 
the caseload parameter here is calculated on the basis of the number of judges only.  
565 P. ALBERS, “Performance indicators and evaluation for judges and courts”, CEPEJ, p. 4, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/events/OnEnParle/MoscowPA250507_en.pdf. 
566 This chart is based on statistics provided by the ECtHR per year, accessible here: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/sites/search_eng/pages/search.aspx#{"sort":["createdAsDate 
Descending"],"Title":["\"analysis of statistics\""],"contentlanguage":["ENG"]}; the recent statistics until June 
2017 can be accessed here: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_annual_2017_ENG.pdf.  
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effect. We can see that this category of WECL-cases form almost half of the Court’s pending 
applications.   
III.2 SHARE OF LEADING AND PILOT CASES IN THE TOTAL CASELOAD OF THE COURT 2012-
2016 
 
This chart is a combination of the data in the statistics compiled by the Court and the Court’s 
priority policy.568 It shows a considerable decline in the Court’s caseload concerning the cases 
dealt with under the WECL procedure. The percentage of pilot and leading cases is negligible 
in comparison to those numbers. This thus confirms the fact that most of the Court’s caseload 
consists of repetitive cases. Included in this data are the cases falling under the Court’s priority 
category II: cases which reveal systemic issues and are thus subject to the pilot judgment 
procedure and so-called leading cases. These two categories are not split up. However, as this 
category forms merely an extremely small part of the Court’s caseload, this does not necessarily 
present a problem in order to show the total impact of the pilot procedure on the Court’s 
caseload. Further, a much bigger part of the Court’s caseload is situated in category V cases: 
repetitive cases. These are part of the so-called WECL cases which are dealt with by a 
Committee of Three Judges based on well-established case law. They mostly follow pilot cases 
and leading cases as well. Furthermore, the Court has only begun to provide this specific 
statistical information since 2012. Based on the Court’s own statistics it is hard to render clear 
information concerning the impact of the pilot judgment procedure on the Court’s caseload.  
In sum, caseload is calculated as the rate of cases per judge or per lawyer. As a result, it could 
be argued that this parameter can be looked at from the perspective of these professionals. 
Therefore, the experiences of the persons working with this caseload may help to offer a more 
complete view of this element of efficiency. In this sense, during the interviews the experience 
                                                 
 
568 This chart is based on statistics provided by the ECtHR per year, accessible here: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/sites/search_eng/pages/search.aspx#{"sort":["createdAsDate 
Descending"],"Title":["\"analysis of statistics\""],"contentlanguage":["ENG"]}; the recent statistics until June 
2017 can be accessed here: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_annual_2017_ENG.pdf; European Court of 
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concerning their caseload was discussed with judges and lawyers at the Court. More 
specifically, questions as to how they manage their case-load and the role of the pilot judgment 
procedure in this came up.  
2. Simplicity/complexity of cases  
Additionally, this way of looking at caseload, oversimplifies the work of judges: some cases 
are simple, while others are more complex.569 The Court itself divides cases in categories 
according to their simplicity or complexity. Complex cases are allocated to a Chamber or the 
Grand Chamber. Simpler meritorious cases are allocated to the Committees of Three Judges 
and clearly inadmissible cases are decided by Single Judges. Using this data, we can see that 
the highest fluctuation takes place in the category of the simplest cases, encompassing the 
Committee and Single Judge cases. It must be noted that the Single Judge procedure was only 
in place with respect to all Council of Europe member States since 2010 with the entry into 
force of Protocol 14.570 The red line in the graphs indicates the start of the Single Judge 
procedure.  
III.3 EVOLUTION IN THE ECTHR'S PENDING CASES, SPLIT IN SIMPLE AND COMPLEX CASES 
2006-2017 
 
It is clear that the highest fluctuation is noticeable within the category of simple cases. This can 
be either due to the Single Judge procedure dealing with large groups of inadmissible individual 
cases. It can also be linked to the existence of a pilot case, which in turn makes it easier for the 
Committees to render a fast-track judgment on similar follow-up cases or make the claims in 
these follow-up cases simply inadmissible and thus susceptible to a decision by a Single Judge. 
                                                 
 
569 P. ALBERS, “Performance indicators and evaluation for judges and courts”, CEPEJ, p. 4, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/events/OnEnParle/MoscowPA250507_en.pdf. 
570 The Single Judge procedure was however already in place from May 2009 with respect to the states that signed 
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As a result, it is important to know if this evolution within the simple cases is mostly due to 
Committee judgments or to Single Judge decisions.  
III.4 EVOLUTION IN THE ECTHR'S PENDING CASES WITHIN SIMPLE CASES, SPLIT IN 
COMMITTEE CASES AND SINGLE JUDGE CASES 2010-2017571 
 
This chart reveals that the rapid decline in simple cases starting 2011 was mostly due to Single 
Judge cases. Committee cases however started to grow. The creation of the WECL procedure 
which came into operation from 2010 for all Council of Europe States however could be an 
explanation for this increase.  
3. Productivity  
Productivity is an indicator that provides information about the production delivered by judges 
and court staff, in terms of judicial decisions. It is the most widely used measure and is 
calculated by dividing the total output of judgments and decisions by the number of personnel 
or the number of hours worked.572 It is also possible to look at the productivity of the court 
system as a whole. Referring back to the resources of the court, it must be noted that modifying 
these different resources can each have an impact on the productivity, and thus efficiency, of 
the Court.573  
The Court does not publicly release information concerning the composition of its human 
resources. One of the respondents however elaborated on the limited capacity of the Court:   
“We have a limited capacity. We have almost two hundred fifty lawyers, forty seven 
judges, we have more than 800 million potential clients. So, the Court does not have the 
capacity to deal with thousands of cases, which might come from different 
                                                 
 
571 As the Single Judge procedure was only introduced after the entry into force of Protocol 14 in 2010, this Chart 
only takes its start from then on.  
572 P. ALBERS, “Performance indicators and evaluation for judges and courts”, CEPEJ, p. 5, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/events/OnEnParle/MoscowPA250507_en.pdf. 
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countries.[…]If we want to deal with every single case, repetitive case, then you have 
to have several buildings around here and you need to recruit thousands of lawyers and 
you need to give rulings in each of those cases, which is practically impossible!”574 
These numbers might however have fluctuated over the years. Indeed, one of the respondents 
has indicated that at one point, the Court did hire more lawyers in order to deal with the 
backlog.575 Consequently, it is not possible to make an analysis of the evolution in the Court’s 
productivity which is based on correct statistics, as these are not publicly available. The 
experiences surrounding this issue in the context of the pilot judgment procedure, existing 
among the interviewees working at the Court will however be included in the next sub-chapter 
dealing with the experiences of the Court’s personnel.   
4. Length of proceedings  
Another indicator of performance can be defined in relation to the length of proceedings.  
                                                 
 
574 Interview III dd 13.01.2017. In 2011, that number was a bit higher and estimated at 270 case lawers, see Y. 
HAECK, C. BURBANO HERRERA, Procederen voor het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens, Intersentia, 
2011, 152.  
575 Interview II dd 17.01.2017.  
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III.5 LENGTH OF PROCEEDINGS AT THE ECTHR 
 
name of the case date of the case date of application total length of proceedings 
Broniowski v. Poland 22/06/2004 12/03/1996 8 years, 3 months 
Hutten-Czapska v. Poland 19/06/2006 6/12/1994 11 years, 6 months
Burdov v. Russia (no. 2) 15/01/2009 15/07/2004 4 years, 6 months
Olaru and others v. Moldova 28/07/2009
11/12/2006; 31/05/2005; 
2/04/2008; 3/01/2007
2 years, 6 months -4 years, 
2 months
Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. 
Ukraine 15/10/2009 13/09/2004 5 years, 1 month
Suljagic v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 3/11/2009 2/07/2002 6 years, 7 months
Rumpf v. Germany 2/09/2010 10/11/2006 3 years, 10 months
Maria Atanasiu and others v. 
Romania 12/10/2010 11/08/2005; 4/08/2004
5 years, 2 months-6 years, 
2 months
Greens and M.T. v UK 23/11/2010 14/11/2008 2 years
Vasilios Athanasiou and others 
v. Greece 21/12/2010 6/10/2008 2 years, 2 months
Finger v. Bulgaria 10/05/2011 6/10/2005 6 years, 5 months
Dimitrov and Hamanov v. 
Bulgaria 10/05/2011 10/11/2006; 6/01/2009
2 years, 4 months-4 years, 
7 months
Ananyev and others v. Russia 10/01/2012 14/09/2007 4 years, 4 months
Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey 20/03/2012 23/05/2007 4 years, 10 months 
Michelioudakis v. Greece 3/04/2012 4/09/2010 1 year, 7 months
Kuric and others v. Slovenia 26/06/2012 4/07/2006 5 years, 11 months 
Manushaqe Puto and others v. 
Albania 31/07/2012 16/11/2006 5 years, 8 months
Glykantzi v. Greece 30/10/2012 9/07/2009 3 years, 2 months
Torregiani and others v. Italy 8/01/2013
seven applications, 
between 08/2009 and 
07/2010
3 years, 5 months-2 years, 
6 months
M.C. and others v. Italy 3/09/2013 29/11/2010 2 years, 10 months
Gerasimov and others v. Russia 1/07/2014
11 applications between 
07/2005 and 08/2011 2 years, 11 months - 9 years
Alisic and others v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, 
Slovenia and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 16/07/2014 30/07/2005 9 years
Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria 27/01/2015
six applications between 
06/2010 and 12/2012
2 years, 1 month - 4 years, 
7 months
Varga and others v. Hungary 10/03/2015
six applications between 
March and October 2013
2 years - 1 year and 5 
months 
Rutkowski and others v. 
Poland 7/07/2015
30/11/2010; 21/02/2011; 
21/07/2011 4 years, 8 months - 4 years
Gazso v. Hungary 16/07/2015 24/07/2012 3 years
W.D. v. Belgium 6/09/2016 28/10/2013 2 years, 11 months
Rezmives v. Romania 25/04/2017
14/09/2012; 6/06/2013; 
24/07/2013; 15/10/2013,
4 years, 7 months - 3 years, 
6 months 
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This table shows the length of procedure at the Court in pilot cases, starting from the date of 
the first application in the case to the date of the judgments. The numbers range from one year 
and seven months to eleven years and six months.  
To further conceptualize the indicator of length of proceedings, the CEPEJ has developed a 
time-management checklist as a practical tool for courts.576 This checklist is intended to enable 
courts of member States of the Council of Europe to collect appropriate information and analyse 
the factors that influence the duration of proceedings.577 However, it could also be applied to 
the European Court of Human Rights itself. It includes six indicators that influence the length 
of proceedings. 
 Firstly, Courts should have the ability to assess the overall length of proceedings, through the 
identification of court proceedings from the user’s perspective and the establishment of the 
integral length of proceedings.578 Secondly, Courts must establish standards for the duration of 
proceedings, through the definition of optimum time-frames and increase the foreseeability of 
these time-frames.579 Thirdly, resulting from a differentiated complexity of cases, courts must 
employ a sufficiently elaborated typology of cases with regard to time consumption.580 
Fourthly, Courts should develop the ability to monitor the course of proceedings through the 
collection of data concerning the timing of the most important stages of the proceedings.581 
Fifthly, Courts must develop means to promptly diagnose delays and to mitigate their 
consequences. To this end, responsibility for the identification and avoidance of delays must be 
clearly attributed, emergency policies should be put in place and procedural means to accelerate 
proceedings should be developed.582 Lastly, Courts should be aware of the added benefit of 
using modern technology as a tool for time management. Technology in this regard can be used 
to monitor the length and delays of proceedings and can act as tools for statistical processing 
and planning in the area of time-frames.583 In the chart in Annex 5 “VI-b Detailed overview of 
                                                 
 
576 P. ALBERS, “Performance indicators and evaluation for judges and courts”, CEPEJ, p. 7-8, 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/events/OnEnParle/MoscowPA250507_en.pdf. 
577 European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Time Management Checklist, 9 December 2005, 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CEPEJ%282005%2912&Sector=secDGHL&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=
rev&BackColorInternet=eff2fa&BackColorIntranet=eff2fa&BackColorLogged=c1cbe6 
578 European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Time Management Checklist, 9 December 2005, 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CEPEJ%282005%2912&Sector=secDGHL&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=
rev&BackColorInternet=eff2fa&BackColorIntranet=eff2fa&BackColorLogged=c1cbe6 
579 European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Time Management Checklist, 9 December 2005, 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CEPEJ%282005%2912&Sector=secDGHL&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=
rev&BackColorInternet=eff2fa&BackColorIntranet=eff2fa&BackColorLogged=c1cbe6 
580 European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Time Management Checklist, 9 December 2005, 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CEPEJ%282005%2912&Sector=secDGHL&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=
rev&BackColorInternet=eff2fa&BackColorIntranet=eff2fa&BackColorLogged=c1cbe6 
581 European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Time Management Checklist, 9 December 2005, 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CEPEJ%282005%2912&Sector=secDGHL&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=
rev&BackColorInternet=eff2fa&BackColorIntranet=eff2fa&BackColorLogged=c1cbe6 
582 European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Time Management Checklist, 9 December 2005, 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CEPEJ%282005%2912&Sector=secDGHL&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=
rev&BackColorInternet=eff2fa&BackColorIntranet=eff2fa&BackColorLogged=c1cbe6 
583 European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Time Management Checklist, 9 December 2005, 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CEPEJ%282005%2912&Sector=secDGHL&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=
rev&BackColorInternet=eff2fa&BackColorIntranet=eff2fa&BackColorLogged=c1cbe6 
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full pilot cases - focus on perspective of the Court (June 2004 - June 2017)” on page 220, it is 
indicated how much time has passed between the introduction of the first application and the 
Court’s rendering of a judgment. The chart in Annex 4 “VI-a Cases open or closed + level of 
cooperation of the State (June 2004 - June 2017)” on page 216 shows how long it has taken for 
a case to be executed or for how long it has already been pending. From the interviews, it will 
be clear that the Court has indeed set up procedures in order to meet its own requirements. As 
they are not all publicly available, they have mostly come up during the interviews with the 
Court’s lawyers. Therefore, they will be discussed in-depth in the next sub-chapter.  
Additionally, the CEPEJ has developed a compendium of best practices concerning time 
management of judicial proceedings. The compendium includes information on the setting of 
time-frames, on dealing with delays, collecting and disseminating data, developing procedural 
case-management policies and adopting caseload and workload policies.584 A number of these 
concepts were focussed on during the interviews with judges and lawyers at the Court as well.  
5. Clearance rate 
Lastly, the research will look at the clearance rate, which can be defined as the number of 
outgoing cases as a percentage of the incoming cases. This indicator can determine whether 
courts are able to keep up with their incoming caseload.585  The evolution of the Court’s 
clearance rate is shown in the next chart.  
III.6 CLEARANCE RATE IN GENERAL 2006-2017 
 
                                                 
 
584 European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice, Compendium of “best practices” on time management of 
judicial proceedings, 8 December 2006, 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CEPEJ%282006%2913&Sector=secDGHL&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=
original&BackColorInternet=eff2fa&BackColorIntranet=eff2fa&BackColorLogged=c1cbe6.  
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Between 2012 and 2014, the Court disposed of a huge number of cases on its docket. The line 
going above the percentage line of 100% thus shows that in this time-frame, the number of 
cases disposed of judicially was considerably bigger than the number of cases allocated to a 
judicial formation. In 2015, the numbers returned back to normal. In 2017, there is again a small 
surge in the numbers. This could be due to the Burmych judgment, as it enabled the Court to 
transfer a large number of pending applications to the Committee of Ministers. During the 
interviews, judges and lawyers were asked about the underlying systems making this possible 
and whether the pilot judgment procedure played a role.  
D. The experience at the side of the Court: is the pilot judgment procedure efficient? 
One of the respondents summarized what the pilot judgment procedure was set up to do in terms 
of efficiency: “globally speaking, one of the reasons why we have used the pilot judgment 
procedure is in order to be more efficient, to go more quickly with less time-consuming 
procedures. That’s for sure.”586 The question remains however, whether the procedure lives up 
to its goals and which circumstances are needed for it do so. 
1. Case-load 
The Registry at the European Court is divided in different Sections and each of them has a 
country from the top 5 violating countries and one from numbers 6-10 under its responsibilities. 
This system was set up to ensure that the workload would be split up equally among the 
Sections.587 At first sight, it would seem that the pilot judgment procedure has a positive impact 
on the case-load of judges and lawyers working at the Court. As in the majority of cases, similar 
applications are kept pending and when there is a domestic remedy available for them so they 
can be sent back, this creates the assumption that it would alleviate their work. One interviewee 
in Strasbourg clarified that this kind of working enables the Registry to work with many cases 
at the same time. Consequently, this interviewee concluded that this directly influences the 
workload in a positive way.588 
Another interviewee elaborated on the effect of a follow-up decision finding a new domestic 
remedy to adhere to the criteria of article 13 on the Registry and described it as a magic wand 
causing all of these cases to disappear. However, this respondent nuanced this by stating that it 
only referred to cases in which there is only a procedural problem. When there is a broader 
issue, such as wide-spread problems with respect to prison conditions or with internment  of 
mentally ill prisoners, this will not be solved so swiftly. As long as these general measures are 
not executed, the pilot judgment procedure will not have meant anything for the Court’s 
backlog.589 Indeed, as another respondent explains in this context: “once the pilot is out, it gives 
you a bit of breath during the time-limit for adjourning. But when the time is over, they come 
back in. Then friendly settlements are needed to alleviate the load.”590 
                                                 
 
586 Interview dd 09.01.2017.  
587 Interview dd 23.02.2017.  
588 Interview I dd 20.01.2017.  
589 Interview II 20.01.2017.  
590 Interview II dd 17.01.2017.  
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However, some respondents emphasized that the pilot judgment procedure as such is a very 
tough and time-consuming procedure for the Court.591 The preparation of a pilot case takes a 
lot of time. First, the lawyers need to go through all the cases stemming from this issue in order 
to create a good overview of the inflow of cases. Then the lawyers need to identify the different 
problems resulting from the structural issue.592 The pilot must be well-prepared and the origin 
of the problem must be well-defined.593 Subsequently, the Court needs to decide: do we 
communicate? If so, do we communicate all of the cases? If not, which one do we 
communicate? 594 The communication is in reality one of the defining stages in the life of a 
case, certainly from a case-management point of view. If there is a friendly settlement before 
the communication, then the parties will settle out of Court which will lead to a strike-out 
decision. It is only when the case has been communicated, that the Court will render its 
assistance in order to come to an agreement. If this is successful, then this will count as a 
friendly settlement. If it is not successful, the Court can still decide for a unilateral declaration. 
Most importantly, a case which has been communicated must be subsequently dealt with by a 
Committee or a Chamber, either with a judgment or through a decision declaring it 
inadmissible. If a case is not yet communicated, it can be found inadmissible through the Single-
Judge Procedure. Consequently, when the Court decides to adjourn applications before they are 
communicated, this decision will have originated from considerations of case-management. 
These kinds of decisions are purely practical.595  
Furthermore, even though these similar applications are kept pending, they still require work 
from the Registry. In the meantime, the Court continues to receive many cases. Even if the 
Registry decides to not deal with them, the individual lawyers still have work to do because the 
applicants keep writing.596 
Similarly, the last stage in the proceedings of follow-up after a pilot case puts work on the plate 
of the Court. One respondent explained that in order to absorb the backlog created by a specific 
systemic issue, the Court had to hire one B lawyer and one intern to permanently work on this 
for more than a year. The pilot judgment procedure is not regarded by this interviewee as a 
magic solution, because there still has to be follow-up care.597  
2. Simplicity/complexity  
It is important to remember that following Rule 61, pilots are subject to priority treatment.598 
This in principle would categorize them as Chamber cases and thus as complex cases. This only 
                                                 
 
591 Interview II dd 20.01.2017.  
592 Interview dd 11.01.2017.  
593 Interview dd 11.01.2017.  
594 Interview II dd 17.01.2017.  
595 Interview II dd 17.01.2017; examples of cases in which the Court decided to adjourn non-communicated cases 
can be found in the continuum of pilot and pilot-like cases on page 32; this adjourning before communication is 
what has been termed ‘unofficial adjourning’ above. This is something that is done also outside of the scope of the 
pilot judgment procedure. However, once cases are communicated, they can only officially be adjourned in the 
context of a pilot case.  
596 Interview III dd 13.01.2017.  
597 Interview dd 09.01.2017.  
598 Rule 61.2 c) Rules of Court.  
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counts for the original pilot case. Cases coming after that would be dealt with by a Committee 
under the WECL procedure, or by a Single Judge after the finding by the Court of an effective 
domestic remedy. These would thus be regarded as simple cases.  
However, this does not reveal the simplicity or complexity of the underlying issue. This is 
important from an efficiency viewpoint as a complex case would require more work from the 
Registry. The question whether pilot cases are simple or complex cases was not unambiguously 
answered by the respondents in Strasbourg. Some respondents agreed that the application of 
the pilot procedure has nothing to do with the simplicity or complexity of the issue.599  
On the other hand, some respondents emphasized that pilot cases have raised complex legal 
issues with respect to the right to property, the right to fair trial and the prohibition of torture.600 
One interviewee differentiated between the different pilot cases involving the right to property. 
The problem in Broniowski was simple, it merely required the State to have new legislation 
which would ensure compensation in accordance with the promises made and the Convention. 
The problem in Hutten-Czapska was more complex. It concerned an issue of rent control where 
the owners complained that their right to property was infringed because the amount of rent 
they could ask from their tenants was controlled by the State. This issue is much more 
complicated because it also involves the rights of the third parties, the tenants. Solving this not 
only required a lot of money but also a thorough reform of the rent control system and even the 
housing situation in Poland. 601   
Nonetheless, as stated above, even if the issue in the original pilot case is a simple one, the pilot 
procedure still is tough and time-consuming for the lawyers and judges working on the case.   
3. Productivity  
Strike-out or inadmissibility decisions as a result of new effective domestic remedies following 
a pilot case are the main factors which increase productivity in the context of repetitive cases. 
The number of hours worked on a pilot case is proportionately more productive than in 
individual cases, if this group of similar applications is equally dealt with in one go.602 Indeed, 
when the Registry is able to quickly do away with a bulk of cases, this is sure to increase 
productivity numbers overall. One respondent explains that this was quite easy with Broniowski 
and Hutten-Czapska because the whole issue can be solved with compensation603, so that 
productivity with these cases was quite good. It gets more complicated with article 3 cases 
concerning sub-standard prison conditions. It is not as easy if the State is required to address 
prison policy or build new prions. It thus depends on the measure that is required from the State 
                                                 
 
599 Interview I dd 13.01.2017; Interview anonymous I; Interview II dd 16.01.2017; Interview dd 9.01.2017; 
Interview anonymous I.  
600 Interview I dd 13.01.2017; Interview II dd 13.01.2017 
601 Interview I dd 16.01.2017.  
602 Interview dd 11.01.2017.  
603 This is contrary to what another respondent stated that the measures required in Hutten-Czapska were more 
complex than in Broniowski.  
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in execution of the pilot. 604 Follow-up to cases concerning detention issues is further difficult 
to base on one judgment because not all facts are the same.605  
Another respondent referred to the decision of Łatak v. Poland, which declared the follow-up 
applications after the quasi-pilot case of Orchowski v. Poland inadmissible for non-exhaustion 
of a new domestic remedy created as a result of this quasi-pilot.606 This bulk of follow-up cases 
consisted of 271 pending applications.607 This is just one example of how a successful pilot 
influences the Court’s productivity positively. As explained above,608 it has become standard 
practice for the Court to evaluate the appropriateness of domestic remedies set up after a pilot 
judgment, resulting subsequently in inadmissibility decisions in the pending similar 
applications.609 
4. Length of proceedings  
a. Overall positive evaluations  
The evaluation of the pilot judgment procedure in terms of speediness was almost unanimously 
positive with the interviewees in Strasbourg.  
With respect to the pilot case, respondents inferred that due to the priority treatment for the pilot 
case, these would naturally be handled quicker than a standard individual case.610 This is 
naturally true if the issue involves the right to property or the right to a fair trial as these articles 
don’t normally call for priority treatment.611  
With respect to the follow-up cases, most respondents added some criteria for the procedure to 
be speedy. From the viewpoint of the Court, it was stated that when the pilot has lead to the 
creation of effective domestic remedies so that pending cases can be sent back, the procedure 
was quicker, compared to the situation where these cases would have been dealt with one by 
one.612 This again thus depends on the level of cooperation of the involved State in the 
willingness to create a domestic remedy which is retroactively applicable. One respondent 
stated that the number of pending cases, the nature of pending cases and the nature of the general 
measures required also plays a role, although the cooperation of the State is the main criterion. 
613   
Another respondent explained that these frozen cases would be in the backlog anyway. The 
involvement of the pilot judgment procedure at least creates a guarantee for the applicants that 
                                                 
 
604 Interview anonymous I.  
605 Interview II dd 17.01.2017.  
606 ECtHR decision, Łatak v. Poland, application no. 52070/08, 12 October 2010.  
607 Interview II dd 17.01.2017.  
608 This point was discussed under “The complementary nature of the relationship between the Committee of 
Ministers and the Court” starting from page 87.  
609 In order to see which cases have already been closed by the Court with such a follow-up decisions, see Annex 
4  “VI-a Cases open or closed + level of cooperation of the State (June 2004 - June 2017)” on page 215.  
610 Interview II dd 17.01.2017; Interview anonymous I.  
611 European Court of Human Rights, The Court’s Priority Policy,  
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Priority_policy_ENG.pdf.  
612 Interview II dd 13.01.2017.  
613 Interview dd 09.01.2017. 
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the Court would work together with the State in order to solve the issue. In this way, the problem 
will be solved quicker and more thoroughly overall.614    
Even if the follow-up cases are not sent back, because either the established domestic remedy 
does not have retroactive effect in the national system or the implementation of general 
measures does not run smoothly at all, being able to apply the recipe thought out in the pilot 
case to a group of similar cases in a WECL procedure will lead to quicker solutions as well. 
One respondent used the Ananyev case to exemplify this point. In the case, the Court explained 
it’s view that prison overcrowding was being caused by excessive use of pre-trial detention, 
which should be an exceptional measure. The Court here offered a recipe for the State to solve 
the underlying issue, as well as a recipe for itself to quickly deal with follow-up cases through 
the WECL procedure. The Court can simply refer to its findings in the pilot case and argue that 
there is no need to depart from those finding. This is procedurally quicker than having to 
elaborately argue the same point over and over. 615 In practice, there is one Registry lawyer who 
routinely works on these specific cases after the pilot judgment. Because this lawyer does not 
need to elaborate much on the merits or the procedural issues, these cases can be dealt with 
quickly afterwards. 616  
Some respondents here also mention the implications of this procedure for the applicants of the 
similar cases that were not picked as the pilot. Even though these repetitive applications are 
dealt with quicker for the Court following a pilot, this does not necessarily mean that these 
applicants are offered a solution in a shorter time-frame.617 This issue will however be discussed 
in the next Chapter concerning access to justice.  
b. Time management at the Court  
The Court has internal guidelines concerning time-frames for processing cases. It is important 
to remark that these are guidelines, they are not binding.618 The timing of cases depends on 
various elements: the actual possibility of dealing with the case within the Registry, the 
prospects of compliance by the State, the prospects of a friendly settlement procedure and so 
on.619 In a WECL case however, the Court generally aims to render a judgment within 8 to 9 
months following the introduction of the first letter.620 
Priority cases are closely watched.621 It is however difficult to have fixed time-limits for these 
priority cases because the speed with which they are dealt with depends on a lot of factors. If 
the lawyer requests more information, this could take more time. Additional procedural issues 
could also add more time. There is however a guarantee behind officially recognizing the 
priority treatment of cases. Every lawyer in the division is working on the case and it is closely 
watched. There is an internal system of attaching warnings to it in the database. Further, 
                                                 
 
614 Interview I dd 20.01.2017.  
615 Interview III dd 13.01.2017; this same point was made in Interview dd 19.01.2017.  
616 Interview II dd 16.01.2017.  
617 Interview II dd 13.01.2017; Interview anonymous I 
618 Interview anonymous I.  
619 Interview II dd 17.01.2017.  
620 Interview III 13.01.2017.  
621 Interview dd 11.01.2017.  
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progress in the case is discussed during meetings. One respondent clarified that it’s more an 
internal control system that is attached to the case, rather than an official deadline.622  
Another respondent subsequently elaborated a bit about the Court’s management of delays. 
Delays occur mostly in the stock-taking, meaning in the identification of cases. The Court 
further has developed some strategies as to how to tackle delays: management of the archives, 
a clearer identification of cases based on the new Rule 47623, the strategies developed 
concerning the Brighton backlog624, and the system where a red flag is put up with a case if it 
has not been handled within the set deadline. According to this interviewee, the Court is now 
pretty much in control of delays.625  
5. Clearance rate  
a. Role of the Single Judge and the WECL procedures  
During the Strasbourg interviews, respondents were asked about this increase in clearance rate, 
especially between 2012 and 2014. This question was specifically designed to know whether 
the pilot judgment procedure played a role in this, and thus whether the procedure fulfils its role 
of increasing the Court’s efficiency.  
A considerable group of respondents shared the view that the pilot judgment did not really do 
much in reducing the Court’s backlog. This was mainly due to the Single Judge procedure.626 
According to some interviewees this rise in the clearance rate was also the result of the new 
competence of the Committees of Three Judges, meaning the WECL procedure. One 
respondent explained that these two measures allowed the Court to get rid of about 90 000 
cases. This affected the workload of course, the Court did a tremendous amount of work in 
2012-2013 in order to get rid of the Brighton backlog. Interestingly, this respondent stated in 
this context: “I think for many cases, we closed both eyes but we got rid of it.”627  
Some interviewees however made it clear that this increase in the Court’s clearance rate was 
due to a combination of different factors, depending on the kinds of cases. Among the 
meritorious cases, one respondent explained that the following techniques contributed : 
recourse to pilot and WECL procedures, simplified communications, recourse to friendly 
settlements and unilateral declarations, the use of the Uzun formula628 and task force 
management of lawyers. Among inadmissible cases, the interviewee stated the decrease of the 
                                                 
 
622 Interview I dd 20.01.2017.  
623 Rule 47 has created a uniform system for submitting a first application to the Court. This has enabled the 
lawyers to work quicker in this stage of a case.  
624 These strategies will be discussed in the next sub-part concerning Clearance rate.  
625 Interview II dd 17.01.2017.  
626 Interview I dd 13.01.2017; Interview II dd 13.01.2017; Interview I dd 18.01.2017.  
627 Interview anonymous I;  
628 This formula means that when an applicant makes claims based on several substantive provisions of the 
Convention, the Court will address the main complaint and find that it is not necessary anymore to address the 
others. For instance, when an applicant complains both on the basis of article 6 that there was no access to a court 
and on article 13 that there was no effective remedy, the Court can decide to use the Uzun formula and only address 
the claim based on article 6.  
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Court’s caseload and backlog was due to the Single Judge Procedure and the strict application 
of the new Rule 47629 which created a uniform application mechanism.630 
b. The role of the pilot judgment procedure in the past  
A group of respondents on the other hand stated that the pilot judgment procedure did have its 
role to play in the reduction of the backlog. They mostly link the pilot judgment procedure then 
to the WECL procedure. There is first a message from the Court in the form of a pilot case, as 
a result of which these follow-up cases can be easily solved following this fast-track procedure. 
The one does not exist without the other and that is the merit of the pilot procedure, according 
to these respondents.631 One respondent explained that the idea of bringing the pilot judgment 
procedure as a working method to the Chambers as well was of crucial importance to deal with 
repetitive cases. Since then, this interviewee explained that the Court was able to not only focus 
on the pilot procedure but also on the execution of pilot cases.632 The first two pilots were 
rendered by the Grand Chamber. From 2009 on, with the case of Burdov (no.2) v. Russia, the 
Chambers also started to use the procedure.633  
Others agreed with this but did however nuanced this claim. The pilot judgment was indeed a 
strategy in this context and did indeed do something for the increase in the Court’s clearance 
rate but the big bulks of cases did go through the previously mentioned Single Judge 
decisions.634 
c. The role of the pilot judgment procedure in the future  
Meanwhile, the importance of these Single Judge decisions for the reduction of the backlog has 
decreased. As some respondents explained, Single Judges have done away with a huge part of 
pending inadmissible applications. However, they do not deal with the meritorious cases. And 
these cases are of course the most time-consuming for the Court to deal with. There has been 
an evolution in the composition of the Court’s backlog, leaving a large group of meritorious 
cases which will present a new challenge to the Court.635 One respondent explained that for this 
new challenge, the Court it trying to put new working methods in place. Grouping cases is part 
of that, whether in a pilot or not. 636  
There is a new wave of connected cases being brought to the Court which is increasing the 
Court’s caseload again.637 A portion of this influx is due to the Turkey coup, which will present 
a new challenge to the Court. The Turkish government dismissed almost 100.000 people, 
including judges, prosecutors, civil servants, police officers, army officers, etc. These people 
                                                 
 
629 Rule 47 now contains a detailed uniform application form and has created the rule that the Court will not 
examine the case if the application is not submitted in the form and manner as required by it.  
630 Interview II dd 17.01.2017.  
631 Interview I dd 20.01.2017; Interview II dd 18.01.2017; Interview II dd 16.01.2017; Interview dd 09.01.2017.  
632 Interview dd 12.01.2017.  
633 See Annex 6 “VI-c Detailed overview of full pilot cases - efficiency factors (June 2004 - June 2017)” starting 
from page 222.  
634 Interview II dd 13.01.2017; Interview anonymous I.  
635 Interview II dd 13.01.2017; Interview anonymous I; Interview 19.01.2017 
636 Interview I dd 18.01.2017.  
637 The rise in numbers can be seen in “III.1 Caseload of the ECtHR as a whole 2006-2017” on page 114.  
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have now turned to the Court and within a few months’ time, the Court received six thousand 
applicants. At the time of the interviews – January 2017 – the Court was receiving three hundred 
to five hundred applications per day. This is however nothing compared to what is pending 
before the Turkish Constitutional Court. At the time of the interviews, one interviewee was told 
that they were approaching the figure of 100 000 cases. One respondent explained how the pilot 
judgment procedure could play a role here. These cases are repetitive and if the problem is not 
dealt with, the Court might have to introduce a pilot judgment to deal with the problem.638 The 
Court would have to identify some categories in which the underlying issue finds effect, and 
then decide on one or a combination of cases within that category. The Court further received 
a large group of incoming applications from Hungary and Romania which were again bringing 
up the question of prison overcrowding. These problems again look like systemic issues and 
thus this respondent expected new pilots in these situations.639  
Another technique which was developed in order to stay up to date with the incoming cases is 
called “one in, one out”, a technique which is relevant concerning cases which can be eliminated 
quickly, meaning unmeritorious cases or WECL cases. One interviewee explained this process 
and its context. After the drop in backlog caused by the Single Judge procedure after 2011, the 
Court still had a mere 5000 of these unmeritorious cases pending. This was deemed a normal 
physiological backlog for this kind of cases. This respondent stated that this was due to the ‘one 
in, one out’ technique meaning that when a lawyer is seized with a new case, he or she has a 
very limited period of time to deal with it. The lawyer is further not allowed to pass to the next 
one before the previous case is finished. So normally, there is a solution in hours. The maximum 
is one week. This respondent stated that this is the real panacea in order to reduce the 
numbers.640  
What is however not under control is the Chamber – or meritorious non-repetitive cases. The 
Court has a number of these cases which also do not fall under priority treatment within the 
Court’s categorization. Issues involving freedom of speech, the right to private life and freedom 
of assembly for instance fall within this category.641 Some of these however had been 
introduced more than ten years ago but have not yet been decided on. This is not a satisfactory 
situation. 642 This point has come up during the interviews a few times. Some of the respondents 
raise the issue that due to the fact that pilots are granted priority treatment, other cases which 
are lower on the priority scale but still present important human right issue don’t get solved. 
The prioritization of the cases means that the Court starts with the core articles: article 2, 3 and 
5§1 ECHR. Vulnerability is also a factor which puts a case higher in the picking order. In that 
sense, issues like length of proceedings was very low in the priority listing but due to the fact 
that this was a systemic issue in a lot of countries, it came to the forefront as a series of pilot 
cases.643 These meritorious but less-prioritized cases remain in the backlog of the Court. As 
                                                 
 
638 Interview III dd 13.01.2017.  
639 Interview dd 19.01.2017.  
640 Interview dd 19.01.2017.  
641 Interview II dd 18.01.2017.  
642 Interview dd 19.01.2017.  
643 Interview II dd 20.01.2017.  
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another respondent posed it: pilot judgments are “taking from Peter to give to Paul”644, meaning 
that they are using a lot of the Court’s resources while leaving applicants in other individual but 
equally important cases in the cold. Efficient processing of pilot cases is thus not only a matter 
for the victims involved in these large-scale human rights issues but is equally of importance to 
all applicants trying to access the Court.  
6. The shadow side of efficiency: attraction of new cases due to the pilot procedure  
Some respondents in Strasbourg pointed towards a perverse effect of the projected efficiency 
of the pilot judgment procedure. In some cases, the application of the procedure seems to have 
created an even bigger influx of cases with respect to the same issue. One of the respondents 
explains this in the context of the case of Yuriy Nikolaeyivic Ivanov v. Ukraine. The Court had 
first adjourned the examination of similar pending cases but had warned Ukraine that it would 
have to re-open them if the State did not address the issue. As sadly expected, Ukraine did 
indeed not execute the judgment, and so the Court re-opened examination. In 2013, it rendered 
judgment in 3000 cases and communicated 3000 others. It further introduced a simplified 
procedure whereby the Court ordered the State to set up domestic remedies and to pay each 
applicant 2000€ for non-pecuniary damage. By doing so, this section disposed of ten years 
backlog. However, the result was that the Court arguably became part of the Ukrainian 
enforcement system. An increasing number of similar cases were being introduced to the Court. 
This respondent stated in this context that there lawyers who made their business of bringing 
such claims to the Court. The 2000€ for non-pecuniary damage became an incentive for 
thousands to come to the Court. Consequently, in 2015, the Court received between 1500 and 
2000 cases per month, leading again to a crisis for the Court’s backlog. As a result, this 
interviewee concluded that “sometimes, being efficient, too efficient is also problematic.”645 
With respect to the Varga v. Hungary case, it is a well-known fact within the Court that the 
case backfired in terms of efficiency.646 Originally, this case was used mainly as a case-
management tool.647 However, at first instance, the Court had not decided to adjourn the similar 
pending cases. At that time, there were merely 90 such cases pending at the Court. Only 
afterwards did it do so because it was being flooded by new cases. At the moment of the 
interviews in Strasbourg – January 2017 – the Court had more than 7000 of those cases. 648  
This shadow side is thus very much linked to a lack of cooperation from the State to solve the 
underlying issue.649 The Ivanov case shows that there is a case to be made for the argument that 
there is no real use in rendering a pilot judgment where there simply is no domestic remedy 
available and the State is not willing to create one. If this is the case, the Court is the only refuge 
for a large number of affected persons at home and this could create a draw towards the Court. 
This is what one respondent elaborated on by stating that pilot judgments are not intrinsically 
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646 Interview III dd 13.01.2017;  
647 Interview anonymous III.  
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linked to human rights violations. They are however applicable to rule of law issues. All of 
these cases concerning the non-enforcement of domestic proceedings are de-naturalizing the 
role of the Court:  
“[T]his shows that there is a fundamental European human rights rule of law issue, that 
States are not getting the message. […] And this of course created a huge pressure on the 
Court. We deal with repetitive violations which are clear from the legal point of view. They 
are clear. Maria Athanasiou, Manushaqe Puto, they shouldn't have been coming at all 
before the Court.”650 
Cooperation in general is an important parameter in order to achieve an efficient handling of a 
pilot case. This is a point which has come up in multiple interviews651: 
“If the government does not agree, we should have to reconsider it. Because when we don’t 
have the cooperation of the government, it is most probable that the whole procedure will 
be of no avail. It’s going to fail.”652 
E. Conclusion: is the Pilot Judgment Procedure efficient?  
From a combination of the statistical data provided by the Court and the empirical data collected 
in the context of this doctoral research, it can be concluded that overall the pilot judgment 
procedure is capable of being efficient. There are however a number of conditions to this.  
1. Case-load  
As to case-load, the evaluation both based on the statistics, as well as on the empirical data is 
positive. The pilot judgment procedure enables striking out a lot of cases at the same time. 
There are however a few nuances to this claim.  
Firstly, strike-outs can only take place when the underlying systemic issue is procedural in 
nature and can thus easily be solved through the creation of a domestic remedy with retroactive 
applicability. In the situation that complex measures are needed, the pilot only creates breathing 
room until the time-limit for the adjournment is over.  
Secondly, the pilot judgment procedure is a tough procedure for the Registry. It requires a lot 
of preparatory and follow-up work, more than in a standard individual case.  
Thirdly, the incoming cases create additional work for the Registry, even if the Court decided 
to adjourn them. Lawyers do the stock-taking of the cases, communicate with these applicants 
and so on.  
2. Simplicity/complexity  
The interviews in Strasbourg clarified that the simplicity or complexity of cases is not a factor 
taken into account when deciding to apply the pilot judgment procedure. The procedure does 
                                                 
 
650 Interview I dd 18.01.2017.  
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not focus on one or the other. This is also reflected in the kinds of issues that the pilot judgment 
procedure has dealt with: going from a legally simple issue such as compensation for loss of 
property in Broniowski, to a more complex issue concerning statelessness in Kuric. The fact 
that these complex issues require more work from the Court however is clear.  
3. Productivity 
Similarly as with the caseload criterion, the pilot judgment procedure seems to be positive for 
the productivity of the Court compared to dealing with these cases in an individual manner 
under the condition that the group of similar cases is dealt with in one go. This in turn depends 
on the kind of measures required from the State. If this is merely compensation, the pilot will 
certainly lead to more productivity. If the required measures are more complex, this creates 
more work for the Registry. Furthermore, when the case concerns sub-standard prison 
conditions, the follow-up cases might differ considerably as to the facts, requiring a different 
approach.  
4. Length of proceedings  
Overall, there is a positive evaluation of the pilot judgment procedure in terms of length of 
proceedings as well. With respect to the pilot case which is afforded priority treatment, there is 
no doubt that these cases are dealt with quicker than if they would have been entertained 
individually. Priority treatment causes pilots to be closely watched through an internal control 
system.  
With respect to the follow-up cases, there are again some additional criteria. For those follow-
up cases to be quickly dealt with by the Court it is necessary that the State creates a domestic 
remedy which is retroactively available so that they can be sent back. This again requires the 
cooperation of the State in addressing the issue. The number of pending cases, the nature of 
pending cases and the nature of the required measure are also factors which influence the length 
of procedure. It must be remarked that this means that these cases go quicker for the Court. This 
does not mean that the solution is found quicker for the applicants. 
Even when these cases are not going quicker, under individual treatment they would be in de 
backlog. The pilot judgment procedure however still creates a dual advantage. Firstly, the 
procedure brings them under priority treatment, while their subject matter might have caused 
them to drop down to the back of the priority list under individual treatment. Secondly, the pilot 
judgment procedure creates a guarantee that the Court and the State are working together to 
solve the underlying issue.  
5. Clearance rate 
The rise in clearance rate between 2012 and 2014 was due to the Single Judge procedure, in 
combination with the WECL procedure. This was made clear both on the basis of the statistics 
as well as the empirical data. The Single Judge procedure is however geared towards 
unmeritorious cases, while the pilot judgment procedure focusses on a wholly different category 
of cases. In the past, the pilot procedure does seem to have played its part with respect to 
meritorious cases, in combination with the WECL procedure for the follow-up cases.  
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The backlog now however consists less and less out of Single Judge cases. There are now more 
meritorious cases, consisting for a large part out of Chamber cases – meaning meritorious and 
complex cases. Due to the priority treatment of the pilot procedure, a lot of these cases have not 
yet been dealt, termed by one of the respondents as taking from Peter to give to Paul. The Court 
however is developing new working methods, including grouping of cases in pilots or outside 
of the pilot judgment procedure.  
6. Shadow side of pilots  
The interviews however revealed that the pilot procedure could have a perverse effect. The 
Court might become part of the domestic enforcement system, causing it to be flooded with 
similar applications. Awarding sums of just satisfaction has an attractive effect towards 
Strasbourg. Seeing that this happens quite easily after a pilot case because the substantive 
arguments have already been made in the pilot case, this creates an incentive to go to the Court.   
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IV. Access to justice – looking at the pilot judgment procedure from the perspective of 
the applicants, through the eyes of lawyers and NGO’s.  
As one author explains: “[f]rom the perspective of the individual applicant, the whole 
complicacy of the pilot judgment procedure becomes particularly apparent.”653 Objections 
from the perspective of applicants have been raised in some follow-up decisions concerning 
their right to compensation.654 Additionally, it has been argued that the applicants in the cases 
which are kept pending, are being hindered in their right to access to the Court.655 Ironically, it 
is this possibility for adjournment that has been labelled as the central element of the pilot 
judgment procedure aimed at alleviating the Court’s overburdened docket.656 These adjourned 
cases will be done away with by the Court using one of the enumerated procedures. As Gerards 
and Glas state: “no matter the method of disposal, no individual access is given to the Court.”657  
The Evaluation Group to the Committee of Ministers during the reforms in 2001 already 
cautioned that an increased attention for productivity entails the risk for the applicants that they 
will not reach the Court or that they will not receive sufficient collective consideration of their 
case. This in turn would then negatively affect the credibility and authority of the Court.658 In 
the Explanatory report to Protocol 14, the right to individual application furthermore remained 
to be considered as one of the principal and unique features of the European Human Rights 
system, an element which could not be altered.659 The pilot judgment procedure however, shifts 
the focus of the Court on the general issue rather than on the individual applicants.  
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In the context of the pilot judgment procedure, the Court has taken the interests of the applicants 
into account, especially regarding the applicants’ and all other victims’ right to speedy 
redress660:  
“The object of that procedure is, on the one hand, to reduce the threat to the effective 
functioning of the Convention system deriving from repetitive cases that originate in 
systemic problems and, on the other, to facilitate the most speedy and effective 
resolution of a systemic dysfunction affecting the protection of Convention rights in the 
national legal order. By incorporating into the process of execution of the pilot judgment 
the interests of all other existing or potential victims of the systemic violation identified, 
the procedure aims to afford redress to all actual and potential victims of that 
dysfunction, as well as to the particular applicant in the pilot case.”661  
Critique has however been voiced from the perspective of the applicants against the pilot 
judgment procedure.662 Fairly early on, the fear that the use of the pilot judgment procedure 
could be detrimental to the applicants involved was even voiced by the Committee of Ministers 
as well:  
“In certain circumstances, it may be preferable to leave the cases to the examination of 
the Court, particularly to avoid compelling the applicant to bear the further burden of 
having once again to exhaust domestic remedies, which, moreover, would not be in 
place until the adoption of legislative changes.”663  
These perspectives all express an assumption that the pilot procedure will negatively affect the 
right to individual application of the applicants involved in these cases. The question thus arises 
what the impact in reality is of this shifted focus on the rights of the applicants, particularly 
concerning their right to individual application. This question will be the focus of this chapter.   
To this end, this chapter will first sketch the general concept of what access to justice is. This 
right was not originally included in the major human rights instruments such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) or the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Furthermore, the right 
of access to justice is an umbrella right, existing of “both a process and a goal”664, making it 
possible for individuals to enforce other fundamental rights. Consequently, it is important to 
firstly demarcate the right of access to justice from a doctrinal point of view, in order to 
understand what it precisely entails (A.). Secondly, this chapter will explain how the Council 
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of Europe itself views the right of access to justice. The discussion will entail both the Court’s 
case law based on article 6 of the Convention, as well as with respect to its right of individual 
application as laid down in article 34 of the Convention. It will further encompass the views of 
other Council of Europe bodies (B.). Thirdly, the use of the terminology of access to justice in 
this dissertation will be further explained. From the sources in the first two sub-parts of this 
chapter, the normative goal of access to justice is split up in certain operationalized parameters. 
These parameters are clarified in this third sub-chapter (C.). In a fourth part, the question 
whether the pilot judgment procedure affects the actual and potential applicants’ right to access 
to justice will be answered based on the experiences of the interviewees (D.). A fifth sub-chapter 
will elaborate on the role of human rights NGO’s in ensuring access to justice, as the research 
revealed that these organizations do play a part (E.). This chapter will then end with a 
conclusion in which the question will be answered whether the pilot judgment procedure 
hinders the right to access to justice (F.).  
A. The human rights framework of access to justice.  
It is not entirely clear what the right to access to justice precisely entails. Access to justice was 
not explicitly framed and recognized as a right of itself in the ECHR, nor was it mentioned in 
the early international human rights documents such as the UDHR and the ICCPR.665 Only in 
2006, was it for the first time included in an international human rights treaty with the adoption 
of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.666 Classically, the early human 
rights treaties – including the European Convention on Human Rights - only contain provisions 
on the right to a fair trial and the right to an effective remedy.667  In general, the right of access 
to justice is then linked to these rights whereby it is conceived as an umbrella term, 
encompassing “sub-rights” in the context of the right to a fair trial and the right to an effective 
remedy.668 However, what this umbrella specifically encompasses is not always clear. The 
following sources have provided clear guidance in this respect: Francioni, the Fundamental 
Rights Agency of the European Union, Cançado Trindade, the International Bar Association 
and Gerards & Glas.   
Francioni has edited one of the most comprehensive books dedicated to the topic of access to 
justice. In this work, he has explained that access to justice encompasses a number of different 
aspects, depending on the preferred interpretation:  
“[i]n a general manner it (meaning access to justice) is employed to signify the 
possibility for the individual to bring a claim before a court and have a court adjudicate 
it. In a more qualified meaning access to justice is used to signify the right of an 
individual not only to enter a court of law, but to have his or her case heard and 
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adjudicated in accordance with substantive standards of fairness and justice. […] 
Finally, in a narrower sense, access to justice can be used to describe the legal aid for 
the needy, in the absence of which judicial remedies would be available only to those 
who dispose of the financial resources necessary to meet the, often prohibitive, cost of 
lawyers and the administration of justice.”669 
The Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union further has published a handbook on 
access to justice, shedding light on the issue from both the Council of Europe as well as 
European Union law standards. The handbook focusses on the right to a fair trial and the right 
to an effective remedy, as protected under the ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. From this, it distinguishes the following key points encompassed by the right to access 
to justice: 1) a fair and public hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal; 2) access 
to legal aid, the right to be advised, defended and represented; 3) the right to an effective remedy 
and; 4) having a decision rendered in a reasonable time.670 
Similarly, Cançado Trindade further explains that the right of access to justice not only entails 
the right to start a procedure before courts or tribunals, but also the guarantees of due process 
of law and protection through faithful compliance with the judgment afterwards. In particular, 
he stresses the close relationship between access to justice and due process guarantees.671 
Lastly, the International Bar Association has issued a report on barriers and solutions 
concerning international access to justice, based on a number of surveys taken from legal 
professionals.672 The report adopts a broad conception of access to justice to cover different 
stages of the justice process. It covers the existence of rights laid down in laws and with 
awareness concerning them. It further looks at both formal and informal dispute resolution 
mechanisms as part of justice institutions. The report also includes questions of access to 
counsel and representation and encompasses the ability of justice systems to provide fair, 
impartial and enforceable solutions.673 The survey that was the basis for this report, questioned 
legal professionals on the right to access to justice divided in seven sections, including questions 
on the legal framework and awareness of rights, access to legal advice and representation, 
access to dispute resolution in civil and criminal matters, due process and fair procedures, the 
judiciary, the enforceability of decisions and lastly questions about barriers to access to justice 
and ways to change those.674 From this survey, three groups of barriers were identified. First, 
societal and cultural barriers presented itself. This includes literacy, education, poverty and 
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discrimination.675 Second, the survey uncovered a number of institutional barriers, such as 
insufficient governmental resources to guarantee access, inadequate organizational structure of 
justice institutions, limited legal assistance and representation, and the lack of enforcement.676 
Lastly, the previous groups of barriers can also intersect. These intersectional barriers include 
a lack of trust in the justice system and corruption.677 This study includes the same focus points 
as the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) study678 but accounts also 
for the possibility that there are other hurdles that were not thought of. In this sense, it casts a 
wider net in assessing problems posed to the exercise of the right to access by applicants than 
the CEPEJ study.  
All of these sources thus seem to agree that the right of access does not merely entail the 
possibility to institute proceedings. The right of access to justice can be called a gateway right. 
It is only when there is access that applicants are able to enforce other fundamental rights 
through courts and tribunals.679 Consequently, it is of primordial importance in any justice 
system, including at the European Court of Human Rights. 680 The right of access to justice is 
thus in reality an umbrella right, which encompasses several distinct sub-rights. Gerards and 
Glas have summarized this wide approach by dividing the concept of access to justice in its 
procedural branch and a substantive prong. The narrow procedural approach terms the notion 
of access to justice as merely providing an opportunity to use a procedure before a court or 
other judicial body. Substantive access to justice also focusses on just outcomes and questions 
whether procedures help realize material justice. This cannot be done without looking at due 
process standards and procedural justice.681 This thesis takes into account this second 
interpretation of access to justice and looks at access to justice with a similar wide approach 
towards the concept of accessibility. In order to further put the right to access to justice in 
context, the following sub-chapter will discuss how the Council of Europe conceptualizes 
access to justice.  
B. How does the Council of Europe see the right to access to justice?  
Within the Council of Europe, there are several bodies that have developed standards and 
working instruments concerning the concept of access to justice. Firstly, the viewpoint of the 
Court itself will be assessed. The Court’s perspective will be examined both based on its 
jurisprudence with respect to the right to a fair trial and to an effective remedy, as well as based 
on its contentieux concerning the right to individual petition which ensures access to 
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Strasbourg. Secondly, the standards set by the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) 
and the CEPEJ will be assessed. Based on these sources, combined with the human rights 
framework of access to justice as set out above, several common denominators will be deduced. 
These factors are then used to operationalize access to justice in the context of this thesis.  
1. The right to access to justice from the viewpoint of the European Court of Human Rights  
Looking at the history and wording of the Convention, it is clear that the European Human 
Rights system was meant to offer a broader protection than merely access to court.682 The 
Preamble to the Convention states that it is meant “to take the first steps for the collective 
enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration”.683 How this is 
interpreted in practice, is explained in the Court’s case law with respect to article 6 (the right to 
a fair trial) and article 13 (the right to an effective remedy) of the ECHR.684 These articles 
however deal with how national systems are held to respect, protect and fulfil the right to access 
to justice based on the European Convention. Access to the Court itself is on the other hand laid 
down in article 34 of the Convention, which ensures for the applicants a right to individual 
application. Below, it will be argued that this is the equivalent of the right to access to justice 
at the level of the ECHR.  
a. The right to a fair trial and the right to an effective remedy.  
i The Right to a Fair Trial – Article 6 ECHR 
The European Court of Human Rights has situated the right to access to justice within article 6 
of the European Convention. It is has posed that article 6(1) ECHR guarantees the right of 
access to a court first in the case of Golder v. UK of 1975.685 Although the right of access was 
not explicitly written into the article, the Court found that it could logically be inferred from the 
text.686 The case further makes clear that access to justice is to be conceived as a practical right. 
The case concerned a convicted prisoner who was refused permission to contact his solicitor in 
order to institute civil proceedings against a prison officer. The right must thus not be a mere 
formal possibility, but it must be feasible in reality.687 Through the evolution of the case law, 
the Court has broadened the scope of the concept of access to a court. In the case of Golder v. 
UK, the breach consisted of Mr. Golder’s impediment to use his right to access to a lawyer. In 
Airey v. Ireland, the applicant was refused legal aid, leading to her not being able to access the 
court.688 The Court further stated that requiring a high fee to institute civil proceedings can 
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impede an applicant’s right to access to court.689 The right of access to justice has also been 
found to be breached when proceedings are stayed by the State for an unduly long period of 
time,690 and where there was no coherent system governing recourse ensuring the litigants a 
‘clear, practical and effective opportunity’ to go to court.691 The Court further elaborated on 
how the right of access to justice works throughout a procedure, ending with the enforcement 
of court decisions as well in the Jeličić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina case:  
“To construe Article 6 as being concerned exclusively with access to a court and the 
conduct of proceedings would indeed be likely to lead to situations incompatible with 
the principle of the rule of law which the Contracting States undertook to respect when 
they ratified the Convention. Execution of a judgment given by any court must therefore 
be regarded as an integral part of the “trial” for the purposes of Article 6.”692  
ii The Right to an Effective Remedy – Article 13 ECHR  
Access to a court under article 6 focusses on specific rights – criminal or civil – which can be 
the subject of a claim before a court.693 This does not however encompass all legal issues which 
can lead to a judicial decision. Therefore, the right to an effective remedy as guaranteed in 
article 13 of the Convention will also be of importance in this respect. Article 13 requires the 
existence of an effective remedy at the national level in order to enforce human rights 
domestically. This is the embodiment of the subsidiarity principle, an element which is of 
crucial importance in the context of pilot judgments.694  
The case law of the Court provides that access to an effective remedy need not necessarily be 
through a judicial body.695 Such a remedy must be effectively accessible both in practice and in 
law.696 It further possible that an aggregate of remedies together provide for an effective 
remedy, in satisfaction of article 13, rather than just one available remedy.697 The Court regards 
a measure to be effective when “it could have prevented the alleged violation occurring or 
continuing or could have afforded the applicant appropriate redress for any violation that had 
                                                 
 
689 ECtHR, Weissman and Others v. Romania, Application no. 63945/00, 24 May 2006, § 40.  
690 ECtHR,  Kutic v. Croatia, Application no. 48778/99, 1 March 2002, § 33.  
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692 ECtHR, Jeličić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, application no 41183/02, 31 October 2006 , § 38.  
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Council of Europe, 2014; ECtHR, Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights: Right to a 
fair trial (civil limb), Council of Europe, 2013.  
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695 As the recent case of Tagayeva and others v Russia shows, an effective remedy for victims could also be seen 
in a truth-finding Parliamentary commission, which serves as an additional element in their right to access to 
justice. (ECtHR, Tagayeva and others v. Russia, application nos. 26562/07, 14755/08, 49339/08, 49380/08, 
51313/08, 21294/11, 37096/11, 13 April 2017, § 631).  
696 ECtHR, Tagayeva and others v. Russia, application nos. 26562/07, 14755/08, 49339/08, 49380/08, 51313/08, 
21294/11, 37096/11, 13 April 2017, § 618.  
697 ECtHR, Abramiuc v. Romania, application no 37411/02, 24 February 2009, § 119; ECtHR, Tagayeva and 
others v. Russia, application nos. 26562/07, 14755/08, 49339/08, 49380/08, 51313/08, 21294/11, 37096/11, 13 
April 2017, 621.  
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already occurred.”698 More tangibly, effectiveness is found in five criteria.699 Firstly, the 
authority providing the remedy must be independent. This is especially important when the 
authority is not a judicial body.700 
Secondly, an effective remedy requires the seized authority to be flexible. This means that it 
must not apply rigid formalism and must take into account the factual situation of the issue 
before it so as to not merely mechanically apply a fixed set of rules.701 Thirdly, this flexibility 
must be balanced with legal certainty. As a result, sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness 
must be in place.702 Fourthly, the Court attaches importance to the transparency of the procedure 
used in this domestic remedy.703 Lastly, the decision must be rendered within a reasonable 
time.704  
b. The right to individual application as protected under article 34 of the ECHR.  
The right to individual petition as safeguarded under article 34 of the ECHR has been named 
as the main cause for the Court’s backlog.705 This right to individual petition is however the 
translation of the right to access to justice within the European Human Rights System. It can be 
argued that it is a leap to infer the existence of a right to access to justice in the international 
courts from the acknowledgement of its national dimension. The right to access to justice has 
been said to be a customary right when it comes to national legal systems. There is on the other 
hand no consensus that there exists an international counterpart.706 It can however be argued 
that the European Court has answered this question with respect to access to its own judicial 
system. The European Convention contains a right of individual application in its article 34:  
“The Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmental organisation 
or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High 
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. 
                                                 
 
698 ECtHR, Ramirez Sanchez v France, application no. 59450/00, 4 July 2006, § 160.  
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702 ECtHR, Maskhadova and others v Russia, application no. 18071/05, 6 June 2013, § 245.  
703 J.H. GERARDS, L. R. GLAS, “Access to justice in the European Convention on Human Rights system”, 
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706 P. SCHMITT, The right of access to justice for individual victims of human rights violations by international 
organizations, Doctoral thesis submitted at KU Leuven, 2015.  
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The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise 
of this right.”707 
Further, Lambert Abdelgawad has in the context of access to justice clarified that “[w]hat the 
Court has affirmed in respect of the judgments of domestic courts and tribunals also applies to 
judgments of the Court itself, since the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms […] is subsidiary to domestic legal systems.”708 The right to individual 
application could thus be regarded as the European Human Rights System’s counterpart to the 
right of access to justice pertaining to national legal systems.  
The right to individual application seems to create a right to direct access to the Court. It ensures 
that applicants have a direct way of addressing their claims to the Court, which then decides on 
the matter and brings justice to the individual. On the contrary, read together with the 
subsequent article 35 of the Convention which outlines the admissibility criteria, it could be 
argued that access to the Court is merely indirect, as it can only be seized after the exhaustion 
of all effective domestic remedies. Furthermore, in the context of pilot judgments, the Court is 
focussing heavily on the underlying issue, rather than on the situation of the individual involved. 
The Court has indeed stated in the Wolkenberg decision that it “cannot be converted into 
providing individualized financial relief in repetitive cases arising from the same systemic 
situation’.709 Gerards and Glas come to the conclusion that the Court offers a dual form of 
access to justice: “In short, the consensus seems to be that the Court’s primary task is to provide 
direct access to substantive justice and that this is a goal in itself. In addition, it (increasingly) 
plays a role in providing indirect access to justice, for it also contributes to general justice.”710 
It  is important to point to the use of the wording “effective exercise” of the right to individual 
petition in article 34. The question thus arises what the Court regards to be an effective exercise 
of the right to access to court. It seems that this is interpreted in a rather practical way. The 
Court has for instance found that there was no effective access to the Court in a case where 
relatives of a prisoner were not allowed to visit, so that this person had lost all contact with the 
outside world. These circumstances were then combined with the fact that meetings with his 
lawyer were monitored and there was no access to certain documents.711 The Court has further 
found a violation of article 34 in a case were a prisoner was not given paper and stamps by the 
prison authorities, making it factually impossible for him to reply to the Court in time.712  
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2. Access to justice criteria developed by the CCJE and the CEPEJ 
Further, the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) - an advisory body of the Council 
of Europe on issues related to the independence, impartiality and competence of judges – 
adopted a Magna Carta of Judges in November 2010. In this document, the CCJE elaborates on 
fundamental principles concerning the judiciary. This document includes the following 
elements under the umbrella of access to justice: transparency of justice, the dissemination of 
information on the operation of the justice system, the use of accessible language, decisions 
must be motivated and taken within a reasonable time, appropriate case management methods 
must be used and court orders must be enforced.713  
From a more practical point of view, the abovementioned checklist that the CEPEJ developed 
for promoting the quality of justice and the courts is important. In this document, the CEPEJ 
looks at the quality of a justice system from the perspective of its users. In this analysis, it has 
stressed that three factors are important for a qualitative judicial system: a sufficient level of 
access to justice, an acceptable degree of public trust in the judiciary, and legitimacy.714 To this 
end, the CEPEJ has further created a checklist, in which it elaborates what it regards as included 
in the concept of access to justice. It conceptualizes access to justice as encompassing several 
pillars. The first pillar looks at access to legal and court information, whereby regard is paid to 
the publication of laws and judicial decisions, the use of interpreters, the dissemination of 
information concerning rights and obligations that is adapted to its target audience, and the 
representation of litigants including the question whether this representation is a monopoly of 
lawyers.715 Secondly, the checklist includes questions concerning financial access, focusing on 
legal aid schemes and court fees.716 The third prong looks into the physical and virtual access 
to the courts, addressing issues of location, services for persons with disabilities or elderly 
people, provisions to hold hearings in other locations, but also policies directed towards 
alternative dispute resolution.717 The fourth part deals with the treatment of parties, ensuring 
that they are treated with dignity, that they understand the legal language of the proceedings, 
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and taking into account the cost of proceedings for the parties.718 Lastly,  the checklist focusses 
on the delivery of the decisions, asking whether the pronouncement and the motivation of the 
judgment are comprehensible, whether the motivation is detailed and systematic, whether the 
reasons given demonstrate fairness and lawfulness of the decisions, and whether standard 
decisions and rules are used for bulk cases.719  
3. Common denominators encompassing the right to access to justice 
In order to operationalize the meaning of access to justice in the context of this thesis, the 
common denominators from all of these sources are taken into account. This wide array of 
sources employ a variation of different factors which can nonetheless be brought back to several 
common elements. These can be brought back to the following schematic representation:  
IV.1 COMMON DENOMINATORS ENCOMPASSING THE RIGHT TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
 Francioni FRA IBA Gerard
s and 
Glas  
ECtHR CCJE CEPEJ  
Practical ability to access Court 
(including legal aid) 
x x x x x  x 
Access to legal information (including 
the use of accessible language) 
  x   x x 
Access to alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms  
  x    x 
Due process standards and procedural 
justice  
x  x x   x 
Appropriate case management tools 
(including having a decision within a 
reasonable time)  
 x   x x  
 
Consequently, the right to access to justice as envisioned in this doctoral research will 
consequently be regarded as an umbrella right, encompassing the following elements. Firstly, 
access to justice includes the classic idea of applicants having the practical ability to reach the 
Court. This not only supposed the practical possibility of bringing a claim before the Court, it 
also includes the right to legal aid when necessary. Secondly, the concept must include access 
to legal information as to how the judicial system works and which rights and obligations the 
applicants have. This also includes the use of accessible language. Thirdly, access to justice 
needs to encompass the applicants’ access to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 
Fourthly, almost all abovementioned sources have mentioned the importance of due process 
standards and procedural justice. The procedural justice concepts used in this respect will more 
thoroughly be explained below under “fair procedures, due process and concepts of procedural 
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justice.” starting from page 150. Fifthly, access to justice also includes appropriate case 
management tools. It thus also supposes that the applicants have an interest and a right to an 
efficient justice mechanism.  
Lastly, work package 5 of the Human Rights Integration project hypothesized that access to 
justice posed specific problems with respect to vulnerable applicants. It states that “in particular 
members of vulnerable groups still experience practical and legal ostacles hindering them to 
effectively pursue cases of alleged human rights violations.” In the context of pilot judgments, 
the question might be raised whether there is a prevalence of vulnerable applicants in these 
cases and whether they experience other or more difficulty in exercising their right to access to 
justice. In a last part in the following sub-chapter thus, the role of the vulnerable status of 
applicants in this process will be discussed.  
C. How accessibility is conceptualized in this thesis  
These common denominators will subsequently be operationalized in order to be used in the 
empirical research conducted in the context of this thesis.  
1. Access to legal representation, free when necessary 
Legal aid was not a focus of the empirical research conducted at the European Court or with 
the applicants’ representatives. Applicants first need to exhaust domestic remedies before they 
can submit their complaint to the European Court of Human Rights.720 Access to free legal aid 
is included in the European Convention and must thus be guaranteed in the national legal 
systems of all Council of Europe States for persons who can show that they lack sufficient 
means to pay for legal assistance and when the interests of justice so require.721 Ideally thus, 
necessitous applicants already have procured legal representation before they come to the 
Court. Consequently, as States are already under an obligation to provide potential applicants 
with free legal presentation when need be, this should not present a problem before the 
European Court as well.  
In the event that applicants do not have legal representation when applying to Strasbourg 
however, the Court has a legal aid scheme available.722 Legal aid at the Court can only be 
requested after the case has been communicated to the involved government.723 This thus means 
that the involved applicant must submit the application form without the assistance of a lawyer 
if they were not able to procure one based on a national legal aid scheme. The Court has 
reformed this application form with the amendment of Rule 47 in 2015, establishing stricter 
rules on what to include in the form. Failure to comply with the requirements will automatically 
                                                 
 
720 Article 35 ECHR.  
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722 European Court of Human Rights, Your application to the ECHR: How to apply and how your application is 
processed, 11, available at: http://echr.coe.int/Documents/Your_Application_ENG.pdf.  
723 European Court of Human Rights, Your application to the ECHR: How to apply and how your application is 
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lead to the Court not examining the case.724 On the other hand, the Court has composed a 
number of documents, detailing how to complete this application form and what the common 
mistakes are in doing so.725 These documents are geared towards making this first step more 
comprehensible for the potential applicants aiming to reach the Court.726 Lastly, it must be 
emphasized that human rights NGO’s and lawyers having ties to these organizations perform a 
primordial task with respect to safeguarding access to justice to certain groups of applicants.727 
In conclusion, seeing firstly that legal aid will mostly be procured through the national system 
based on article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and secondly that the Court 
has an alternative system of legal aid for when that is not the case, the element of access to legal 
representation is not separately included in this study.  
2. Access to clear legal information 
Access to clear legal information is meant to enable applicants to firstly, make an informed 
decision about turning to the Court and to secondly, know how their application will be handled. 
The Court has developed a number of tools in this respect for applicants. As explained above 
on page 147, applicants have relatively easy access to information as to the initiation of a case 
through submitting a valid application. As to the content of their claims, all case law is 
published on the HUDOC website.728 In order to make this more manageable, applicants have 
access to multiple case law guides and research reports through the Court’s website, sorted 
either by Convention article or by theme.729 The Court additionally has invested in making its 
case law more accessible to the public with offering translations in other Council of Europe 
languages than French and English.730 For applicants who have submitted a claim before the 
Court, the website further features an online tool which makes it possible to follow the state of 
proceedings of their cases.731 This tool is however only available for cases which have already 
been allocated to a judicial formation. This means that these cases have already been 
communicated to the Government. For case management reasons, the Court sometimes decides 
to not communicate cases pending a similar pilot judgment procedure.  
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Certainly in the context of a pilot case, information is of primordial importance. The pilot 
judgment procedure was created through practice and until recently, the procedure was still in 
its start-up phase. As a result, information about how the procedure works in general was not 
easily accessible, not to scholars let alone to applicants coming to the Court with their individual 
cases. The Court recently started to expand the extent of the information it circulates concerning 
the pilot judgment procedure. For the past few years, the Court has started to publish an 
information note on pilot judgments. This note briefly explains what the procedure is and which 
objectives it is meant to serve. It then discusses all cases considered by the Court as pilot cases 
with a brief overview of the facts and the general measures ordered by the Court. The latest 
version of the Pilot Judgment Factsheet of October 2017 also includes information on the 
follow-up decisions succeeding previous pilot judgments, indicating that this has become 
standard practice.732  
Rule 61 elaborates on the information that is provided to the applicants involved in a pilot 
judgment procedure. With respect to the applicants directly involved in the pilot case,  it is 
indicated that the Court will seek their views as to the existence of a systemic issue and the 
suitability of the application of the procedure.733 This rule does not indicate whether these 
applicants are expressly being informed about the pilot judgment procedure. Are they informed 
about how this procedure will work, how their specific case is going to be handled, and what 
the consequences are for their case? When then the applicants submit their views, what is the 
weight given to these submissions? And if the Court does not follow these submissions, does it 
inform the applicants about the reasons for not doing so?   
Rule 61 further explains that the applicants of the adjourned cases will be informed “in a 
suitable manner” of the decision to adjourn. They will also be notified of all relevant 
developments affecting their case.734 Renata Degener and Paul Mahoney, both working on the 
case of Broniowski at the time, clarify that in adjourning the similar applications, all the 
applicants were individually informed of the adjournment. This included information 
concerning the consequences of the adoption of the pilot judgment procedure for the further 
handling of their cases. Subsequently then, the applicants were advised of the procedural 
developments in the leading case, including in the friendly settlement.735 Rule 61, adopted after 
the Broniowski judgment, does not indicate what kind of information is provided to these 
applicants, which manner is used to distribute the information, and when they are provided with 
this information. There is also no indication that these applicants are given the opportunity to 
submit their views concerning the application of the procedure to the Court. It is thus not clear 
whether the method of dealing with these adjourned applications had become standard practice. 
Therefore, these questions were of importance during the interviews at the Court. With respect 
to the questions posed to the human rights lawyers and representatives of human rights NGO’s 
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involved in these cases, their intermediary roles were taken into account. The focus was on how 
they communicated with the Court and how they in turn translated this communication to their 
clients.  
3. Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms? friendly settlements and unilateral 
declarations.  
The European Human Rights system includes the possibility for friendly settlements. The 
Convention explains that the Court may place itself at the disposal of the parties if they wish to 
engage in friendly settlement negotiations at any stage of the proceedings. The result of such a 
procedure is that the Court strikes the case out of its list and transmits the decision to the 
Committee of Ministers, which is tasked with supervising the execution of the terms of the 
friendly settlement.736 
The Rules of Court clarify that securing a friendly settlement in practice involves a more active 
approach by the Court. Once an application is declared admissible, the Registrar will enter into 
negotiations with the parties with a view to obtaining a friendly settlement procedure. It is only 
when they agree with the Registry’s proposal, that the friendly settlement will have been 
reached.737 Such an agreement can further only be reached in conformity with respect for human 
rights738 and will not be concluded without the involvement of the Court. This thus creates the 
obligation for the State to execute the terms of the agreement, pursuant to its tasks laid down 
under article 46 of the Convention. If the State does not abide by the friendly settlement, the 
applicant can write a letter to the Court requesting the case be restored to its list.739  
In the instance that the applicant does not agree to the terms of the proposal for friendly 
settlement the involved State can ask the Court to allow a unilateral declaration. Such a 
declaration clearly acknowledges that there has been a violation, includes redress measures and 
contains, if appropriate, remedial measures to be taken by the State. The Court can then strike 
the case out of its list if it is satisfied that respect for human rights does not require it to continue 
examination, even if the applicant wishes otherwise.740 
An approved agreement or – if there is no agreement, an approved unilateral declaration - is 
thus a judicial settlement and might arguably not be characterized as an alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism.741 Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is an umbrella term 
encompassing varying means to resolve conflict, either within or outside the formal legal 
system but always without adjudication or decision by a judge. ADR is built on the basic 
principles of negotiation, mediation and arbitration. Mediation is a process in which a neutral 
and unbiased third party facilitates a negotiated agreement between parties, without resulting 
                                                 
 
736 Article 39 ECHR.  
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738 Article 39 ECHR.  
739 H. KELLER, M. FOROWICZ AND L. ENGI, Friendly settlements before the European Court of Human Rights – 
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740 Rule 62A of the Rules of Court.  
741 H. KELLER, M. FOROWICZ AND L. ENGI, Friendly settlements before the European Court of Human Rights – 
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in a formal decision. Arbitration involves a third party, chosen by the conflicting parties, taking 
a decision in a less formal manner than a court. 742 Resolving a conflict through ADR also means 
that the legal system is not involved resulting in the fact that the solution is not necessarily 
found in legal rights. Importantly, all forms of ADR are conducted in private, both in terms of 
process as well as outcome.743   
The use of friendly settlements and unilateral declarations can thus not be regarded as a form 
of alternative dispute resolution made possible within the confines of the European Convention. 
In reality, the Registrar who is part of the Court’s Registry and who is thus not neutral nor 
unbiased makes a proposal to the state and the applicant.744 They can either accept or reject this 
proposal. If accepted by both parties, the Court can then promulgate this proposal as a friendly 
settlement. If only the involved State accepts, the Court can still accept it as a unilateral 
declaration. The Court is very much involved. Friendly settlements and unilateral declarations 
are thus not forms of ADR. As a result, it can be concluded that the Court does not provide for 
such forms of solving a legal dispute, contrary to the criteria of access to justice developed in 
the context of this dissertation. Friendly settlements and unilateral declarations however do play 
an important role in pilot judgment. They will thus be part of this thesis, under a separate 
heading. They will however not be termed as part of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.  
In the context of  a pilot judgment procedure, Rule 61 requires for a friendly settlement to be 
accepted by the Court that it contains a declaration by the State concerning firstly, the 
implementation of general measures directed towards remedying the underlying systemic issue 
and secondly, the redress offered to the actual and potential applicants.745 A friendly settlement 
will thus only be allowed when the State also deals with the general issue and takes the interests 
of the other applicants into account.746   
In the context of this thesis, it was important to know how friendly settlements take form with 
respect to pilot judgments: who is involved in these talks and what is the result of these friendly 
settlements? The question whether they are successful here and how that success is defined was 
also raised. The human rights lawyers were asked how they regarded the use of friendly 
settlements and unilateral declarations in the context of pilots.  
4. fair procedures, due process and concepts of procedural justice.  
All abovementioned sources include substantive due process guarantees and fair procedures in 
the concept of access to justice. Due process entails the principle that the State, or the Court in 
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Scotland and other jurisdictions, July 2014, 1.  
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746 ECtHR decision, Załuska and Rogalska v. Poland, application nos. 53491/10 and 72286/10, 20 June 2017, § 
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this instance, abides by the rule of law. This ultimately aims to result in fair procedures.747 In 
order to put a focus however on the experience of fairness of the users of the legal system, this 
thesis will employ concepts of procedural justice.  
a. General overview  
Procedural justice refers to a collection of criteria that a procedure must meet in order to be 
perceived as fair by its user. It is believed that a procedure which is evaluated by an individual 
as fair will be high in quality and will thus improve access to justice.748 Previous research has 
indicated that users of a justice system determine fairness not only by how fair and satisfactory 
they find the outcome of the procedure (distributive justice) but also by how they estimate the 
fairness of the decision-making process (procedural justice).749 There is a whole body of 
literature on procedural justice, starting from the first notion of the concept by Thibault and 
Walker in 1975.750 This thesis will however thoroughly focus on how the study of procedural 
justice has informed the operationalization of this part of the access to justice concept used.  
Several authors have endeavoured to uncover which elements make a procedure fair in the eyes 
of its users. Procedural justice entails an enormous body of literature written from a myriad of 
different angles. This research has focussed on two great areas in which procedural justice 
theory was developed. The first focus is on the concept of procedural justice in the criminal 
justice system which is the focus of Thibaut and Walker, and later, of  Lind and Tyler. This 
body of research places procedural justice concepts in a judicial sphere, making it particularly 
relevant for the topic of this thesis. Secondly, this thesis looks at the concept of origanisational 
justice which is the specialization of Leventhal’s research who first developed his theory more 
broadly with respect to social relationships. The situation of the applicants in a pilot judgment 
procedure, virtually placed in a large group of similarly situated others, is different than the 
situation of a single defendant in a criminal procedure. Furthermore, human rights cases are 
litigated differently and take place in a different context than in a domestic criminal trial. As a 
result, procedural justice principles which are more adaptable to this situation were needed. The 
principles developed by Leventhal were equally applicable to the situation of the applicants in 
this context. As a result, the conceptualization of procedural justice in this doctoral research 
will encompass the ground principles of both bodies of research. In incorporating both sets of 
principles, it has been ensured that overlap is included under the heading of an encompassing 
principle.  
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b. Parameters of procedural justice used in this dissertation.  
(i) Voice  
The first element which is important here is voice, a criterion developed by Lind and Tyler in 
the context of criminal justice. Voice gives applicants the opportunity to share their viewpoints 
and to present their case.751 The adjournment of similar pending cases in and of itself principally 
can pose a problem in this respect, as the involved applicants are not given a chance anymore 
to have their case examined by the Court. In the context of this thesis, it was important to know 
how the applicants, both from the pilot case as from the similar pending cases express their 
views during the procedure. In the interviews with the applicants’ representatives, this question 
was more focussed on how the shape the applicants’ participation as to the presentation or the 
strategy of the case.  
Secondly, it must be emphasized that generally victims of violations are not included in the 
procedure before the Committee of Ministers concerning execution. The applicants are able to 
submit information to the Committee concerning the individual measures and payment of just 
satisfaction by the State. This information however still is discussed in a meeting where the 
State is represented but the victims are not. The execution of the judgment is therefore outside 
of the control of the applicant. 752 It must nevertheless be added that NGO’s, national 
institutions and applicants are able to make documents available to the Committee of Ministers, 
which may be similar to the actual oral arguments and may provide a starting point for 
consideration by the Department for the Execution of Judgments.”753 This does provide a 
manner for the victims to get their voices heard. Consequently, the interviews also included 
questions concerning the involvement of the applicants’ lawyers at the Committee of Ministers 
and the strategies employed by the relevant NGO’s in this respect.  
(ii) Consistency and bias suppression  
This research is further based on the conceptualisation of procedural fairness worked out by 
Leventhal in 1980, who was among the first to propose six specific criteria that a procedure 
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must meet: consistency, bias suppression, accuracy, correctability, representation and 
ethicality.754  
Consistency entails that procedures must be applied consistently across people and across 
time.755 The respondents at the Court were thus asked how the decision is taken to apply the 
pilot judgment procedure. Which parameters are important here, which criteria are used and 
what influences the decision to apply the procedure? These questions also relate to bias 
suppression, meaning that the decision-maker should be neutral.  
(iii)Accuracy  
Accuracy requires that the decision is taken based on correct and accurate information. The 
Court’s case law indicates that it bases itself on a variety of sources in order to show that the 
problem is indeed systemic and what the repercussions are on the applicants. Firstly, the Court 
might base itself on other Council of Europe sources. This includes decisions by the 
Parliamentary Assembly, such as in Ananyev and Finger.756 Other cases refer to documents of 
the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment (CPT), a body which visits prisons in all Council of Europe States and monitors 
whether they adhere to the requirements of the Convention.757 Documents by the Committee of 
Ministers are also regularly referenced by the Court.758 
The Court in most pilot cases refers to existing case law concerning the issue, indicating that 
the problem is already known. It both looks at decisions pronounced by national courts759 or 
one of its own previous judgments dealing with the same issue. With respect to its own 
judgments, it might point towards the fact that it has already found similar violations with 
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respect to the same State showing that the problem has existed for a long time.760 On the other 
hand, it also refers to its own previous pilot judgments dealing with a comparable issue in order 
to argue that it will employ the same approach and will thus apply the pilot judgment 
procedure.761 
The questions used at the Court relate to the gathering of information which is then used to 
support the decision for applying the procedure. The questions directed towards the applicants’ 
representatives how they argue the systemic nature of the issue.  
(iv) Correctability  
Correctability relates to the availability of appeal possibilities to correct inaccurate outcomes. 
The respondents were thus asked which possibilities are open to the applicants in case they do 
not agree with the outcome of the case. The situation of the applicants in the similar pending 
cases was also of great interest. Here, the question rose whether these applicants could challenge 
the choice of the pilot case and whether they had any possibilities of questioning the outcome 
of the pilot case as the result of the case have a bearing on them as well.  
(v) Ethicality  
Ethicality means that the procedure implements general ethical and moral standards. These 
standards could arguably found in the fundamental rights laid down in the European 
Convention, including the prohibition of discrimination in article 14 ECHR. This principle 
translates itself in the context of the pilot judgment procedure from the perspective of the 
applicants in the equal treatment among all similarly situated applicants. The Court has been 
confronted with arguments in this sense from applicants and has addressed them in varying 
ways. The Stella decision concerned a group of follow-up applicants who complained 
concerning the general measures set up after the Torregiani pilot judgment. Among other 
complaints, they submitted that they received a lesser amount of compensation based on the 
domestic compensation scheme than what the lead applicant in Torreggiani had received. The 
Court argued that it was within the State’s margin of appreciation to decide on the amounts in 
line with the standard of living in the country, as long as the amount is not unreasonable.762 
This reasoning, which takes the viewpoint of the involved State, is opposite to what the Court 
has concluded in the decision of Zaluska and Rogalska, with respect to a group of follow-up 
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applicants to the Rutkowski pilot judgment. Here, the applicants had claimed that the specific 
circumstances in their cases warranted for a higher sum of just satisfaction. They wanted their 
cases to be continued, instead of adjourned and sent back domestically. The Court explained to 
the applicants that it is an international judicial authority whose primary task it is to render 
authoritative legal judgments, not to award compensation to each and every person involved. 
As a result, the Court argued that, in order to ensure that there is no disparity in the level of 
awards leading to a divisive effect among the applicants, a unified approach is called for.763 
This case can arguably also present a problem in terms of representation, which will be 
discussed below.764   
Furthermore, the Court has in its case law taken on arguments against adjourning based on 
moral considerations. The Court tends not to adjourn in cases of sub-standard prison conditions. 
In Varga, the Court explained that this is due to the fundamental nature of the rights protected 
under article 3 and the importance and urgency of the complaints brought under this article.765 
With respect to two pilots concerning non-enforcement of domestic decision, the Court also 
decided against adjourning based on morality considerations. In the cases of Burdov (no.2) and 
Gerasimov, the Court found that “it would be unfair if the applicants in such cases, who have 
allegedly been suffering for years as a result of continuing violations of their right to a court 
and sought relief in this Court, were compelled yet again to resubmit their complaints to the 
domestic authorities, be it on the grounds of a new remedy or otherwise”.766  
Ethicality was not a separate area of the questionnaire used at the Court as well as with the 
representatives of the applicants as these principles are reflected across the questionnaire as a 
whole.  
(vi) Representation  
Representation is further a particularly interesting criterion when reviewing the pilot judgment 
procedure. The fact that the situation of the applicants of the similar pending cases depends on 
the outcome of a case to which they are not a party, raises questions. It could be argued that the 
pilot judgment procedure is some form of an aggregation of claims procedure, the most well-
known example of which is the class action procedure. Representation in these kinds of 
procedures is especially important as the results have a wide impact on persons who are not 
necessarily involved in the procedure as such. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
governing the class action procedure in the United States, lays down specific prerequisites with 
respect to the representativeness of the case, which must be fulfilled before a class action can 
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be certified. Firstly, the claims or defences of the applicant are typical of the claims of the class 
and secondly, the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class.767 No such requirements exist with respect to the pilot judgment procedure. From fairly 
early on indeed, questions were raised about the need for a representative pilot. Interestingly, it 
was claimed that the Broniowski case was not an ideal representative case, as the issues 
involved were much to singular to show the broader underlying problem. A participant in an 
international workshop concerning the pilot judgment procedure stated in this respect that 
“these applicants must certainly have the possibility to claim that their case is different, singular, 
and so that their case has to be decided upon.”768 In this context, the decision of Załuska and 
Rogalska where the applicants claimed that the circumstances of their case differed from those 
in the previous pilot judgment of Rutkowski and thus warranted a higher sum of just satisfaction 
is also important here. Upon confrontation with this group of applicants, the Court decided to 
handle the case as a unilateral declaration. It first mentioned that it had previously accepted the 
amount of compensation in other friendly settlements and unilateral declarations coming after 
the Rutkowski case as being in line with respect for human rights and that it had found that the 
Polish government was being diligent in putting the necessary general measures in place. It  
further emphasized that “it is an international judicial authority and that its principal task is to 
secure the respect for human rights, rather than compensate applicants’ losses minutely and 
exhaustively.”769 Consequently, these applicants were told that their cases would not be 
separately dealt with, without investigation of these particular circumstances which the 
applicants claimed warranted a different treatment.  
The questionnaire used at the Court thus includes a question concerning the requirements for 
ensuring representativeness of the pilot case, as well as questions concerning the selection of a 
pilot case and the options of the applicants of the similar cases when they do not agree with the 
selection of the case. A similar question was asked in interviews with the applicants’ 
representatives, in as far as they have any control over the selection of the pilot case.  
5. Appropriate case management 
Applicants also have an interest in appropriate case management and thus in the efficient 
functioning of the justice system in order to be able to access it. It is evident that when the Court 
is unable to work properly, an applicant will not be heard within a reasonable time. The Court 
has previously focussed on the need for timely delivery of justice for the applicants. It has used 
this as an argument against adjourning similar pending applications in the case of Vassilios 
Athanasiou.770 The Court further developed a solution meant to take into account both the need 
for the State to take measures as well as the interests of the applicants in similar pending cases. 
In the Gerasimov case,  the Court included as part of the general measures that the applicants 
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of the pending applications do not need to go back to the domestic system to receive 
compensation. Instead, the state is obliged to offer them redress within a certain time-limit on 
an ad hoc basis. With this, the Court means that the compensation must be offered either through 
a national compensation scheme or through a friendly settlement procedure at the Court.771 This 
case must be seen as an in-between solution, both aimed at lessening the burden for the Court 
as well as to provide a solution to the victims within a fixed period of time.  
Flexibility with respect to case management will subsequently also form part of this chapter. 
Rule 61 of the Rules of Court explains that an adjourned case can be re-opened at any time 
‘where the interests of the proper administration of justice so require’. Re-opening of adjourned 
cases has happened before, for example after the non-execution of Ivanov-type cases.772 It is 
however not clear whether this is the only reason for the Court to re-open cases. The respondents 
at the Court were thus asked which situations would qualify for a re-opening of cases.  
6. vulnerability  
Work Package 5 of the Human Rights Integration Project hypothesized a link between the 
vulnerable status of potential applicants to their having difficulty to access the courts. Following 
this logic, this doctoral research attempted to incorporate this dimension into the research. As 
will be shown below however, the empirical research conducted suggests that vulnerability is 
not necessarily of special importance in the context of the pilot judgment procedure.773  
Vulnerability is a concept that is both universal as particular. All human beings are inherently 
vulnerable but they experience this inert vulnerability each individually.774 Looking first at the 
universal conception of vulnerability, harm and suffering play a central role. All human beings, 
as vulnerable subjects, are inherently susceptible to harm in its many varieties.775 This can 
include bodily, moral, psychological, economical and institutional sufferings.776 The particular 
conception of vulnerability acknowledges the different positions persons can take in their 
environments and the differing perceptions of their vulnerability.777 Important in this context is 
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that vulnerability is truly a relational concept since it looks at the individual in his/her social 
context.778  
The European Court however, does not look at the concept of vulnerability in this sense. It does 
not regard every human being as inherently vulnerable, but attaches this characteristic in its 
case law to particular individuals or groups.779 Unfortunately, the Court is not always consistent 
in doing so.780  
On the one hand, the European Court has considered applicants as vulnerable, specifically on 
the basis of their membership to a vulnerable group. Members of these groups are then 
automatically regarded as vulnerable by the Court. The concept of a vulnerable group first 
emerged with the case of Chapman v. The United Kingdom, when the Court labelled the 
applicant as belonging to a vulnerable group, the Roma. The vulnerability of Roma emerges 
from their minority status and historically discriminatory behaviour directed towards them.781 
Later on, the Court broadened the list of vulnerable group to include persons with mental 
disabilities,782 people living with HIV,783 and in certain cases asylum seekers.784 The Court has 
however not developed a clear set of characteristics of what constitutes a ‘vulnerable group’. 
Peroni and Timmer have distilled three common denominators, based on a close reading of the 
case law of the court. Firstly, vulnerability is considered relational. The Court thus recognized 
the vulnerability of an individual as being influenced by their environment, consisting of 
societal, historical or institutional structures.785 The person is vulnerable because of his/her 
being part of a vulnerable group.786 Secondly, the Court accounts vulnerability as particular. A 
vulnerable person is a “group member whose vulnerability is shaped by specific group-based 
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experiences”.787 Thirdly, the Court characterizes vulnerability as being intrinsically linked to 
harm. The Court has identified different patterns of harm in its case law, such as prejudice and 
stigmatization, social disadvantage and material deprivation.788  
On the other hand, the Court has regarded individual applicants as vulnerable, independent of 
the group that they belong to. The Court has established in its case law that persons in detention 
are put in a vulnerable position due to the fact that they are put under State control.789 Next, it 
has found applicants vulnerable because of their status of victim – of domestic abuse,790 sexual 
offences,791 or trafficking792 - or because of their gender, 793 or their sexual orientation794. 
Furthermore, the Court has established that persons who are in a situation of a legal power 
imbalance are put in a vulnerable position. This includes persons who are accused of criminal 
charges and persons who lack legal capacity.795 Lastly, the Court has considered children as 
inherently vulnerable in a number of cases.796  
In some pilot cases, the Court mentioned the vulnerable status of the applicants involved. 
Logically, in pilot cases concerning violations of article 3 of the Convention the Court has 
brought up the vulnerability of the applicants involved. Mostly, the Court has mostly attributed 
vulnerability to detainees, either as a group or individually . In the cases of Torreggiani and 
Rezmives, the Court mentioned the vulnerability of detainees in general as they find themselves 
under the control of the State.797 The Court also raised the particular vulnerability of detainees 
with mental illnesses in the case of W.D..798 In Neshkov however, although it was a case 
concerning detainees, the Court only marked one of the applicants as particularly vulnerable 
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due to his disability and the fact that he was still subjected to the harsh prison conditions. This 
prompted the Court to order specific individual measures with respect to this applicant.799 The 
case of Kuric v. Slovenia, concerned a group of applicants who had become stateless following 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The Court stressed that these applicants were in a situation of 
vulnerability and insecurity which was not appropriately compensated by the State.800  
The case of Burdov (no.2) however carries special importance here. The case concerned the 
non-execution of domestic judgments ordering payment of compensation or social benefits. The 
Court stated that this wide-spread problem affected not only victims of the Chernobyl disaster 
but also other large groups of Russian population, including in particular some vulnerable 
groups.801 The Court made this comment in the section where it investigated whether there 
existed a practice incompatible with the Convention, in order to find that the issue itself was 
structural and warranted the use of the pilot judgment procedure. The use of the vulnerability 
language in this part of the judgment could thus indicate that the Court takes the status of the 
involved applicants into account when deciding to apply the procedure. As a result, the question 
concerning the implications of vulnerability for the pilot judgment procedure was included in 
the interviews, both at the Court as with the applicants’ representatives and human rights NGOs.  
D. The experiences at the side of the applicants: does the pilot judgment procedure affect 
the right to individual petition?  
The elements of access to justice as conceptualized in the framework of this dissertation, were 
subsequently used in the interviews both with Court personnel as well as in the interviews with 
the applicants’ lawyers and representatives of human rights NGO’s. Their experiences will be 
outlined in this sub-chapter, following the structure set out above.  
1. Access to clear legal information 
Rule 61 already clarifies that there is a difference in the kinds of communication given to the 
applicants in the pilot case and those in the similar pending cases. Therefore, the communication 
with respect to both categories of applicants will be discussed separately.  
a. With respect to the applicants in the pilot case 
The respondents explained that the Court communicated in a similar fashion in the pilot case 
as in standard individual cases.802 When the Court communicates the case to the Government, 
it also sends a letter to the applicants in order to ask for further submissions. This letter contains 
a number of questions for the parties to answer. These questions already show the direction in 
which the Court is going to analyse the case. With a pilot case, the Court includes a question in 
this communication where it asks the parties to submit information to the Court as to whether 
the facts of the case reveal the existence of a structural problem which could be linked to other 
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analogue applications.803 This indicates that the Court is planning to apply the pilot judgment 
procedure and the applicants are thus invited to submit their views on this. One respondent 
mentioned that the Court also included some general information concerning Rule 61 in the 
original communication letter.804 Another stated that the Court includes a short description of 
what the pilot judgment procedure is.805 An interviewee at the side of the Court submitted that 
the applicants receive a letter setting out the procedure, which also explains what will happen 
to them and what they need to do.806 Another respondent at the Court however stated that the 
Court does not provide any explanation concerning what the procedure entails and what the 
consequences are.807  
Some interviewees remarked that they thought this question was directed primarily towards the 
government.808 As a result, one respondent did not submit any information concerning the 
systemic nature of the issue at hand, mostly because that is a lot of work and this task was 
attributed to the NGO backing the case. 809 Another tried to include as much information as 
possible to show that the problem was indeed systemic: complaints by others in a similar 
situation but also parliamentary documents, documentaries and newspaper articles.810  
A group of the respondents on the side of the applicants questioned the language used by the 
Court in its communication with the applicants. One respondent criticized the language used in 
the communication of the Court as not adapted to laymen. This person stated that the Court is 
communicating with applicants as if all of them have an attorney who is skilled with respect to 
the procedure before the European Court of Human Rights. This person did not see any kind of 
specific effort on the side of the Court to make sure that the parties understand what is going 
on.811 Others stated that the communication is very - and even extremely - formal and must thus 
be translated for the clients.812 Yet another explained that this information is not intended for 
the applicants but for the legal representatives.813 Two interviewees even posed that the Court’s 
judgments in and of themselves are not meant for the applicants involved. They are about the 
abstract theory of human rights but not about the real situation of the people, it does not bring 
support for their situation. As a result, these respondents indicated that this is the reason they 
do not bring more case before the Court, because “it’s not good for the people”.814 As to the 
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language used in the communication from the Court, the lawyers and NGO representatives are 
thus playing an intermediate role in the Court’s communication with the applicants.  
This is not the only instance where they are intermediaries. In a number of interviews, the 
lawyer involved explained that the information between the Court and the applicants arrived at 
their address.815 So, not only the use of formal language, but  the manner of distributing the 
information as well puts the lawyers in this intermediary role. This thus makes that the lawyer 
plays an important part in the level of understanding of the applicant of what is happening in 
their case. One respondent at the Court clarified that the level of understanding will depend on 
the lawyer: “If you have a specialized lawyer in the field of European human rights, than yes, I 
would say that he or she understands very well what is happening.”816 
This intermediary role not only makes the lawyer very important, it can also put the lawyers 
and NGO representatives in a difficult position. One respondent narrated what happened when 
some of the victims were included in the case and others weren’t. The ones that were included 
and finally managed to get compensation were indeed tremendously happy at the time. The 
interviewee however indicates that it was very difficult to communicate this to one of the 
victims who was not included. It was difficult to explain to this person what the problem was 
in their case. They did not understand and the respondent thinks the organization was blamed 
for the failure in that case by the victim involved.817 Another respondent talked about working 
with persons with mental disabilities and how it is extremely difficult to get information from 
the Court across to this group of applicants. In some instances, such applicants become angry 
towards their lawyer because they do not understand what the lawyer is actually doing. 
Deontology in this instance requires the lawyer to act in the best interests of the client, 
regardless of whether this client fully understands what is precisely happening.818 
b. With respect to the applicants in similar pending cases  
It might be argued that it is only pertinent that the applicants in the analogue pending cases are 
informed when their cases are being adjourned.819 However, the Court sometimes decides to 
not communicate similar cases as a case-management tool. This results de facto in adjournment, 
while there is no indication in Rule 61 about whether the Court needs to inform these applicants 
about their decision to stay communication. One interviewee here indicated that it’s only when 
there is an official adjournment that the applicants are informed.820 
Rule 61 states that the applicants in the adjourned cases must be informed ‘in a suitable 
manner’.821 From the interviews at the Court, it has further become clear that there is no 
standard practice concerning the information provided to the applicants when their cases are 
officially adjourned. Many do not know how the court communicates with this group of 
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applicants.822 One interviewee at the Court indicated that the Court sends letters to the 
applicants in these cases that they should direct their cases to the new national remedy. If this 
fails, they can always come back.823 An interviewee at the side of the applicants confirmed this 
and stated that the Court sometimes sends letters to the applicants of adjourned cases to inform 
them of the fact that their case is kept pending.824Another respondent at the Court merely 
indicated that these applicants are being notified by the Registry that their case is kept 
pending.825 The manner or content of the information is unclear. The Court sometimes also puts 
up a notification on the website, both in the official languages of the Council of Europe – 
meaning English and French – and the official language of the involved State.826 One 
respondent at the Court clarified that the Court generally puts up such a notification on its 
website and does not inform these applicants individually. This respondent however stated that 
their division made the decision to write letters to all applicants whose cases would be 
adjourned. However, it would be difficult to find all these applicants as they might have 
changed locations – a concern which was real seeing the characteristics of the group of victims 
involved – or might not have a lawyer. Consequently, the division decided to issue a press 
release in English and the official language of the involved State. The press release was then 
made available on the website of the Court and the government of the involved country was 
requested to circulate it, also among the relevant authorities. It was thus up to the government 
to help spread the information. This interviewee clarified that there was a lot of discussion about 
how the applicants would be informed and that this was something they felt uncomfortable 
about.827 Furthermore, when applicants are informed that their cases are sent back to the 
domestic system, they are instructed to again submit their claim there.828  
Due to their intermediary role, there is a possibility for the involved lawyers to explain to the 
larger group of victims what is happening. One of the respondents at the side of the applicants 
explained that, together with the involved NGO, they organized an information session for the 
group of victims involved. This group was larger than the applicants of the case at the Court. 
This person specifically said that these sessions were consultations. The lawyers discussed with 
the attendees what was going on, what the issues were, what they were going to argue before 
the Court and what the possible outcomes were. This respondent stated that this created a sort 
of link between the representatives at the Court and the victims at large.829 This kind of strategy 
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is however only possible when there is a clearly defined group of victims which is manageable 
in size in order to organize such consultations.  
2. Friendly settlements and unilateral declarations  
a. How friendly settlements work at the Court.  
The interviews clarified that friendly settlements are not as friendly as the name might suggest. 
It is rather a fast-track procedure for the Court. In the vast majority of cases, there is no 
negotiation between the parties. Instead, the Registry submits a proposal to the applicants 
involved which includes the amount of compensation they could be awarded based on 
established case law. The State also receives a letter in which the established case law is 
explained and the same proposition is thus made. This proposal is sent to the parties already at 
the communication of the case.830 If successfull, the Court can strike out the case831 without 
having to be very elaborate on the facts and the reasoning of a case. It is in essence a win-win-
win situation for all parties involved.832 It must however be emphasized that this situation 
applies when the case has already been communicated to the State. Friendly settlements in cases 
which have not yet been communicated result in confidential decisions. They are not made 
public, contrary to friendly settlements in cases which have already been communicated.833 
With respect to pilot judgments, there are several possibilities for friendly settlements. In some 
pilot cases, the Court reserves the issue of just satisfaction for determination at a later date. This 
might then result in a friendly settlement, like in the Broniowski case for example.834 In other 
instances, the Court did not reserve the issue of just satisfaction and has thus already decided 
on the compensation for the applicants in the pilot case. In these instances, the similar cases 
might be solved by friendly settlement. These friendly settlements can occur either on an 
individual basis or collectively.835 The State can however also try to foster a solution nationally, 
without the involvement of the Court’s Registry. This would then mean that there are indeed 
national negotiation proceedings based on a previous pilot judgment. If this succeeds, the Court 
will then subsequently strike out these cases.836   
b. Experience within the Court  
Within the Court, there are varying viewpoints concerning the use of friendly settlements and 
unilateral declarations in the context of pilots. Firstly, there is the pragmatic viewpoint. These 
respondents were in favour of the use of friendly settlements to alleviate the work load for the 
Court because procedurally, these cases result in strike-out decisions.837 On the other side of 
the spectrum, there are the more principled viewpoints. One interviewee stated that friendly 
settlements and unilateral declarations should not be allowed in the context of a pilot case 
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because this would be an easy way out for the government and the underlying problem would 
remain.838 Another explained that friendly settlements are not an option in cases finding a 
violation of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment as this provision is of such 
great importance.839 
There are however a whole array of considerations which portray a more nuanced regard for 
the use of friendly settlements and unilateral declarations in pilots. One interviewee explained 
that friendly settlements would only be successful if the government cooperates. If the 
government is indeed fixing the underlying systemic problem and it is not possible to repatriate 
the pending cases, friendly settlements can help solve the issue. But if there is no solution, this 
respondent clarified that the Court still accepts unilateral declarations although these will then 
continue forever: “As long as you don’t deal with the root cause of the problem it makes no 
sense to go on delivering judgments, or settling. It relieves the Court of the numbers becoming 
huge but it is not an ultimate solution.”840 Another stressed that friendly settlements can only 
be allowed if the State has taken measures which guarantee that the systemic problem will not 
come back again to the Court. The Court should first satisfy itself that it is not in effect 
confronted with a situation of on-going non-execution of the pilot judgment, where adequate 
general measures have not been taken by the respondent government within a reasonable 
time.841 One interviewee put the emphasis on the applicants involved, stating that it’s important 
to have the applicants’ approval.842  
Unilateral declarations were not thoroughly discussed in the interviews at the Court. They were 
primarly portrayed as back-up solutions to friendly settlements. Firstly, one respondent clarified 
that they also are only accepted by the Court when they include the State’s solution for the 
systemic element.843 Another interviewee explained that they could help in situations where the 
applicants are not reasonable.844  
c. Experiences at the side of the applicants  
Unsurprisingly, friendly settlements are not regarded very positively from the perspective of 
the applicants’ lawyers and NGO’s. One respondent clarified that they can be a way for the 
governments to sweep issues under the carpet. The governments avoid a judgment on the merits 
which might be more high profile. They can only be useful where governments really cooperate, 
admit they know the problem and subsequently solve it.845 Another mentioned that the 
government might not be willing to accept a friendly settlement but set up a national 
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compensation scheme instead. As the follow-up decision Stella has showed846, States can award 
lower compensations nationally than they would be required to pay by the Court.847  
3. Fair procedures and due process  
a. Voice 
The focus of the research concerning voice was on two stages in the proceedings: first at the 
Court and later at the Committee of Ministers.  
i Voice at the Court  
Firstly, the applicants’ possibilities for manifesting their voice before the Court was examined. 
Due to the intermediary role of lawyers, applicants need to get their voice heard through them. 
The lawyer in turn thus has a responsibility towards his or her clients in order to get these voices 
across to the Court. The question however remains how this process takes form and which 
voices take preference.  
Some lawyers already make a selection of the cases that they bring to the Court, be it alone or 
in cooperation with an affiliated NGO. One respondent explained that the case started with a 
group of activists who was trying to persuade a team of lawyers to bring their case before the 
Court. The lawyers indeed accepted to do this pro bono and gave the group some information 
as to which articles of the Convention could be involved. The lawyers further instructed the 
activists to collect as many stories as possible, they would select the cases which had the biggest 
chances of winning. In practice that meant a group of applicants varying in age and problems 
but who together sketched the width of the problem very well.848 Another interviewee stated 
that they consult with the applicants who would want to be the lead applicant. They then put 
the name of this person first in the application, in the hopes that the Court will indeed select 
this person. According to this respondent, it does not matter for the Court who is the lead while 
it matters for the applicants.849 Lawyers also sometimes group cases themselves.850 
The selection of the case is already made with a certain goal in mind. When this stage is over, 
lawyers build their case building towards this same goal. In order to engage the applicants at 
the Court, it is not only necessary to have a stream of information coming from the lawyers to 
the applicants as discussed under “Access to clear legal information”. Information must also be 
transferred from the applicants to the lawyers to ensure the inclusion of the applicants’ 
viewpoints. Most lawyers thus build their case in consultation with their clients.851 Even when 
communication is difficult with the client, one respondent stated that there is always a 
discussion concerning all aspects of the case. There is no point in fooling the client. However, 
some types of clients are not capable to help build strategy, in which case the lawyer must act 
                                                 
 
846 ECtHR, decision, Stella  and others v. Italy, application no. 49169/09, 16 September 2014.  
847 Interview I dd 21.03.2017.  
848 Interview dd 9.03.2017.  
849 Interview I dd 21.03.2017.  
850 Interview I dd 23.02.2017.  
851 Interview dd 1.03.2017; Interview dd 16.03.2017; Interview dd 2.03.2017; Interview dd 22.02.2017; Interview 
II dd 23.02.2017.   
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in the best interests of his or her client.852 Another respondent submitted that it is important to 
explain to the clients what the proposed strategy is, but also potential constraints and chances 
for reasonable success. This respondent has found that in most cases applicants agree. However, 
when they do not agree, this respondent has also dropped certain legal remedies.853 When 
working with applicants who are also activists in their own right, it is imperative to build 
strategy together with the applicants. These kinds of applicants have substantial knowledge of 
the problem and can help with constructing the argument and providing evidence of the 
systemic problem.854 Lastly, when the lawyer is affiliated to an NGO who also submitted a third 
party intervention, an interviewee explained that the applicants were consulted with respect to 
their case but not with respect to the content of the third party intervention.855 
Only one interviewee stated not to strategize with the victims.856 Another explained that in the 
pilot case, strategizing was not done together with the applicants, although this was because 
there was language barrier between them which made communication especially difficult. 
Building strategy was however done with the human rights NGO involved, which played a 
bridge role between the lawyers and the applicants.857 This was confirmed by a respondent who 
has also worked in other cases with applicants who lived far away and where there was a 
language barrier. In such cases, it is impossible to have the regular communication needed for 
this purpose. However, it is possible to work with local NGO’s who can bridge this gap.858 
ii Voice at the Committee of Ministers  
Secondly, applicants in principle do not have the opportunity to present any information 
concerning the larger issue before the Committee of Ministers. Furthermore, applicants in the 
adjourned cases, when they are later sent back to the domestic system, never come into contact 
with the Committee of Ministers.859 As will be explained below, participation at the level of the 
Committee of Ministers is mostly the prerogative of human rights NGO’s involved behind the 
scenes in these cases.860 They are able to submit information concerning the execution of the 
general measures in a given country and, when the case indeed has an NGO backing it, this 
organization can then interfere. Two of the respondents at the side of the applicants explained 
how this scenario can take place in reality. One of the examples is elaborated on in the 
following-subchapter. Here, a large outside organization organized informal meetings parallel 
with a human rights meeting at the Committee of Ministers in order to inform the 
representatives there about the execution process. During these sessions, the NGO closest to 
                                                 
 
852 Interview dd 16.03.2017.  
853 Interview dd 22.02.2017.  
854 Interview II dd 23.02.2017.  
855 Interview I dd 23.02.2017.  
856 Interview dd 2.03.2017.  
857 Interview dd 9.03.2017.  
858 Interview II dd 23.02.2017.  
859 This is the case when their cases are sent back domestically. When their cases are handled through the WECL 
procedure or via friendly settlement/unilateral declaration, they will ultimately come into contact with the 
Committee of Ministers.  
860 This point was made by an Interviewee who has previously been involved in cases at the Court both as a lawyer 
as well as a representative of an NGO; Interview dd 22.02.2017. This point will be revisited more in-depth 
“Strategy before the Committee of Ministers.” Starting from page 176.  
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the victims of the large-scale violation was invited to provide more background information 
and to represent the victims’ viewpoints there.861 Secondly, another interviewee talked about 
how the involved organization – which submitted a third party intervention and provided the 
lawyer to represent the applicant in the case at the Court – also submitted information to the 
Committee of Ministers. The Council of Europe further had a project on the large-scale issue 
running in that specific country. The representatives of the organization were also included in 
the start-up of that project by providing information on the case and talk about the implications 
of it.862 
b. Consistency and bias suppression 
Respondents at the Court were asked about their parameters for choosing to apply the pilot 
judgment. Their answers however have been included in the first chapter outlining the pilot 
judgment procedure in general.  
What must be remembered in the context of consistency is that there are no fixed parameters 
for the application of the procedure. There are instead a number of factors influencing this 
decision: the number of incoming petitions, the principle of subsidiarity, the applicants’ 
interests and most importantly the level of cooperation of the State involved. However, these 
factors are not communicated so that there are no certain rules on which the applicants can rely 
in order to know whether their case would qualify for the pilot judgment procedure, what 
evidence to bring to argue for or against and what the consequences are. One of the interviewees 
at the Court stated in this regard that “[y]ou can't expect one hundred per cent coherence and 
consistency; you can't expect perfection. You should stand back and look at the general flow.”863 
It must equally be emphasized however that Rule 61 includes the possibility for the applicants 
themselves to ask for the application of the procedure. From the interviews at the Court 
however, it seems that this has not happened yet.864 None of the lawyers representing the 
applicants further indicated that they had specifically asked for the application of the pilot 
judgment procedure. One of the respondents at the Court stated in this regard to be disappointed 
that applicants have not used this possibility to ask for the application of the pilot procedure 
themselves.865  
c. Accuracy 
Accuracy in this thesis concerns the information on which the Court bases itself to decide to 
apply the pilot procedure. This in turn creates transparency for the applicants on how they can 
argue the systemic nature of their case before the Court and which sources they should 
reference.  
The interviews with the applicant’s representatives show that in some instances, there is close 
cooperation with a human rights NGO who is then tasked with writing such a third party 
                                                 
 
861 Interview dd 9.03.2017.  
862 Interview II dd 23.02.2017.  
863 Interview anonymous II.  
864 Interview I dd 17.01.2017; Interview I dd 16.01.2017.  
865 Interview I dd 16.01.2017.  
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intervention directed at showing the court the wider context of the issue at hand. When there is 
no human rights NGO cooperation however, lawyers tend to use other sources in order to show 
the systemic character of the problem. One interviewee included new paper articles, reports 
from the national parliament and a documentary to evidence the wide-spread nature of the 
issue.866 Another decided to gather testimonies on how the problem had impacted the victims, 
not only from the applicants in the case at hand but also from the larger group of victims.867 
From the interviews at the Court, it seems that providing the Court with a large amount of 
information from a wide array of sources is effective in showing the systemic nature of the issue 
at hand, as well as working together with a human rights NGO. Below, the importance of third 
party interventions is elaborated on.868 However, the interviews indicated that the Court indeed 
draws information from varying sources. No evidence is inadmissible before the Court. 
Accessible public information is thus used.869 One respondent at the Court referenced 
newspaper articles as a source.870 Another stated that the Court rather relies on general 
information available, meaning reports from NGO’s and the CPT instead of on information 
from the parties. This respondent however did not frame this as distrust towards the parties but 
rather as an assumption that the parties would not have an interest in sketching the broader 
context.871 
d. Correctability 
Only two respondents at the Court have provided a clear answer concerning the question 
whether there are options for the applicants involved in pilot cases to argue against a certain 
outcome which they deem incorrect. With respect to the applicants in the pilot case, they have 
the same options as in other cases. This means that they can request to have their case 
entertained by the Grand Chamber. However, if the case started at the Grand Chamber, there is 
no real option to have the case re-examined. With respect to the applicants in the adjourned 
cases, one interviewee stated that “they have to trust the Court”.872 There is thus nothing to be 
done. 
e. Ethicality 
One interviewee at the Court stated that the Court accepts lesser amounts of compensation 
awarded nationally because that means that the pending cases are dealt with quickly. However, 
the amount must still be in proportion to the issue at hand.873 Another stated that due to the pilot 
judgment procedure, there is always a remedy provided for all the victims involved. The Court 
is due to its limited capacity in human and other resources not able to render judgments on 
                                                 
 
866 Interview dd 16.03.2017.  
867 Interview dd I dd 21.03.2017; Interview dd 9.03.2017.  
868 This will be discussed under “Role of human rights NGOs for the Court: providing context” from page 178 on.  
869 Interview II dd 17.01.2017.  
870 Interview II dd 16.01.2017.  
871 Interview anonymous I.  
872 Interview II dd 17.01.2017; Interview 9.01.2017.  
873 Interview II dd 18.01.2017.  
THE PILOT JUDGMENT PROCEDURE AT THE ECTHR: AN EVALUATION IN THE LIGHT OF PROCEDURAL 
EFFICIENCY AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE  
170 
 
thousands and thousands of the same cases. At least with the pilot procedure, there is a 
remedy.874 
At the side of the applicants, one of the interviewees talked about a clear discrimination between 
those applicants whose cases were examined under the pilot judgment and all the others. This 
respondent argued that it was a clear discrimination because there is no reason given why those 
who are picked by the court as being the lead plaintiffs in a pilot judgment should receive more 
than the others.875 There was however a more pragmatic view a well. One of the lawyer stated 
that indeed the compensation was lower at the national level, but that this was not an issue since 
the amounts of compensation awarded in Strasbourg were too high anyway. If the client would 
ask to bring a case to complain about the compensation being lower than in Strasbourg, this 
respondent would do so although principally, the amount is objectively speaking sufficient.876  
Moral considerations with respect to not adjourning similar pending cases, evidenced both in 
the case law as well as in the empirical research, have been elaborated on above.877 
f. Representation  
The Court tries to select one or more cases that are representative of the issue at hand. The 
interviews at the Court have however clarified that there are no fixed internal rules on how to 
ensure representativeness of the chosen case or combination of cases. The lawyers of the Court 
thus select these cases based on their own assessment of the situation at hand, undoubtedly 
assisted by the information provided to them by the lawyer in the first application. However, 
the empirical research suggests that the focus at the Court is on the issue rather than on the 
person behind the application. Factors taken into account are whether the case exemplifies the 
underlying issue well, whether the applicant is represented, whether the case was important on 
the national level, whether the systemic issue is at the heart of the complaint, whether the 
applicant in the case submitted a qualitative application, etc. One of the applicants’ 
representatives speculated that the Court chose a specific case because it was a clear cut case 
concerning the systemic issue. It did not present any side issues, so it was easy to handle.878 
Factual elements of the case are thus not specifically taken into account. 
On the side of the applicants’ representatives the interviews have shown that they sometimes 
do a pre-selection of the case or cases to bring to the Court. In performing this selection, they 
are employing different criteria. One respondent explained that cases were selected based on 
their increased chance of winning because they contained facts which are easier to prove.879 
Another stated that they let the applicants decide who wants to be lead plaintiff.880 Others do 
not make a selection before taking the case to Strasbourg. If multiple victims come, one 
interviewee stated that they group the cases and let the Court decide which one to select.881 
                                                 
 
874 Interview III dd 13.01.2017.  
875 Interview I dd 21.03.2017.  
876 Interview dd 1.03.2017.  
877 Under “Ethicality” starting from page 153.  
878 Interview dd 1.03.2017.  
879 Interview dd 9.03.2017.  
880 Interview I dd 21.03.2017.  
881 Interview I dd 23.02.2017.  
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Another systematically sent every application to Strasbourg with the aim of showing the Court 
that the issue was not individual or accidental.882  
Some respondents also had a double role: either they represented both the lead applicants as 
well as applicants in adjourned cases or they were affiliated with an NGO dealing with the 
broader issue through which there was contact with the larger group of victims. One respondent 
explained that the involved NGO collected testimonials from the larger group of victims staying 
behind in order to both write the third party intervention as well as to help shape the arguments 
before the Court.883 Another one of these lawyers mentioned the other applicants after the 
communication of the pilot case in order to argue the systemic nature of the issue. This 
interviewee further was not particularly negative towards the adjourning of the other cases 
pending the taking of general measures. It already takes a considerable amount of time for a 
case to take its course through the system of the Court. It does not really make a big difference 
if they have to wait until there is a judgment or they have to wait to hear that they need to return 
to a national remedy in order to get compensated.884  
4. Appropriate case-management  
Most respondents at the Court did not have a real example in mind where the Court would opt 
to reopen the proceedings in adjourned cases in the interests of justice. The factual situation of 
an applicant might warrant the reopening of a case. One respondent thought about a situation 
where an applicant might be of old age and the Court would decide to examine the case so that 
this person might still see a judgment and find a remedy.885 Another stated that if an applicant 
would be in pre-trial detention in bad conditions, this would be an ideal situation to continue 
the case.886 The possibility to have an adjourned case re-opened further works as a safety 
measure which enables the Court to reopen cases when the measure set up by the State in 
execution of a pilot judgment is deemed ineffective, or when the individual measures promised 
in a friendly settlement procedure are not executed afterwards.887 One respondent at the Court 
described it as a catch-all provision meant to give some room to the Court as it is not possible 
to see or anticipate what is happening on the national level.888  
Others talked about the cases that were stayed after the Ivanov pilot, where the examination of 
cases was opened after it became clear that the involved State was not executing the judgment. 
This respondent explained that these cases needed to be revitalized because some of them were 
brought to Strasbourg ten or more years ago and it is not appropriate to wait anymore. 889   
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884 Interview dd 16.03.2017.  
885 Interview III dd 13.01.2017.  
886 Interview I dd 17.01.2017.  
887 Interview I dd 18.01.2017; Interview I dd 20.01.2017.  
888 Interview II dd 13.01.2017.  
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5. Vulnerability  
a. Pragmatic correlation between vulnerability and the pilot judgment procedure – 
viewpoint from the side of the Court  
The interviews at the Court have clarified that there is no direct link between the pilot judgment 
procedure and vulnerability. It can thus not be argued that the Court uses the pilot procedure to 
target situations disadvantageous particularly to persons belonging to vulnerable groups.  
Firstly, the interviews confirmed that there was no clear definition of the concept of 
vulnerability at the Court. Many respondents, also on the side of the applicants, mentioned that 
the concept is susceptible to interpretation.890 One respondent even stated that there is a lively 
debate going on within the Court concerning vulnerability, referring to the dissent of judge Sajó 
in the judgment of M.S.S. v. Greece and Italy.891  
Secondly, many respondents at the Court answered bluntly that the pilot judgment procedure 
has no connection to the vulnerable status of the applicants.892 A large part of respondents at 
the Court linked vulnerability and the pilot judgment procedure in the sense that both cause the 
involved case to be treated under priority treatment.893 One respondent in this context stated 
that vulnerability is relevant when priority is involved, so when a case would be accorded a 
lower priority level if not for the vulnerability of the applicants. As the pilot judgment procedure 
does the same, there is thus not really a point in doing this.894 
There were however some answers which attempted to clarify the relationship between 
vulnerability and the pilot judgment procedure to a higher degree. One respondent at the Court 
clarified how the vulnerable status of the applicants would come into play when it comes to 
deciding to apply the pilot procedure. On the one hand, vulnerability would plead against 
applying it if this would result in the adjournment of similar cases. This is because, according 
to this respondent, it is not possible to freeze article 2 and 3 cases, as well as article 8 cases 
when women and children are concerned. On the other hand, the respondent explained that the 
vulnerable status of the applicants might make the Court more keen on giving a clear message 
in article 2 and 3 cases and thus decide for applying the procedure. In this situation, the Court 
would then group the cases in order to deliver justice for all involved in one judgment. The 
respondent however concluded by stating that vulnerability is not an element taken into 
consideration by the Court when deciding to apply the pilot procedure.895  
                                                 
 
890 At the side of the Court : Interview II dd 17.01.2017; Interview anonymous I; Interview II dd 16.01.2017; 
Interview dd 09.01.2017. At the side of the applicants: Interview dd 22.02.2017; Interview II dd 23.02.2017.  
891 ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, application no. 30696/09, 21 January 2011 . In his partly concurring, 
partly dissenting opinion judge Sajó stated that he did not regard the group of asylum-seekers to be a particularly 
vulnerable group per se. He argued that asylum-seekers are far from being a homogenous group, if a group at all. 
Some or many asylum-seekers may be vulnerable, but it is not an attribute inherent to the group as such.  
892 Interview I dd 13.01.2017; Interview II dd 1301.2017; Interview III dd 13.01.2017; Interview anonymus I; 
Interview II dd 16.01.2017; Interview dd 19.1.2017.  
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Another respondent stated that there might indeed be a correlation between the vulnerable status 
of the applicants and the use of a pilot in their case. This however is just a correlation, due to 
the nature of cases that the Court has before it, not due to a conscious choice by the Court to 
employ the procedure to the benefit of this specific group of applicants. This respondent 
explained that the targeted large-scale issues often entail issues touching upon article 3. Since 
the concept of vulnerability is close to the rights protected under article 3, it is logic that 
vulnerability sometimes comes with this.896 The respondent further stated that the vulnerable 
status of the applicant might in some cases trigger the Court to already decide on the issue 
concerning just satisfaction in order to speed up the process for this applicant.897 This would 
thus be contrary to the practice in Broniowski, where the issues under article 41 were reserved 
at first and later solved by friendly settlement.   
This respondent was not alone in seeing this correlation between the use of the pilot procedure 
and the vulnerable status of the involved applicants. Another respondent also opined that this 
was due to the kinds of cases that the Court is dealing with based on articles 2 and 3. However, 
this respondent placed this in the context of prioritization from a different, more pragmatic, 
angle. The priority policy at the Court dictates that it must handle its cases in an order where 
the most vulnerable applicants come first and where the core articles are put in hierarchy as 
well.898 Based on this policy, this respondent clarified that the Court has decided to first deal 
with the cases involving these core issues and thus encompassing the most vulnerable 
applicants. The respondent suggested that the Court stumbled upon these issues and found 
systemic problems. There is thus no philosophy behind it.899  
b. Strategic choice for vulnerability – viewpoint from the side of the lawyers and human 
rights NGO’s 
Lawyers and representatives of human rights NGOs explained that sometimes they did use the 
concept of vulnerability as a strategic tool. This however was discussed in a broader context, 
away from the pilot judgment procedure.  
One respondent explained that the lawyers and the human rights NGO involved selected the 
most vulnerable persons in the larger group to bring their cases before the Court. They further 
made sure that the group was diverse, showing a whole range of ages, family situations and 
thus varying vulnerabilities. This selection was done particularly to make the poignant situation 
of this group of persons more tangible through the facts and to show the whole scope of the 
issue in the case. When this case eventually went to the Grand Chamber, this NGO raised 
funding in order to bring these applicants to Strasbourg to attend the hearing. The respondent 
stated in this context that there was no translation available for the victims and they were seated 
in the audience as there is no seating for them with the lawyer. The organization made sure that 
these victims were in the first row so that the judges could see the suffering that they went 
                                                 
 
896 This respondent was not alone in placing this correlation, this was also mentioned in Interview II dd 20.01.2017.  
897 Interview I dd 20.01.2017.  
898 These core articles are articles 2 – the right to life, 3 – the probition of torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment and 5§1 – the right to liberty and security.  
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through. The lawyer then read a little bit about every applicant and they raised their hand when 
they were spoken of.900  
Others emphasized the importance of highlighting the vulnerable position of the applicants so 
that the threshold for the application of article 3 is lower. Vulnerability leads to a specific kind 
of protection and maybe to a specific way of applying the conditions of an article 3 claim.901 
One respondent here stated that it’s not only about the facts. Sometimes the article is applicable 
because of the vulnerable status of the applicants.902  
Another respondent explained that their organization uses vulnerability as a factor in deciding 
whether to take on a case or not. This because of the substantive nature of the issue and thus 
the need to offer help, as well as with respect to access to justice as vulnerability negatively 
affects access: “other people perhaps have more capacity to get legal advice and therefore we 
should focus on the people who are more vulnerable in that sense.”903 
In conclusion, it thus seems that both sides agree that vulnerability is not a factor in the pilot 
judgment procedure.  
E. The role of NGO’s in pilot judgments: third party interventions and NGO 
representation.  
In analysing the case law, it became clear that human rights NGOs were represented in a 
considerable amount of cases involving a systemic human rights issue, whether these cases 
resulted in full pilots, quasi-pilots or cases merely mentioning the existence of a structural 
problem.904  As will be explained in this sub-chapter, human rights NGO’s do have an important 
role to play when it comes to access to justice. Some of these organizations engage in strategic 
litigation for this reason. In the context of pilots, the empirical data suggests that they can further 
play a central role in informing the Court about the systemic nature of the issues at hand.  
1. NGO involvement as third parties or as lawyers  
NGO involvement can procedurally take up two forms. The most evident way for an NGO to 
involve itself in a case before the Court is by submitting a third party intervention. According 
to article 36 of the Convention, the President of the Court may invite any State which is not 
party to the proceedings or any person concerned who is not the applicant to submit written 
comments or to take part in the hearings.905 In practice, this provision is used by organizations 
to request leave to the President in order to submit amicus curiae briefs, thereby providing 
                                                 
 
900 The specific Interview will not be referenced here, as it might entail identifying information.   
901 Interview dd 2.03.2017; Interview dd 16.03.2017.  
902 Interview dd 2.03.2017.  
903 Interview II dd 23.02.2017.  
904 Of the 28 full pilots, 4 cases had one or more NGOs submitting a third party intervention and 4 cases involved 
a lawyer with an affiliation to a human rights NGO. Of the 19 quasi-pilots: two cases had NGO third party 
interventions and 3 involved a lawyer with NGO affiliation. Of the 11 cases involving a systemic issue without a 
procedural consequence, 4 had NGO third party interventions and 4 involved a lawyer with human rights 
affiliation.  For specific information on which cases involved which organizations, see Annexes 7 to 9 detailing 
the occurance of NGO involvement respectively in full pilots, quasi-pilots and cases mentioned. The respondents 
at this side of the spectrum were further selected on the basis of this information.  
905 Article 36 ECHR.  
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theoretical or contextual information to the Court in the hope of inspiring its deliberations on 
the case at hand. In most cases, NGO’s who have a specific expertise in the subject matter of a 
certain case want to intervene in order to share their contextual knowledge with the Court. There 
are roughly two kinds of third party interveners.906 There are the repeat-players such as Open 
Society Justice Initiative, European Human Rights Advocacy Centre (EHRAC) and Amnesty 
International who intervene regularly.907 So-called “one-shotters” on the other hand intervene 
only once in a specific case. An example of this is the Association for the Protection of Foreign-
Currency Savers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an organization which intervened in the case of 
Suljagic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina.908 It must be emphasized however that third party 
interventions can only be allowed by the Court after the case has been communicated to the 
State. The first step must thus be taken by the applicants and their lawyers.  
NGO’s are however also involved in pilot cases on a different level. In some situations, the 
applicant  in the chosen pilot case was represented by a lawyer affiliated or working together 
with a human rights organization. For the full pilot cases of Ananyev, Kuric, Neshkov and 
Rutkowski, this was the case.909  
2. Role of human rights NGOs in securing access to justice 
a. NGO’s and access to justice  
Two of the interviewed applicants’ lawyers who are affiliated to a human rights organization  
explicitly linked their work to access to justice. They explained that NGO’s indeed focus on the 
systemic nature of the issue and its widespread impact. However, they contend that by doing 
so, they work for the most vulnerable part of the involved population: the persons who do not 
have the capacity to bring claims before a court, let alone to go to Strasbourg and submit an 
application to an international court.910  
One of these respondents explained that such an organization does have an aim of bringing 
cases strategically. The respondent explained that this meant using the human and other 
resources of the organization to the best effect. If the case indeed ends up changing the law, the 
impact is greater than one that just secures victory for the individual applicant. This interviewee 
then put the situation of the involved organization in contrast to the work of private lawyers. 
Contrary to these private lawyers, an organization can work in cases where people would not 
be able to afford such a lawyer.911 Another put the work of an NGO in context and stated that 
they never work in a vacuum. When NGO’s are involved, this normally means that there is a 
                                                 
 
906 N. BÜRLI, Third-Party Interventions before the European Court of Human Rights, Intersentia, 2017, 6.  
907 It could be argued that the Ghent University Human Rights Centre is a repeat-player as well; See the website 
of the Human Rights Centre of Ghent University here: http://www.hrc.ugent.be/third-party-
interventions/#1493480334529-9b942f5b-d56f. 
908 ECtHR, Suljagic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, application no. 27912/02, 3 November 2009.  
909 See Annex 7 “VI-d Detailed overview of full pilot cases - focus on the perspective of the applicants (June 2004 
- June 2017)” starting from page 227.  
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structural problem on which they have an expertise and on which they have collected evidence 
and documents.912  
b. Strategic litigation before the Court  
Two respondents explained that the pilot judgment procedure is an interesting strategic tool 
which can lead to substantial reform in law and administrative practice.913 It could thus be used 
specifically for strategic litigation by human rights NGO’s. Strategic litigation can be defined 
as a “form of public interest litigation where a case is pursued on behalf of an applicant or group 
of applicants, with a view to achieving a law reform goal beyond the individual case. While 
legal ethics dictate that the clients’ interests are paramount in litigation, strategic litigation seeks 
an additional social or political impact beyond the remedy sought by the individual.”914  
When these organizations either bring the case to Strasbourg themselves or when they work in 
tandem with a lawyer, they make a first selection of the case. Several respondents explained 
that NGO’s have limited resources, forcing them to make conscious decisions concerning which 
cases to bring to Court.915 They select the cases which shed light on a bigger underlying issue 
or show particularly severe facts.916 Sometimes, when several cases reveal a similar fact pattern, 
they already group these cases.917   
In some cases, lawyers and involved NGOs are working closely together behind the scenes. In 
one situation where there was coordination between the lawyer and the NGO involved, the 
lawyer did not submit information concerning the systemic nature of the issue at hand but 
focused instead on the specific situation of the client. Sketching the context in which this 
individual applicants’ rights were violated was left to the work of the NGO involved. This was 
a clear coordination of tasks between the two actors.918  In another case, the driving force was 
the NGO while the lawyer representing the applicants in the pilot case was not directly affiliated 
with the organization. The NGO selected the lawyer based on prior knowledge of the 
Convention system and provided background information concerning the domestic political 
situation and facts about the applicants involved. Furthermore, the NGO organized information 
sessions with the lawyer open to all persons of the involved victim pool, in order to both provide 
information to other victims as well as to gather information for the case at the Court. The 
human rights organization thus worked as a bridge between the lawyer and the group of 
applicants.919  
                                                 
 
912 Interview dd 09.03.2017 ; This idea was also brought up in Interview II dd 23.02.207 and Interview dd 
02.03.2017 
913 Interview I dd 23.02.2017; Interview II dd 23.02.2017.  
914 A. COOMBER, “Strategically litigating equality – reflections on a changing jurisprudence”, 15 European Anti-
Discrimination Law Review, 2012, 11. Andrea Coomber was then Legal Director of the NGO Interights and had 
formerly headed the organization’s equality litigation before the ECtHR, among others. 
915 Interview dd 22.02.2017; Interview dd 1.03.2017; Interview II dd 23.02.2017.  
916 Interview dd 1.03.2017.  
917 Interview II dd 23.02.207; Interview I dd 23.02.2017;  
918 Interview dd 1.03.2017.  
919 Interview dd 09.03.2017.  
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It is important to emphasize that the respondents on the side of lawyers and NGO’s do not think 
that there is a specific strategy to trigger the application of the pilot judgment procedure.920 
NGO’s however, by their very nature, focus on large-scale issues and sometimes strategically 
select a case or a group of cases to bring to the Court. As one respondent explained: “it’s all 
about the case.” There is no clear-cut information available concerning which criteria the Court 
uses to select a case for pilot treatment. Furthermore, even if a ‘perfect’ case is brought, it can 
still merely result in an article 46 case. As a result, an NGO can only focus on the cases to be 
brought to the Court. If the NGO wants to trigger the procedure, they will bring a case which 
fits into it. The organization further needs to think about how to show that the problem is indeed 
systemic: reference to earlier case law, bring evidence that the problem is embedded in the law 
itself, etc. This is a point thus where lawyers, NGO’s and applicants can work together.921  
c. Strategy before the Committee of Ministers.  
Applicants and their representatives can only submit information concerning the execution of 
individual measures and just satisfaction to the Committee of Ministers. NGO’s on the other 
hand are able to provide the Committee with information concerning the execution of general 
measures. As a result, strategic litigation sometimes also results in a strategy before the 
Committee of Ministers.  
One respondent explained  the involved human rights organization submitted information as to 
execution to the Committee of Ministers as well. Furthermore, they were supported by a big 
organization, both financially as strategically. This supporting organization organized 
unofficial hearings for interested members of the Committee of Ministers to which the smaller 
NGO was invited. The hearings identified the main cases on which something was to be said in 
terms of execution. Experts, NGOs and representatives of victims were then asked to participate 
in order to explain to the Committee how the implementation was going from their perspective 
and what other measures would still be needed. As a result, the Committee kept the execution 
of this specific case on the agenda for several sessions, maintaining pressure on the State to 
execute properly.922 Another respondent further explained that the case before the Court had 
the intention of having a violation found and securing compensation for the chosen applicants. 
The process before the Committee of Ministers on the other hand is much broader and is geared 
towards fostering change for the whole group of similarly situated applicants.923 
d. Nuancing the occurence of strategic litigation in pilot and pilot-like cases.  
Strategic litigation is something linked to human rights NGO’s and it must be emphasized that 
many respondents were not affiliated to NGO’s. Furthermore, regardless of NGO affiliation, 
many did not employ tactics of strategic litigation nor were they  convinced about the need for 
it. As a result, many of the lawyers did not have any affinity to the concept.  As one respondent 
put it: “it’s not an American lawyer movie.” This respondent did not believe in strategic 
                                                 
 
920 The fact that there is no strategy was expressly mentioned in Interview dd 22.02.2017; Interview II dd 
23.02.2017; Interview dd 1.03.2017;  
921 Interview II dd 23.02.2017.  
922 Interview dd 09.03.2017.  
923 Interview I dd 21.03.2017.  
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litigation and opined that if the application is well written, the case will be good and will lead 
to result.924  
All respondents, including lawyers not affiliated to an NGO, do strategize in a way about their 
case and the underlying issues, although that does not necessarily mean they employ tactics of 
strategic litigation. They do this either by indeed working with an NGO, or with selecting a 
case specifically because it shows the precarious situation of the targeted group, by grouping 
large pools of similar cases, by attempted to communicate with the larger group of involved 
victims, by bringing large groups of similar cases individually to the Court, by talking to 
domestic politicians, by writing newspaper articles or even academic articles concerning the 
case, etc.925 It is a minority of the interviewees who strategically select cases and build their 
case with the express motivation to foster change in the home country through litigation at the 
Court.  
Some of the lawyers had their own tactic in order to get the issue on the agenda of the Court, 
without calling it a strategy. These lawyers mostly had an expertise with respect to a certain 
group of applicants and were in the position to bring a considerable amount of similar cases. 
Overwhelming the Court with the same cases over and over again was their way of showing 
the systemic nature of the issue, in both cases without knowing that the pilot judgment 
procedure even existed. Furthermore, they employed this tactic – first domestically and later at 
the Court - as a means to test a certain way of working and when this did not have the expected 
result, the next case could benefit from the lessons learnt.926 This way, the Court was – maybe 
unknowingly - de facto working as a teacher in order to create expertise with these lawyers 
concerning a specific issue.  
Indeed, a lot of the interviewed lawyers and NGO representatives were surprised that their case 
became a pilot or a quasi-pilot judgment. They either did not know about the existence of the 
procedure,927 or were not expressly arguing to have their case decided using the pilot 
template.928 One respondent called the case an ‘accidental pilot judgment’ explaining that the 
initiative came entirely from the Court.929 
3. Role of human rights NGOs for the Court: providing context 
This observation leads to another important role for human rights NGO’s in the context of pilot 
judgments. At the Court, many respondents were in favour of NGO’s submitting third party 
interventions in order to provide background information to the Court concerning the structural 
nature of the issue at hand.930 One respondent even stated that these third party interventions 
                                                 
 
924 Interview dd 1.03.2017.  
925 Interview II dd 23.02.2017; Interview II dd 21.03.2017; Interview I dd 23.02.2017; Interview I dd 21.03.2017; 
Interview dd 16.03.2017; Interview dd 2.03.2017; Interview dd 22.02.2017; Interview 9.03.2017; Interview dd 
1.03.2017.  
926 Interview dd 9.03.2017; Interview dd 16.03.2017.  
927 Interview dd 16.03.2017; Interview dd 22.02.20174; Interview I dd 21.03.2017.  
928 Interview II dd 21.03.2017; Interview 9.03.2017; Interview dd 1.03.2017; Interview I dd 23.02.2017.   
929 Interview dd 1.03.2017.  
930 Interview I dd 13.01.2017 ; Interview II dd 13.01.2017 ; Interview III dd 13.01.2017; Interview anonymous I; 
Interview I dd 18.01.2017; Interview dd 09.01.2017; Interview dd 23.02.2017.   
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are relatively more important in pilot cases as the applicant lawyer is in most cases focused on 
the specific situation of the individual applicant. So, if the Court wants to gather information 
concerning the nature of the issue at hand, these third party intervention can indeed provide the 
necessary context.931 One respondent stated in this sense that it is useful to have a different, 
external perspective from an organization working in the field.932 
These third party interventions might also form part of a larger strategy. As discussed, in some 
cases there was coordination between lawyer and NGO where the third party intervention 
served as added information helping both the individual applicant as the informing the Court 
concerning the bigger issue in order to prompt a violation pertaining to the problem in 
general.933  
It must be emphasized that none of the respondents at the Court indicated that the involvement 
of an NGO through the affiliation of a lawyer is a consideration taken into account when 
deciding on applying the procedure. To the contrary, two respondents at the Court explicitly 
mentioned that the involvement of an NGO is not a reason for the Court to pick a certain 
situation or case for the pilot judgment procedure.934 Some respondents however explained that 
the quality of the submissions of the lawyer representing the applicant might indirectly be a 
factor taken into account when choosing the pilot case.935 The Court more generally uses the 
information provided by the  parties as a basis to show that the problem is indeed systemic.936 
A lawyer associated with an NGO might be able to place the individual case in its broader 
context and offer more qualitative submissions showing context which the Court can use to 
render a pilot judgment.  
F. Conclusion: does the pilot judgment procedure hinder the right to access to justice?  
1. Access to clear legal information 
With respect to the applicants in the pilot case, the Court includes a question concerning the 
existence of a structural issue in the communication. There does not seem to be standard 
practice on what info is further annexed to the communication letter. Sometimes, the Court 
provides general information concerning Rule 61, other times not.  
A finding which continuously came up during the interviews was the intermediary role of the 
lawyers and human rights NGO’s involved in these cases. They need to translate for their 
clients, as the language used by the Court is very technical and formal. This leads to conclude 
that the lawyer is extremely important in the context of providing clear legal information for 
the applicants involved.  
                                                 
 
931 Interview II dd 17.01.2017.  
932 Interview I dd 20.01.2017.  
933 Interview dd 9.03.2017; Interview I dd 23.02.2017.  
934 Interview I dd 20.01.2017 ; Interview dd 09.01.2017.  
935 Interview I dd 18.01.2017; Interview I dd 20.01.2017; Interview II dd 13.01.2017; Interview anonymous I; 
Interview II dd 16.01.2017.  
936 Interview I dd 20.01.2017 ;  
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With respect to the applicants in the similar pending cases, the kind of information provided 
depends on the procedural stage at which the Court has decided to stop the examination of the 
cases. If this happens before the case is communicated, this will be a de facto adjournment 
meaning also that these applicants don’t need to be informed. If this happens after the 
communication of the case, this will be an official adjournment meaning that based on Rule 61, 
the applicants need to be informed ‘in a suitable manner’. What this suitable manner entails 
however is not part of standard practice. Sometimes they receive letters. Other times, there is a 
notification on the Court’s website. There can also be a press release which is distributed by the 
Court and the State involved.  
2. Friendly settlements and unilateral declarations  
Within the Court, there are different viewpoints concerning the use of friendly settlements and 
unilateral declarations ranging from pragmatic – meaning that they are encouraged because they 
alleviate the caseload - to principled – signifying that they should not be allowed because it is 
amoral. In between, there are nuanced perspectives as well, clarifying that the State must 
cooperate in executing the needed general measures before friendly settlements can be allowed 
or successful. A State’s cooperation is necessary because otherwise there is the chance that the 
Court is left fighting a running battle. Unilateral declarations seem to be less standard in pilot 
cases.  
Similarly at the side of the applicants, it is argued that friendly settlements are only useful when 
the State cooperates. The reason however is not so much tied up with procedural efficiency. 
The respondents on this side of the coin generally did not regard the use of friendly settlements 
as positive because this would be a means for the State to buy off its caseload and sweep its 
problems under the rug.  
3. Fair procedures and due process 
a. Voice 
Here the lawyers and human rights NGO’s are tasked with getting the applicants’ voices across 
to the Court. They again play an important intermediary role. Firstly, they make a selection of 
the case or cases they bring to the Court. Further, they build their case in consultation with the 
applicants. Sometimes, they even strategize with them. If there are logistical issues, such as 
distance or language, local human rights NGO’s can play a bridging role. If possible, these 
organizations do the same for the victims other than the applicants. If not, the voice of the other 
victims will thus not be part of the procedure before the Court. With respect to the procedure 
before the Committee of Ministers, the emphasis is mostly on the human rights NGO’s 
involved.  
b. Consistency and bias suppression 
With regard to the decision to apply the pilot procedure, the interviews have clarified that there 
are no fixed parameters which the Court uses to make this decisions. There is further no 
consistency in the application of the procedure. The applicants however can ask for this 
themselves. Interestingly, none of the respondents at either side have indicated that this has 
happened.  
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The Court basis itself on a variety of sources in making the decision to apply the procedure. 
NGO’s are tasked with writing third party interventions, which are of great help to the Court in 
order to outline the systemic nature of the issue. These third party interventions however only 
come after the decision to apply the pilot procedure. The lawyers representing the applicants 
rely on different sources: parliamentary documents, newspapers, testimonies, documentaries, 
etc. Whatever the source is, it is admissible before the Court and it is effective in evidencing 
the structural nature of the underlying problem.  
d. Correctability 
With respect to the applicants of the pilot case, they are afforded the same legal avenues as 
applicants in standard individual cases. The applicants in the similar pending cases however do 
not have a legal recourse when they want their case to be re-examined.  
e. Ethicality 
As to ethicality, it seems as if pragmatics reign both at the Court as at the side of the applicants. 
At the Court, the point was made that the Court is simply not capable of rendering judgment in 
all of these cases individually. There is thus the choice between no remedy at all, or the pilot 
procedure: “at least with the pilot procedure, there is a remedy”. It is only in cases which involve 
core human rights issues, such as violations of article 3 that ethical principles play a vital role, 
for instance in the decision to not adjourn these cases.  
At the side of the applicants, only one respondent took the principled view that the pilot 
procedure created a situation of discrimination between the applicant in the pilot case and the 
others.  
f. Representation 
Representation is a criterion which is especially important with respect to the selection of the 
pilot case. At the side of the applicants, some lawyers already did a pre-selection, either based 
on an increased chance of winning or on the will of the applicants involved. Other lawyers 
however did not do a pre-selection, some sent these applications as a group, others decided to 
bring every case individually to show the large-scale nature of the issue.  
At the Court, there is again no standard practice as to how the pilot is selected. A myriad of 
selection criteria were uttered in these interview: whether the case exemplifies the problem 
well, whether the case was important at national level, whether the applicant is represented, 
whether the application was qualitative and whether the systemic issue is at the heart of the 
complaint.  
4. Appropriate case-management  
The possibility for the Court to re-open cases based on the interests of justice was found to be 
a safety measure when the State is not executing the requested general measures properly, or at 
all.  
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5. The intermediary role of the work of human rights NGOs and lawyers.  
Human rights NGO’s and lawyers clearly play an important part in securing access to justice 
for the applicants involved.  
On the one hand, some NGO’s are involved in strategic litigation which they link to access to 
justice. In this way, they aim to secure a solution for the most vulnerable within the victim 
population who would not bring a case to the Court or would not be able to afford a lawyer. 
They further want to foster change in the home State, which then secures a lasting impact for a 
larger group than the ones who were able to get to Strasbourg. The pilot judgment procedure 
was found to be an interesting tool for this purpose. This use of strategic litigation must however 
be nuanced as it is not something that is widely used amongst the respondents. There are many 
other ways however in which NGO’s and lawyers strategize which does not involve strategic 
litigation: they might simply be working together with an NGO with expertise on the underlying 
issue, they write articles domestically in the context of putting attention on the issue or they 
may bring every single case to the Court in order to learn from the experience and get better 
judgments from the Court.  
On the other hand, human rights NGO’s might submit third party interventions to the Court 
whereby they provide context concerning the underlying systemic problem. The Court 
generally welcomes this information. It must however be emphasized that NGO affiliation of 
the lawyer is not a criterion used by the Court to select a case as the pilot.  
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V. The intersection of efficiency and accessibility: was the problem solved in reality?  
The Court evaluates the efficiency of the pilot judgment procedure through the level of 
implementation of the general measures contained in it. In its Stella decision, the Court argued 
that the creation of the new domestic remedies in Italy were a direct result of the pilot judgment 
procedure. This in turn puts an end to the threat to the Court’s machinery, previously posed by 
the large numbers of similar petitions coming from Italian prisoners. Moreover, the Court stated 
that this presented the affected persons with a means to obtain redress more rapidly.937 Based 
on this wording by the Court, it can be argued that the Court sees the sufficient implementation 
of the pilot judgment as a positive development affecting both the efficiency of the Court and 
the situation of the applicants. The interviews at the Court confirm that it defines success in a 
pilot case as positive change in the country of origin.938 Clearly, the Court primarily wants its 
judgments to be executed and thus for the problem to be solved domestically.  
During the Oslo Conference on the long-time future of the Court, Başak Çali addressed the 
attendees on the research she undertook interviewing domestic stakeholders in the reform 
process.939 These domestic stakeholders were domestic lawyers, domestic judges, 
parliamentarians who are not part of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly and 
domestic NGO’s. This research showed that from a judicial, pedagogical perspective these 
repetitive cases are an interesting tool. The frequent, repetitive caseload helps judges to 
internalize the principles set by the Court. Furthermore, politicians are also more easily 
persuaded to reform when faced with a bulk of cases finding violations concerning the same 
issues.940 She contended that repetitive case law is not necessarily a bad outcome, it is a 
constant, visible reminder that some States are failing to protect human rights. These repetitive 
cases have positive impact on the case law of higher courts and in the work of political and 
public institutions. According to Başak Çali , there is thus no need to revise the mission of the 
Court.941 
It thus remains to be questioned whether these pilot judgments are indeed the most effective 
manner to solving the underlying issue, seeing Başak Çali’s argument that repetitive case law 
helps the domestic stakeholders to appropriate the human rights principles of the Court. To this 
end, this chapter will firstly sketch the manner in which the Committee of Ministers and the 
Court respectively look into the level of execution of a pilot judgment (A.). Secondly, the 
Court’s practice of assessing the domestic remedies set up after a pilot in follow-up decisions 
will be looked at (B.). Thirdly, the primordial factor of State cooperation will be focussed on in 
relation to the level of execution of a pilot case (C.). Lastly, this chapter will portray different 
                                                 
 
937 ECtHR, decision, Stella  and others v. Italy, application no. 49169/09, 16 September 2014, § 43. 
938 Interview I dd 17.01.2017; Interview I dd 16.01.2017; Interview I dd 13.01.2017; Interview II dd 16.01.2017.  
939 B. ÇALI, A. KOCH AND N. BURCH, The Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights: the view from the 
ground, Strasbourg, 2 May 2011.  
940 Conference on the long-term future of the European Court of Human Rights, Session I – History, reforms and 
remaining challenges, Oslo, 7 April 2014, 31-32.  
941 Conference on the long-term future of the European Court of Human Rights, Session I – History, reforms and 
remaining challenges, Oslo, 7 April 2014, 32-33.  
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viewpoints concerning what constitutes success in the context of the pilot judgment procedure 
(D.).  
A. Monitoring of the State’s execution of a pilot judgment  
The Committee of Ministers is tasked with the monitoring of the execution of the Court’s 
judgments. It invites the State for a regular check-up of the execution process and takes 
information from civil society organization concerning the general measures and from the 
applicants concerning the individual measures. Based on this, the Committee of Ministers then 
decides whether the matter has been resolved. A Resolution of the Committee of Ministers 
closing a case is thus the last stage of the process by which a State is held to adhere to the human 
rights obligations contained in the Convention.  
The Court on the other hand makes a more abstract assessment of the domestic remedies taken 
by the States post pilot judgment by way of a decision in a selection of follow-up cases. The 
Court uses this assessment in order to relieve itself from the burden of the other similar cases. 
When the Court finds that the newly set up domestic remedy is effective, it can decide to strike 
out the remaining pending cases on the basis of article 37 ECHR in order to try this new remedy 
if it was made available retroactively to the cases already pending. If this domestic remedy is 
not found to be effective, the Court can still decide that the incoming similar petitions are 
inadmissible for non-exhaustion on the basis of article 35 ECHR of an effective domestic 
remedy.942 In some cases however, the Court has already adopted a decision in which it has 
officially closed the pilot judgment procedure. The Court has done this because it was still 
receiving similar applications, which it then needed to process according to the two disposal 
methods mentioned here. These cases thus still signify a – albeit smaller – workload for the 
Court. The Court subsequently pronounced that it had fulfilled its task based on article 19 of 
the Convention: the domestic remedy set up after the pilot was deemed generally compatible 
and there is no longer a live Convention issue on which the Court has to pronounce itself. The 
Court in these instances decides that the pilot judgment procedure is closed and will thus not 
examine such cases anymore. The Court can still decide to entertain a case where the applicant 
had turned to the domestic remedy after which there is another human rights issue to be 
examined by the Court.943 It does however not seem that officially closing a pilot judgment is 
standard practice, the Court might only decide to officially close pilot judgment proceedings 
when it is confronted with a continuing stream of incoming petitions.  
Until end of October 2017, the Court has officially closed four pilot judgment procedures: 
Broniowski,944 Hutten-Czapska945, Suljagic946 and Kuric947. In ten other pilots, the Court has 
found in a decision that the domestic remedy set up after the previous pilot judgment was an 
                                                 
 
942 Interview anonymous II.  
943 ECtHR, decision, E.G. v. Poland and 175 other Bug River applications, application nos. 50425/99 and 175 
others, 23 September 2008, §§ 19-29.  
944 ECtHR, decision, E.G. v. Poland and 175 other Bug River applications, application nos. 50425/99 and 175 
others, 23 September 2008, Point 2 of the Operative Part  
945 ECtHR, decision, Association of Real Property Owners in Łódź and others v. Poland, application no. 3485/02, 
8 Mach 2011,  
946 ECtHR, decision, Zadrić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, application no. 18804/04, 16 November 2010.  
947 ECtHR, decision, Anastasov and others v. Slovenia, application no. 65020/13, 18 October 2016,  
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effective remedy.948  This is the case in the full pilot judgments of Burdov (no.2) v. Russia, 
Olaru and others v. Moldova,, Rumpf v. Germany, Vasilios Athanasiou and others v. Greece, 
Finger v. Bulgaria, Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey, 
Torreggiani and others v. Italy, Rutkowski and others v. Poland and Neshkov v. Bulgaria.949  
B. The Court’s assessment of domestic remedies set up after a pilot  
The Court does not have a general practice on how it assesses these new remedies afterwards. 
In some of these assessments, the Court makes a detailed overview of the new remedy, either 
in theory or in practice. In the four pilots which have officially been closed by the Court, the 
newly set up remedies were evaluated based on a thorough examination of both the text of the 
laws as well as the practice. The parties were also given the chance to answer questions 
concerning the new remedy and their argumentation is taken into account by the Court in the 
decisions.950 In other evaluations of the remedies set up after pilots, the Court has also evaluated 
the practice rather than merely the theory.951 In other cases, there was no practice yet to base 
the evaluation on but the Court took the time to thoroughly evaluate the text of the law and the 
interplay between different measures. The Court further looked at the action plans submitted 
by the involved State to the Committee of Ministers and took the monitoring decisions of the 
Committee into account in its own assessment. This kind of assessment has taken place in the 
decisions following the pilot cases of Finger v. Bulgaria, Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria952, 
Torreggiani v. Italy953 and Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria954.  
                                                 
 
948 See Annex 4  “VI-a Cases open or closed + level of cooperation of the State (June 2004 - June 2017)” on page 
216 .  
949 Respectively in ECtHR, decision, Nagovitsyn and Nalgiyev v. Russia, application nos. 27451/09 and 60650/09, 
23 September 2010; ECtHR, decision, Balan v. Moldova, application no. 44746/08, 24 January 2012; ECtHR, 
decision, Taron v. Germany, application no. 53126/07, 29 May 2012; ECtHR, decision, Techniki Olympiaki A.E. 
v. Greece, application no; 40547/10, 1 October 2013; ECtHR, decision, Balakchiev and others v. Bulgaria, 
application no. 65187/10, 18 June 2013; ECtHR, decision, Uzun v. Turkey, application no; 10755/13, 30 April 
2013; ECtHR, decision, Stella  and others v. Italy, application no. 49169/09, 16 September 2014; ECtHR decision, 
Załuska and Rogalska v. Poland, application nos. 53491/10 and 72286/10, 20 June 2017; ECtHR, decision, 
Atanasov and Apostolov v. Bulgaria, application nos. 65540/16 and 22368/17, 27 June 2017. The Court previously 
found the follow-up domestic remedy set up after Broniowski appropriate and sufficient in ECtHR decision, 
Andrzej Wolkenberg and others v. Poland, application no. 50003/99, 4 December 2007. It further seems that an 
assessment of the newly set up law in execution of the Gerasimov  pilot judgment is underway. The Court decided 
in the case of Prisekin and Prisekiny v. Russia to allow the state’s unilateral declaration and stated that it would 
wait for another case in which the applicants had tried the new remedy in order to evaluate it: ECtHR, decision, 
Prisekin and Prisekiny v. Russia, application nos. 30949/06 and 49965/06, 26 June 2017.  
950 ECtHR decision, Andrzej Wolkenberg and others v. Poland, application no. 50003/99, 4 December 2007, §§ 
36 and 67-77; ECtHR, decision, Association of Real Property Owners in Łódź and others v. Poland, application 
no. 3485/02, 8 Mach 2011, §§ 82-89; ECtHR, decision, Anastasov and others v. Slovenia, application no. 
65020/13, 18 October 2016, §§ 89-102.  
951 ECtHR, decision, Nagovitsyn and Nalgiyev v. Russia, application nos. 27451/09 and 60650/09, 23 September 
2010, § 31; ECtHR, decision, Techniki Olympiaki A.E. v. Greece, application no; 40547/10, 1 October 2013, § 58.  
952 The general measures in execution of both pilot judgments were found effective in ECtHR, decision, Balakchiev 
and others v. Bulgaria, application no. 65187/10, 18 June 2013.   
953 ECtHR, decision, Stella  and others v. Italy, application no. 49169/09, 16 September 2014.  
954 ECtHR, decision, Atanasov and Apostolov v. Bulgaria, application nos. 65540/16 and 22368/17, 27 June 2017.  
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There are however examples where the Court is more easily satisfied. In some cases, the Court 
merely takes the word of the State.955 Here, the Court looks at the text of the laws put in place 
after the pilot case and states that they require the national judges to apply Convention standards 
in the domestic system. Whether that is de situation in practice is however not assessed. There 
is also no thorough examination of the interplay of different measures. The Court avails itself 
that the domestic measure is effective solely based on the fact that it refers to Convention 
standards. In these cases, the Court generally instructs the applicants to first test the vailable 
remedy. Such decisions have been taken in the aftermath of the pilot cases of  Olaru and others 
v. Moldova, Rumpf v. Germany and Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey.956 After the pilot case of 
Rutkowski, the Court found that the State had demonstrated ‘an active and reliable commitment’ 
to take the necessary general measures and proceeded to make a general overview of the 
measures already created by Poland. It subsequently allowed a series of friendly settlements 
along with a series of unilateral declarations where the applicants had not agreed to the State’s 
proposed compensation amount because they argued that their specific circumstances justified 
a higher sum.957 In the follow-up decision to the pilot case of Suljagic v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the Court merely referred to the Committee of Ministers resolution that stated 
that the general measures requested in the pilot case appeared to have been taken. The Court 
subsequently stated that it did not need to depart from this conclusion and decided to close the 
pilot proceedings all together.958 
Interestingly, in two cases the applicants complained that the State had indeed put up a 
compensation scheme in execution of the previous pilot. There was however no measure set up 
to addressing the actual problem and thus preventing the issue from coming up again. Contrary 
to what could be expected from a subsidiarity point of view, the Court did not deem this 
problematic. Indeed, a preventive measures was found by the Court to be the best solution. 
However, the State is afforded discretion to decide which measures should be introduced.959 
This kind of reasoning arguably shows that the Court, when forced to choose, is more concerned 
with keeping these cases away from its docket rather than having the State de facto resolve the 
underlying problem. With such a reasoning, efficiency is here even prevailing over subsidiarity.  
C. State cooperation after the pilot: the execution stage  
It has been argued multiple times that the cooperation of the State is of primordial importance 
in the context of the pilot judgment procedure. This cooperation is especially needed with 
respect to the execution of the pilot judgment, whereby the Court is alleviated of the burden to 
deal with the same issue over and over again and the applicants are effectively offered a solution 
                                                 
 
955 P.LEACH, “Tackling systemic human rights violations – the role of Pilot Judgments” in Pilot Judgment 
Procedure in the European Court of Human Rights and the Future Development of Human Rights’ Standards and 
Procedures – Third Informal Seminar for Government Agents and Other Institutions, Kontrast, May 2009, 25-26.  
956 Respectively in ECtHR, decision, Balan v. Moldova, application no. 44746/08, 24 January 2012, §§ 18-19; 
ECtHR, decision, Taron v. Germany, application no. 53126/07, §§ 39-40; ECtHR, decision, Uzun v. Turkey, 
application no; 10755/13, 30 April 2013, § 62.  
957 ECtHR decision, Załuska and Rogalska v. Poland, application nos. 53491/10 and 72286/10, 20 June 2017.  
958 ECtHR, decision, Zadrić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, application no. 18804/04, 16 November 2010.  
959 ECtHR, decision, Nagovitsyn and Nalgiyev v. Russia, application nos. 27451/09 and 60650/09, 23 September 
2010, §§ 33 – 35; this reasoning was repeated in ECtHR, decision, Balan v. Moldova, application no. 44746/08, 
24 January 2012, §§ 20 – 21.  
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on the domestic level. State cooperation after the pilot can be looked at on two levels: firstly, 
whether the State indeed executed the judgment and whether the State has done this witihin a 
reasonable time.  
1. The level of execution of a pilot case 
Specifically focussing on the cases in which the involved government had opposed the 
application of the pilot procedure, it must be said that a little under half of them have already 
been closed by the Committee of Ministers.960 In sixteen of the full pilot cases the State objected 
to the use of the procedure. Of those sixteen cases, eight are fully closed following a final 
resolution of the Committee of Ministers.961 It must also be stated that eight of the full pilot 
cases which have not yet been executed, are under four years old, the period of time on average 
needed for the implementation of a pilot judgment, including a final resolution by the 
Committee of Ministers.962 Five of these young cases are also counted in the seventeen cases 
involving opposing States. That leaves a total of two cases involving States which did not agree 
with the application of the pilot judgment procedure and which have already taken more than 
the average time-frame to execute the judgment: the cases of Yuriy Nikolaeyevic Ivanov v. 
Ukraine and Greens and M.T. v. UK.  Both of these however do not require complex general 
measures from the state involved.963 Furthermore, the Committee of Ministers had previously 
expressed its disappointment concerning both States. With respect to Ukraine, the Committee 
in 2012 stated that it profoundly reproached that the pilot judgment was still not executed and 
urged the State to do so with the utmost urgency.964 As evidenced in the Burmych case, the 
Ukrainian State is reluctant to execute causing an enormous influx of similar cases. The Court 
then decided to strike these cases out regardless and passed the buck to the Committee of 
Ministers in an attempt to foster a solution on the political level. Concerning the UK, the 
Committee in 2015 reiterated its serious concern about the on-going delay in removing the 
blanket ban on prisoners’ voting rights.965  
  
                                                 
 
960 It must be emphasized that stock-taking was done in June 2017. 13 of a total of 28 pilot cases have been closed 
by a Committee of Ministers’ Final Resolution; See Annex 4 “VI-a Cases open or closed + level of cooperation of 
the State (June 2004 - June 2017)” starting from page 216.  
961 These are the cases of: Glykantzi v. Greece, Michelioudakis v. Greece, Burdov (no. 2) v. Russia, Dimitrov and 
Hamanov v. Bulgaria, Finger v. Bulgaria, Hutten-Czapska v. Poland,  Suljagic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Rumpf v. Germany.  
962 This average execution time will be discussed below under “Late execution of a pilot case” on page 189. 
963 In Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine, the Court obliged the state to put in place a domestic remedy capable 
of securing adequate and sufficient redress for the non-enforcement of domestic remedies; in Greens and M.T. the 
Court obliged the United Kingdom to do away with the blanket ban on prisoners’ right to vote.  
964 Committee of Ministers, Interim Resolution Execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
– Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov against Ukraine and the Zhovner group of 389 cases against Ukraine concerning the 
non-enforcement or delayed enforcement of domestic judicial decisions and the lack of an effective remedy in 
respect thereof, CM/ResDH(2012)234, 6 December 2012.  
965 Committee of Ministers, Interim Resolution Execution of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights 
– Hirst and three other cases against the United Kingdom, CM/ResDH(2015)251, 9 December 2015.  
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Susi has earlier also stated that the Court might first come out with a leading case, in order to 
give an incentive to the State to tackle the issue. If the State does not do this within a reasonable 
Name of the case 
case closed 
for CoM? 
time between judgments and 
CoM final resolution 
time the case has been 
pending (until 30 June 2017) 
Broniowski v. Poland yes 5 years, 3 months
Hutten-Czapska v. Poland yes 10 years, 3 months 
Burdov (no. 2) v. Russia yes 2 years, 11 months
Olaru and others v. Moldova no 7 years, 11 months 
Yuriy Nikolaeyevich Ivanov. Ukraine no 7 years, 9 months 
Suljagic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina yes 1 years, 7 months
Rumpf v. Germany yes 2 years, 3 months
Maria Atanasiu and others v. 
Romania no 6 years, 9 months 
Greens and M.T. v. UK no 6 years, 8 months 
Vasilios Athanasiou and others v. 
Greece yes 5 years
Finger v. Bulgaria yes 4 years, 4 months
Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria yes 4 years, 4 months
Ananyev and others v. Russia no 5 years, 6 months
ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey yes 2 years, 9 months
Michelioudakis v. Greece yes 3 years, 8 months 
Kuric and others v. Slovenia yes 3 years, 11 months
Manushaqe Puto and others v. 
Albania no 4 years, 11 months
Glykantzi v. Greece yes 3 years, 2 months 
Torregiani and others v. Italy yes 3 years, 2 months
M.C. and others v. Italy no 3 years, 10 months
Gerasimov and others v. Russia no 3 years
Alisic and others v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, 
Slovenia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia no 3 years
Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria no 2 years, 5 months
Varga and others v. Hungary no 2 years, 4 months 
Rutkowski and others v. Poland no 2 years 
Gaszo v. Hungary no 1 years, 9 months 
W.D. v. Belgium no 10 months 
Rezmiveş and others v. Romania no 2 months 
Legenda:  level of cooperation:  
 - Yellow: state opposed the application of the procedure  
- no colour: state did not oppose the procedure  
- pink: state welcomed the application of the procedure  
- purple: the state recognized the structural nature of the problem.  
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time-frame, he contends that the Court will then decide to adopt a pilot judgment procedure. 966 
This idea seems to originate from the assumption that the success rate will be higher in case of 
a full pilot judgment, rather than with a quasi-pilot. The case of Iacov Stanciu v. Romania seems 
to confirm this theory. In its communication, the Court had indicated that it was contemplating 
to introduce the pilot judgment procedure in this case.967 In the end, the Court made this a quasi-
pilot case in which the Romanian government was arguing that the problem of sub-standard 
detention conditions was not a systemic one and that the Court was invited to deal with these 
applications on a case-by-case basis.968 The State subsequently took some time to execute the 
judgment. The last Interim Resolution taken by the Committee of Ministers in this case was 
taken on 12 March 2015 and indicates the Deputies’ concern surrounding the measures taken 
by the authorities. They specifically note that the legislative reforms instituted by the Romanian 
government would not alter the situation.969 Consequently, the Court came out with a pilot 
judgment Rezmiveş and others v. Romania, in which it explicitly refers to the case of Iacov 
Stanciu and states that this was not properly executed more than four years after this first 
principled judgment.970  
A similar dynamic took place with the Torreggiani judgment.971 The Court had first come out 
with the judgment of Sulejmanovic in 2009, which was treated under enhanced procedure by 
the Committee of Ministers.972 However, the Court came out four years later with the pilot 
judgment in Torreggiani, which was subsequently executed within 3 years.973 Furthermore, 
looking at the case law, it can be generally stated that pilot judgments are more quickly 
executed. Of the twenty-two quasi-pilot cases pronounced between 2005 and 2016, a mere five 
cases have been closed through a Final Resolution by the Committee of Ministers.974  
2. Late execution of a pilot case  
Lambert Abdelgawad has however shown that non-compliance is generally not the problem. 
Late execution is a phenomenon which is more prevalent in pilots as well as in individual 
cases.975 When looking at the full pilots again, States that have already executed the judgment 
                                                 
 
966 M. SUSI, “The Definition of a ‘Structural Problem’ in the Case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
Since 2010”, German Yearbook of International Law, 2012, 412.  
967 ECtHR Statement of Facts and Questions to the Parties, Iacov Stanciu v. Romania, application no. 35972/05, 
21 May 2010, Question 3.  
968 ECtHR, Iacov Stanciu v. Romania, application no. 35972/05, 24 July 2012, § 192.  
969 Committee of Ministers, Interim Resolution concerning the Bragadireanu Group, CM/Del/Dec(2015)1222/12, 
12 March 2015, § 2.  
970 ECtHR, Rezmiveş and others v. Romania, application nos. 61467/12, 39516/13, 48231/13 and 68191/13, 25 
April 2017, §§ 107-111.  
971 F. FAVUZZA, “Torreggiani and Prison Overcrowding in Italy”, Human Rights Law Review, 2017, 153-173. 
972 ECtHR, Sulejmanovic v. Italy, application no. 22635/03, 16 July 2009.  
973 See Annex 4 “VI-a Cases open or closed + level of cooperation of the State (June 2004 - June 2017)” on page 
216; Committee of Ministers, Execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Two cases 
against Italy, CM/ResDH(2016)28, 8 March 2016.  
974 See Annex 4 “VI-a Cases open or closed + level of cooperation of the State (June 2004 - June 2017)” on page 
216; a sixth case (M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece) is only closed with respect to Belgium.  
975 E. LAMBERT ABDELGAWAD, The execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Council of 
Europe Publishing, 2008, 64. Concerning the reasons given in the literature for non-execution or late execution, 
see: E. LAMBERT ABDELGAWAD, The execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Council of 
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but originally objected to the application of the pilot judgment procedure don’t seem to do this 
in a longer time-frame than is the case on average with respect to pilot cases.976 Looking at the 
cases977, the pilots which have now been executed have attained this status on average in four 
years. This is roughly the same average time-frame within which the pilots concerning opposing 
States were executed.978  
Furthermore, most pilot judgments include in the operative part of the judgment a specific time-
frame for the States to execute the general measures indicated by the Court. In a minority of 
cases the Court finds that the States must set up an action plan with the Committee of Ministers 
within a certain time-limit: 
  
                                                 
 
Europe Publishing, 2008, 64; G. Guillaume, Foreword of A. Azar, L’exécution des decisions de la Cour 
Internatonale de Justice, Bruylant, Droit International, Brussels, 2003, 291; PACE Resolution 1226 (2000) 
“Execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights”.  
976 The comparison will only take place between pilot cases, as it is aimed at assessing the difference in execution 
time-frame depending on the cooperation level of the state, not depending on the procedure used.  
977 See “V.1 Full pilot judgments: State's cooperation in relation to the level of execution” on page 188.  
978 Although this is a very small sample, it also encompasses all full pilot cases.  
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V.2 FULL PILOT CASES: THE INDICATION OF TIME-LIMITS FOR GENERAL MEASURES 
 
 
In a lot of these cases, the Court merely orders the involved State to set up a domestic remedy 
within a certain time-frame.979 This however seems to be more of a division of competences 
                                                 
 
979 The Court did this in the cases of Neshkov v. Bulgaria; Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria; Finger v. Bulgaria; 
Manushaqe Puto v. Albania; Maria Atanasiu and others v. Romania; Rumpf v. Germany, Ümmühan Kaplan v. 
Name of the case 
time-limit for general 
measures 
time-limit for action 
plan with Committee of 
Ministers
Broniowski v. Poland / /
Hutten-Czapska v. Poland / /
Burdov (no. 2) v. Russia x /
Olaru and others v. Moldova x /
Yuriy Nikolaeyevich Ivanov. Ukraine x /
Suljagic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina x /
Rumpf v. Germany x /
Maria Atanasiu and others v. Romania x /
Greens and M.T. v. UK x /
Vasilios Athanasiou and others v. Greece x /
Finger v. Bulgaria x /
Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria x /
Ananyev and others v. Russia / x
Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey x /
Michelioudakis v. Greece x /
Kuric and others v. Slovenia x /
Manushaqe Puto and others v. Albania x /
Glykantzi v. Greece x /
Torregiani and others v. Italy x /
M.C. and others v. Italy / x
Gerasimov and others v. Russia x /
Alisic and others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia x /
Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria x /
Varga and others v. Hungary / X
Rutkowski and others v. Poland / /
Gaszo v. Hungary x /
W.D. v. Belgium x /
Rezmiveş and others v Romania / x
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with the Committee of Ministers, as the Committee usually requires more from the State in 
order to address the underlying issue. In Neshkov for instance, the Committee requested the 
Bulgarian authorities to adopt reforms aimed at combatting prison overcrowding and poor 
material conditions of detention.980 In the cases of Finger  and Dimitrov and Hamanov, the 
Committee also ordered the State to take measures with a view to remedying the systemic 
problem of excessive length of proceedings, aside to the creation of a domestic remedy within 
the time-frame set up by the Court.981 The same pattern emerged in the other cases where the 
Court merely made the obligation to put up a domestic remedy within a certain time-limit 
binding upon the State.982 In an Interim Resolution concerning the case of Burdov (no.2) v. 
Russia, the Committee even referenced to specific paragraphs of the obiter dicta in the judgment 
where the Court talked about general measures which could remedy the underlying problem, 
but which the Court had not made binding in the operative part of the judgment.983  
With respect to the time-limits set by the Court, the question raises whether these States have 
executed the required general measures within the time-frame set up by the Court.  
  
                                                 
 
Turkey; Glykantzi v. Greece; Michelioudakis v. Greece; Vassilios Athanasiou and others v. Greece; Yuriy 
Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine and Burdov (no.2) v. Russia.  
980 Committee of Ministers, Decision Neshkov and others and Kehayov group v. Bulgaria Supervision of the 
execution of the Court’s judgments, CM/Del/Dec(2016)1250/H46-6, 8-10 March 2016.  
981 Committee of Ministers, Decision DjaNGOzov, Kitov, Dimitrov and Hamanov, and Finger groups against 
Bulgaria, CM/Del/Dec(2011)1228/6, 2 December 2011.  
982 See Committee of Ministers, Decision Manushaqe Puto and others, Driza group against Albania, 
CM/Del/Dec(2013)1186/1, 5 December 2013; Committee of Ministers, Decision Ormanci group and Ümmühan 
Kaplan against Turkey, CM/Del/Dec(2013)1164/31, 7 March 2013; Committee of Ministers, Decision 50973/08 
Athanasiou and others 70626/01 and Manios group 2531/02, CM/Del/Dec(2011)1115/15, 8 June 2011; 
Committee of Ministers, Interim Resolution Execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov and Zhovner group against Ukraine concerning the non-enforcement or delayed 
enforcement of domestic judicial decisions and the lack of an effective remedy in respect thereof, 
CM/ResDH(2017)184, 7 June 2017.  
983 Committee of Ministers, Interim Resolution Execution of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights 
Burdov No. 2 against the Russian Federation regarding failure or serious delay in abiding by final domestic 
judicial decisions delivered against the state and its entities as well as the absence of an effective remedy, 
CM/ResDH(2011)293, 2 December 2011. 
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V.3 EXECUTION OF A PILOT WITHIN THE SET TIME-LIMIT 
 
 
In only two of the full pilot cases where the Court included a time-limit for the execution of the 
general measures did the States actually provide for these measures within this time-limit: in 
Suljagic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Rumpf v. Germany. Ümmühan Kaplan was partly 
executed within the deadline. In many other however, the State merely exceeded the time-limit 
with a few months. Late execution thus is a problem with pilot judgments as well.  
D. Varying viewpoints regarding success in pilot cases  
A superficial examination of the newly created domestic remedies can arguably not provide the 
Court with sufficient guarantees that the previous pilot is in reality duly executed. Indeed an 
interviewee at the Court stated that the level of success of these cases was mixed. The cases of 
Broniowski, Hutten-Czapska, Burdov (no.2), Torreggiani, Suljagic and quasi-pilot Orchowski 













Burdov (no. 2) v. Russia 15/01/2009 6 months yes 4/05/2010 no
Olaru and others v. Moldova 28/07/2009 1 year no / no
Yuriy Nikolaeyevich Ivanov v. 
Ukraine 15/10/2009 1 year no / no
Suljagic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina 3/11/2009 6 months yes 
already before the 
judgment came 
out! (21/03/2009 - 
16/07/2010) yes 
Rumpf v. Germany 2/09/2010 1 year yes 
3/12/2011 (but 
CoM stated this 
was within the 
time limit) yes 
Maria Atanasiu and others v. 
Romania 12/10/2010 18 months no / no
Greens and M.T. v. UK 23/11/2010 6 months no / no
Vasilios Athanasiou and others v. 
Greece 21/12/2010 1 year yes 
Greece needed 
roughly five years 
to institute all 
needed measures no
Finger v. Bulgaria 10/05/2011 12 months yes 
1/10/2012 and 
15/12/2012 no
Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria 10/05/2011 12 months yes 
1/10/2012 and 
15/12/2012 no





Michelioudakis v. Greece 3/04/2012 1 year yes 20/02/2014 no
Kuric and others v. Slovenia 26/06/2012 1 year yes 21/11/2013 no
Manushaqe Puto and others v. 
Albania 31/07/2012 18 monts no / no 
Glykantzi v. Greece 30/10/2012 1 year yes 20/02/2014 no
Torreggiani and others v. Italy 8/01/2013 1 year yes 27/06/2017 no
Gerasimov and others v. Russia 1/07/2014 1 year yes 19/12/2016 no
Alisic and others v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, 
Slovenia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 16/07/2014 1 year yes 28/12/2016 no
Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria 27/01/2015 18 months no / no
Gaszo v. Hungary 16/10/2015 1 year no / no
W.D. v. Belgium 6/09/2016 2 years no / ?
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were marked as successes. Rutkowski and the quasi-pilot of Scordino (no.1) v. Italy were 
however found to have failed. These remedies work in theory but not in practice because “for 
instance the amount of compensation is not reasonable” so that in a lot of these cases the Court 
still had to interfere individually.984 This view is however not shared by everyone at the Court. 
One respondent for instance stated that generally the pilot judgment procedure is successful, 
except for the Ivanov case.985 Another named the case of Greens and M.T. v. UK  as 
unsuccessful.986 The State’s reluctance to execute the judgment in this situation is said to be 
due to the political sensitivity concerning prisoner’s right to vote in the UK. It is a point which 
is politically unsellable and is certainly gone to the background post-Brexit.987 
Not surprisingly, at the side of the applicants, the evaluation of the effect of the pilot on the 
ground is more negative. Interestingly, there is critique on the more or less standard practice of 
the Court to merely ask the State to set up a domestic remedy. This has resulted in the affected 
States setting up compensation schemes which have in turn been found appropriate by the Court 
to start striking cases out or finding cases inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic 
remedies. The underlying systemic problem however – for instance the non-execution of 
domestic judgments, the excessive length of procedures, the sub-standard conditions in 
detention, etc… - remain to exist. This means that the underlying problem in practice is not 
solved.988 It could however be argued that monitoring the solving of the systemic problem itself 
is the task of the Committee of Ministers. As the Court thoroughly explains in the Burmych 
case, it does not have to keep entertaining similar cases when the underlying human rights 
problem is resolved and there is no live Convention issue anymore, while the Committee of 
Ministers is expressly tasked by the Convention to monitor the execution process.989  
It must however be emphasized that even in cases where the Court has closed the pilot 
procedure, the procedure might not have had the intended result. The situation of the erased in 
Slovenia is for instance still not solved, contrary to the assumption that this might be the case 
as the Court already closed the pilot proceedings following Kurić.990 The Court closed the case 
with respect to the segment of the erased who had been able to ask for regularization of their 
status following the Kurić pilot. However, there is still a group who was not able to ask for 
regularization under the newly set up law in Slovenia. It is estimated that eleven thousand out 
of twenty thousand erased retrieved their status. The application with respect to this group of 
persons who is still erased is pending before the Court.991   
                                                 
 
984 Interview I dd 17.01.2017.  
985 Interview I dd 16.01.2017.  
986 Interview II dd 16.01.2017.  
987 Interview anonymous II.  
988 Interview dd 1.03.2017; Interview I dd 21.03.2017.  
989 Articles 37.1(b), 19 and 46 of the Convention; ECtHR, Burmych and others v. Ukraine, application nos. 
46852/13 et al., 12 October 2017, §§ 176-208.  
990 This case involved the situation of the erased, meaning the persons who were erased from the residence logs in 
Slovenia following the declaration of the country’s independence in 1991. There are still persons from this group 
who remain without a legal status.  
991 Hudoc indicates that this case has not yet been communicated to the state. In order to ensure this respondent’s 
anonymity, there will be no reference to the specific Interview.  
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VI. Conclusion  
Based on the claims in the literature that the pilot judgment procedure is necessary in the light 
of procedural justice but at the same time hinders applicants’ right to individual application, 
combined with the framework offered by the IAP project, this doctoral thesis centred around 
the following main research question: How is the pilot judgment procedure working in reality 
in terms of procedural efficiency and access to justice and do we need changes in this system?  
To this end, the research was split up in four distinct sub-questions which will all be addressed 
in this conclusion:  
1) How does the pilot judgment procedure work in practice?  
2) Is the pilot judgment procedure efficient?  
3) Is the pilot judgment procedure accessible for the applicants involved?  
4) How can we make the pilot judgment procedure both efficient, while also accessible to 
the involved applicants?  
These research questions were addressed through a mixed methodology, combining desk 
research including the study of statistics with qualitative empirical research methods in the form 
of interviews. Both these methods were necessary when looking at the pilot judgment procedure 
with an insider view, in order to uncover how it works in reality for the lawyers in Strasbourg 
and the applicants involved.  
The research conducted leads to three distinct sub-conclusions. Firstly, the pilot judgment 
procedure seems to have outgrown the experimental phase and has now crystalized in a complex 
procedure. This complexity will be laid down in the first part of this conclusion. Secondly, the 
pilot procedure is found to be efficient in general, under certain conditions. These conditions 
will be explained in the second part. Thirdly and lastly, the pilot procedure as it exists today is 
indeed not satisfactory from an access to justice perspective. Consequently, this third part will 
highlight the elements of the procedure which pose a problem and touch upon possible 
adaptions in the procedure which could be further investigated in finding a solution.  
A. The pilot judgment procedure: grown out of its infancy  
The pilot judgment procedure was created through practice and was thus first not codified. 
Consequently, there was a lot of uncertainty surrounding it. The interviews at the Court have 
shown that there still are diverging viewpoints concerning how the procedure works and what 
its intended goals are. This is because the pilot judgment procedure was designed and remained 
to be a flexible procedure which can be adapted to the circumstances at hand. The Court has 
issued pilots in case where there were not many other similar cases pending. It has also decided 
not to adjourn these similar cases. Sometimes, it has indicated very specific general measures 
in the operative part of the judgment, other times it has left this task to the Committee of 
Ministers. The practice varies greatly. The interviews show that this was due to an 
experimentation phase within the Court.  
Lately however, the procedure grew out of its infancy and seems to have entered a new phase. 
The Registry now puts out a factsheet on pilot judgments which is regularly updated. It contains 
the following elements of a pilot case: the existence of an underlying systemic issue which leads 
to multiple similar cases being brought to the Court; the choice of the Court to deal with one or 
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a selection of these cases under priority treatment; the diagnosis of the problem at hand; and 
the indications given to the involved government of the type of remedial measures necessary to 
resolve the issue. The fact sheet further includes the possibility to adjourn on the condition that 
the State acts promptly to execute the requested general measures as the key feature of the 
procedure. This Registry document also includes a discussion on the follow-up decisions 
whereby the Court evaluates the general measures set up in certain cases after the pilot case, 
indicating that this has become standard practice. This follow-up procedure was something that 
was not explicitly included in the original design of the pilot judgment procedure, but which 
has now indeed become an integral part of it.  
Underneath, the procedure is represented schematically. This is meant to show the pilot 
judgment procedure in all its complexity and offer a visual guide on the integral functioning of 
the procedure in practice. It sketches the life of cases that are involved in these pilot judgment 
procedures. The red lines represent the course of the case chosen as the example or pilot case. 
These cases are given priority treatment. The Court will further use these to diagnose the 
underlying systemic issue and to indicate general measures. In most cases, the Court will do so 
in the obiter dicta of the judgment, leaving it to the Committee of Ministers to oversee the 
specifics of these general measures. The Court will however mostly include the express 
obligation to create a domestic remedy both for the victims still at home as for the other pending 
cases already at the Court.  
These other pending cases are represented in black. A large part of these cases will be adjourned 
pending the creation of a domestic remedy. If this domestic remedy is made retroactively 
available to the cases already pending at the Court, they can be sent back to the domestic system 
for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. If not, they can be dealt with through friendly 
settlements or a judgment might follow through the Well-Established Case Law procedure 
(WECL). They subsequently are also sent to the Committee of Ministers which monitors 
execution. When such a case is ended with a unilateral declaration, it will not be sent to the 
Committee of Ministers. There will be no monitoring. When the State however does not execute 
the terms of the unilateral declaration, the applicants can still submit this complaint to the Court 
again.992 
The green lines represent the follow-up cases whereby the Court tests the domestic remedy set 
up in execution of the pilot case. If this domestic remedy is found appropriate, these cases will 
be found inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and will thus be sent back to 
the national legal system. If the Court has done so and it continuously receives similar 
applications, it can decide to close the pilot judgment procedure. This will lead to other cases 
being automatically struck from the list: the Court has fulfilled its role under the Convention 
and there is no live Convention issue anymore.  
 
                                                 
 
992 This is ultimately what happened for some applicants in the Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov pilot judgment.  
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B. The pilot procedure is efficient under certain conditions  
As elaborated on in this thesis, the pilot judgment procedure was created for several purposes. 
Efficiency was one of its main goals, as it would enable the Court to process a large group of 
similar cases in one judgment. When looking at the bigger picture however, it is clear that the 
pilot judgment procedure only had its role to play in a specific category of cases: the repetitive 
meritorious applications. At the height of the Court’s caseload in 2011, the unmeritorious cases 
were the overwhelming share of the backlog. When the caseload of the Court thus took a 
dramatic decline starting 2011, this was not due to the pilot procedure. This was predominantly 
attributable to the Single Judge procedure which did away with an enormous backlog in 
unmeritorious – and thus inadmissible – cases.  
With respect to these repetitive meritorious cases however, the interviews and the numbers 
show that the pilot judgment procedure has done its part. This is however when the pilot 
judgment procedure is looked at in a holistic manner, showing its complete complexity. It is 
thus the whole chain of decisions, starting with the judgment in the chosen pilot case, over the 
adjournment to the friendly settlements, the WECL procedure and the follow-up decisions 
which play a part in the pilot judgment’s efficiency. This way, the procedure is certainly capable 
of being efficient when certain conditions are met.  
1. Necessary condition: State cooperation 
First and foremost, the State must cooperate. There is no point in starting the pilot judgment 
procedure when the State is not willing or capable to execute the general measures as requested 
in the pilot judgment. As witnessed in the Ivanov pilot case, it is not possible to send cases back 
or to conclude friendly settlements or unilateral declarations in cases where the State does not 
set up a domestic remedy or does not execute the terms agreed to. As a consequence, the Court 
will be continuously confronted with the same issue over and over leading to the failure of the 
pilot procedure all together. This in turn negatively affects the caseload, the productivity and 
the length of proceedings.  
2. No complex general measures 
The pilot judgment procedure is furthermore efficient when the Court does not require complex 
general measures from the State. This might explain why the Court in a considerable amount 
of cases indicates which general measures the State must take in the obiter dicta of the judgment 
– meaning that these requirements remain non-binding-, while merely including the obligation 
for the State to set up a domestic remedy in the operative part of the judgment – which is then 
binding. Setting up a domestic remedy is a simple procedural measure which can rapidly be set 
up in the national system, compared to requiring States to review their detention policy or to 
draft new complex legislation. The Court can then use this newly created domestic remedy as 
a means to find similar cases inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and thus 
send them back domestically. General measures aimed at eliminating the underlying problem 
– so-called preventive measures – are then left to the States under the supervision of the 
Committee of Ministers. Sometimes the Court also includes the obligation for the States to 
submit an action plan with the Committee of Ministers within a certain time-limit.   
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VI.1 COURT'S INDICATION OF SPECIFIC GENERAL MEASURES IN OBITER DICTA VS. GENERAL 
MEASURES IN THE OPERATIVE PART OF THE JUDGMENT 
 
 
This construction might be argued to come close to what was originally intended in the 
Committee of Minister’s Resolution on cases revealing underlying systemic problems. The 
Court is coming back to its original role under this resolution by diagnosing the underlying 
problem and giving the Committee some guidance as to how the judgment should be executed. 
The Committee can then again fulfil its traditional role in designing the needed measures 
together with the State and monitoring their implementation. The Court has thus found its way 
back to the original design of the pilot judgment procedure and has in the process bettered it.  




setting up a 















Broniowski v. Poland x x x /
Hutten-Czapska v. Poland x / x /
Burdov (no. 2) v. Russia / x / /
Olaru and others v. Moldova / x / /
Yuriy Nikolaeyevich Ivanov v. Ukraine x x / /
Suljagic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina x / x /
Rumpf v. Germany x x / /
Maria Atanasiu and others v. Romania x / x /
Greens and M.T. v. UK x / x /
Vasilios Athanasiou and others v. Greece x x / /
Finger v. Bulgaria x x / /
Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria x x / /
Ananyev and others v. Russia x x / x
Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey x x / /
Michelioudakis v. Greece x x / /
Kuric and others v. Slovenia / x / /
Manushaqe Puto and others v. Albania x / x /
Glykantzi v. Greece x x / /
Torregiani and others v. Italy x x / /
M.C. and others v. Italy x / x x
Gerasimov and others v. Russia x x / /
Alisic and others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia x / x /
Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria x x / /
Varga and others v. Hungary x x x X
Rutkowski and others v. Poland x / x /
Gaszo v. Hungary x x / /
W.D. v. Belgium x / x /
Rezmiveş and others v Romania x / x x
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3. Precluding the perverse effect of attracting more similar cases 
Lastly, the Court must particularly pay attention to cases where it is being made part of the 
national enforcement system, such as in the case of Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v.Ukraine. In 
cases where there is indeed a rule of law issue, such as mass non-enforcement of domestic 
decisions, the Court might be seen as the last hope for the affected victims. Issuing a pilot 
judgment in such a case has the perverse effect of attracting thousands of similar cases. The fact 
that the Court is awarding sums of just satisfaction is the main element here, turning the Court 
de facto in a reparations tribunal. This is certainly not the role of the Court under the Convention 
and it has a disastrous consequence for the Court’s efficiency. The Court thus decided in the 
Burmych case that it was not going to be turned into such a reparations tribunal and decided to 
strike all of these cases out of its list and hand them over to the Committee of Ministers to be 
dealt with under the execution process of the Ivanov pilot. This contrary to the right to individual 
petition of these victims, as the procedure before the Committee merely foresees for them the 
possibility to submit their views concerning the execution of individual measures. Seeing these 
developments, it is necessary to investigate whether there is a possibility for the Court to judge 
on the underlying issue while also being protected from streams of applicants merely turning to 
Strasbourg to request just satisfaction.  
a. Whether the Court can refrain from awarding just satisfaction  
The question whether the Court could refrain from awarding just satisfaction in pilot cases is 
certainly an interesting and important one. Article 41 of the Convention does not make 
awarding just satisfaction a mere possibility for the Court. It states that “[i]f the Court finds that 
there has been a violation of the Convention and the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law 
of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court 
shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”993 It is however not said how 
much and in which manner the Court must do so.  
The Ukrainian State in the Ivanov case already raised the issue that it did not have the required 
budget to compensate all of these victims, adding also the uncertainty that there could be more. 
The underlying claim revolved around monetary issues. Ukraine had been brought before the 
Court for non-execution of domestic judgments which created for the involved applicants a 
right to compensation from the government. When the Court thus ordered the State to not only 
execute these domestic judgments but also to pay just satisfaction to the applicants involved, 
the Court in reality aggravated the problem. Furthermore, as Lambert Abdelgawad has shown, 
execution depends more on political willingness than on the fear of being sanctioned.994 As a 
result, it is thus more effective to build political willingness in the home State.  
                                                 
 
993 Article 41 ECHR; emphasis added.  
994 E. LAMBERT ABDELGAWAD, The execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Council of 
Europe Publishing, 2008, 291.  
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A solution might arguably be found in setting up a separate structure where the State makes a 
certain fixed sum available and victims can submit their claims for just satisfaction.995 This 
enables the State to anticipate the required budget. This in turn might foster a more cooperative 
State, a criterion which is primordial in turning a pilot successful. Secondly, it alleviates the 
workload for the Court. This trust can operate independently from the Court, it can be made 
part of the Committee of Ministers as it belongs in the execution process following a pilot case. 
Thirdly, it enables all victims to put in their claim and in the process argue why their case must 
be differentiated from the original pilot. As will be explained below from page 207 onward, 
this would be a step forwards in the light of the procedural justice standards of correctability 
and representation.  
b. Protocol no. 16.  
A solution could further be found in the entering into force of Protocol no. 16, which will enable 
the Court to bring out advisory opinions. The Protocol at the time of writing – January 2018 – 
has eight ratifications.996 Ten ratifications are necessary for it to enter into force.997 The Court 
can already bring out advisory opinions upon request of the Committee of Ministers on legal 
questions concerning the interpretation of the Convention.998 Protocol no. 16 however foresees 
the possibility for the highest courts and tribunals of the States parties to request the Court for 
advisory opinions on question of principle concerning the interpretation of the Convention in 
the context of a case pending before it.999 It is not the aim of this procedure to transfer the case 
to the Court. It stays at the national level while it allows the Court to focus on the question of 
principle in assistance to the national court tasked with resolving the case.1000 There must be a 
case underpinning this request for interpretation, there can thus not be an abstract review of a 
State’s legislation.1001 The involved State has the right to take part in the proceedings. The 
President of the Court can also invite any person or other State to take part.1002 The explanatory 
report clarifies that the parties to the case at the national level would be invited to submit their 
                                                 
 
995 Clear examples of this are the Mesothelioma and Asbestos Trust Funds in the United States (see 
https://www.asbestos.com/legislation/trust-fund.php). See further United States Government Accountability 
Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Asbestos Injury 
Compensation – The Role and Administration of Asbestos Trusts, GAO-11-819, September 2011. There are similar 
trust funds in South Africa (see http://asbestostrust.co.za/home/) and in the United Kingdom (see 
https://tandnasbestos.org.uk/). Belgium also has a fund for asbestos but this was not set up following litigation (see 
http://www.fedris.be/afa/afa_nl.html).   
996 Council of Europe¸ Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 214, available 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/214/signatures?p_auth=mXr8XsDw.  
997 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Draft Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Opinion 285 (2013), 28 June 2013.   
998 Article 47-48 ECHR.  
999 Article 1 Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Council of Europe Treaty Series – No. 214, 2 October 2013.  
1000 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,Council of Europe Treaty Series – No. 214, § 11; ECtHR, Opinion of the Court 
on Draft Protocol no; 16 to the Convention extending its competence to give advisory opinions on the 
interpretation of the Convention, 6 May 2013, § 8.  
1001 ECtHR, Opinion of the Court on Draft Protocol no; 16 to the Convention extending its competence to give 
advisory opinions on the interpretation of the Convention, 6 May 2013, § 7.  
1002 Article 3 Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Council of Europe Treaty Series – No. 214, 2 October 2013. 
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views. These proceedings at the Court would thus also be open to the applicants and potentially 
to third party interventions.1003  
It is important to remark that these opinions are not binding on the high court requesting them, 
nor do these courts have to motivate why they depart from the  Court’s opinion.1004 The parties 
to the underlying case however can still turn to the Court afterwards. When the national court 
requesting the advisory opinion has followed it, the parties cannot bring claims based on this 
back to the Court. However, when the national court had not followed the opinion, they can 
bring their claim to the Court. Interestingly, these advisory opinions will become part of the 
case law of the Court although they will not have direct effect on other later applications.1005 
This kind of construction would thus allow the Court to focus on the issue of principle affecting 
large groups of victims in the home State. If the national courts than follow the Court’s opinion, 
the problem might be solved before it floods the Court’s gates.   
There is however an important consideration to be made here. As explained earlier, the 
jurisprudence of these highest courts have previously been taken into account by the Court in 
the context of pilot procedures. This thus means that these courts had already found that there 
was a systemic problem in the home country before the cases eventually came to Strasbourg. 
Consequently, even when the country’s highest court find that there is a structural issue which 
must be addressed, the State authorities might still not address it. The question thus raises 
whether the involved State would be more inclined to remedy the structural problem when the 
national highest courts’ judgments are already based on the opinion of the European Court of 
Human Rights.   
                                                 
 
1003 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to Protocol No; 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,Council of Europe Treaty Series – No. 214, § 20. 
1004 Article 5 Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Council of Europe Treaty Series – No. 214, 2 October 2013; ECtHR, Opinion of the Court on Draft Protocol no; 
16 to the Convention extending its competence to give advisory opinions on the interpretation of the Convention, 
6 May 2013, § 12. 
1005 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,Council of Europe Treaty Series – No. 214, § 26-27.  
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C. The pilot procedure lacks accessibility: some proposals  
With the pilot judgment procedure the Court claims to have returned to its original role under 
the Convention of setting the principles to which the States must abide in executing their duties 
under the European Convention on Human Rights. This was named in the interviews to be the 
other primordial aspect of the procedure, next to procedural efficiency. It enabled the Court to 
put the emphasis back on the States and require them to take up their roles under the 
Convention’s subsidiarity principle to execute the Court’s judgments and provide effective 
domestic remedies for victims of large-scale human rights violations. Certainly with the new 
developments in the Burmych case, the Court has refused to let itself be a part of the national 
legal systems by having to render judgments awarding just satisfaction due to malfunctions in 
domestic courts, and rightly so. 
The Court was however created for the benefit of the roughly 800 million persons under the 
jurisdiction of the Council of Europe. The Court can consequently not deny its duty towards 
the applicants. The interviews have made clear that the Court’s communication – including its 
judgments – is very formal and theoretical. Some respondents argued that its work is intended 
for lawyers and academics, rather than for the victims involved. The Court indeed is tasked 
with interpreting the Convention, thereby developing common European human rights 
standards.1006 However, it must not forget its original duty towards the victims of human rights 
violations as exemplified by the right to individual justice and its central status in the European 
Human Rights System. Otherwise, the Court risks to provide justice which is merely illusory 
and theoretical, rather than practical and effective.1007 With reference to this difficult marriage 
between individual and constitutional justice, one respondent at the side of the applicants stated 
that the pilot judgment procedure “is a compromise and as all compromises it has some 
drawbacks, it's probably the best that the Court can do right now.”1008 An interviewee at the 
Court went further and stated that there is no justice in a pilot judgment for the individuals 
involved.1009 
This thesis takes a more nuanced viewpoint. It is posed that it is possible for the Court to 
combine these two emphases of procedural justice and access in the pilot judgment procedure, 
provided that some adaptations are made. The tension which was discussed at the beginning 
between the need for the Court to focus on procedural efficiency and the interests of the 
applicants involved can thus be relaxed under certain conditions. Finding ways to fulfil both 
sets of interests further fits well with the goal set in Work Package 5 of the IAP project: “The 
research will formulate clear-cut and substantiated proposals reconciling optimal access with 
                                                 
 
1006 This has been termed in the literature as the constitutional role of the Court, which is put in contrast with its 
task to deliver individual justice as explained under “The decision to apply the pilot procedure” starting from page 
36 .   
1007 Ensuring rights which are practical and effective is a recurring requirement the Court ask of both itself as well 
as the states in its own case law. See in this regard the case of Airey v. Ireland where the Court established this 
principle; see ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, application no; 6289/73, 9 October 1979, §24; More recent examples can 
be found in the cases of ECtHR, Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and others v. Romania, application no; 76943/11, 
29 November 2016, § 86; and ECtHR, Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia, application nos. nos. 60367/08 and 
961/11, 24 January 2017, § 30.  
1008 Interview I dd 21.03.2017.  
1009 Interview anonymous I.  
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the need of procedural efficiency and an efficient management of incoming cases.”1010 The 
points which raise problems in the context of access to justice will be discussed following the 
same structure as above.  
1. Improving access to clear legal information 
There does not seem to be a standard practice concerning the provision of information to both 
the applicants in the pilot case, as well as the applicants in the other similar cases. The 
information which is provided further is clearly intended for the lawyers of the applicants, as it 
is drafted in a theoretical and formal manner. The Court could invest more in making its 
communication understandable to laymen.  
With respect to the applicants in the pilot case, the Court should first work out such a standard 
practice whereby it also includes information concerning the procedure itself and what the 
applicants can expect.  
With respect to the applicants in the other cases, many respondents were not even aware of any 
information to this group of applicants. As a result, there should be some form of 
communication targeted to this group. A press release in the language of the involved country 
can suffice, certainly if the respondent State is required to spread it in the home country.  
2. Friendly settlements and unilateral declarations: only when the State cooperates 
Respondents at both sides of the procedure indicated that friendly settlements and unilateral 
declarations are only useful when the State cooperates. Although principled, this is mere logic. 
The system concerning friendly settlements and unilateral declarations is in essence a fast-track 
procedure which is meant to be a win-win-win situation. If friendly settlements and unilateral 
declarations are allowed in cases where the cooperation of the State is unclear, this would only 
result in a win-situation for the State. The involved applicants would not receive just 
satisfaction, nor would the underlying issue be resolved. This in turn would maintain – or even 
aggravate – the constant stream of similarly situated applicants to the detriment of the Court. 
Looking holistically at the pilot procedure then, it can be deduced that these friendly settlements 
and unilateral declaration should only be allowed after the Court has already taken a follow-up 
decision in which it has verified that the State has executed the pilot judgment, at least with 
respect to setting up a domestic remedy and ideally with addressing the underlying issue as a 
whole.  
3. Fair procedures and due process  
a. Voice: drawing inspiration from class actions in the interests of the silent majority 
Voice presents one of the biggest challenges here. The applicants in the pilot case are heard 
before the Court. The applicants in the other cases however do not get their voices across. There 
is however an important role here for the lawyers and human rights NGO’s involved. Rule 61 
foresees the possibility for the applicants to request the application of the pilot judgment 
                                                 
 
1010 See page 10 above.  
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procedure. Based on the interviews, it seems that none of the pilots that have already come out 
have been initiated by the applicants. This provision however creates the possibility for the 
applicants to group themselves – either with or without the involvement of an NGO – and go 
to the Court. Such grouping would in turn be beneficial to the Court for it could process and 
register the incoming petitions efficiently.1011 This however assumes that there is a definable 
class of individuals – such as in Broniowski for example1012- who can group themselves to bring 
the attention of the Court to the underlying issue, which is not always the case.1013  
In this sense, it is interesting to draw inspiration from class action procedures. First of all, it 
must be emphasized that there is not one class action procedure, these types of procedures are 
part of a spectrum as well. There is the archetype of the class action in the US Federal Rules.1014 
There are also several variations and procedure derived from the class action across the globe: 
from Canada, to Brazil, over Finland to Belgium, from South Africa to South Korea.1015 There 
are however some general traits to the procedure. A class action can be defined as a 
representative action brought by a legally appointed litigant on behalf of a group of similarly 
situated, unknown litigants that have not given power of attorney to this representative 
beforehand.1016 The judgment resulting from this representative action is then binding on all 
members of the class.1017 Class actions differ from pilot judgment as they do not rely on one 
test case, which is individual in nature, for rendering a decision on the larger underlying issue. 
Class actions result in a court deciding on the legal or factual issues common to the whole class.  
Class actions however are relevant here because show that in principle, it is possible to render 
a judgment on a large-scale issue without hearing every individual involved. The condition 
however is that there are a number of safeguards built into this procedure which are aimed at 
protecting the silent majority of victims. The reference to class actions is not new. It has been 
first hinted towards in the Broniowski case with the Court’s phrasing of ‘an identifiable class 
of citizens’.1018 It was first explicitly brought up as a reference point for the pilot judgment 
procedure by Judge Zupančič in his separate opinion to Hutten-Czapska v. Poland. In his 
separate opinion, Judge Zupančič even explicitly references to the certification stage of class 
                                                 
 
1011 See in this sense Erik Fribergh, former Registrar at the European Court of Human Rights who called on the 
relevant Hungarian trade unions to group cases in order for the Court to be able to manage them. The Registrar 
stated that “it is important that the presentation of the applications be coordinated at national level by a limited 
number of representatives.” See European Court of Human Rights Press Release, European Court Registrar calls 
for special measures to deal with influx of Hungarian pension cases, ECHR 009 (2011), 11 January 2012.  
1012 ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland, application no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, § 189.  
1013 See the Continuum of pilot and pilot-like cases on page 29.   
1014 Rule 23 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (US), 20 December 1937, http://uscode.house.gov.   
1015 For an overview, see the website of ‘Global Class Actions Exchange’, an joint initiative of Stanford Law 
School, the Oxford Centre for Socio-Legal Studies and Tilburg University:  
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/.  
1016 Class actions in this context are defined as a representative action brought by a legally appointed litigant on 
behalf of a group of similarly situated, unknown litigants that have not given power of attorney to this 
representative beforehand; see P.G. KARLSGODT, World Class Actions:  A Guide to Group and Representative 
Actions around the Globe, OUP, 2012, xxxix. 
1017 S.VOET, Een Belgische vertegenwoordigende collectieve rechtsvordering, Intersentia, 2012, 13. 
1018 ECtHR, Broniowski v. Poland, application no. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, § 189.  
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actions, which will be discussed here.1019 There are also traces to be found of the comparison 
drawn between class actions and pilot judgments in the literature.1020 It must however be 
emphasized that this thesis does not aim to make a comparison with class actions, it wants to 
learn from the class action’s procedural design with respect to the protection of absent class 
members.  
Voet has identified the main building blocks in the class action procedure, from which this 
dissertation will draw inspiration. Specifically, the criteria developed in the context of 
certification are of importance here. Certification takes place during the admissibility phase.1021 
It is intended to make sure that the class action is the most efficient manner to handle the cases 
and that the class representative is appropriate to represent the class. Therefore it is firstly 
important that there is a common legal or factual dispute at the base of the class action. This is 
the requirement of commonality. Secondly, treating the issue in the form of a class action must 
the superior option in terms of efficiency than treating all of these cases separately, which has 
been termed the requirement of superiority. Thirdly, the chosen representative must be 
appropriate to represent the whole class.  
The first two of these requirements are already built into the pilot judgment procedure. Firstly, 
the efficiency reasoning underpinning the pilot judgment procedure shows that pilot cases 
would in principle meet the requirement of superiority. Rule 61 further States that the Court 
may initiate the pilot judgment procedure when the underlying issue triggers or may give rise 
to similar applications. The interviews lastly show that the pilot procedure is a tough procedure 
for the Registry, ensuring that the Court will not resort to this procedure if not absolutely 
necessary. Secondly, the requirement of commonality is in principle also covered as based on 
Rule 61, the pilot procedure must be concerned with cases originating from the same source: a 
structural or systemic problem in the home country. The third requirement will however be of 
great importance here. It will be discussed more in detail below from page 208. 
b. Consistency and accuracy: specialized division within the Court’s Registry   
There are no fixed criteria for gathering information and for making the decision to apply the 
pilot judgment procedure. This may lead to a differing practice, resulting in uncertainty for all 
involved as witnessed by past practice in the experimentation phase. Furthermore, the States 
parties had already called on the Court to develop clear and predictable standards for the 
procedure in the Interlaken Declaration. They urged the Court to do so specifically with respect 
to the selection of applications, the procedure to be followed in the adjourned cases and to 
evaluate the effect of applying the procedure.1022 Susi further has argued that greater 
                                                 
 
1019 ECtHR, Hutten-Czapska v. Poland, application no. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, Parly concurring, partly dissenting 
opinion of Judge Zupančič.  
1020 L.R. HELFER, “Redesiging the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle 
of the European Human Rights Regime”, The European Journal of International Law, 2008, Vol. 1, 148; T. 
SAINATI, “Human Rights Class Actions: Rethinkingg the Pilot-Judgment Procedure at the European Court of 
Human Rights”, 56 Harvard International Law Journal No.1, 2015.  
1021 S.VOET, Een Belgische vertegenwoordigende collectieve rechtsvordering, Intersentia, 2012, 367- 368.  
1022 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights, Interlaken Declaration, 19 
February 2010, 7 b).  
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predictability concerning the concept and consequences of the pilot judgment procedure, might 
alarm the States into addressing their underlying issues. As long as the procedure lacks 
predictability, he claims that this is not the case.1023 Increased consistency and accuracy thus 
not only is important for the applicant in order to predict what will happen with their case. It is 
further an element which might cause greater impact with the involved States.  
As the procedure has now assumed a clear shape, there could be created a specialized division 
within the Court concerning the pilot procedure.1024 The Court already has a program for 
creating greater specialization within the Registry. Across different divisions,1025 the Court is 
bringing experienced Registry lawyers from varying countries together in specialization hubs 
with a view to obtain greater operational efficiency and developing staff expertise. These 
specialization hubs will then have an advisory role in each area of expertise. The Court does 
this with the aim of having a more standardized and consistent drafting by the Registry of cases. 
There is already a first hub, created mid-2016 which specializes in asylum and migration 
issues.1026 Pilot judgments could however be another one, by which more consistency and 
accuracy could be ensured in this field.  
c. Correctability: creating the possibility to argue differentiation 
The applicants in the similar cases do not receive the possibility to argue their case, nor to 
submit that their case differs from the chosen pilot. This not only presents a problem for these 
applicants, it also reduces the possibility of having a holistic view of the problem and thus of 
the measures required to address the underlying systemic issue.1027 When the wrong measures 
are taken, the case can come back to Strasbourg leading again to an influx of repetitive cases. 
This is thus not only an issue from an access to justice viewpoint but might also pose problems 
from the perspective of procedural efficiency. There must thus be a procedure for these 
applicants to submit to the Court that their case is different.  
It is true that a variation of this has taken place in the follow-up decision of Zaluska and 
Rogalska.1028 Part of the applicants here argued that the circumstances in their case differed, 
leading to their request for a higher award of just satisfaction. Applicants should however be 
given the opportunity to argue that their case differs from the chosen pilot away from the 
question concerning pecuniary damage, enabling the Court to see the complete picture of the 
underlying systemic problem. There could be merit in creating a possibility with such a 
specialized pilot judgment ‘hub’. Such a pilot division could respond to claims from applicants 
for differentiation more rapidly based on experience and specialized knowledge. Practically, 
                                                 
 
1023 M. SUSI, “The Definition of a ‘Structural Problem’ in the Case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
Since 2010”, German Yearbook of International Law, 2012, 404. 
1024 This idea was brought up during an Interview with a lawyer on the sides of the applicants; Interview I dd 
21.03.2017. A respondent at the Court also mentioned the class action procedure as a source of inspiration; 
Interview I dd 16.01.2017.  
1025 Every member state of the Council of Europe has its own division within the Registry.  
1026 European Court of Human Rights, The Interlaken Process and the Court (2016 Report), 1 September 2016, § 
12. 
1027 E. LAMBERT ABDELGAWAD, The execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Council of 
Europe Publishing, 2008, 49;  referring to CDDH (2007) 011 Addendum 1, Interim Report, 13 April 2007. 
1028 ECtHR decision, Załuska and Rogalska v. Poland, application nos. 53491/10 and 72286/10, 20 June 2017.  
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the press release following a pilot case could include the possibility for similarly situated 
applicants to differentiate their case. As mentioned on page 147, an online tool already exists 
for applicants to follow their case at the Court. Such an online tool could be expanded in pilot 
cases to providing a standard form within which applicants can shortly argue differentiation. 
This gives them the opportunity to do so, while makes it manageable for the Court to process.  
d. Representation: certification of the procedure  
With reference to the certification of the procedure as mentioned above in “Voice: drawing 
inspiration from class actions in the interests of the silent majority”, representation is reflected 
in requiring appropriate representation of the common underlying issue and thus of the whole 
of the affected victim pool. This results in the requirement that both the party as well as his or 
her lawyer must be capable and appropriate to represent the class.1029 Requiring appropriateness 
ensures that the applicant in the representative case is willing to represent the whole class. His 
or her lawyer must further show a minimum level of competence in handling such large-scale 
cases and in the subject of the case at hand.1030 The interviews at the Court have indeed shown 
that the quality of the work delivered by the lawyer in the case is important to make a pilot 
successful, although it is not a criterion based upon which the Court selects a case as the pilot. 
The principle of adequate representation is thus not yet explicitly part of the pilot judgment 
procedure. As the pilot procedure is meant to foster change and thus to affect all victims 
involved, this should be a minimum requirement in deciding which case to choose as the pilot 
case.  
The interviews have further shown that the Court selects the pilot based on a number of criteria 
including whether the case exemplifies the problem well. In a lot of cases, the Court selects a 
group of applications who together cover the whole of the underlying problem. The Court thus 
already aims to ensure that the underlying legal issue is uncovered in its entirety in order to 
foster a good representation of the involved applications. However, there is no possibility for 
the other applicants to claim that their case is different than the pilot(s) selected.  
This possibility does exist in a class action procedure. In case of an opt-in class action, all 
persons who want to be included in the class need to specifically express their wish to the Court. 
Although they do not become parties to the case per se and are thus not heard by the Court, 
their opt-in to the procedure exemplifies their express consent to be included. The pilot 
judgment procedure however leans closest to an opt-out class action procedure, where all 
persons falling within the defined class are automatically part of the class action. If they do not 
wish to be included and thus might wish to bring their case individually because they do not 
regard themselves to be part of the class, they can opt out of the class by specifically expressing 
their wish to the Court.1031 Including a possibility for the similarly situated applicants to submit 
arguments why their case differs from the chosen pilot would thus improve the pilot judgment 
                                                 
 
1029 S.VOET, Een Belgische vertegenwoordigende collectieve rechtsvordering, Intersentia, 2012, 369.  
1030 P.G. KARLSGODT, World Class Actions:  A Guide to Group and Representative Actions around the Globe, 
OUP, 2012, 23. 
1031 P.G. KARLSGODT, World Class Actions:  A Guide to Group and Representative Actions around the Globe, 
OUP, 2012, xxxix – xl.  
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procedure from an access to justice perspective on the basis of representativity, correctability 
and voice.  
D. Need for further research 
The proposals made in this dissertation’s conclusion are to be seen as suggestions for further 
research. The merit of this research is predominantly in uncovering the complete intricacy of 
the pilot judgment procedure and further evaluating it from two normative frameworks: 
procedural efficiency on the one hand and access to justice on the other. As a result, this 
dissertation has identified some elements in the procedure which pose problems in reality.  
From the viewpoint of procedural efficiency, there are three conditions that must be kept in 
mind if the pilot judgment procedure is to be successful: State cooperation, no complex general 
measures and precluding the attraction of more similar cases. These are however not elements 
which the Court has control over. Consequently, the Court can merely take them into account 
when deciding to apply the pilot judgment procedure. This thesis further tried to formulate some 
proposals through which the Court can try and foster the best possible conditions for working 
with the pilot judgment procedure. These can be researched more thoroughly in order to create 
an action plan to be used in practice.  
As to access to justice, this research has uncovered elements of the pilot judgment procedure 
which are de facto hindering the involved applicants’ right to individual application. Contrary 
to the situation in the context of procedural efficiency, these are steps in the procedure which 
the Court can control. As a result, this research has formulated proposals for the Court to alter 
its procedure in order to meet the applicants’ needs in this respect. The Court was not only 
created to set a theoretical standard for human rights in Europe. It was set up in the aftermath 
of World War II for the persons under the control of European States who need an institution 
to turn to when their human rights are violated. The Court cannot forget its function in this 
regard. There is no point in safeguarding the efficient functioning of a system which is sailing 
off course.   
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Annex 1 – List of respondents  
AT THE COURT  
• President Guido Raimondi 
• Judge Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos 
• Judge Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque  
• Judge Ledi Bianku 
• Judge Ayşe Işil Karakaş 
• Judge Paul Lemmens 
• Judge (now former Judge) Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska  
• Former Judge Egbert Myjer  
• Jurisconsult Lawrence Early  
• Deputy Section Registrar Renata Degener  
• Deputy Section Registrar Hasan Bakirci 
• Registry Lawyer Irene Gentile-Brown 
• Registry Lawyer Claire Dubois-Hamdi 
• Registry Lawyer Ana Vilfan-Vospernik 
• Registry Lawyer Natalia Kobylarz 
• Registry Lawyer Boglárka Benkó  
• Anonymous I 
• Anonymous II 
• Anonymous III 
 
LAWYERS  
• Prof. Dr. Philip Leach 
• Prof. Dr. Dmitri Bartenev   
• Prof. Dr. Andrea Saccucci 
• Dr. Krassimir Kanev 
• Dr. Neža Kogovšek Šalamon  
• Dr. Dániel Karsai  
• Ms. Chloé Bregnard Ecoffey 
• Mr. Zouhaier Chihaoui 
• Mr. Peter Verpoorten 
• Anonymous  
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Annex 2 – Questionnaire used at the Court  
1. General: introduction  
Introduction Introduction of project + confidentiality agreement  
Question  Could you tell me about your experience with the PJP (in general)?  
Question How do you define a pilot judgment procedure?  
2. How does the PJP work? – EFFICIENCY  
Category  Caseload  
Subcategory Numerical  
Question How do you consider your workload?  
Follow-up Do you see an evolution/a change in the last years?  
Follow-up Since when have you noticed this change?  
Follow-up Why do you think that is?  
Follow-up How – do you think – has the PJP influenced this evolution?  
Subcategory Simplicity/complexity  
Question  What kinds of cases does the PJP deal with?  
Category Productivity  
Question How does the application of the PJP influence the productivity of your 
section?   
Follow-up 
(when asked 
to clarify how 
productivity is 
defined) 
How does the application of the PJP influence the hours worked on a bulk 
of cases?  
Category  Length of proceedings  
Question How does the application of the PJP influence the length of a procedure in 
the pilot case?  
Follow-up Do you have any idea as to how it influences the length of a procedure in a 
case that was adjourned because of a pilot case?  
Subcategory Time-frames of proceedings  
Question Has the Court developed standards for optimum time-frames with respect 
to pilot cases?  
Follow-up Are these time-frames communicated to the parties?  
Subcategory Monitoring of the course of proceedings  
Question  How does the Court monitor where and why delays occur?  
Subcategory Prompt diagnosis and mitigation of delays  
Question What tools – procedural or others - are used to mitigate delays or reduce 
the length of proceedings?  
Category Clearance rate  
Question In looking at the Court’s statistics, I have noticed an evolution in clearance 
rate. Between 2012 and 2014, the Court disposed of a big amount of the 
cases on its docket. In your opinion, what made this possible?  
3. How does the PJP work? – ACCESS TO JUSTICE  
Category Access to clear legal information  
Subcategory with respect to the pilot case  
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Question What kind of information is provided to the applicants of the pilot case 
concerning the procedure?  
Follow-up How does the Court inform the applicants as to the functioning of the 
procedure?  
Follow-up How does the Court inform the applicants as to the consequences of the 
application of the procedure?  
Question According to the rules, the Court invites the parties’ submissions 
concerning the application of the procedure. What is the weight given to 
these submissions?  
Follow-up If the Court does not follow the submissions by the applicants, does the 
Court inform them as to why?  
Subcategory With respect to the other cases (adjourned cases)  
Question What kind of information is provided to the applicants of the adjourned 
cases?  
Follow-up Are they informed as to the functioning of the PJP?  
Follow-up Are they informed as to why their case was adjourned?  
Follow-up Are they informed as to why their case was not selected as the pilot case?  
Follow-up When are they provided with this information?  
Follow-up Are these other applicants given time to give their submissions as to the 
application of the PJP?  
Follow-up Do they have the opportunity to argue as to why the pilot is/is not 
representative?  
Follow-up What weight is given to these submissions?  
Follow-up Does the Court then motivate why it followed/did not follow these 
submissions?  
Category Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms  
Question How does the requirement of friendly settlement work in the context of 
the PJP?  
Follow-up Why is it successful/is it unsuccessful?  
Question Who is involved in these talks?  
Follow-up Are the applicants of the adjourned cases involved?  
Question What is the result of these friendly settlements on the applicants of the 
adjourned cases?  
Category Fair procedures and due process/ Procedural justice  
Subcategory Voice  
Question How do the applicants express their views during the procedure?  
Question What kind of influence do they have on the outcome arrived by through 
the procedure?  
Subcategory Consistency/Bias suppression/Accuracy/Representation 
Question How is it decided to apply the PJP?  
Follow-up How is the information collected upon which to decide to apply the PJP?  
Question What influences the decision to apply the PJP?  
Question What criteria are used to apply the PJP?  
Follow-up What criteria are there concerning number of cases involved?  
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Follow-up What criteria are there concerning the representativeness of the PJP?  
Question What weight is given to the status of the applicants?  
Subcategory Correctability 
Question What options do the applicants of the pilot case have when they do not 
agree with the outcome of the case?  
Question What options do the applicants of the cases that were adjourned have 
when they do not agree with the outcome of the pilot case?  
Category Appropriate case management  
Question  The rules of court specify that the Court can examine an adjourned case 
‘when the interests of the justice so require’. How is this interpreted in 
practice? 
Follow-up Why have adjourned cases in the past been re-examined?  
Category Vulnerability  
Question What are the consequences of the applicants being marked as vulnerable?  
Question  How do you define vulnerable?  
Follow-up What do you think about the use of the concept of ‘vulnerability’ in the 
Court’s case law?  
Category NGO involvement  
Question  What is the weight given to third party intervention?  
Follow-up How does the kind of NGO involved influence the weight given?  
Question What are the differences in cases where the lawyers are specialized in 
human rights law?  
Question What are the differences in cases where the lawyers are part of a human 
rights organization?  
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Annex 3 – Questionnaire used during interviews with applicants’ lawyers and 
human rights NGO’s 
1. General: introduction  
Question Could you tell me about your experience with the PJP (in general)?  
Question Did you represent only the applicants in the pilot case, or also applicants 
in adjourned cases concerning the same systemic issue?  
2. Strategy  
Question  Did you know about the procedure beforehand?  
Question If so, did you intend for your case to be a pilot case?  
Question How did you argue that this was a systemic/structural issue ?  
Question How does the use of the pilot judgment procedure fit into your overall 
strategy?  
Question If this is part of a strategy, where does your main focus lie: with the 
applicants or with the bigger issue?  
Question Does this strategy also involve the implementation of a possible 
judgment?  
Question Do you communicate with the other lawyers/organizations involved?    
Question Do you have any influence on the selected pilot?  
Question If so, did you select an example case (or a group of cases)?  
Question If so, how did you select the example case?  
Question How do you regard the freezing of cases in the context of the pilot 
judgment procedure?  
3. Relationship with applicants  
Question How did the applicants in the case find you?  
Question How would you describe your relationship with them? How would you 
describe the role that you play in these cases?  
Question How do you consult with them in building your case?  
Question  How would you estimate the distance between you and the applicants?  
4. Communication with applicants  
Question What kind of information do you receive from the Court? Both as to the 
functioning of the PJP, as well as with respect to the consequences.  
Question How do you communicate with the applicants? Both the applicants of the 
pilot case, as well as those of the frozen cases.  
5. Communication with the Court  
Question How do you evaluate your communication with the Court’s Registry?  
Follow-up Who is your main communication with within the Registry?  
Question How do you evaluate the Court’s communication with the applicants?  
6. Friendly settlements / unilateral declarations  
Question How do you consider the involvement of friendly settlements in pilot 
judgment procedures?  
Question How do you consider the involvement of unilateral declarations in pilot 
judgment procedures?  
7. Vulnerability  
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Question Have you used the concept of vulnerability in your application?  
Question If so, why did you use it? (strategy?)  
Question  If you used the concept, was it picked up by the Court?  
8. NGO lawyers  
Question How would you estimate your work differs from lawyers with/without an 
NGO connection?  
Question How would you describe the advantages and disadvantages?  
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Annex 4  
VI-A CASES OPEN OR CLOSED + LEVEL OF COOPERATION OF THE STATE (JUNE 2004 - JUNE 2017) 
 
 













name of Court's 
decision closing




date of CoM 
resolution to close 
number of CoM 
Resolution to close
pending - date of last interim 
CoM resolution
pending - number of 
latest interim CoM 
Resolution
time between judgments and 
CoM final resolution 
time the case has been 
pending (until 30 June 2017) 
Broniowski v. Poland 22/06/2004 yes 
Wolkenberg v. 
Poland 4/12/2007 yes
E.G. v. Poland and 175 
other Bug River 
applications 23/09/2008 yes 30/09/2009 CM/ResDH(2009)89 / / 5 years, 3 months
Hutten-Czapska v. Poland 19/06/2006 yes 
 The association 
of real property 
owners in Lodz v. 
Poland 8/03/2011 yes
 The association of real 
property owners in 
Lodz v. Poland 8/03/2011 yes 21/09/2016 CM/ResDH(2016)259 / / 10 years, 3 months 
Burdov (no. 2) v. Russia 15/01/2009 yes 
 Nagovitsyn and 
Nalgiyev v. Russia 
+ Fakhretdinov 
and others v. 
Russia 
23/09/2010 (both 
same date) no / / yes 2/12/2011 CM/ResDH(2011)293 / / 2 years, 11 months
Olaru and others v. Moldova 28/07/2009 yes Balan v. Moldova 24/01/2012 no / / no / / 8/03/2012
CM/Del/Dec(2012)11
36/15 7 years, 11 months 




strike-out) / / no / / 6/12/2012 CM/ResDH(2012)234 7 years, 9 months 
Suljagic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina 3/11/2009 yes 
Zadric v. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina 16/11/2010 no / / yes 8/06/2011 CM/ResDH(2011)44 / / 1 years, 7 months
Rumpf v. Germany 2/09/2010 yes Taron v. Germany 29/05/2012 no / / yes 5/12/2013 CM/ResDH(2013)244 / / 2 years, 3 months
Maria Atahanasiou and others v. 
Romania 12/10/2010 no
/ (but look at 
Preda v. Romania - 
there was no 
caselaw yet) / no / / no / / 4/12/2014 CM/ResDH(2014)274 6 years, 9 months 
Greens and M.T. v. UK 23/11/2010 no / / no / / no / / 9/12/2015 CM/ResDH(2015)251 6 years, 8 months 
Vasilios Athanasiou and others v. 
Greece 21/12/2010 yes 
Techniki 
Olympiaki A.E. v 
Greece 1/10/2013 no / / yes 9/12/2015 CM/ResDH(2015)230 / / 5 years
Finger v. Bulgaria 10/05/2011 yes 
Balakchiev and 
others v. Bulgaria 18/02/2013 no / / yes 24/09/2015 CM/ResDH(2015)154 / / 4 years, 4 months
Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria 10/05/2011 yes 
Balakchiev and 
others v. Bulgaria 18/02/2013 no / / yes 24/09/2015 CM/ResDH(2015)154 / / 4 years, 4 months
Ananyev and others v. Russia 10/01/2012 / / / no / / no / / 4/03/2013
CM/Del/Dec(2013)11
64/24 5 years, 6 months
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decision closing




date of CoM 
resolution to close 
number of CoM 
Resolution to close
pending - date of last interim 
CoM resolution
pending - number of 
latest interim CoM 
Resolution
time between judgments and 
CoM final resolution 
time the case has been 
pending (until 30 June 2017) 
ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey 20/03/2012 yes Uzun c. turquie 30/04/2013 no / / yes 17/12/2014 CM/ResDH(2014)298 / / 2 years, 9 months
Michelioudakis v. Greece 3/04/2012 / / / no / / yes 9/12/2015  CM/ResDH(2015)231 / / 3 years, 8 months 
Kuric and others v. Slovenia 26/06/2012 yes 
Anastasov and 
others v. Slovenia 18/10/2016 yes
Anastasov and others v. 
Slovenia 18/10/2016 yes 25/05/2016 CM/ResDH(2016)112 / / 3 years, 11 months
Manushaqe Puto and others v. 
Albania 31/07/2012 no / / no / / no / / 21/09/2017
CM/Del/Dec(2017)12
94/H46-1 4 years, 11 months
Glykantzi v. Greece 30/10/2012 no / / no / / yes 9/12/2015 CM/ResDH(2015)231 / / 3 years, 2 months 
Torregiani and others v. Italy 8/01/2013 yes 
Stella et autres c. 
Italie 16/09/2014 yes / / yes 8/03/2016 CM/ResDH(2016)28 / / 3 years, 2 months
M.C. and others v. Italy 3/09/2013 no / / no / / no / / 10/12/2015
CM/Del/Dec(2015)12
43/H46-10 3 years, 10 months
Gerasimov and others v. Russia 1/07/2014 no / / no / / no / / 10/12/2015
CM/Del/Dec(2015)12
43/H46-16 3 years
Alisic and others v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, 
Slovenia and the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 16/07/2014 no / / no / / NO / / 11/03/2016
CM/Del/Dec(2016)12
50/H46-24 3 years
Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria 27/01/2015 yes 
Atanasov and 
Apostolov v. 
Bulgaria 27/06/2017 no / / no / / 10/03/2017
CM/Del/Dec(2017)12
80/H46-9 2 years, 5 months
Varga and others v. Hungary 10/03/2015 no / / no / / no / / 11/03/2016
CM/Del/Dec(2016)12
50/H46-11 2 years, 4 months 
Rutkowski and others v. Poland 7/07/2015 yes 
Zaluska and 
Rogalska v. 
Poland 22/06/2017 yes / / NO / / / / 2 years 
Gaszo v. Hungary 16/10/2015 no / / NO / / NO / / 11/03/2016
CM/Del/Dec(2016)12
50/H46-12 1 years, 9 months 
W.D. v. Belgium 6/09/2016 no / / no / / no / / 10/03/2017
CM/Del/Dec(2017)12
80/H46-6 10 months 
Rezmiveş and others v. Romania 25/04/2017 no / / no / / no / / / / 2 months 
Lukenda v. Slovenia 6/10/2005 yes 
Korenjak v. 
Slovenia 15/05/2007 no YES 8/12/2016 CM/ResDH(2016)354 / / 11 years, 2 months 
Sejdovic v. Italy 1/03/2006 no / / no / / yes 7/06/2016 CM/ResDH(2016)121 / / 10 years, 3 months
Scordino (no. 1) v. Italy 29/03/2006 no / / no / / NO / / 24/09/2015
CM/Del/Dec(2015)12
36/10 
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time the case has been 
pending (until 30 June 2017) 
Ramadhi and others v. Albania 13/11/2007 no / / no / / no / / 21/09/2017
CM/Del/Dec(2017)12
94/H46-1 9 years, 8 months
Driza v. Albania 13/11/2007 no / / no / / no / / 21/09/2017
CM/Del/Dec(2017)12
94/H46-1 9 years, 8 months 
Kauczor v. Poland 3/09/2009 no / / no / / YES 4/12/2014 CM/ResDH(2014)268 / / 5 uears, 3 months
Orchowski v. Poland 22/10/2009 yes 
ŁOMIŃSKI V 
POLAND 22/10/2010 no / / YES 21/09/2016 CM/ResDH(2016)254 / / 6 years, 11 months







greece!) 4/12/2014 CM/ResDH(2014)272 7/06/2017
CM/Del/Dec(2017)12
88/H46-15
with respect to belgium 3 
years, 10 months 
with respect to Greece: 6 
years, 5 months 
Mandic and Jovic v. Slovenia 20/10/2011 yes Bizjak v. Slovenia 8/07/2014 YES / / NO / / 9/06/2016
CM/Del/Dec(2016)12
59/H46-32 5 years, 6 months 
Strucl and others v. Slovenia 20/10/2011 no / / NO / / NO / / 9/06/2016
CM/Del/Dec(2016)12
59/H46-32 5 years, 6 monts 
Grudic v. Serbia 17/04/2012 no / / NO / / NO / / 2/12/2013
CM/Del/Dec(2013)11
86/17 5 years, 2 months 
Kaverzin v. Ukraine 15/05/2012 no / / NO / / NO / / 10/03/2017
CM/Del/Dec(2017)12
80/H46-35 5 years, 1 month
Lindheim and others v. Norway 12/06/2012 no / / / / / YES 30/03/2016 CM/ResDH(2016)46 / / 3 years, 9 months 
Iacov Stanciu v. Romania 24/07/2012 no / / NO / / no / / 13/03/2015
CM/Del/Dec(2015)12
22/12 4 years, 11 months
Aslakhanova v. Russia 18/12/2012 no / / NO / / NO / / 10/03/2017
CM/Del/Dec(2017)12
80/H46-24 4 years, 6 months 
Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine 9/01/2013 no / / NO / / NO / / 10/03/2017
CM/Del/Dec(2017)12
80/H46-37 4 years 5 months 
Vlad and others v. Romania 17/03/2015 no / / NO / / NO / / 10/03/2017
CM/Del/Dec(2017)12
80/H46-21 2 years, 3 months 
Bittó and others v. Slovakia 28/01/2014 no / / NO / / NO / / /
ACTION PLAN 
SUBMITTED 3 years, 5 months 
Grance Stevens and others v. Italy 4/03/2014 no / / / / / NO / / /
ACTION PLAN 
SUBMITTED 3 years, 4 months 
Harakchiev and Tolumov v. Bulgaria 8/07/2014 no / / no / / no / / 10/03/2017
CM/Del/Dec(2017)12
80/H46-9 3 years
Mansur Yalçin v. Turkey 16/09/2014 no / / / / / NO / / /
INFORMATION 
AWAITED 2 years, 10 months 
S.Z. v. Bulgaria 3/03/2015 no / / NO / / NO / / 9/12/2016
CM/Del/Dec(2016)12
73/H46-8 2 years, 6 months 



















name of Court's 
decision closing




date of CoM 
resolution to close 
number of CoM 
Resolution to close
pending - date of last interim 
CoM resolution
pending - number of 
latest interim CoM 
Resolution
time between judgments and 
CoM final resolution 
time the case has been 
pending (until 30 June 2017) 
Yevdokimov and others v. Russia 16/02/2016 no / / / / / NO / / /
INFORMATION 
AWAITED 1 year, 4 months 
Novruk and others v. Russia 15/03/2016 no / / no / / no / / /
action plan 
submitted 1 year, 3 months 
Zherebin v. Russia 24/03/2016 no / / no / / no / / 10/03/2017
CM/Del/Dec(2017)12
80/H46-25 1 year, 3 months 
Holomiov v. Moldava 7/11/2006 no / / NO / / NO / / 2/12/2013
CM/Del/Dec(2013)11
86/12 10 years, 8 months 
Makharadze and Sikharulidze v. 
Georgia 22/11/2011 no / / / / / NO / / / awaiting action plan 5 years, 7 months
Konstantin Markin v. Russia 22/03/2012 no / / / / / NO / / /
AWAITING UPDATED 
ACTION PLAN 5 years, 3 months 
Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di 
Stefano v. Italy 7/06/2012 no / / / / / YES 5/04/2017 CM/ResDH(2017)104 / / 4 years, 10 months
Tarakhel v. Switzerland 4/11/2014 no / / / / / YES 11/06/2015 CM/ResDH(2015)96 / / 7 months 2 years, 7 months 
Söro v. Estonia 3/09/2015 no / / / / / NO / / 13/02/2017
ACTION REPORT 
RECEIVED 1 year, 9 months 
Mursic v. Croatia 12/03/2015 no / / / / / NO / / /
ACTION PLAN 
RECEIVED 2 years, 3 months 
Legenda:  
*kinds of cases  
- blue: full pilots 
- green: quasi-pilots 
- orange: cases in which the court found a systemic issue but no procedural 
consequence.  
* level of cooperation:  
 - Yellow: state opposed the application of the procedure  
- no colour: state did not oppose the procedure  
- pink: state welcomed the application of the procedure  
- purple: the state recognized the structural nature of the problem.  
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Annex 5  
VI-B DETAILED OVERVIEW OF FULL PILOT CASES - FOCUS ON PERSPECTIVE OF THE COURT (JUNE 2004 - JUNE 2017) 
 
 
Name of the case Date of the case 
Judges Registrar 
issue Convention right reason for PJP
CASE OF BRONIOWSKI v. POLAND 22/06/2004
Mr. L. Wildhaber, president; Mr. C.L. Rozakis, Mr. J.-P. Costa, 
Mr. G. Ress, Sir Nicolas Bratza, Mrs. E. Palm, Mr L. Caflisch, Mrs 
V. Stráznicka, Mr. V. Butkevych, mr. B. Zupancic, Mr. J. 
Hedigan, Mr. M. Pellonpää, mr. A.B. Baka, Pr. R. Maruste, Mr 
M. Ugrekhelidze, Mr. S. Pavlovschi, Mr. L. Garlicki, Mr P.J. Mahoney
malfunctioning of Polish legislation 
and practice caused by the failure to 
set up an effective mechanism to 
implement the right to credit of Bug 
River claimants
article 1 prot. 1 - right to 
property 
80000+ affected + already 167 similar 
applications pending
CASE OF HUTTEN-CZAPSKA v. POLAND 19/06/2006
Luzius Wildhaber, President,Christos Rozakis,Jean-Paul 
Costa,Boštjan M. Zupančič,Giovanni Bonello,Françoise 
Tulkens,Peer Lorenzen,Kristaq Traja,Snejana 
Botoucharova,Mindia Ugrekhelidze,Vladimiro 
Zagrebelsky,Khanlar Hajiyev,Egbert Myjer,Sverre Erik 
Jebens,Davíd Thór Björgvinsson,Ineta Ziemele, Anna 
Wyrozumska Lawrence Early, Section Registrar,
Polish restrictive system of rent 
control without the provision for a 
procedure enabling landlords to 
recover losses
article 1 Prot. 1 - right to 
property 
potentially affected persons ranged 
around 600 000 + 18 similar cases, of 
which one is filed by an association 
representing 200 landlords. 
 CASE OF BURDOV v. RUSSIA (No. 2) 15/01/2009
Christos Rozakis, President,Anatoly Kovler,Elisabeth 
Steiner,Dean Spielmann,Sverre Erik Jebens,Giorgio 
Malinverni,George Nicolaou
André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar
non-enforcement or delayed 
enforcement of final domestic 
judgments
article 6 - right to a fair 
trial / article 1 Prot. 1 - 
right to property / article 
13 - right to an effective 
remedy
already 200 judgments + 'vulnerable 
victims' (!!!) + previous decision by the 
Court on the same case + 700 similar 
cases pending. 
CASE OF OLARU AND OTHERS v. MOLDOVA 28/07/2009
Nicolas Bratza, President,Lech Garlicki,Giovanni 
Bonello,Ljiljana Mijović,David Thór Björgvinsson,Ledi 
Bianku,Mihai Poalelungi
Lawrence Early, Section Registrar
non-compliance with final domestic 
judicial decisions ordering the 
municipal authorities to provide the 
applicants with social housing 
article 1 Prot. 1 - right to 
Property / article 6 - right 
to a fair trial
legislation bestowed social housing 
privileges on a very wide category of 
persons; however, a chronic lack of 
resources on the part of the local 
governments lead to non-enforcement 
of these rights / 300 pending cases 
CASE OF YURIY NIKOLAYEVICH IVANOV v. UKRAINE 15/10/2009
Peer Lorenzen, President,Karel Jungwiert,Rait Maruste,Mark 
Villiger,Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,Zdravka 
Kalaydjieva,Mykhaylo Buromenskiy
Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar
non-execution of final domestic 
court proceedings 
article 6 - right to fair trial 
/ article 13 - right to an 
effective remedy / article 
1 Prot. 1 - right to 
property 
already over 300 similar cases decided 
since 2004 + approx. 1400 applications 
pending. 
CASE OF SULJAGIC v. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 3/11/2009
Nicolas Bratza, President,Lech Garlicki,Giovanni 
Bonello,Ljiljana Mijović,David Thór Björgvinsson,Ledi 
Bianku,Mihai Poalelungi
Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar
structural problem with respect to 
the repayment scheme for foreign 
currency deposited before the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia
art. 1 Prot. 1 - right to 
property 
more than 1350 similar applications 
currently pending before the court 
CASE OF RUMPF v. GERMANY 2/09/2010
Peer Lorenzen, President,Renate Jaeger,Karel 
Jungwiert,Mark Villiger,Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,Zdravka 
Kalaydjieva,Ganna Yudkivska
Stephen Phillips, Deputy Section Registrar
excessive length of proceedings 
before domestic courts 
art. 6 - right to fair hearing 
within reasonable time / 
art. 13 - right to an 
effective remedy
already 40 similar cases (of which 13 in 
2009 alone), and some 55 applications 
still pending + no real initiative has been 
take domestically. 
CASE OF MARIA ATANASIU AND OTHERS v. ROMANIA 12/10/2010
Josep Casadevall, President,Elisabet Fura,Corneliu 
Bîrsan,Alvina Gyulumyan,Egbert Myjer,Ineta Ziemele,Ann 
Power
Santiago Quesada, Section Registrar
ineffective restitution of property 
confiscated during the communist 
regime in romania / pending cases 
were adjourned pending national 
general measures
article 6 - right to a fair 
trial / article 1 Prot. 1 - 
right to property 
already 150 similar violations found + 
several hundred pending  + several 
hundred thousands waiting in Romania
CASE OF GREENS AND M.T. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM 23/11/2010
Lech Garlicki, President,Nicolas Bratza,Ljiljana Mijović,David 
Thór Björgvinsson,Ledi Bianku,Mihai Poalelungi,Vincent 
Anthony de Gaetano,
Lawrence Early, Section Registrar,
prisoner's right to vote article 3 Prot 1 - right to 
free elections / article 13 - 
right to effective remedy
the state's lenghty delay implementing 
the Hirst case + "significant number" of 
repetitive applications before and 
following the May 2010 general election






Name of the case Date of the case 
Judges Registrar 
issue Convention right reason for PJP
CASE OF VASSILIOS ATHANASIOU AND OTHERS v. GREECE 21/12/2010
Nina Vajić, présidente,Christos Rozakis,Khanlar Hajiyev,Dean 
Spielmann,Sverre Erik Jebens,Giorgio Malinverni,George 
Nicolaou Søren Nielsen, greffier de section
excessive length of administrative 
proceedings
art. 6 - right to a fair trial / 
art. 13 - right to an 
effective remedy
already 300 similar judgments + more 
than 200 currently pending
CASE OF FINGER v. BULGARIA 10/05/2011
Nicolas Bratza, President,Lech Garlicki,Ljiljana Mijović,Päivi 
Hirvelä,Ledi Bianku,Zdravka Kalaydjieva,Nebojša Vučinić
Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,
excessive lenghth of civil 
proceedings 
article 6 - right to a fair 
trial / article 13 - right to 
an effective remedy
50 cases already decided and 500 
pending 
CASE OF DIMITROV AND HAMANOV v. BULGARIA 10/05/2011
Nicolas Bratza, President,Lech Garlicki,Ljiljana Mijović,Päivi 
Hirvelä,Ledi Bianku,Zdravka Kalaydjieva,Nebojša Vučinić
Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,
excessive lenghth of criminal 
proceedings
article 6 - right to a fair 
trial / article 13 - right to 
an effective remedy
already 80 similar judgments + 200 
similar applications pending 
CASE OF ANANYEV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA 10/01/2012
Nina Vajić, President,Anatoly Kovler,Peer Lorenzen,Mirjana 
Lazarova Trajkovska,Julia Laffranque,Linos-Alexandre 
Sicilianos,Erik Møse
Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,
inhuman and degrading treatment in 
pre-trial detention 
article 3 - prohibition of 
inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment 
/ article 13 - right to an 
effective remedy
already 80 similar judgments + 250 
similar applications pending 
CASE OF ÜMMÜHAN KAPLAN v. TURKEY 20/03/2012
Françoise Tulkens, présidente,Danutė Jočienė,Isabelle Berro-
Lefèvre,András Sajó,Işıl Karakaş,Paulo Pinto de 
Albuquerque,Helen Keller Stanley Naismith, greffier de section,
length of judicial proceedings article 6 - right to fair trial 
/ article 13 - right to an 
effective remedy
over 2700 applications stemming from 
the same issue pending
 CASE OF MICHELIOUDAKIS v. GREECE 3/04/2012
Nina Vajić, présidente,Anatoly Kovler,Peer 
Lorenzen,Elisabeth Steiner,Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, Linos-
Alexandre Sicilianos,Erik Møse André Wampach, greffier adjoint de section,
excessive lenghth of criminal 
proceedings 
article 3 - prohibition of 
torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment 
more than 300 cases already decided + 
chronic and persistent nature of the 
problem + more than 250 pending 
CASE OF KURIĆ AND OTHERS v. SLOVENIA 26/06/2012
Nicolas Bratza, President,Jean-Paul Costa,Françoise 
Tulkens,Nina Vajić,Dean Spielmann,Boštjan M. 
Zupančič,Anatoly Kovler,Elisabeth Steiner,Isabelle Berro-
Lefèvre,Päivi Hirvelä,George Nicolaou,Luis López 
Guerra,Zdravka Kalaydjieva,Nebojša Vučinić,Guido 
Raimondi,Ganna Yudkivska,Angelika Nußberger,
Vincent Berger, Jurisconsult
following Slovenia's declaration of 
independence in 1991, a large group 
of persons were "erased" from the 
Slovenian Register of Permanent 
Residents, causing them extreme 
hardship for over 20 years. 
article 8 - respect for 
private and family life / 
article 13 - right to an 
effective remedy / article 
14 - prohibition of 
discrimination
number of "erased" people: 25671 / 
although only a small number of pending 
cases, the Court was mindful of the 
potential inflow of future similar cases. 
CASE OF MANUSHAQE PUTO AND OTHERS v. ALBANIA 31/07/2012
Ineta Ziemele, President,Päivi Hirvelä,George Nicolaou,Ledi 
Bianku,Nona Tsotsoria,Zdravka Kalaydjieva,Paul Mahoney
Françoise Elens-Passos, Section Registrar
non-enforcement of administratiove 
decisions awarding compensation for 
property confiscated under the 
communist regime
article 13 - right to an 
effective remedy / article 
6 - right to a fair trial / 
article 1 Prot. 1 - right to 
property 
20 applicants + 80 cases pending + 
possibility for more
CASE OF GLYKANTZI v. GREECE 30/10/2012
Nina Vajić, présidente,Peer Lorenzen,Elisabeth 
Steiner,Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,Julia Laffranque,Linos-
Alexandre Sicilianos,Erik Møse
Søren Nielsen, greffier de section,
excessive lenghth of civil 
proceedings 
article 6 - right to a fair 
trial / article 1 Prot. 1 - 
right to property / article 
13 - right to an effective 
remedy
already more than 300 similar cases 
decided + persistent nature of the 
problem  + significant number of 
affected individuals and need to provide 
them with swift and appropriate address 
at the national level + 250 applications 
pending. 
 CASE OF TORREGGIANI AND OTHERS v. ITALY 8/01/2013
Danutė Jočienė, présidente,Guido Raimondi,Peer 
Lorenzen,Dragoljub Popović,Işıl Karakaş,Paulo Pinto de 
Albuquerque,Helen Keller
Stanley Naismith, greffier de section
overcrowding in prisons article 3 - prohibition of 
inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment 
/ article 13 - right to an 
effective remedy
proof of structural issue: the terms of 
the declaration of a national state of 
emergency issued by the italian Prime 
minister in 2010 ; and several hundred 
applications pending 
 CASE OF M.C. AND OTHERS v. ITALY 3/09/2013
Danutė Jočienė, présidente,Guido Raimondi,Peer 
Lorenzen,Dragoljub Popović,Işıl Karakaş,Nebojša 
Vučinić,Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque
Stanley Naismith, greffier de section
impossibility for infected persons to 
obtain an annual adjustment of the 
supplementary part of a 
compensation allowance paid to 
them following accidental 
contamination as a result of blood 
transfusions or the administration of 
blood derivatives. 
article 6 - right to a fair 
trial / article 1 Prot. 1 - 
right to property / article 
14 - prohibition of 
discrimination
162 infected persons in this case, 
however "un millier de réquerants" are 
involved / authorities' unwillingness to 
adjust the compensation, including after 
the Constitutional Court's judgment. 





Name of the case Date of the case 
Judges Registrar 
issue Convention right reason for PJP
CASE OF GERASIMOV AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA 1/07/2014
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, President,Elisabeth Steiner,Khanlar 
Hajiyev,Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,Julia Laffranque,Ksenija 
Turković,Dmitry Dedov
Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,
excessive delays in the enforcement 
of court decisions  providing the 
applicants housing and utility 
services 
article 6 - right to a fair 
trial / article 13 - right to 
an effective remedy / 
article 1 Prot. 1 - right to 
property
non-enforcement or delayed 
enforcement of judicial decisions led to 
the most frequent violations by Russia + 
already more than 150 similar cases 
decided + chronic incapacity of resources 
of the government to comply with 
obligation to provide compensation in 
kin 
CASE OF ALIŠIĆ AND OTHERS v. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, CROATIA, SERBIA, SLOVENIA AND "THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA" 16/07/2014
Dean Spielmann, President,Josep Casadevall,Guido 
Raimondi,Ineta Ziemele,Mark Villiger,Isabelle Berro-
Lefèvre,David Thór Björgvinsson,Danutė Jočienė,Dragoljub 
Popović,Päivi Hirvelä,Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,Ganna 
Yudkivska,Angelika Nußberger,Linos-Alexandre 
Sicilianos,André Potocki,Faris Vehabović,Ksenija Turković Michael O’Boyle, Deputy Registrar,
inability to recover "old" foreign-
currency savings, deposited with two 
banks in what is now Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, following the 
dissolution of the former Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yusoslavia
article 1 Prot. 1 - right to 
property / article 13 - 
right to an effective 
remedy
more than 1850 similar applications 
pending, introduced on behalf of more 
than 8000 applicants. 
CASE OF NESHKOV AND OTHERS v. BULGARIA 27/01/2015
Ineta Ziemele, President,Päivi Hirvelä,George Nicolaou,Nona 
Tsotsoria,Zdravka Kalaydjieva,Krzysztof Wojtyczek,Faris 
Vehabović
Françoise Elens-Passos, Section Registrar,
inhuman and degrading detention 
conditions and the related lack of 
effective remedies 
article 3 - prohibition of 
inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment 
/ article 13 - right to an 
effective remedy
already 20+ similar cases decided and 
40+ cases on the same issue pending
CASE OF VARGA AND OTHERS v. HUNGARY 10/03/2015
Işıl Karakaş, President,András Sajó,Nebojša Vučinić,Helen 
Keller,Egidijus Kūris,Robert Spano,Jon Fridrik Kjølbro
Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar
overcrowding in prisons art 3 - prohibition of 
inhumand and degrading 
treatment / art. 13 - right 
to an effective remedy
similar to previous cases + 
approximately 450 similar cases pending 
+ at the end of 2013 over 5000 inmates 
were held in Hungarian prisons on 
remand. 
CASE OF RUTKOWSKI AND OTHERS v. POLAND 7/07/2015
Guido Raimondi, President, Päivi Hirvelä, Ledi Bianku, Nona 
Tsotsoria, Paul Mahoney, Krzysztof Wojtyczek, Faris 
Vehabović
Françoise Elens-Passos, Section Registrar
lenghty court proceedings and 
inadequate victim compensation
article 6 - right to a 
hearing within a 
reasonable time / article 
13 - right to an effective 
remedy
facts reveal a systemic issue + already 
280 cases decided + already 358 under 
friendly settlement + 650 similar cases 
pending
CASE OF GAZSÓ v. HUNGARY 16/07/2015
Işıl Karakaş, President, András Sajó, Nebojša Vučinić, Helen 
Keller, Paul Lemmens, Egidijus Kūris, Jon Fridrik Kjølbro
Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar
excessive length of civil proceedings article 6 - right to a fair 
trial / article 13 - right to 
an effective remedy
more than 200 violations found already 
and  400 more pending / no 
improvements made despite the court's 
consistent case-law on the matter. 
CASE OF W.D. v. BELGIUM 6/09/2016
Işıl Karakaş, présidente,Julia Laffranque,Nebojša Vučinić,Paul 
Lemmens,Ksenija Turković,Jon Fridrik Kjølbro,Stéphanie 
Mourou-Vikström, Hasan Bakırcı,Deputy Section Registrar 
detention of offenders with mental 
disorders in a prison environment 
unsuited to their therapeutic needs
article 3 - prohibition of 
inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment 
/article 5 - right to liberty 
and security and habeas 
corpus / article 13 - right 
to an effective remedy
at the time some 50 cases pending, the 
number of applications was constantly 
increasing
CASE OF REZMIVES AND OTHERS v. ROMANIA 25/04/2017
Ganna Yudkivska, présidente, Vincent A. De Gaetano, Nona 
Tsotsoria, Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, Krzysztof Wojtyczek, 
Iulia Motoc, Marko Bošnjak, Marialena Tsirli, Section Registrar 
detention conditions article 3 - prohibition of 
inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment 
already similar violations found since 
2007 and incoming cases have not ceased 
to come in + reference to Iacov Stanciu 
(quasi-pilot), CoM has evaluated the 
measures proposed by Romanian 
government as ineffective and 
requested additional measures. + CPT 
reports => persistance of the problem
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Annex 6  
VI-C DETAILED OVERVIEW OF FULL PILOT CASES - EFFICIENCY FACTORS (JUNE 2004 - JUNE 2017) 
 
name of the case 
date of the case date of application date of decision PJP
total length of 
proceedings 
number of similar cases 
already resolved number of pending cases other reasons for PJP
identifiable 
group




to adjourn all 
similar pending 
cases 8 years, 3 months / 167 80000+ affected  => threat to the Court's machinery Bug River People




asked from the 
parties. 11 years, 6 months
the operation of rent-control schemes may potentially 
affect some 100000 landlords and some 600000 to 900000 
tenants (para 191). landlords 
Burdov v. Russia (no. 2)
15/01/2009 15/07/2004  3/07/2008 4 years, 6 months 200 700
Court already decided cases on this point, some of which 
had come out before the violation against the head 
applicant in this case => flagrant violation of article 46 
ECHR. (para 134) /






2 years, 6 months -4 
years, 2 months not specified 300
lack of funds to enforce the previous decisions by the 
Court + to actually solve the problem domestically (even 
without involvement of the Court) + acknowledgment by 








Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. 
Ukraine 
15/10/2009 13/09/2004  25/11/2008 5 years, 1 month more than 300 (para 83). 1400
the case concerns a recurring problem (prolonged non-
enforcement of final decisions). More than half of the 
Court's judgments concerning Ukraine deal with this 
issue. + in line with Burdov: "the Court considers it 
appropriate to apply the pilot-judgment procedure in the 
present case, given notably the recurrent and persistent 
nature of the underlying problems, the large number of 
people affected by them in Ukraine and the urgent need 
to grant them speedy and appropriate redress at domestic 
level." (para 81) /
Suljagic v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
3/11/2009 2/07/2002 not clear 6 years, 7 months /
1350, on behalf of more than 
13500 => serious threat to the 
future functioning of the 
machinery of the Court. 
affects large number of people: more than 1/4 of the 
Bosnian population had "old" foreign-currency savings. /
Rumpf v. Germany
2/09/2010 10/11/2006  24/11/2009 3 years, 10 months more than 40 (para 64) 55
more than half of the Court's judgments against germany 
concern excessive lenght of judicial proceedings + in 
previous case, the Court had already drawn Germany's 
attention to article 46 and its obligation to execute the 
Court's judgments. + in line with Yuriy Nikolayevich v. 
Ukraine: "the Court considers it appropriate to apply the 
pilot judgment procedure in the present case, given 
notably the recurrent and persistent nature of the 
underlying problems, the number of people affected by 
them in Germany and the need to grant them speedy and 
appropriate redress at domestic level." /




name of the case 
date of the case date of application date of decision PJP
total length of 
proceedings 
number of similar cases 
already resolved number of pending cases other reasons for PJP
identifiable 
group





5 years, 2 months-6 
years, 2 months 150
"several hundred" para 217 => 
"aggravating factor concerning 
the state's responsibility" + 
threat to functioning of court's 
machinery several hundred thousands affected waiting in Romania /
Greens and M.T. v UK
23/11/2010 14/11/2008 July 2010 2 years / 2500
with each election, numbers of potential applications go 
up; at any one time there are approximately 70000 serving 
prisoners in the UK (para 111) yes: prisoners 
Vasilios Athanasiou and others 
v. Greece
21/12/2010 6/10/2008 24/09/2009 2 years, 2 months 300 200+
para 44: "Partant, la Cour estime qu'il y a lieu d'appliquer 
en l'espèce la procédure d'arrêt pilote, compte tenu 
notamment du caractère chronique et persistant des 
problèmes en question, du nombre important de 
personnes qu'ils touchent en Grèce et du besoin urgent 
d'offrir à celles-ci un redressement rapide et approprié à 
l'échelon national" no (para 43) 
Finger v. Bulgaria
10/05/2011 6/10/2005  23/02/2010 6 years, 5 months
50 (the Court specifically 
mentions that 43 of those 
were resolved via friendly 
settlements or were struck 
out of the list after a unilateral 
declaration by the Gov't) 500 specific "diagnose" of Bulgaria's problem /





2 years, 4 months-4 
years, 7 months
80+ (the Court specifically 
mentions that 41 of these 
cases were resolved via 
friendly settlement or were 
struck out of the list after a 
unilateral declaration by the 
Gov't) 200 specific "diagnose" of Bulgaria's problem /
Ananyev and others v. russia 
10/01/2012 14/09/2007 14/05/2009 4 years, 4 months 80+ 250
structural problem remains capable of affecting a large 
number of individuals who have been detained in 
remand centres across Russia (para 186) + para 187: 
ameliorating the "practically inhuman prison conditions" 
was one of the accession commitments Russia ondertook 
to implement when joining the CoE .  para 190: "Taking 
into account the recurrent and persistent nature of the 
problem, the large number of people it has affected or is 
capable of affecting, and the urgent need to grant them 
speedy and appropriate redress at the domestic level" + 
Based on number of decided and pending cases + 
Resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly, report by the 
Monitoring Committee, Interim Resolution on the 
execution of the Kalashnikov judgment of the Committee 
of Ministers + no denial by Russian authorities. detainees
Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey
20/03/2012 23/05/2007  6/12/2011 4 years, 10 months /
330 communicated 
applications and 2373 non-
communicated applications. 
potential number of affected persons and judgments 
following from this + Committee of Ministers had 233 
cases concerning length of proceedings with respect to 
Turkey in 2011. /





name of the case 
date of the case date of application date of decision PJP
total length of 
proceedings 
number of similar cases 




3/04/2012 4/09/2010 2/12/2010 1 year, 7 months 300 250+ 
chronic and persistent character of the problems and the 
important number of affected persons + big number of 
caes in the intermediate resolution of the committee of 
ministers of 2007 + the chronic problem was already 
recognized in another pilot case  concerning Greece 
(Vassilios Athanasiu) + committee of ministers + other 
pilot 
no identifiable 
class of citizens 
(para 63). 
Kuric and others v. Slovenia
26/06/2012 4/07/2006 not clear 5 years, 11 months / / 
number of erased people: 25671; small number of 
pending cases but big possible influx. "It is inherent in the 
Court’s findings that the violation of the applicants’ rights 
guaranteed by Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention 
originates in the failure of the Slovenian legislative and 
administrative authorities" (para 402 Chamber Judgment) the erased
Manushaqe Puto and others v. 
Albania
31/07/2012 16/11/2006 not clear 5 years, 8 months / number not indicated 
violations despite previous cases + worry concerning the 
high number of potential incoming cases => threat to 
Convention machinery + number of pending cases + 
statistiscs provided by the Gov't / 
Glykantzi v. Greece
30/10/2012 9/07/2009 2/12/2010 3 years, 2 months 300+ 250+
the case concerns excessive lenght of proceedings, which 
has been the subject of other pilots (against other 
countries f.i. Scordino, Burdov and Lukenda), therefore 
the Court finds it appropriate to apply the PJP here as 
well (para 67) + resolution of CoM concerning large 
number of similar cases against Greece + already a 
previous pilot case 
no identifiable 
class of citizens





3 years, 5 months-2 
years, 6 months / "several hundred"
statistics +  the terms of the declaration of a national state 
of emergency issued by the italian Prime minister in 2010 
+ the number of potential affected persons + the need to 
offer urgent redress at the national level. prisoners 
M.C. and others v. Italy
3/09/2013 29/11/2010  10/06/2011 2 years, 10 months /
approximately 50, each 
representing groups of 
applicants => total of "un 
millier de requérants"
"des milliers de personnes ont introduit des recours 
internes" + the practice affects or is able to affect in the 










2 years, 11 months - 
9 years 150 600
differentiated sample of applications was joined in this 
pilot => shows that the underlying problems are 
widespread and the need for effective solutions urgent 
(para 213) + blatant refusal of the state to enforce court 
decisions+ the nature of the underlying problems, the 
number of persons affected and the urent need to grant 




utiliy services by 
court decision 
Alisic and others v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, 
Slovenia and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia
16/07/2014 (GC)  
6/11/2012(Ch) 30/07/2005 not clear 9 years / 
1650+, introduced on behalf of 
8000+ applicants. / 
holders of old 
currency savings 




name of the case 
date of the case date of application date of decision PJP
total length of 
proceedings 
number of similar cases 
already resolved number of pending cases other reasons for PJP
identifiable 
group





2 years, 1 month - 4 
years, 7 months 25+ 
almost 40 prima facie 
meritorious applications 
underlying facts in all decided cases were similar + 
widespread problem resulting from malfunctioning of the 
Bulgarian penitentiary system can be seen from the 
Committee of Minister's decisions concerning the 
enforcement of the previous decision + problem had 
affected and remains capable of affecting in the future 
large numbers of people + although the Government 
didn't recognize the structural nature of the problem, it 
did concede that conditions in a number of facilities were 
deficient (but working on it). The penitentiary authority 
of Bulgaria however accepted that the penitentiary 
system was justifiably being critized on a number of 
points + CPT report + annual report of the Bulgaria 
Ombudsman + report by Bulgarian Helsinki Committee + 
2014 McManus Report + statistical date of the government 
+ "potential inflow of future cases" + fact that the 
problem has persisted for many years detainees
Varga and others v. Hungary
10/03/2015
six applications 
between March and 
October 2013 23/09/2014
2 years - 1 year and 
5 months 4 450
"recurrent and persistent nature of the proble + large 
number of people affected or capable of affecting + 
urgent need to grant them speedy and appropriate 
redress" detainees









4 years, 8 months - 
4 years 280
at least 100 per year since 
2004;  650 pending Polish 
cases involving a similar 
complaint 
300 cases still pending before the Committee of Ministers 
+ huge inflow of cases in the national courts / 
Gazso v. Hungary
16/07/2015 24/07/2012 13/11/2014 3 years 200 400
"in line with its approach in ümmühan Kaplan v Turkey: 
recurrent and persistent nature of the underlying 
problems, the number of people affected by them and 
the need to grant them speedy and appropriate redress" + 
problems have persisted in the four years that have 
elapsed since the reforms mentioned by the government /
W.D. v. Belgium
6/09/2016 28/10/2013 not clear 2 years, 11 months / 50 (constantly increasing) 
pilot follows a number of principled judgments on the 
same issue+ structural nature of the issue is not denied by 
the Government + standard phrasing: "eu égard au 
nombre de personnes potentiellement concernées en 
belgique et aux arrêts de violation auxquels les requêtes 
en question pourraient donner lieu" (para 166). 
detainees with 
mental disability 






4 years, 7 months - 
3 years, 6 months 150 3200
Already similar cases in 2007: to date 150 similar 
judgments had been rendered. The constant increase 
lead to a previous quasi-pilot (Iacov Stanciu v. Romania in 
2012). The problem was still not solved after this quasi 
pilot. detainees
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Annex 7  
VI-D DETAILED OVERVIEW OF FULL PILOT CASES - FOCUS ON THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE APPLICANTS (JUNE 2004 - JUNE 2017) 
 
name of the case date of the case lawyers ngo involvement third party interventions vulnerable applicants legal aid involvement convention right
Broniowski v. poland 
22/06/2004
Mr. Z. Cichón (cracow); Mr. W. 
Hermelinski (Warsaw) 
no no no yes
article 1 protocol 1 - right to 
property 
Hutten-Czapska v. Poland 19/06/2006 Mr. B Sochanski (Szczecin) no no no no
article 1 Prot. 1 - right to 
property 
Kovacic and others v. Slovenia 3/10/2008 Mr. M. Zugic and Mr . Z. Nogolica no
Croatian government based on 
right to intervene (art. 36§1 ECHR; 
Rule 44§1(b)). / no
article 1 Prot. 1 - right to 
property 
Burdov v. Russia (no. 2) 15/01/2009
Mr N.A. Kravtsov (in the original case; no 
mention in the no. 2 case) no no
yes para 133 (part of the victims 
pool) yes
article 6 - right to a fair trial / 
article 1 Prot. 1 - right to 
property / article 13 - right to 
Olaru and others v. Moldova 28/07/2009
Mr A Tanase, Mr F. Nagacevschi, Ms. J 
Hanganu and Mr. A Bizgu (Chisinau). no no no
a icle 1 Prot. 1
Property / article 6 - right to a 
fair trialYuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. 
Ukraine 15/10/2009 I. Pogasiy (Kirovograd) no no no
article 6 - right to fair trial / 
article 13 - right to an 
effective remedy / article 1 
Suljagic v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 3/11/2009 no mention no
Association for the Protection of 
Foreign-Currency Savers in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina; the Association 
for the Return of Foreign-Currency 
Savings in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Diasproa
art. 1 Prot. 1 - right to property 
Rumpf v. Germany 2/09/2010 Mr. S. Schill (Wetzlar) no no yes
art. 6 - right to fair hearing 
within reasonable time / art. 
13 - right to an effective 
remedy
Maria Atanasiu and others v. 
Romania 12/10/2010
Mr C-L Popescu, Mr. C-R Popescu, Ms R-A 
Niculescu-Gorpin and Ms M Niculescu-
Gorpin (Bucharest) no
Asociaţia pentru Proprietatea 
Privată and ResRo 
Interessenvertretung Restitution in 
Rumänien no
article 6 - right to a fair trial / 
article 1 Prot. 1 - right to 
property 
Greens and M.T. v UK 23/11/2010
Mr. T Kelly (Coatbridge) (of Taylor & Kelly - 
law firm specialized in HR)
no/specialized law firm 
(Taylor & Kelly) 
Equality and Human Rights 
Commission no no
article 3 Prot 1 - right to free 
elections / article 13 - right to 
effective remedy
Vasilios Athanasiou and others 
v. Greece 21/12/2010 Mr. N Anagnostopoulos and A. Psyha ? no no
art. 6 - right to a fair trial / art. 
13 - right to an effective 
remedy
Finger v. Bulgaria 10/05/2011
Mr. M. Ekimdzhiev and Ms G. 
Chernicherska (Plovdiv) ? no no
article 6 - right to a fair trial / 
article 13 - right to an 
Dimitrov and Hamanov v. 
Bulgaria 10/05/2011
A. Atanasov (Plovdiv) and Mr. Ekimdzhiev 
and Ms. K Boncheva (Plovdiv) ? no no
article 6 - right to a fair trial / 
article 13 - right to an 
effective remedy




name of the case date of the case lawyers ngo involvement third party interventions vulnerable applicants legal aid involvement convention right
Ananyev and others v. russia 10/01/2012
Mr. O Preobrazhenskaya (legal specialist 
resident in strasbourg!); Mr. A Anokhin 
(astrakhan). 
Oksana Probrazhenskaya: 
director of the Centre for 
International Protection 
(Russian branch of 
International Commission of 
Jurists); it's something 
between an NGO and a 
specialized law firm. no no no
article 3 - prohibition of 
inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment / 
article 13 - right to an 
effective remedy
Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey 20/03/2012 Ms G. Kiratli (Ankara) no no no
article 6 - right to fair trial / 
article 13 - right to an 
effective remedy
Michelioudakis v. Greece 3/04/2012 Ms. V Chirdaris no no no no
article 6 and article 13 - 
excessive length of 
proceedings 
Kuric and others v. Slovenia 26/06/2012
Mr A.G. Lana and Mr. A Saccucci (Rome) 
and Ms A Ballerini and Ms. M Vano 
(genoa) 










Serbian government; Equal Rights 
Trust; Open Society Justice 
Initiative; the Peace Institute - 
Institute for Contemporary Social 
and Political Studies; and the Legal 
Information Centre of Non-
Governmental Organisations. In GC 
case: UNHCR and Open Society 
Justice Initiative. 
yes ( the 'erased' - aka 
statelessness - para 412 of GC 
judgment). no
article 8 - respect for private 
and family life / article 13 - 
right to an effective remedy / 
article 14 - prohibition of 
discrimination
Manushaqe Puto and others v. 
Albania 31/07/2012 Mr. S Puto and Mr. A Tartari (Tirana) no no no
article 13 - right to an 
effective remedy / article 6 - 
right to a fair trial / article 1 
Prot. 1 - right to property 
Glykantzi v. Greece 30/10/2012 Ms. L. Panousis and Ms. A Panousi no no no
article 6 - right to a fair trial / 
article 1 Prot. 1 - right to 
property / article 13 - right to 
an effective remedy
Torregiani and others v. Italy 8/01/2013
Ms. F. Urciuoli, Ms P. Rodi, Mr. Giuseppe 
Rossodivita no no
in general "dans certains cas" for 
prisoners: vulnerability para. 65; 
vulnerability of persons under 
control of the state para 72 no
article 3 - prohibition of 
inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment / 
article 13 - right to an 
effective remedy
M.C. and others v. Italy 3/09/2013
M. Dragone and C. Defilippi (Mestre and 
Milan) no no no no
article 6 - right to a fair trial / 
article 1 Prot. 1 - right to 
property / article 14 - 
prohibition of discrimination




name of the case date of the case lawyers ngo involvement third party interventions vulnerable applicants legal aid involvement convention right
Gerasimov and others v. Russia 1/07/2014 E. Mezak (Syktyvkar), A. Vologin (Volsk) no no no
article 6 - right to a fair trial / 
article 13 - right to an 
effective remedy / article 1 
Prot. 1 - right to property
Alisic and others v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, 
Slovenia and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 16/07/2014 (GC) B. Mujcin, Mr. E. Eser, Mr. A Mustafic no no no
article 1 Prot. 1 - right to 
property / article 13 - right to 
an effective remedy
Neshkov and others v. Bulgaria 27/01/2015
only one applicant was represented, by 
Ms. D Fartunova
lawyer working with 
Bulgarian Helsinki Committee
Bulgarian Lawyers for Human 
Rights and Bulgarian Helsinki 
Committee
Mr. Zlatev, one of the applicants 
and still in the penitentiary 
facilities, was "particularly 
vulnerable" which warranted 
specific individual measures, 
para. 292 +302. no
article 3 - prohibition of 
inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment / 
article 13 - right to an 
effective remedy
Varga and others v. Hungary 10/03/2015
T. Fazekas, D. Karsai, A Cech, A 
nemesszeghy and G. Magyar (Budapest) 
and Mr. Kovacs (Szeged). no no no no
art 3 - prohibition of 
inhumand and degrading 
treatment / art. 13 - right to an 
effective remedy
Rutkowski and others v. 
Poland 7/07/2015
Mr. A Bodnar and Ms. I Pacho; Mr. M. 
Kowalczyck; Ms. A Dawidowska
first two lawyers working for 
the Helsinki Foundation for 
Human Rights no no no
article 6 - right to a hearing 
within a reasonable time / 
article 13 - right to an 
effective remedy
Gazso v. Hungary 16/07/2015 D. Karsai (Budapest) no no no
article 6 - right to a fair trial / 
article 13 - right to an 
effective remedy
W.D. v. Belgium 6/09/2016 P. Verpoorten (Herentals) no no
yes (as a mentally ill person, para 
106). no
article 3 - prohibition of 
inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment 
/article 5 - right to liberty and 
security and habeas corpus / 
article 13 - right to an 
effective remedy
Rezmives and others v. 
Romania 25/04/2017
first applicant by M.C. Boncea (Bucarest), 
third applicant by N.T. Popescu (Bucarest). 
Second and fourth applicant represented 
themselves. no no
yes, in general as for all 
detainees (para 72). no
article 3 - prohibition of 
inhuman or degrading 
treatment. 
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Annex 8  
VI-E OVERVIEW OF QUASI-PILOT CASES (2004 - 2017) 1032 
 
                                                 
 
1032 It must however be emphasized that these charts are not exhaustive. It is possible that there are other cases which the Court internally regards as quasi-pilot case while they are not identifiable 
as such in the case law.  
name of the case 
date of the case 
issue convention rights reason for systemic
representation for 
the applicant ngo involvement third party interventions vulnerable applicants 
Lukenda v Slovenia 
6/10/2005 excessive length of proceedings + no 
effective remedy article 6 + article 13
persistent backlog in 
slovenian courts + 500 
pending similar cases Verstovšek lawyers no no
Sejdovic v Italy 
01/03/2006 (GC)
convictions in absentia without 
opportunity to present a defence article 6 
Chamber: malfunctioning of 
domestic legislation + lack of 
an effective mechanism; 
Grand Chamber: waiting for 
the domestic application of a 
new law. 
Mr B. Bartholdy, a 
lawyer practising in 
Westerstede 
(Germany) no Slovakian government 
Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) 
29/03/2006 (GC) 
length and unfairness of proceedings + 
interference with peaceful enjoyment of 
property
article 6 + article 1 
Protocol 1
malfunctioning of domestic 
legislation as to right to 
property; as to excessive 
lenghth of proceedingsl 
hundreds of similar cases 
currently pending Mr N. Paoletti, no
Polish, Czech and Slovakian 
Governments
Ramadhi and others v. Albania
13/11/2007
non-enforcement of domestic decisions 
that awarded compensation for land 
acquisition
article 1 Prot. 1 + 
art. 6 + art. 13 
already dozens of identical 
applications before the Court; 
legal vacuums detected in 
this case may give rise to 
other applications  O. Muçollari no no
Driza v. Albania
13/11/2007
non-enforcement of domestic decisions 
that awarded compensation for land 
acquisition art. 6 + art. 13
already dozens of identical 
applications before the Court; 
legal vacuums detected in 
this case may give rise to 
other applications  A. Driza-Maurer no no
Kauczor v. Poland 
3/02/2009
pre-trial detention exceeding 
reasonable time + unreasonable length 
of criminal proceedings article 5 + aticle 6
already considerable amount 
of similar cases decided Mr I. Płaza no no




name of the case 
date of the case 
issue convention rights reason for systemic
representation for 
the applicant ngo involvement third party interventions vulnerable applicants 
Orchowksi v. Poland 
22/10/2009 inhuman and  degrading detention 
conditions + overcrowding in 
contravention to right to physical 
integrity article 3 + article 8
160 applications concerning 
overcrowding currently 
pending + structural nature of 
problem was acknowledged 
by Constitutional Court + 
statistical data Ms K. Burska no no
para 120 + 151: in general 
"prisoners are in a vulnerable 
position". 
M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece
21/01/2011 (GC)
expulsion from Belgium to Greece, 
following EU Dublin II regulations, in 
contravention to right to life and right to 
freedom from torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment + complaint that he 
had been subject to such ill-treatment in 
Greece 
Article 2 + article 3 + 
article 13
para 401: implicitly. Living 
conditions of asylum-seekers 
in Greece + prolonged period 
of uncertainty and lack of 
prospect for improvement => 
article 3 violation + 
shortcomings in the asylum 
procedure and risk of 
refoulement => article 3 
juncto 13. 
Mr. Z. Chihaoui 
(founder of 
specialized HR law 
firm - de facto 
strategic litigation). specialized law firm 
the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom Governments, 
the Centre for Advice on 
Individual Rights in Europe 
(the AIRE Centre), Amnesty 
International, the Council of 
Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights, the Office of 
the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and the Greek 
Helsinki Monitor. The 
Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom Governments, the 
Commissioner and the UNHCR 
were also authorised to take 
part in the oral proceedings. 
yes! Applicant was particularly 
vulnerable due to his status as 
an asylum-seeker because of 
everything he had been 
through during his migration 
and the traumatic experiences 
he was likely to have endured 
previously. (para 232.) ; 
asylum-seekers are a 
particularly underpriviliged 
and vulnerable group (para. 
251)
Mandic and Jovic v. Slovenia
20/10/2011
bad prison conditions and no effictive 
remedy
article 3 + article 8 + 
article 13. 
No structural problem!! 
overcrowding in Ljubljana 
prison over a number of 
years. However, the Court 
cannot conclude that there 
exists a structural problem 
consisting of “a practice that 
is incompatible with the 
Convention” nationwide. 
Odvetniška Družba 
Matoz O.P. D.O.O., 
a law firm 
practising in Koper no no
in general "prisoners are in a 
vulnerable position" (para 22). 
Strucl and others v. Slovenia
20/10/2011
bad prison conditions and no effictive 
remedy
article 3 + article 8 + 
article 13. 
No structural problem. 
Contrary to Mandic and Jovic: 
"The Court is aware that the 
solving of the overcrowding 
may necessitate the 
mobilisation of significant 
financial resources, in 
particular as the problem is 
not limited to Ljubljana 
prison, but exists, though to a 
lesser extent, in most of the 
closed prison facilities in the 
country." (para. 139). 
However, the Court still 
concludes that there is no 
structural problem (with the 
same exact sentence - para. 
140). 
Odvetniška Družba 
Matoz O.P. D.O.O., 
a law firm 
practising in Koper no no no




name of the case 
date of the case 
issue convention rights reason for systemic
representation for 
the applicant ngo involvement third party interventions vulnerable applicants 
Grudic v. Serbia
17/04/2012 applicants had not been paid their 
disability pensions for years article 1 Protocol 1 
large number of potential 
applicants + relevant laws 
have not been implemented R. Garibović no no no
Kaverzin v Ukraine 
15/05/2012
torture by police, lack of effective 
investigation, inadequate medical 
assistance an detention conditions article 3
structural problem with 
respect to lack of adequate 
medical facilities (para. 131); 
systemic issues of ill-
treatment by police and no 
effective remedy (40+ cases 
already decided + 100+ 
pending; para. 172); / no no
yes! Para 174: " criminal 
suspects appear to be one the 
most vulnerable group of 
victims of ill-treatment by the 
police"
Lindheim and others v. Norway
12/06/2012
under new legislation, lessess were 
entitled to demand an unlimited 
extension of rent contracts on the same 
conditions as applied previously article 1 Protocol 1 
the problem is in the law + 
reference to Hutten-Czapska 
v. Poland. 
S.O. Flaaten and G. 
Hika no no no
Iacov Stanciu v Romania
24/07/2012
detention conditions article 3
para 196: structural and 
recurrent problem of 
overcrowding and the 
resulting, inadequate 
conditions of detention 
Ms Mihaela Ghirca 
and Mr Bogdan 
Dragoş (legal aid). no
Association for the Defence of 
Human Rights in Romania – the 
Helsinki Committee (APADOR-
CH)
para 166: prisoners in general 
in vulnerable position 
Aslakhanova v Russia
18/12/2012
disappearances in Grozny or the Grozny 
District in Chechnya on various dates 
between 2002 and 2004 and no effective 
investigations
Article 2 + article 3 + 
article 5 + article 13
very elaborate! Para 216 and 
onwards. More than 120 
similar judgments already (on 
the combination of 2, 3, 5 and 
13) + 100+ pending => 
systemic problems at the 
national level that affect core 
human rights. 
lawyers of the NGO 
Stichting
Russian Justice 
Initiative (SRJI) (in 
partnership with 
the NGO Astreya) 
and
Mr D. Itslayev
yes! Stichting Russian Justice 
Initiative and Astreya no No
Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine
9/01/2013 dismissal from post of judge at Supreme 
Court article 6
para 199: serious systemic 
issues as to the functioning of 
the Ukrainian judiciary 
Mr P. Leach and Ms 
J. Gordon, lawyers 
of EHRAC yes! EHRAC no no
Vlad and others v. Romania
26/11/2013
length of proceedings and no effective 
remedy in that regard article 6 + article 13
para 154 and onwards: already 
200 similar cases decided and 
500+ currently pending. 
Mr Bogdan Dorin 
Duda no no no
Bittó and others v. Slovakia
8/01/2014
rent control rules
article 1 para 1, both 
separate and j° 
article 14
para 133 and onwards: "a 
situation" (implied systemic) 
+ 13 applications pending 
involving 170 persons 
Mr J. Brichta, a 
lawyer practising in 
Bratislava, and Mr 
M. Siman of EL 
Partners s.r.o no no no
Grande Stevens and others v. Italy
4/03/2014
unfair proceedings, not before an 
independent and impartial tribunal, no 
peaceful enjoyment of possession, 
violation of ne bis in idem
article 6 + article 1 
Protocol 1 + article 4 
Protocol 7 no
Mr A. Bozzo and Mr 
G. Bozzi, Mr. N. Irti no no no




name of the case 
date of the case 
issue convention rights reason for systemic
representation for 
the applicant ngo involvement third party interventions vulnerable applicants 
Harakchiev and Tolumov v. Bulgaria 
8/07/2014
sub-standard detention conditions article 3 + article 13 
the problem is in the law + 
has given rise to similar 
applicants
Mr M. Ekimdzhiev 
and Ms S. 
Stefanova no no no
Mansur Yalçin v. Turkey
16/09/2014
compulsory religious culture and ethics 
classes taught in primary and secundary 
schools infringed on right to education article 2 Protocol 1
the education system does 
not provide the possibility at 
all for the parents' conviction 
s to be respected. 
Mr N. Sofuoğlu and 
Mr S. Topçu no no no
S.Z. v. Bulgaria 3/03/2015
Undue delays in criminal proceedings 
and failure properly to investigate rape 
and assault allegations article 3 
the Court saw a number of 
similar cases and called this a 
recurrent problem. 
Y. Grozev et N. 
Dobreva no no
yes, as a victim of human 
trafficking and forced 
prostitution
Novruk and others v Russia
15/03/2016
 applicants alleged that they were 
victims of discrimination on account of 
their health status (HIV) in the 
determination of their applications for
residence permits article 8 j° article 14
extensive explanation (paras 
131 and onwards)!! It is a 
structural issue, but national 
legislation under way. If this 
is not enough, the court will  





associated to NGO 











represented by D. 
Bartenev, 
renowned human 
rights lawyer and 
director of a 







yes (people with HIV are a 
vulnerable group) para 100
Zherebin v Russia 
24/03/2016
lenghty pre-trial detention without 
sufficient reasons article 5
para 78: systemic problem 
"originated in a widespread 
problem resulting from a 
malfunctioning of the Russian 
criminal justice system which 
has affected, and may still 
affect in the future, a 
considerable number of 
persons charged in criminal 
proceedings". However, no 
explanation as to why the 
court didn't apply the PJP. Mr D. Agranovskiy ? no no
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Annex 9  
VI-F OVERVIEW OF CASES MENTIONING A SYSTEMIC ISSUE WITHOUT A PROCEDURAL CONSEQUENCE1033 
 
name of the case date of the case issue convention right reason for systemic 
representation for 








conditions, lack of 
adequate medical 
aid and breach of 
right to liberty article 3 + article 5
!! Was not marked by the Court as being systemic. 
However, in his dissent, Judge Pavlovschi, the 
Moldovan judge(!!), expresses his regret that the 
judgment does not stress the systemic problem of 
'tactit prolongation' of pre-trial detention, based on 
the Moldovan legislation. 
Mr Sergiu Gogu, a 
lawyer practising in 
Chişinău and a 
member of the non-
governmental 
organisation 




failure to protect 
life and health in 
prison article 2
para 54: structural problem of inadequate monitoring 
and treatment of prisoners suffering from serious 
contagious diseases, such as tuberculosis (at the 
material time)
Mr Zaza Khatiashvili 
and Mr Ioseb 
Khatiashvili (human 
rights lawyers but 
not explicitly 
afficiliated to an 
organisation - Mr. 
Khatiashvili is the 
head of the 
Georgian Bar 
Association) ? no
yes, in general: 
persons in custody 
are in a vulnerable 
position (para 71)
Konstantin Markin v 
Russia 22/03/2012
 refusal to grant him 
parental leave 
because he 
belonged to the 
male seks article 8 j° article 14
yes (para 144), because applied to all servicemen in 
the army
Ms K. Moskalenko 
(human rights 
lawyer and 
member of the 
NGO Moscow 
Helsinki Group)jand 
Ms I. Gerasimova, 
lawyers practising 
in Moscow, and Ms 
N. Lisman, lawyer 




the Human Rights 
Centre of the 
University of Ghent yes (para 159)




                                                 
 
1033 It must be emphasized that these cases are rare and hard to find. The first case in this chart of Holomiov v. Moldova for instance did not mention in the judgment that the issue was systemic. 
The Moldovan judge in his dissent however clarified that it was. This chart is meant to give an indication as to the kinds of cases which are being treated completely as individual cases but 
involve systemic issues.  
name of the case date of the case issue convention right reason for systemic 
representation for 
the applicant ngo involvement 
third party 
intervention vulnerable applicant
Centro Europa 7 
S.R.L. and Di 
Stefano v. Italy 7/06/2012







infringed their right 
to freedom of 
expression, and 
especially their 
freedom to impart 
information and 
ideas.
article 10 + article 
14 + article 6 + 
article 1 Protocol 1 
+ 
structural nature was stressed by the third party (para 
128), however the court did not address it specifically 
Mr A. Pace, Mr R. 
Mastroianni, Mr O. 






 the absence of 
individual 
guarantees as to 
how asylum 
seekers would be 
taken charge of, in 
view of the 
systemic 
deficiencies in the 
reception 
arrangements for 
asylum seekers in 
Italy. article 3 + article 8
structural inadequacy of reception facilities for 
asylum-seekers in Italy was uttered by the applicants. 
The Court did not explicitely mention this was the 
case but uttered grave concerns as to the current 
capacities of the system. 
Ms Chloé Bregnard 
Ecoffey, acting on 
behalf of the Legal 
Aid Service for 
Exiles
the Legal Aid 
service for Exiles 
Observations were 






by the organisation 
Defence for 
Children, the 
Centre for Advice 
on Individual Rights 
in Europe (“the 
AIRE Centre”), the 
European Council 
on Refugees and 
Exiles (“ECRE”) and 
Amnesty 
International













name of the case date of the case issue convention right reason for systemic 
representation for 
the applicant ngo involvement 
third party 
intervention vulnerable applicant
Söro v. Estonia 3/09/2015
 the publication of 
information about 




violated his right to 
respect for his 
private life article 8 
in the separate opinions, the systemic impact of the 
judgment was uttered multiple times Ms M. Valge ? no no
Mursic v Croatia 20/10/2016




principally owing to 
a lack of personal 
space article 3 
structural problem of inadequate detention 
conditions was uttered by the applicant, however, 
the court found that " The present case does not raise 
a structural issue concerning the conditions of 
detention in Croatia." (para 143)




received from the 
Observatoire 
international des 
prisons – section 
française (OIP-SF), 
Ligue belge des 
droits de l’homme 
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Annex 10 – Rule 61 of the Rules of Court  
Rule 61 – Pilot judgment procedure1034  
1. The Court may initiate a pilot-judgment procedure and adopt a pilot judgment where 
the facts of 
an application reveal in the Contracting Party concerned the existence of a structural or systemic 
problem or other similar dysfunction which has given rise or may give rise to similar 
applications. 
2. (a) Before initiating a pilot-judgment procedure, the Court shall first seek the views of 
the parties 
on whether the application under examination results from the existence of such a problem or 
dysfunction in the Contracting Party concerned and on the suitability of processing the 
application in 
accordance with that procedure. 
(b) A pilot-judgment procedure may be initiated by the Court of its own motion or at 
the request of 
one or both parties. 
(c) Any application selected for pilot-judgment treatment shall be processed as a matter 
of priority 
in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. 
3.  The Court shall in its pilot judgment identify both the nature of the structural or 
systemic problem 
or other dysfunction as established as well as the type of remedial measures which the 
Contracting 
Party concerned is required to take at the domestic level by virtue of the operative provisions 
of the 
judgment. 
4.  The Court may direct in the operative provisions of the pilot judgment that the remedial 
measures referred to in paragraph 3 above be adopted within a specified time, bearing in mind 
the 
nature of the measures required and the speed with which the problem which it has identified 
can 
be remedied at the domestic level. 
                                                 
 
1034 Rule 61 of the Rules of Court, 14 November 2016.  
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5.  When adopting a pilot judgment, the Court may reserve the question of just satisfaction 
either in 
whole or in part pending the adoption by the respondent Contracting Party of the individual and 
general measures specified in the pilot judgment. 
6.  (a) As appropriate, the Court may adjourn the examination of all similar applications 
pending the 
adoption of the remedial measures required by virtue of the operative provisions of the pilot 
judgment. 
(b) The applicants concerned shall be informed in a suitable manner of the decision to 
adjourn. They 
shall be notified as appropriate of all relevant developments affecting their cases. 
(c) The Court may at any time examine an adjourned application where the interests of 
the proper 
administration of justice so require. 
7.  Where the parties to the pilot case reach a friendly-settlement agreement, such 
agreement shall 
comprise a declaration by the respondent Contracting Party on the implementation of the 
general 
measures identified in the pilot judgment as well as the redress to be afforded to other actual or 
potential applicants. 
8.  Subject to any decision to the contrary, in the event of the failure of the Contracting 
Party 
concerned to comply with the operative provisions of a pilot judgment, the Court shall resume 
its 
examination of the applications which have been adjourned in accordance with paragraph 6 
above. 
9. The Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the 
Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe, and the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 
shall be 
informed of the adoption of a pilot judgment as well as of any other judgment in which the 
Court 
draws attention to the existence of a structural or systemic problem in a Contracting Party. 
10.  Information about the initiation of pilot-judgment procedures, the adoption of pilot 
judgments 
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and their execution as well as the closure of such procedures shall be published on the Court’s 
website. 
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